



More than thirty years after the fall of the Pol Pot regime, a UN- backed tri-
bunal, fusing Cambodian and international law, procedure, and personnel, was 
established to try key Khmer Rouge officials for atrocities committed in the late 
1970s. In this definitive scholarly treatment of the “Extraordinary Chambers in 
the Courts of Cambodia” (ECCC) from legal and political perspectives, John D. 
Ciorciari and Anne Heindel examine the ECCC’s institutional features, com-
pare it to other hybrid and international criminal courts, evaluate its operations, 
and draw lessons for the future.
Ciorciari and Heindel begin by discussing the political factors and historical 
contingencies that led the United Nations and Cambodian Government to cre-
ate a hybrid tribunal with a number of unique features. Next, they examine the 
tribunal’s operations to date, focusing on how its institutional form has affected 
its various intended functions. They argue that many aspects of the ECCC’s 
judicial proceedings have been broadly consistent with international standards 
and that the Court’s in- country location has provided important benefits in 
terms of public outreach and victim participation. Nevertheless, the authors 
demonstrate that the ECCC’s complex, divided institutional structure and 
wrangling between national and international actors have slowed the proceed-
ings, contributed to administrative irregularities, led to due process concerns, 
and jeopardized the Court’s public legitimacy and ability to leave a legacy of 
credible justice. Ciorciari and Heindel argue that the ECCC’s experiences reveal 
many of the challenges of managing a mass crimes process, especially in the con-
text of a hybrid court. They conclude with recommendations on measures that 
can be taken to meet some of those challenges going forward.
John D. Ciorciari is an assistant professor at the Gerald R. Ford School of 
Public Policy at the University of Michigan.
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Justice is notoriously elusive in the aftermath of mass atrocities. In Cambodia, 
more than three decades after the demise of the Pol Pot regime, many survivors 
still seek some form of legal accountability. Almost all seek a better understand-
ing of the tragedy that befell them and the healing that may come from a process 
that acknowledges, dignifies, and in some measure responds to their suffering. 
Many international actors, too, have engaged in the quest for justice, cognizant 
of the lingering stain of Khmer Rouge impunity on efforts to strengthen global 
accountability norms and promote the rule of law. This book emerges from our 
own efforts to advance law and meaning in the shadow of Khmer Rouge violence.
We focus on the most prominent official undertaking to address the Khmer 
Rouge legacy— the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia 
(ECCC)— a hybrid judicial institution managed by the Cambodian Govern-
ment and United Nations and tasked with putting former Khmer Rouge of-
ficials on trial. We endeavor to shed light on specific institutional features and 
practices that boost or inhibit a tribunal’s capacity to meet its many, and some-
times conflicting, mandates. As in other societies coping with violent pasts, tri-
als are not the only ways to meet survivors’ needs or strengthen the law, but the 
ECCC is an integral part of Cambodia’s engagement with its troubled past. It 
also holds important lessons for other societies that prosecute mass crimes as 
part of broader transitional justice processes.
Conducting a detailed analysis of the ECCC would not have been possible 
without many helping hands. A number of current and former officials from 
the ECCC, United Nations, Cambodian Government, and other key states and 
non- governmental groups took time out of busy schedules to help us navigate 
this complex hybrid institution and the politics surrounding it. These include 
Anees Ahmed, Kris Baleva, Mychelle Balthazard, Andrew Cayley, Hans Corell, 
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Every year, the monsoon rains come to Cambodia. The Mekong floods, and 
the country’s lowland plains become glassy lakes punctuated by palm trees and 
stilted wooden homes. The tranquil water washes the earth and furnishes new 
life. When the floods recede, however, the land reveals that it still bears the scars 
of the country’s brutal past. Thousands of large pits are scattered across the 
landscape— reminders of bombardment during years of war and innumerable 
mass graves dug during the Pol Pot years. Scores of stupas and memorials serve 
as bandages that Cambodians have used to dress their wounds. Beside them, 
survivors can often be seen praying and leaving offerings for the departed. Like 
others who have suffered mass human rights abuses, Cambodians remain en-
gaged in a complex process to deal with past atrocities and make sense of their 
country’s troubled modern history.
No part of Cambodia’s past involved greater suffering than the Pol Pot era, 
when Cambodia descended from being a “sideshow” to the Vietnam War to the 
neglected site of some of history’s most appalling atrocities. That period began 
in April 1975, when communist Khmer Rouge guerrillas emerged victorious in 
a five- year civil war against the U.S.- backed military regime of General Lon 
Nol. On April 17, Khmer Rouge fighters streamed into Phnom Penh. Most were 
young peasants, carrying AK- 47s on their shoulders and dressed in simple black 
cotton uniforms, traditional checkered headscarves known as krama, and black 
rubber sandals made from old tires. A beleaguered city, swollen with refugees, 
greeted their arrival with a sigh of relief and hope that their triumph would 
bring peace.1 Those hopes faded quickly. Within hours, the young guerrillas be-
gan rounding up and executing Lon Nol officials and other suspected enemies 
of the revolution. They also began evacuating the city, forcing people of all ages 
onto dusty roads with little knowledge of their destinations.2
Khmer Rouge leaders thus began a radical and ruthless program for social 
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transformation. Their ideological impetus, which one scholar has described as 
“hyperMaoism,”3 was to create a self- sufficient agrarian state immune to un-
wanted foreign influence. The Khmers Rouges emptied the cities so that “new 
people”— such as urban merchants and bourgeois intellectuals— would be dis-
persed among the “base people” already working in rural cooperatives.4 Monks 
and other religious leaders were defrocked, currency was abolished, and families 
were forcibly separated to weaken traditional social bonds and replace them 
with loyalty to Angkar, the faceless revolutionary “Organization” only later re-
vealed to comprise the top leadership of the Communist Party of Kampuchea 
(CPK).
The Standing Committee of the CPK’s Central Committee, the “highest 
leading body” of the renamed state of Democratic Kampuchea,5 built a nation-
wide bureaucratic and security apparatus on foundations of party allegiance 
and fear. One of its chief aims was to “sweep clean” the state by “smashing” and 
“screening out” the “enemies” of the revolution and other “no- good elements.”6 
Angkar was said to have “eyes like a pineapple” on constant vigil, as Khmer 
Rouge cadres— often victims themselves, with guns rather than pencils thrust 
into their hands as children— detained, tortured, and killed suspected “enemies,” 
sometimes in public view to set an example and often for offenses as minor as 
stealing small portions of food to feed their families.7 Schools and other build-
ings were converted into makeshift prisons, where many suspects were subject-
ed to primitive torture devices before being dispatched to their deaths, often by 
bludgeoning to save precious bullets.8
When radical Khmer Rouge economic and social policies failed to deliv-
er a “Super Great Leap Forward,”9 countless others died of hunger or disease. 
Between April 1975 and January 1979, an estimated 1.5 to 2 million people— 
roughly a quarter of the country’s population— perished under CPK rule.10 For 
survivors, Democratic Kampuchea lingers in their memories as “hell on earth,” 
a “prison without walls”11 in which people of all ages toiled endlessly in poorly 
managed factories or fields, parroted lifeless revolutionary slogans, and hoped 
that they and their families would not be the next to be summoned before ju-
venile cadres to face charges that so often swiftly turned to death. Personal ac-
counts provide windows into survivors’ immense individual suffering as they 
mourn the loss of loved ones, search for understanding, and grasp for justice 
and a sense of healing.12
Dealing with atrocities like those committed in Democratic Kampuchea 
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raises difficult questions. What exactly happened? Who is most to blame? How 
can victims achieve some form of redress? How can a society heal social divi-
sions, build a rule of law, and lessen the likelihood of future abuses? All of these 
questions have been asked in Cambodia, and none has been easy to answer. The 
opacity of the Pol Pot regime has left survivors scouring for information about 
why the Khmers Rouges killed and what became of many victims whose fami-
lies still do not know their fate. Apportioning blame has been difficult in a state 
where Khmer Rouge veterans— and the foreign powers that contributed to the 
rise and rule of the CPK— remain influential. The sheer scale of the violence 
has been a daunting impediment to redressing victims for their losses. Promot-
ing social reconciliation and the rule of law have been generational challenges.
Societies emerging from mass terror have implemented a variety of tran-
sitional justice mechanisms to pursue truth, accountability, reconciliation, and 
other aims. These include truth commissions, lustration schemes, amnesty pro-
grams, and criminal trials. None is a silver bullet. The legal and institutional 
arrangements conducive to promoting some desired ends do not always advance 
other objectives, and choices need to be made. Addressing mass atrocities thus 
presents both moral imperatives and confounding policy challenges. To make 
good on the former requires wrestling with the difficulties of the latter.
Cambodia’s path to historical truth, justice, and reconciliation has been 
marred by inadequate and inconsistent official efforts to deal with the Khmer 
Rouge legacy. A spate of hasty domestic criminal trials followed the overthrow 
of the Pol Pot regime by Vietnam- backed forces but had little effect on Khmer 
Rouge leaders, who retreated to the jungle and led a protracted insurgency with 
foreign support. Selected amnesty programs coaxed some Khmers Rouges away 
from the insurgency but were not accompanied by an official truth commission 
process. While ordinary Cambodians and non- governmental groups worked 
to promote grassroots- level reconciliation, that process was frustrated by the 
lingering impunity of top Khmer Rouge leaders and lack of a credible official 
accounting of the atrocities of the Pol Pot era.13
Roughly two decades after the demise of Democratic Kampuchea, the Cam-
bodian Government, United Nations, and key UN member states began to fo-
cus more seriously on the issue of Khmer Rouge accountability. Although they 
could have pursued a number of institutional mechanisms, they chose to make a 
criminal tribunal the centerpiece of transitional justice efforts in the country. To 
that end, they created a novel judicial body, the Extraordinary Chambers in the 
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Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), which opened its doors on the western outskirts 
of Phnom Penh in 2006. The ECCC is a “hybrid” tribunal that fuses local and 
international laws, procedures, and personnel.
Like other mass crimes courts, the ECCC was created primarily to deliver 
justice and secondarily to advance other aspects of social healing and develop-
ment. Its principal mandate is to try “senior leaders” of the Pol Pot regime and 
others deemed “most responsible” for crimes committed under CPK rule.14 More 
than three decades after the Khmer Rouge tragedy, only a few senior Khmer 
Rouge figures survive. The ECCC will likely be the last officially sanctioned 
opportunity to seek a measure of justice and pronouncement of legal truth on 
the inner workings of the Pol Pot regime. It also provides an opportunity to 
empower survivors through speech acts, facilitate discussion of a subject that 
has often been taboo in Cambodian society, and promote more far- reaching 
objectives such as reconciliation and the rule of law.
Satisfying such lofty goals is difficult for any court of law. Criminal trials 
are not designed to carry out all— or even most— of the functions needed to 
address past atrocities. Yet tribunals are often part of the societal response, and 
when they function well, they can play crucial roles within broader transitional 
justice processes. When they fail, they can dash hopes and consume resources 
that would better have been expended on other measures. This book examines 
how the ECCC’s unique structural features and the agency of key official actors 
have affected its capacity to deliver credible jurisprudence, administer complex 
proceedings, provide meaningful engagement for survivors, and leave a positive 
societal legacy.
We argue that the ECCC’s experience shows some advantages of incorpo-
rating local legal principles and personnel but reveals even more strikingly the 
risks of operating a mixed court. Our title— Hybrid Justice— evokes the awk-
wardness of an accountability process based on fusing national and interna-
tional laws, procedures, personnel, and political interests. The ECCC shows 
how susceptible mass crimes courts are to legal confusion, procedural delay, and 
financial and administrative impasses when authority and responsibility are di-
vided. It also shows the danger of creating a court with inadequate institutional 
safeguards against administrative malfeasance and political interference, espe-
cially when the host government has a weak track record of judicial integrity 
and independence. Agency clearly matters, but a court’s structural design can 
make its functional success much more or less likely.
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The goals of our analysis are twofold. First, we aim to contribute to a bet-
ter understanding of the transitional justice process in Cambodia by providing 
a detailed account of why the ECCC was endowed with unique institutional 
features and how the Court has advanced, or sometimes failed to advance, its 
stated objectives. Second, by examining the Cambodian case in comparative 
perspective, we seek to shed light on the types of institutional features and per-
sonnel choices that help tribunals meet their mandates or impair their func-
tional effectiveness— lessons that can help guide the reform of existing courts 
and design of new ones.
A Unique Hybrid Court
The ECCC and other hybrid courts exist along a wider spectrum of criminal 
tribunals ranging from ordinary domestic courts to the three purely interna-
tional bodies now in operation— the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals 
for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda (ICTY and ICTR) and the Interna-
tional Criminal Court (ICC). Hybrid courts emerged in the late 1990s, largely 
in response to perceived problems with fully international tribunals. In 1993 
and 1994, the UN Security Council established the ICTY in The Hague and 
the ICTR in Arusha, Tanzania. Their creation was a watershed for interna-
tional criminal accountability, but it quickly became apparent that both tribu-
nals would consume much more time and money than originally foreseen, and 
“tribunal fatigue” spread among key UN donor states.15
Sovereignty was another major concern. To many critics— including the 
governments of powerful developing countries such as China and Brazil— the 
ICTY and ICTR were projections of Western power and set dangerous prece-
dents for justice meted out by the strong against the weak.16 The out- of- country 
locations of the ad hoc courts also made investigations more cumbersome, ar-
guably weakened deterrence, and reduced the tribunals’ contact with the gov-
ernment and survivor population, which limited opportunities for capacity- 
building and outreach and education programs.17 To critics, distant trials run 
by foreign powers lacked not only local ownership but also political legitimacy.18
Domestic proceedings were one possible alternative, but some national 
court systems lacked the capacity or credibility to manage complex criminal tri-
als. For example, a generation of conflict and foreign rule left East Timor with 
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fewer than 10 trained lawyers by the end of Indonesian occupation in 1999.19 In 
Cambodia, UN- appointed experts and officials deemed national courts unap-
pealing, both due to capacity constraints and because they were riddled with 
corruption and political interference.20
In theory, hybrid courts would deliver justice meeting international stan-
dards but at a lower cost, easing sovereignty concerns by operating with host 
government consent and enjoying the functional advantages of proximity to the 
locus delicti and aggrieved population.21 The greater ease of transporting inves-
tigators, evidence, and witnesses within the host country would save money, 
as would the lower cost of local operations and personnel.22 Local judges and 
lawyers would contribute linguistic skills and country knowledge to comple-
ment the legal expertise of their international counterparts.23 The late Antonio 
Cassese, who served first as ICTY president and later as president of the hybrid 
Special Tribunal for Lebanon, emphasized hybrid courts’ potential “spill- over 
effect” of training local legal personnel and ability to promote a “cathartic pro-
cess” by connecting with and educating the nearby survivor population.24
Hybrid courts also carry risks, however. Too much international control ex-
poses them to charges of imperialism, but too little subjects them to the vicissi-
tudes of local judicial systems and the risk that local actors would use the court 
to convict their enemies and defend their domestic allies.25 As scholar Suzannah 
Linton argues, the hybrid model was “a radical move away from the earlier pre-
vailing wisdom that the non- inclusion of nationals of the country most affected 
would preserve impartiality, objectivity and neutrality.”26 The danger of political 
interference from local executive authorities is clear.27 Where national authori-
ties engage in obstructive or dilatory tactics, hybrid tribunals generally lack the 
legal authority to compel state cooperation, precisely because they are created 
consensually rather than by binding resolutions of the UN Security Council— 
as in the case of the ICTY and ICTR.28 The mixed composition of courts also 
increases their complexity and poses administrative and operational challenges 
quite apart from political haggling.29
Funding and political commitment are further potential challenges. Unlike 
the ICTY and ICTR, which receive funds from the general UN budget, hybrid 
courts generally have relied on voluntary funding, leaving them vulnerable to 
financial gaps. To a significant degree, they took shape precisely because key 
donor states were unwilling to invest the financial and political capital needed to 
set up fully international courts.30 These risks explain why many human rights 
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advocates have been skeptical of mixed courts, and even some international law-
yers and officials instrumental in designing hybrid courts have not presented 
them as models that should be followed in the future.31
Cambodia was not the first site for a hybrid court. From 1996 to 2003, 
pursuant to the Dayton Peace Agreement, a hybrid Human Rights Chamber 
operated in Bosnia and Herzegovina, staffed with judges from the national sys-
tem and elsewhere in Europe.32 In East Timor, UN transitional administrators 
created hybrid “Special Panels for Serious Crimes” in the Dili District Court 
to deal with violence by Indonesian Special Forces and allied militias after the 
Timorese referendum for independence in 1999.33 They also created a Special 
Crimes Unit funded and staffed by the United Nations to investigate offenses.34 
In Kosovo, a proposal to establish a hybrid war crimes court was shelved due 
to cost considerations,35 but UN administrators did establish hybrid panels to 
hear cases involving interethnic strife and possible judicial bias.36
In both East Timor and Kosovo, hybrid courts were part of the domestic 
judicial system but had international majorities on the bench— a feature UN 
officials adopted in Kosovo after early judgments by majority- domestic courts 
suggested that only international majorities would ensure impartiality.37 In 
2002, the United Nations and Sierra Leonean government signed an agreement 
establishing the Special Court for Sierra Leone— which is based in Freetown 
and likewise featured a majority of foreign judges and key personnel— to hear 
criminal cases related to that country’s civil war.38 The ECCC was established 
the following year by a 2003 agreement between the United Nations and Cam-
bodia and subsequent 2004 domestic implementing law.
The ECCC identifies itself as part of the family of hybrid courts and asserts 
that hybridity has several advantages:
The hybrid tribunal model is seen as a way to provide full national involvement 
in the trials while at the same time ensuring that international standards are 
met. Unlike tribunals for Rwanda or the former Yugoslavia, these trials are not 
removed from the place where the crimes occurred. They are held in Cambodia, 
conducted mainly in Khmer, open to participation by Cambodian people and 
reported via local television, radio and newspapers.39
It is important not to treat all hybrid courts as products of the same template, 
however. Hybrid courts differ in crucial ways, and the ECCC is sui generis in 
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many respects. It has a strong domestic legal basis and civil law character and 
is the first mixed court with a majority of domestic judges. It is the only mass 
crimes court with national and international co- prosecutors and co- investigating 
judges, who share responsibility for the investigation. Judicial, defense, and ad-
ministrative roles are also divided between Cambodian and UN appointees, 
splitting the Court into two distinct “sides.” It is also the first to include victims 
in the proceedings as civil parties. These unique aspects of the ECCC proceed-
ings have had profound effects on its function.
Importance of the Cambodian Case
Understanding the ECCC’s institutional features and functions is important 
both for Cambodia scholars and for analysts of international criminal law and 
transitional justice. The Court represents the apex of Cambodia’s tormented ac-
countability process. Human rights activist Kek Galabru spoke for many when 
she said that the start of Khmer Rouge trials finally gave “hope for justice to 
victims, who have been waiting thirty years”40 to take a stand against Khmer 
Rouge impunity. The tribunal also has importance well beyond Cambodia’s 
borders. It represents what human rights lawyer James Goldston has called “an 
extraordinary experiment in transitional justice”41— the first hybrid tribunal in 
which the United Nations effectively took a back seat to a national judicial sys-
tem. Assessing the results of this and other novel, experimental aspects of the 
Court is imperative as lawyers and diplomats seek to reform the ICC, advise na-
tional governments on best practices for mass crimes trials, or create or modify 
hybrid tribunals.
A few hybrid courts have taken shape since the ECCC was established. In 
2005, the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina agreed with the internation-
al Office of the High Representative to create a mixed War Crimes Chamber 
as part of the national court system with authority to try cases for lower- to 
mid- level perpetrators referred to it by the ICTY.42 In 2009, the United Na-
tions and Lebanese government established a majority- international Special 
Tribunal for Lebanon to address the murder of Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri 
in 2005 and related crimes. In 2012, Senegal and the African Union agreed 
to create “Extraordinary African Chambers”43 to try former Chadian dicta-
tor Hissène Habré. Like the ECCC, Senegal’s extraordinary chambers exist 
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“within the existing Senegalese court system”44 and feature a majority of do-
mestic judges. Variants on the Cambodian model of a domestically led hybrid 
court may appeal to governments eager to retain political control while reap-
ing some of the financial, technical, and reputational benefits of international 
involvement. This book evaluates the extent to which that model has worked 
in Cambodia.
The ECCC has had some important successes. It conducted its first trial 
largely in line with international standards and issued the first credible con-
viction of a Khmer Rouge official for crimes of the Pol Pot era against Ka-
ing Guek Eav alias “Duch,” former head of the infamous CPK prison at Tuol 
Sleng, where thousands of prisoners were tortured and sent to their untimely 
deaths. The Court has featured a zealous prosecution and defense, extensive 
investigations of its first two cases, and numerous credible judicial rulings. It 
has also developed an innovative victim participation program, conducted local 
outreach programs, and maintained high public favorability ratings. Cambodia’s 
Deputy Prime Minister Sok An has trumpeted the ECCC experiment as a suc-
cess, saying in a 2010 speech before UN Secretary- General Ban Ki- moon that 
“[t]he ECCC is now internationally recognized as a good model not only for 
Cambodia, but also for internationally assisted courts that may be established 
in the future.”45
Many observers disagree, as the Court’s significant failings have been appar-
ent. It has become mired in controversies over corruption allegations, adminis-
trative mismanagement, and a nearly debilitating feud between key Cambodian 
and international personnel on the scope of prosecution. As scholar Duncan 
McCargo argues, these feuds have been “inextricably bound up in politics,” un-
dermining the credibility and integrity of the process.46 The ECCC has also 
proven slower and more costly than anticipated, leading to frequent funding 
shortfalls and a decision to truncate its most important case against a group of 
surviving senior Khmer Rouge leaders.
Brad Adams of Human Rights Watch, a strident critic of the tribunal, re-
ports widespread agreement in UN circles that the ECCC is “a mistake that 
should never be repeated elsewhere.”47 Scholar Peter Maguire argues that the 
United Nations entered a “Faustian” arrangement and should “relegate the 
‘mixed tribunal’ model to the dust bin of history.”48 Former UN Legal Counsel 
Hans Corell, who resisted Cambodian preponderance during the tribunal ne-
gotiations, said in 2012:
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I am sure that, today, even people without courtroom experience realize that 
the solution chosen for the ECCC should not be used as a model for any future 
effort of this nature. The UN hallmark should not be given to institutions over 
which the Organization does not have full administrative control.49
Many analysts have argued that operating as the junior partner to the Cambo-
dian Government exposes the United Nations to serious reputational risk.50 
Former ECCC official Craig Etcheson asserts that difficulties in the Khmer 
Rouge trials have made the Cambodian model “radioactive” to most of the rel-
evant officials in the UN Secretariat.51 To its many detractors, the ECCC is a 
black sheep within the family of UN- backed tribunals. We evaluate the extent 
to which that reputation is warranted.
An Outline of Our Argument
We argue that the ECCC is not a model to be followed and that the Court’s 
design flaws have added considerably to the challenge of delivering a credible 
and efficient accountability process, often undermining the best efforts of many 
of its staff. The Court’s key structural flaws lie more in its uniqueness than in 
its status as a hybrid institution. Given the state of Cambodia’s judiciary, the 
ECCC’s greatest built- in weakness is that the United Nations has too much 
involvement to escape responsibility for the Court but too little authority to 
run it. That has contributed to halfhearted UN ownership and relatively weak 
international responses to serious problems that have originated on the Cam-
bodian side. Weak oversight mechanisms also leave the UN side subject to inad-
equate scrutiny, while bifurcation between its national and international “sides” 
prevents decisive leadership, contributes to inefficiency, and facilitates politici-
zation of contentious issues. An awkward mix of civil and common law features 
only add to the confusion and challenge of running a fair and efficient process.
As we discuss in chapter 1, these flaws were readily apparent during the 
lengthy negotiations between UN and Cambodian officials. Most would have 
been difficult to avoid, however, due to Cambodia’s acute sovereignty concerns 
and the absence of international will or capacity to impose a different struc-
ture. The same political tensions and distrust that led to the ECCC’s divided 
structure have continued to stress the institution at its weak points throughout 
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the process. The ECCC’s challenges raise the obvious question of whether and 
when the United Nations should ever participate in hybrid arrangements with 
difficult domestic partners.
To help answer that question, we conduct a detailed analysis to identify 
which of the ECCC’s functional shortcomings result from idiosyncratic insti-
tutional features, which reflect more general problems with hybrid or interna-
tional courts, and which have little to do with institutional structure at all. Of 
course, a tribunal’s performance depends on which of many possible criteria are 
invoked to judge it. It is too early to discern the ECCC’s long- term effects on 
Cambodian reconciliation and the rule of law— and even what its ultimate ju-
dicial findings will be— but the first seven years of the tribunal’s operations en-
able us to evaluate several core functions that are part of the Court’s expressed 
mandate. In chapter 2, we discuss efforts to pair the two sides of the ECCC— 
managing complex investigations efficiently, filling lacunae in the 2003 UN- 
Cambodian agreement and 2004 domestic implementing law, and applying a 
mix of vastly different national and international laws and procedures.
Chapter 3 examines how the Court’s divided administration, funding, and 
oversight have affected its management of people and money. Critics of the 
ECCC’s structure feared that heavy Cambodian participation would be a recipe 
for bureaucratic ineptness and corruption. Both issues have surfaced, nearly 
knocking the Court off the rails before its first trial began, exposing serious 
flaws in its split structure and frail oversight mechanisms, and contributing to 
inefficiency and frequent funding shortfalls.
The ECCC’s legal proceedings also bear the imprint of the Court’s problem-
atic structure. Chapter 4 discusses “Case 001,” the trial of Duch. Case 001 was a 
relative success and ended in a conviction but was the ECCC’s easiest functional 
test, as it was based on abundant evidence and was relatively uncontroversial 
from a political standpoint. Chapter 5 turns to a tougher test— the Court’s more 
complex second trial involving four former Khmer Rouge leaders— Deputy 
Secretary of the Communist Party of Kampuchea Nuon Chea, Deputy Prime 
Minister Ieng Sary, Social Affairs Minister Ieng Thirith, and President of the 
State Presidium Khieu Samphan. The greater scope of alleged offenses and 
higher political stakes of “Case 002” strained the Court’s judicial and adminis-
trative capacity, delayed the proceedings, and resulted in an unprecedented split 
indictment. Ieng Thirith was severed from the case due to dementia, and Ieng 
Sary passed away in early 2013, leaving only two frail and elderly defendants on 
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trial. Even if Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan are convicted of some offenses, 
most of the alleged crimes of surviving Khmer Rouge leaders will go unpun-
ished, and the trial will deliver only a modest revelation of official truth.
An even more difficult institutional test for the ECCC has been to deal 
with further potential prosecutions— the subject of chapter 6. Since 2008, the 
Cambodian Government and Cambodian judges and staff have stonewalled 
attempts by the international co- prosecutor to try an additional five to six 
suspects. The highly politicized dispute has rocked the institution to its core, 
drained the tribunal of donor enthusiasm and public legitimacy, and shown the 
Achilles’ heel of the ECCC’s institutional structure— its acute vulnerability to 
political interference and paralysis.
The remaining chapters concentrate on some purported strengths of in- 
country hybrid courts: victim participation, outreach, and legacy. Chapter 7 ex-
amines the ECCC’s ambitious victim participation scheme allowing certain vic-
tims to join the trials as civil parties. Like the inclusion of investigating judges, 
the ECCC’s pathbreaking civil party scheme is drawn from the French civil law 
tradition, which has played a more prominent part in the Khmer Rouge tri-
als than any other internationalized mass crimes proceedings.52 The civil party 
scheme had some success in the Duch trial but proved difficult to implement in 
Case 002 given the vast number of Cambodian victims of the various crimes 
alleged.
Chapter 8 turns to outreach, which should be a relative strong suit of the 
ECCC due to the Court’s in- country location and access to relatively robust 
local media and civil society organizations. It also discusses legacy initiatives, in-
cluding capacity- building and setting a positive example. Like victim participa-
tion, legacy efforts have faced challenges common across mass crimes courts— 
relative neglect, weak funding, and a lack of clear ownership.
Throughout the book, we show how the ECCC’s unique structural features 
have affected its function, sometimes helping it achieve successes but more often 
rendering it vulnerable to inefficiency and political interference. We also show 
that the mere novelty of the Court’s design has compromised its efficiency and 
fairness, as appointees from various national backgrounds have spent much of 
their time and energy learning new principles of law, crafting new procedures, 
and resolving myriad judicial and administrative questions for which no clear 
precedent existed. The Cambodian experience thus suggests that even a new 
court without some of the ECCC’s particular design flaws would have had dif-
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ficulty delivering efficient due process, outreach, and capacity- building on a lim-
ited budget and in a limited period of time.
Any tribunal that confronts mass atrocities faces the challenge of optimiz-
ing between interests such as efficiency, due process, and social impact. Budget-
ary pressures and political constraints only add to the difficulty. Some trade- offs 
are inevitable, but tracing the effects of the ECCC’s institutional features can 
help identify which have functional promise and which should be studiously 
avoided at the ICC, national mass crimes proceedings, and any future hybrid 
tribunals. Learning from the ECCC can also help other courts reduce the start- 
up costs of developing, testing, and modifying new rules and practices.
Of course, not all of the ECCC’s successes or shortcomings are attributable 
to its institutional design. International Deputy Co- Prosecutor William Smith 
emphasizes that the Court operates within a structure that results from political 
compromise, but within that frame, “everything comes down to people.”53 As we 
discuss throughout the book, judges, lawyers, and staff have sometimes made 
important positive contributions to the Court, while at other times they have 
contributed to functional shortcomings. Moreover, the Court does not exist in a 
vacuum. Regular interventions by interested officials— such as Prime Minister 
Hun Sen and donor and UN officials— clearly have affected outcomes. Any in-
stitution’s effectiveness is a function of both structure and agency, and although 
we focus primarily on the former, our analysis provides regular reminders that 
experienced, principled, independent, and proactive appointees are crucial to 





Forging a Hybrid Court
“A Mountain Never Has Two Tigers”
Transitional justice could have taken many forms in Cambodia. A truth com-
mission, lustration policies, amnesty programs, and domestic or international 
trials were all considered or attempted in the years following the Khmer Rouge 
reign of terror, but it was the ECCC that became the centerpiece of accountabil-
ity efforts. Both the decision to focus on selected criminal trials and the features 
of the tribunal created to hold the trials were products of political compro-
mise. Officials from the UN Secretariat and Cambodian Government forged 
the Court through difficult negotiations that boiled down, in the words of one 
journalist, to “bitter mutual distrust and an ensuing battle for control.”1
U.S. officials brokered key compromises, and key UN member states— 
particularly Japan, Australia, France, and the United States— pressed the UN 
Secretariat to conclude a deal. Partly for that reason, Cambodia won the battle 
for control, leading to an unprecedented hybrid court with majority domestic 
control and a bifurcated institutional structure. This chapter shows how a leg-
acy of distrust and competing contemporary political interests translated into 
a hybrid tribunal with unique— and in many respects problematic— structural 
features.
A Foundation of Political Distrust
The emergence of a hybrid tribunal in Cambodia owes much to distrust. By 
the late 1990s, when official talks on a Khmer Rouge tribunal began, neither 
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the Cambodian Government nor the UN Secretariat trusted the other side to 
run the process. Both sides had ample historical reasons to be suspicious of one 
another.
Battle Lines Drawn during the Cold War
A brief history of the Khmer Rouge movement is essential to understanding the 
challenges of accountability in Cambodia and the positions key actors would 
later take in negotiating the ECCC. The Khmer Rouge (“Red Khmer”) move-
ment was deeply embedded in the domestic and international political conflict 
that has engulfed Cambodia for most of its modern history. The Khmers Roug-
es emerged in the early 1960s as a radical offshoot of the broader Indochinese 
communist movement,2 rebelling against the royalist regime of Prince Noro-
dom Sihanouk during a period when Cambodia was slowly drawn into the vor-
tex of the Vietnam War.3
In 1970, Marshal Lon Nol led a right- wing military coup against Sihanouk, 
who formed a government- in- exile in Beijing. With U.S. support, the corrupt 
and draconian Lon Nol government intensified repression of left- wing fighters 
and alienated much of the rural peasantry as the country descended into a bru-
tal civil war. The United States, still at war in Vietnam, launched a massive aerial 
bombing campaign against Vietnamese sanctuaries and Khmer Rouge targets 
in Cambodia,4 causing widespread civilian casualties and driving more peas-
ants into the arms of an increasingly radical and uncompromising communist 
insurgency.5 China and Vietnam funneled guns and grain to the Cambodian 
revolutionaries, who overran government defenses and captured Phnom Penh 
soon after a war- weary U.S. Congress withdrew financial support for Lon Nol 
in early 1975.
After the Khmer Rouge victory, darkness descended over the country. U.S. 
President Gerald Ford and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger asserted in May 
that a “bloodbath” and “atrocity of major proportions” was unfolding.6 Some ac-
counts from refugees escaping to Thailand provided corroborating evidence, but 
those reports largely fell on deaf ears or were discounted as attempts to justify 
the Vietnam War after the fact.7 Some prominent Western intellectuals even of-
fered sympathetic accounts of Khmer Rouge rule in the newly renamed state of 
“Democratic Kampuchea” (DK).8 The United Nations and Western powers did 
little in response to mounting evidence of atrocities, as the Vietnam Syndrome 
took hold in Washington and other key capitals.
China did worse, emerging as the Pol Pot regime’s main external sponsor, 
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furnishing aid and weapons to the Khmers Rouges to balance against Viet-
namese influence in Indochina at a time of intense rivalry between Beijing 
and Vietnam’s principal patron— the USSR.9 In addition to material support, 
China provided an ideological model for the Khmers Rouges, who designed 
their agrarian society roughly on a Maoist model and pledged to achieve a “super 
great leap forward.”10 Pol Pot pointedly chose to unveil himself as leader and 
announce the existence of the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK) during 
a 1977 visit to China— a favor to his comrades in Beijing.11
With most of the international community disengaged and China provid-
ing aid uncritically, the Pol Pot regime survived in power for nearly four years 
and exacted an immeasurable cost in human life and suffering. In addition to 
the countless losses and injuries sustained during the Pol Pot era, Khmer Rouge 
rule left deep scars in the country’s social and political fabric that remain rele-
vant today and affect the course of the country’s accountability efforts. One was 
an utter devastation of the country’s educated population. The CPK launched a 
merciless campaign to purge foreign and bourgeois influence from the country. 
Merchants, intellectuals, military officers, and bureaucrats were suspect; those 
wearing glasses or speaking a foreign language were sometimes set aside to be 
purged.12 The Khmer Rouge regime left behind a country with very few trained 
doctors, lawyers, counselors, teachers, bureaucrats, and other professionals to 
lead effective efforts at justice, truth- telling, reconciliation, and personal healing.
Another core feature of Khmer Rouge rule was a relentless assault on tradi-
tional social structures, including family units and ethnic and religious groups. 
Family members were often split; marriages were frequently somber, forced 
affairs designed to break apart the urban “new people”;13 and family members 
were taught to report one another for the slightest infractions or face harsh 
punishment themselves. The Khmers Rouges banned all “reactionary religions 
detrimental to Democratic Kampuchea,” sent out explicit orders to “defrock 
the monks,” razed the Catholic cathedral, and forced Cham Muslims to eat the 
same pork- laden food as others to survive.14 Ethnic minorities and hill tribes, 
viewed as politically suspect and possible fifth columns for foreign intelligence 
agencies, were also targeted for dispersion and sometimes destruction.15 Large- 
scale forced migration has left many survivors searching for loved ones, and the 
Khmer Rouge assault on faith and families has meant that the social structures 
most needed to help survivors heal have had to be rebuilt. Indeed, the Khmer 
word for reconciliation, phsas phsa, literally means “putting the broken pieces 
back together.”
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The opacity of Khmer Rouge rule has also contributed to a lack of public 
understanding of what happened and why. The regime’s rhetoric spoke of broad 
revolutionary goals and the faceless “Organization,” Angkar. Victims of purges 
were sometimes killed in public to set an example, but often they simply disap-
peared into CPK prisons or were sent away to be killed on the false pretense of 
redeployment. Years later, many Cambodians still ask who or what Angkar was. 
Many report that they still do not know with certainty whether some of their 
closest family members are dead or alive.16 One of the most common refrains 
is an inability to understand how such shocking violence could be possible, or 
what it could hope to achieve. In sum, CPK rule left Cambodians asking many 
painful questions but meager social resources with which to answer them— a 
major justification for international involvement later in the process.
Regime Change and False Starts toward Transitional Justice
The Pol Pot regime came to an end in January 1979, when the Vietnamese army 
and allied Cambodian resistance fighters invaded Cambodia and ousted the 
CPK. Leading the Cambodian resistance were former Khmers Rouges who 
had defected into southern Vietnam during the Pol Pot era. Importantly, these 
included the current President of the Senate Chea Sim, chairman of the Na-
tional Assembly Heng Samrin,17 and Prime Minister Hun Sen, who defected to 
Vietnam in 1977 after serving as a relatively junior CPK military commander.18 
Although no compelling evidence has implicated these senior officials in atroci-
ties,19 links between the current Cambodian administration and the CPK raise 
the possibility of charges against sitting officials, which almost certainly adds to 
the government’s resolve to control the Khmer Rouge trials.20
By early 1979, the Vietnamese army and Cambodian resistance secured most 
of the country and established the new People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) 
as Khmer Rouge leaders took refuge in the hills and jungles.21 The PRK’s top 
priorities were to defeat the large Khmer Rouge insurgency and pacify a country 
where impulses for revenge were strong. Some Khmers Rouges were tried and 
convicted in local courts, and others fell prey to revenge killings, but violent 
reprisals threatened to exacerbate Cambodia’s civil war and push more former 
Khmer Rouge rank and file into the jungles. The PRK thus instituted a kind 
of reconciliation plan. It coaxed Khmer Rouge cadres to join reeducation pro-
grams by issuing leaflets and transmitting radio broadcasts promising leniency 
to those who apologized and rejoined the fold.22 Alongside that carrot, it wield-
ed the formidable stick of counterinsurgency warfare.23
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In the summer of 1979, with help from Vietnamese officials,24 the PRK gov-
ernment established a “People’s Revolutionary Tribunal” to address the crimes 
of the Khmers Rouges. The PRK Ministry of Justice conducted trials in ab-
sentia of former DK Prime Minister Pol Pot and Deputy Prime Minister Ieng 
Sary. The trial sought to win support for the PRK domestically and advance its 
claim for Cambodia’s seat at the United Nations— an important mark of inter-
national legitimacy. Shortly before the trial, the presiding judge said publicly:
Trying the Pol Pot– Ieng Sary clique for the crime of genocide will on the one 
hand expose all the criminal acts that they have committed and mobilize the 
Kampuchean people more actively to defend and build up the people’s power, 
and on the other hand show the peoples of the whole world the true face of the 
criminals who are posing as the representatives of the people of Kampuchea.25
After an abrupt five- day trial, Pol Pot and Ieng Sary were found guilty of geno-
cide and sentenced to death— history’s first genocide conviction.26
Although few observers doubted that the defendants were guilty of grave 
crimes, procedural flaws and politicization deeply undermined the trial’s cred-
ibility. The tribunal’s title nearly announced the defendants’ guilt: “The People’s 
Revolutionary Tribunal Held in Phnom Penh for the Trial of the Genocide 
Crime of the Pol Pot– Ieng Sary Clique.”27 Pol Pot and Ieng Sary had no com-
munication with their appointed lawyers, who were not permitted to cross- 
examine witnesses. Their counsel’s feeble defense was to seek mitigation by 
asserting that their clients were mere accomplices to a Chinese master plan of 
genocide— an accusation that only confirmed the tribunal’s nakedly political 
nature. Most outsiders disregarded the proceedings as a show trial to justify 
Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia. The 1979 tribunal did have elements of a 
hybrid nature, with an American communist defense lawyer working beside his 
Cambodian peer and an East German prosecutor advising the court,28 but the 
trial’s main legacy was to highlight the risk that a domestically led judicial pro-
cess could lead to a crudely stage- managed affair.
The 1979 verdicts had little practical effect. Pol Pot and Ieng Sary were be-
yond the PRK’s reach, surrounded by Khmer Rouge insurgents who gained 
support from governments opposed to Vietnam and its principal ally, the Soviet 
Union. The Thai military provided sanctuaries and channels for aid, while Chi-
na gave an estimated $100 million per year to the Khmers Rouges in military as-
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sistance and other aid.29 Western powers and other members of the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) helped organize a “Coalition Govern-
ment of Democratic Kampuchea” (CGDK) composed of royalists, right- wing 
republican factions, and the Khmers Rouges to occupy Cambodia’s UN Gen-
eral Assembly seat. Although Prince Sihanouk was the nominal head of the 
CGDK and republican leader Son Sann was Prime Minister, former DK head 
of state Khieu Samphan was vice president, and the Khmers Rouges were the 
coalition’s dominant fighting force.
Western and ASEAN governments successfully framed the Vietnamese 
invasion as a violation of state sovereignty rather than a case of liberation. In 
1982, by a large majority vote, the CGDK kept Cambodia’s seat at the UN Gen-
eral Assembly.30 Like the mujahidin in Afghanistan or paramilitaries in Cen-
tral America, the Khmers Rouges became useful proxies in a geopolitical game. 
Private human rights advocates based in the United States promoted account-
ability, twice attempting to bring cases against the CGDK in the International 
Court of Justice.31 However, those efforts had little effect without high- level po-
litical interest in putting the Khmers Rouges on trial.
Official efforts at transitional justice were limited during the 1980s and 
closely connected to the geopolitical struggle. In 1982 and 1983, a PRK organiza-
tion called the Renakse (Salvation Front) organized a nationwide review and 
condemnation of Khmer Rouge atrocities comprising community meetings, 
site investigations, and thousands of survivor petitions bearing more than one 
million signatures or thumbprints.32 Yet the findings were not broadly dissemi-
nated, Khmers Rouges did not participate, and PRK officials revealed a nakedly 
political purpose: to wrest control from the CGDK in the UN General As-
sembly.33 The PRK also established a national “Day of Anger” to recall Khmer 
Rouge abuses. Perhaps more helpfully, the PRK erected Buddhist stupas and 
other memorials at former terror sites across the country and helped dig up 
remains from mass burial pits. Private efforts at reconciliation also arose, such 
as ceremonies during the annual pchum ben festival, a traditional Khmer day of 
remembrance of the dead.34 These practices helped Cambodians begin to heal, 
but they did little to address the scar of continuing Khmer Rouge impunity.
A Slow Crawl toward Accountability
In the late 1980s, the thawing of the Cold War led to UN- sponsored talks in 
Paris for a peace settlement in Indochina, but the United Nations and key 
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member states continued to downplay Khmer Rouge accountability as part of a 
peace- before- justice approach. China insisted on Khmer Rouge representation, 
and other Security Council members agreed, believing Khmer Rouge participa-
tion provided useful leverage in securing a Vietnamese withdrawal and reduced 
Khmer Rouge incentives to spoil the peace.35 The talks led to the 1991 Paris 
Peace Agreement, which established a UN Transitional Authority for Cam-
bodia (UNTAC) with mandates for various peacekeeping activities, civil ad-
ministration, and organizing elections to produce a new Royal Government of 
Cambodia (RGC). UNTAC’s mandate did not call for Khmer Rouge account-
ability. Politically, UNTAC helped marginalize the Khmers Rouges, which boy-
cotted the UNTAC- sponsored 1993 elections, but from a military standpoint 
UN peacekeepers did little to defang the insurgency.36 That task would fall to 
the newly elected RGC.
The royalist party Funcinpec finished first in the 1993 elections. It was led 
by Sihanouk’s son, Norodom Ranariddh, and enjoyed support from many 
Western governments. The Cambodian People’s Party (CPP)— the successor 
to the PRK’s governing party— finished second, and its leader was a young Hun 
Sen, who had served as Prime Minister in the pre- UNTAC period. Ranariddh 
lacked an outright majority, however, and Hun Sen maintained strong authority 
within the bureaucracy and security services. After some negotiation, Ranarid-
dh agreed to share power with Hun Sen as Co- Prime Ministers in a newly re-
fashioned constitutional monarchy, with Sihanouk as King and head of state.37
Although the Khmers Rouges remained a significant fighting force, their 
foreign support dwindled, and the movement weakened. International interest 
in trying the Khmers Rouges rose in 1993– 94, as the International Criminal 
Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR) inaugurated 
a new phase in international criminal law. In 1994, the U.S. Congress passed 
the Cambodian Genocide Justice Act and established a special Office of Cam-
bodian Genocide Investigation at the State Department.38 That office funded 
Yale University’s Cambodian Genocide Program to establish the Documenta-
tion Center of Cambodia (DC- Cam), which helped lay groundwork for trials 
by accumulating information about DK atrocities.39
In 1994, the Cambodian National Assembly formally outlawed the Khmer 
Rouge organization.40 The Government’s main focus was to defeat the insur-
gency by attracting defections and emphasizing “national reconciliation”— a 
policy shared by the CPP and the royalist leaders.41 The CPP did call for trials 
on occasion, however, focusing on senior Khmer Rouge officials.42 In a January 
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1995 conversation with U.S. officials, senior Cambodian diplomat Hor Nam-
hong voiced his government’s support for Khmer Rouge trials, which would be 
“Cambodia’s responsibility to instigate.”43
Efforts to secure defections continued, and in August 1996 Hun Sen bro-
kered a deal under which Ieng Sary defected to the Government with roughly 
3,000 of the estimated 7,500 active Khmer Rouge guerrillas.44 In exchange, Si-
hanouk formally pardoned Ieng Sary for the death sentence handed down dur-
ing the 1979 tribunal and granted him amnesty from prosecution under the 1994 
law barring Khmer Rouge membership. Ranariddh approved the deal. It was 
unpopular among many members of both the CPP and Funcinpec and would 
later produce tension in the tribunal negotiations, but it did help cripple the 
insurgency and prompt Khmer Rouge infighting. In 1997, after former DK De-
fense Minister Son Sen began talking to Cambodian officials, he and his family 
were murdered. Khmer Rouge cadres arrested and convicted Pol Pot and three 
others for the killing in July 1997 at a “People’s Tribunal,” sentencing him to life 
in a makeshift prison.45
Fragmentation of the Khmer Rouge movement enabled talks about ac-
countability to proceed but did not determine what form accountability would 
take. In January 1997, UN Special Representative for Human Rights in Cam-
bodia Thomas Hammarberg called for a truth commission,46 but the proposal 
won little support, and conversations quickly shifted toward criminal trials. 
Some scholars have argued that officials dispensed with the idea of a truth com-
mission too quickly in Cambodia,47 and indeed there appears to have been little 
serious discussion on the topic. A truth commission would consume resources 
and would not deliver the form of justice that many UN and Western officials 
sought. Moreover, a broad fact- finding inquiry would draw attention to the nu-
merous dirty hands in Cambodia’s recent history.48 These factors likely explain 
why the main political protagonists agreed on a prosecutorial approach. Despite 
that point of agreement, building an institution to conduct the trials would not 
be easy. After years of conflict, the key actors had clear stakes in the process and 
reasons to be wary of one another.
Compromising on a Hybrid Court
In June 1997, with encouragement from the UN Commission on Human 
Rights,49 Hun Sen and Ranariddh sent a joint letter to UN Secretary- General 
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Kofi Annan requesting help in bringing the Khmers Rouges to justice and 
adding:
Cambodia does not have the resources or expertise to conduct this very impor-
tant procedure. Thus, we believe it is necessary to ask for the assistance of the 
United Nations. We are aware of similar efforts to respond to the genocide and 
crimes against humanity in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, and ask that 
similar assistance be given to Cambodia.50
That week, reports of Pol Pot’s whereabouts intensified efforts to set up a tribu-
nal. The U.S. government advocated passing a UN Security Council resolution 
to create an ad hoc international court like the ICTY or ICTR, which appeared 
consistent with the Cambodian Co- Prime Ministers’ request. U.S. officials also 
developed plans to capture Pol Pot and other Khmer Rouge leaders for trials 
outside of Cambodia.51
At the same time, both Hun Sen and Ranariddh continued to seek Khmer 
Rouge defections on terms that would benefit their respective political camps.52 
That competition for defections helped splinter the Khmer Rouge movement,53 
but it also contributed to a domestic crisis. In July 1997, shortly after Khmer 
Rouge leaders reportedly pledged to ally with Funcinpec,54 Hun Sen carried 
out what most analysts characterized as a coup.55 Troops loyal to him defeated 
their royalist opponents, solidified control over most areas of the country, and 
executed an uncertain number of Funcinpec officials. Ranariddh fled the coun-
try.56 Hun Sen’s takeover led to widespread criticism abroad and exacerbated an 
already sour relationship between CPP leaders and some of the foreign govern-
ments most actively promoting Khmer Rouge trials— particularly the United 
States. The Clinton administration suspended bilateral aid to condemn Hun 
Sen’s forces for the violence.57
Nevertheless, movement toward the trials continued, and both the CPP 
and Funcinpec leaders in exile continued to voice their support.58 Hammarberg 
took the case to the UN headquarters but avoided the Security Council due to 
China’s expressed opposition to the trials. China expressed its opposition as a 
defense of sovereignty but was also loath to draw attention to its role as the ide-
ological inspiration and principal patron of the Pol Pot regime.59 In December 
1997, Hammarberg thus raised the issue at the UN General Assembly, which 
passed a resolution recommending that the Secretary- General dispatch experts 
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to Cambodia to evaluate the possibility of putting surviving Khmer Rouge of-
ficials on trial.60
In April 1998, the top target for prosecution, Pol Pot, was pronounced dead 
in Thailand days after a New York Times article revealed secret U.S. plans to 
capture and hold him for trial.61 The cause of his death remains shrouded, as 
his body was soon cremated without an autopsy, raising speculation that he was 
murdered by fellow Khmers Rouges or others keen to forestall a trial.62 Another 
senior Khmer Rouge suspect, Mok— the infamous one- legged CPK Central 
Committee member known by many as “the Butcher” for his brutality— said: 
“The world community should stop talking about this now that Pol Pot is dead. 
It was all Pol Pot.”63
If Pol Pot was killed to derail the American push for a trial, the plan failed. 
The U.S. government continued to press the Security Council to create a fully 
international tribunal under its Chapter VII authority. In late April, U.S. of-
ficials circulated a draft Security Council resolution that would create an “In-
ternational Criminal Tribunal for Cambodia” in The Netherlands sharing many 
components of the ICTY, including its registry and appeals chambers.64 The 
U.S. proposal generated little interest in the Security Council. China argued that 
Khmer Rouge accountability was an internal Cambodian affair and that invoking 
Chapter VII authority would require a threat to international peace and security 
that was no longer present in Cambodia.65 Russia and France emphasized the 
importance of Cambodian consent,66 and many Latin American governments 
saw the ad hoc tribunals as illegitimate.67 In addition, some European officials 
disfavored U.S. efforts to build another ad hoc tribunal as they lobbied states to 
sign the Rome Statute to create the International Criminal Court (ICC). Facing 
stiff headwinds, the U.S. draft resolution was never formally introduced.
Meanwhile, Hun Sen began to solidify domestic control and regain interna-
tional legitimacy. In July 1998, the CPP won national elections funded largely by 
Japan and the European Union, and the new CPP- led government was widely 
recognized despite concerns that the elections were not free and fair.68 As his 
position in power became more secure, Hun Sen’s position toward the trials 
shifted. U.S. Ambassador for War Crimes David Scheffer met him in August 
1998 and concluded:
Hun Sen’s first preference was to have the senior Khmer Rouge leaders fade 
away as long as their troops were neutralized. His second choice seemed to be a 
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trial that he controlled. Obviously, if this were to happen, given his track record, 
it would be seen as lacking credibility and would taint everyone associated with 
it.69
The U.S. government continued to challenge Hun Sen’s legitimacy. The most 
strident attack came in October 1998, when U.S. Congressman Dana Rohra-
bacher (R- CA) introduced a successful House resolution accusing Hun Sen 
of serious crimes during the DK era, PRK period, and thereafter and advocat-
ing an international criminal trial against him, not just “a handful of geriatric 
Khmer Rouge leaders”70— a resolution that CPP leaders deeply resented.71
In December of that year, Thailand helped arrange the defection of former 
DK leaders Khieu Samphan and Nuon Chea.72 Although the U.S. government 
and others pressed for justice, Hun Sen emphasized the need for “national rec-
onciliation.” He said that Khieu Samphan and Nuon Chea should be welcomed 
“with bouquets of flowers, not with prisons and handcuffs” and that Cambodia 
“should dig a hole and bury the past and look ahead to the 21st century with a 
clean slate.”73
Opposition parties and international critics attacked Hun Sen’s remarks 
and accused the CPP of negotiating with the United Nations in bad faith. King 
Sihanouk refused to countenance an amnesty and said that an international 
tribunal “would have the perfect right to take up the case of genocide in Cam-
bodia” because it concerned “all the world’s people.”74 Hun Sen said that he con-
sidered the possibility for trials but emphasized that they should be done “in the 
context of war and peace [and] in the context of national reconciliation, which 
is all one package.”75 To many critics, Hun Sen simply sought to bolster his own 
domestic control, which was more a cause of than a solution to Cambodia’s 
contemporary problems and certainly did not justify an amnesty for some of 
history’s most heinous mass crimes.76
The debate magnified with the completion of the UN Group of Experts’ 
report, which recommended that the UN Security Council establish an ad hoc 
international tribunal. The Group advised the UN not to support domestic 
trials due to corruption and political interference in the Cambodian judicial 
system and rejected a “mixed Cambodian- foreign court.”77 As Group member 
Steven Ratner later explained, the experts believed a mixed tribunal “would de-
pend too much on the cooperation of the Cambodian government.”78 Hun Sen 
fired back, appealing to sovereignty norms and asserting that any international 
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tribunal would also need to investigate foreign countries’ roles in supporting the 
Khmers Rouges after 1979.79 He also wrote to Kofi Annan, stressing the dangers 
of an international trial:
If improperly and heedlessly conducted, the trials of Khmer Rouge leaders 
would panic other former Khmer Rouge officers and rank and file, who have 
already surrendered, into turning back to the jungle and renewing the guerrilla 
war in Cambodia.80
He added that Cambodia was considering a truth and reconciliation commis-
sion along South African lines as an alternative— a suggestion that U.S. Secre-
tary of State Madeleine Albright promptly and publicly rejected. Albright as-
serted that “we want these top leaders to be brought to justice” and insisted that 
a truth commission was “not a substitute for an international tribunal” focused 
on top Khmer Rouge suspects.81
Just days after Hun Sen’s letter arrived, the last pillar of the Khmer Rouge 
leadership fell when government forces near the Thai border arrested Mok. 
Hun Sen announced that he intended to try Mok in a domestic court82 and 
informed Hammarberg that outside legal experts would be allowed only as ob-
servers after being invited by the Cambodian court.83 Foreign Minister Hor 
Namhong put the government’s case bluntly:
The international community talks about finding justice for the Cambodian 
people . . . But what has the international community been doing vis- à- vis the 
Khmer Rouge lately? Once the genocidal Khmer Rouge regime was toppled, 
the so- called international community continued to support the Khmer Rouge. 
The so- called international community forced Cambodia to accept the Khmer 
Rouge as partners in the Paris Peace talks. . . . It said nothing about responsibil-
ity of the Khmer Rouge, let alone prosecution of them. But now that Cambodia 
has achieved peace and reconciliation, they call for an international tribunal. 
Can we trust them?84
Hun Sen launched a similarly stinging critique:
It took me 20 years to destroy the political and military organization of the 
Khmer Rouge and to bring the leaders of this organization to a court of law. . . . 
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[W]hen we were fighting against them, when we were demanding that the lead-
ers of the Khmer Rouge be brought to trial, there were some people in some 
countries, including America, who were against us.  .  .  . If foreigners have the 
right to lack confidence in Cambodian courts of law, we Cambodians also have 
the right to lack confidence in an international court of law. Why? Because 
those who would mandate an international court used to support the Khmer 
Rouge . . . 85
Hun Sen exclaimed that the only jobs the UN Secretary- General would give 
Cambodians would be to “go into the jungle to capture the tiger.”86
Cambodian officials may have noted the experience of Rwanda, which re-
quested an international tribunal after the 1994 genocide but later became the 
only country to vote against the Security Council resolution establishing the 
ICTR. Like its Cambodian counterparts, the Rwandan government highlight-
ed UN abandonment during the conflict and emphasized that its forces “had to 
fight alone . . . in order to stop the carnage.”87 It resented the failure to situate 
the court within Rwanda where the crimes occurred and where there would be 
an opportunity “to promote the harmonization of international and national ju-
risprudence.”88 And as in Cambodia, Rwandan authorities sought some control 
over the process for political reasons; perhaps the primary unstated reason for 
Rwanda’s objection to the ICTR was the Security Council’s decision to include 
jurisdiction over crimes committed by the Rwandan Patriotic Front— the new 
government’s armed forces.89
Cambodian leaders distrusted a UN- led process that their domestic and 
foreign foes could use to undermine the CPP’s standing, either by pressing 
charges against sitting officials or taking credit for justice that the CPP had 
failed to deliver. Nevertheless, Cambodia’s leaders faced pressure to cooperate 
with the United Nations from a number of sources, including Cambodian op-
position leader Sam Rainsy, the UN Commission on Human Rights, West-
ern donors, international media, and civil society actors.90 Critics argued that 
Cambodian courts could not deliver credible trials due to endemic corruption, 
mismanagement, and a questionable commitment to justice. Yet a purely inter-
national tribunal was unlikely. The International Criminal Court would not be 
an option due to its non- retroactive temporal jurisdiction, which limits that 
court to crimes committed after July 2002. China, Russia, and others opposed 
creating an ad hoc international tribunal for Cambodia, and China would likely 
veto any such proposal at the UN Security Council.91
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To break the impasse, U.S. and UN officials began to consider a “mixed” 
tribunal. In April 1999, U.S. Senator John Kerry met Hun Sen to discuss in-
cluding both Cambodian and international judges and personnel.92 UN lead-
ers took no immediate official position on the proposal, but in a step toward 
compromise, Hun Sen informed Kofi Annan in late April that he planned to 
try Mok and others in domestic courts but that “foreign judges and prosecutors 
would be allowed to take part fully,” rather than merely observing the process, to 
ensure that the trials met “international standards of due process.”93 Meetings 
between Hun Sen and Hammarberg explored the mixed tribunal option more 
fully in the months that followed.
Meanwhile, conditions on the ground continued to evolve. In May, govern-
ment forces arrested Duch, the infamous former chief of the CPK’s central in-
ternal security office. Custody of Duch and Mok— as well as the Cambodian 
Government’s close watch over Ieng Sary, Khieu Samphan, and Nuon Chea— 
gave it added bargaining leverage. Moreover, by 1999 the CPP was in a strong 
domestic position and had managed to restore largely positive relations with 
China, which had become the country’s second- largest donor (after Japan) and 
offered much- needed financial support with relatively few political conditions 
attached.94 This reduced the Cambodian Government’s reliance on the West 
and made it unlikely that the CPP would hand over the suspects to an interna-
tional body. Without UN participation, however, the CPP would lose financial 
resources and a stamp of international legitimacy. The hybrid court option had 
appeal, provided that Cambodians would have control.
UN officials could also countenance a hybrid court if they had sufficient 
control. The ICTY and ICTR had provided valuable legal judgments and prec-
edents, but donors were weary of their high costs and lengthy proceedings. 
Out- of- country locations had compromised their ability to connect with sur-
vivor populations and to transfer skills and legal principles to ailing domestic 
systems. To many critics, these courts also presented sovereignty problems and 
were essentially instruments of Western power. A hybrid court could thus have 
both functional advantages and a better chance of winning political support. 
In June 1999, Hun Sen wrote to Kofi Annan requesting UN assistance to draft 
legislation for “a special national Cambodian court to try Khmer Rouge leaders 
[which] would provide for foreign judges and prosecutors to participate in its 
proceedings.”95 The UN Office of Legal Affairs accepted that starting point for 
negotiations, and both the UN and RGC convened teams to represent their 
respective sides.
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A Battle for Control
Despite convergence toward a hybrid arrangement, Cambodian and UN offi-
cials had very different views on how to organize the tribunal. As Tom Fawthrop 
and Helen Jarvis note:
Who would be in control of the Khmer Rouge trials was the key issue over 
which the Cambodian government and the United Nations constantly locked 
horns. This underlay all the points of controversy and compromise in the three 
rounds of negotiations, numerous exchanges of letters and interventions by 
third parties from 1999 to 2003.96
As talks began in August 1999, UN officials insisted that the tribunal should be 
a sui generis court, and a majority of judges and key personnel should be inter-
national appointees.97 The Cambodian side rejected that proposal,98 and in Sep-
tember Hun Sen met with Kofi Annan and offered three options— the United 
Nations could participate in a tribunal within Cambodia’s existing courts, pro-
vide legal advice without direct participation, or withdraw.99 Hun Sen explained 
to Hammarberg in October:
Cambodia wants to be given opportunity to be masters of its own situation. 
You can participate, but do not try to be masters of the issue. . . . I do not wish 
a foreign woman to come to Cambodia and dress up in a Khmer dress. I want 
a Khmer woman to dress in a Khmer dress and for foreigners to come and help 
put on the make- up.100
To overcome the deadlock, the United States again intervened— initially by 
approaching the Cambodian Government without consulting the UN team.101 
U.S. Ambassador to Cambodia Kent Wiedemann and U.S. Ambassador for 
War Crimes David Scheffer floated the idea of establishing a “special chamber” 
(later “extraordinary chambers”) within the Cambodian court system.102 Schef-
fer also introduced the idea of a supermajority vote. If the court were to have 
a Cambodian majority, the vote of at least one international judge would be 
required for any judicial decision. Scheffer advanced the measure to “manage 
a Cambodian majority on the bench (if that proved to be the endgame)” and 
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to establish “the minimum threshold of international oversight in the decision- 
making process of the judges.”103 The Cambodian Government welcomed the 
U.S. proposals, which they regarded as a viable path to a Cambodian- majority 
court. U.S. diplomats pressured Annan and his legal staff and encouraged them 
to “play ball,” but UN officials pushed back. UN Legal Counsel Hans Corell 
argued that the supermajority idea was a “recipe for paralysis” and insisted on an 
international majority on the bench.104
UN officials also insisted that the Secretary- General should appoint all 
judges and prosecutors to ensure international standards and reduce the risk of 
political interference. The Cambodian Government instead proposed allowing 
the Secretary- General to nominate only international judges, who would then 
be appointed formally by the Supreme Council of Magistracy, the body respon-
sible for judicial appointments under Cambodian law.105
The question of control was linked to the Court’s jurisdiction, because nei-
ther side wanted to entrust the other with the power to determine the scope 
of prosecution. Both the UN Secretariat and RGC agreed to focus on alleged 
Khmer Rouge crimes committed between April 17, 1975, and January 6, 1979.106 
Hun Sen periodically threatened to pursue a “package deal” including U.S. 
abuses in the preceding civil war period,107 but he too had ample reasons to 
avoid a broader temporal frame that would draw attention to crimes committed 
in the 1980s.108
Personal jurisdiction was more contentious. UN officials argued that both 
senior Khmer Rouge leaders and others deemed most responsible for the atroc-
ities should be eligible for prosecution, in line with the UN Group of Experts’ 
recommendation.109 Corell also asserts that he “never discussed who should be 
prosecuted,” reasoning that international law requires an independent prosecu-
tor to decide.110 Hun Sen publicly agreed that it would be the “unique jurisdic-
tion of the court to make charges” and said that he had “no rights whatsoever 
to charge this or that person, or to pre- determine how many people will stand 
trial.”111
The discussion of numbers and particular defendants was never far beneath 
the surface, however. U.S. and UN officials generally favored more expansive 
prosecution, sometimes pointing to the UN experts’ recommendation of rough-
ly 20 to 30 defendants. Hun Sen announced in late 1999 that he intended to try 
only “four or five of the people responsible.”112 He later admitted that he “should 
not comment on or say anything that is within the bounds of the judiciary,”113 
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but a number of other statements indicated his preference for a small universe 
of defendants, whom he sometimes identified by name.114
Casting too wide a net, he argued, would invite instability and jeopardize 
the government’s reconciliation plan. Critics argued that Hun Sen also sought 
to limit the number of potential defendants out of self- interest, as he and other 
high- ranking CPP members had been part of the Khmer Rouge organization 
before defecting to Vietnam to lead the resistance.115 Hun Sen pointedly said 
that trials should exclude those who (like himself ) had “helped to overthrow 
the genocide.”116 A broad prosecutorial net also could draw attention to defec-
tion deals between the CPP and notorious former Khmer Rouge fighters. The 
most prominent case, that of Ieng Sary, remained a bone of contention between 
the UN and Cambodian sides, as the latter resisted UN demands to invalidate 
Ieng Sary’s 1996 amnesty and pardon.
Despite disagreement on the basic issues of control and the scope of the 
Court’s jurisdiction, the Cambodian Government pressed ahead, drafting a 
domestic law to create a tribunal and submitting it to the National Assembly 
without UN approval. The draft law foresaw a court with a Cambodian court 
president, Cambodian majorities in each of the chambers, a Cambodian Co- 
Prosecutor, and a Cambodian head of administration— all to be drawn from 
the ranks of the Cambodian judiciary and civil service. Moreover, both the na-
tional and international Co- Prosecutors would have to sign indictments, which 
UN officials feared would leave the CPP with a veto over prosecutions. To the 
UN side, all of these features made the structure unacceptably vulnerable to po-
litical influence. Annan responded quickly, demanding an international majority 
of judges and an internationally appointed prosecutor.
The draft law also provided for Cambodian and UN- appointed Co- 
Investigating Judges. Investigating judges, who share investigatory duties with 
the prosecutors, are derived from the French civil law tradition and exist in the 
Cambodian judicial system. According to Corell, the Cambodian side regarded 
the inclusion of investigating judges as “a natural thing to do,” and the UN team 
elected not to oppose the concept, which would have frustrated negotiations.117 
Hammarberg was concerned that investigating judges would unnecessarily 
complicate the process and serve as another possible barrier to prosecution.118 
Corell was more focused on the complication introduced by having twin pairs 
of prosecutors and investigating judges.119 Both concerns would prove to be 
warranted.
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To manage the risk of disagreement and deadlock between the Co- 
Prosecutors and Co- Investigating Judges, U.S. officials pushed for the establish-
ment of a special judicial panel for that purpose. UN and Cambodian officials 
soon agreed to create a Pre- Trial Chamber composed of three Cambodian and 
two international judges, empowered to block investigations or indictments 
only by supermajority vote. Although the new chamber would add a layer to 
the judicial process, Corell and his team regarded it as a necessary safeguard 
for the integrity of the proceedings.120 Cambodia’s agreement was a significant 
concession, as it would enable an international Co- Prosecutor to forge ahead in 
the absence of a countervailing supermajority.121
The UN team remained highly skeptical of a majority- Cambodian court 
but agreed in July 2000 that the tribunal would be “a Cambodian court with the 
participation of international judges and prosecutors.”122 Corell also unveiled 
a draft UN- Cambodian “Framework Agreement” to govern UN- Cambodian 
cooperation on the tribunal. It proposed giving the United Nations authority 
to appoint international judges, the international Co- Prosecutor, and two new 
officials: a deputy international prosecutor and Deputy Director of Adminis-
tration. The Cambodian side gave little ground, and in January 2001 the Cam-
bodian National Assembly approved a draft law (the “2001 Law”).123 It retained 
the Cambodian majorities in each chamber and gave Cambodia control over all 
appointments, subject to UN nomination of international appointees. Opposi-
tion leader Sam Rainsy argued that the 2001 Law would merely produce CPP- 
led show trials,124 but King Sihanouk signed it in August.
The UN team warned that international funds and political support would 
come only if the Cambodian Government amended the 2001 Law to cor-
respond more closely to the draft Framework Agreement. The two sides also 
struggled over which would have legal primacy: the Framework Agreement or 
the Cambodian law. Deputy Prime Minister Sok An asserted that the Frame-
work Agreement would establish “modalities of cooperation . . . concerning for-
eign technical and financial support” but would not have the power to modify 
or prevail over a domestic law.125 Annan argued that the Framework Agreement 
must have the status of a binding treaty, because reducing the agreement to a 
technical memorandum of understanding would “deprive it of its substantive 
role of ensuring [ ] international standards of justice.”126
This and other sticking points— including the scheme for appointments, 
the validity of Ieng Sary’s 1996 amnesty and pardon, and the rights of the ac-
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cused, victims, and witnesses— led a frustrated Kofi Annan to withdraw his 
UN team from negotiations in February 2002. Corell explained:
[T]he UN should not be part of a court that would fail to provide victims of the 
Khmer Rouge with the credible justice they deserve . . . UN affiliation to such 
a court could set a precedent for lowering international standards . . . [and] the 
UN’s name would [be] attached to a judicial process over which it had little or 
no control.127
He later recalled that the UN team had “lost confidence.” To Corell, “the lodestar 
was that if the UN was going to engage in any project of this nature, it had to 
rise to the standards required by international agreements,” such as the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. When Corell saw those standards 
as unmet, he “put [his] foot down.”128 Many human rights advocates supported 
the pullout. Kek Galabru, head of the human rights group LICADHO, argued 
that the UN would “lose all credibility” if it partook in a trial that fell short of 
international standards.129 Dinah PoKempner of Human Rights Watch called 
the decision “sad but courageous” and praised the UN team for refusing to sup-
port trials vulnerable to procedural irregularity and political interference.130
UN demands were consistent with how hybrid courts had been designed 
elsewhere. While negotiations dragged on in Cambodia, hybrid courts or panels 
with international majorities of judges began work in East Timor, Kosovo, and 
Sierra Leone. The mixed panels in Kosovo and East Timor were created by UN 
transitional administrations in those territories and thus had fundamentally dif-
ferent origins than the ECCC, but the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL)131 
was a directly relevant comparison for the Cambodian tribunal talks. The SCSL 
was a tribunal established by agreement between the national government and 
United Nations, given limited personal jurisdiction over those who bore “the 
greatest responsibility for serious violations” during Sierra Leone’s civil war, and 
endowed with substantial funding, bureaucracy, and a brick- and- mortar facility 
in Freetown. Most key personnel at the SCSL were international, including an 
international prosecutor and registrar and majorities of judges in the trial and 
appeals chambers.132
Corell, who worked on the SCSL negotiations as well as the ECCC talks, 
asserts that he “made the comparison all the time between a state really commit-
ted to a credible and effective process and Cambodia, which was different.”133 
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While the Sierra Leonean government deferred to UN leadership at the SCSL 
and did not even fill all of its allocated slots with national personnel,134 the Cam-
bodian Government refused to cede control over the process. Sok An said the 
UN withdrawal was “[n]o problem at all”— Cambodia would hold domestic 
trials if necessary but would “keep the door open” to further talks.135 The RGC 
waited and faced only modest local political pressure when 14 members of the 
opposition Sam Rainsy Party demanded an explanation for the apparent failure 
of the tribunal talks.136
Internationally, most pressure was directed at the UN side. The United 
States, Japan, and Australia were particularly active, and all were keen to see 
trials in Cambodia.137 These and other states, as well as the European Union, 
pressed Annan to reconsider.138 In April, Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Va-
jpayee visited Phnom Penh and offered to send an Indian judge to the court if 
the United Nations backed out, as Hun Sen warned that the RGC’s “patience 
was limited” and threatened to initiate domestic trials139— though he took no 
evident steps to do so. The UN Human Rights Commission also passed a reso-
lution urging the parties to restart talks,140 and the Secretary- General’s Special 
Representative for Human Rights in Cambodia, Peter Leuprecht, urged the 
UN team to reengage.141 In July, ASEAN Foreign Ministers— who generally 
took a hands- off approach to the tribunal in line with the ASEAN norm of 
non- interference142— issued a gently worded request for UN reengagement at 
Cambodia’s request.143 After Hun Sen indicated his willingness to modify the 
2001 Law to accommodate UN concerns, Japan began convening interested UN 
member states to press Annan to resume negotiations.144
Pressure, Compromise, and  
the Creation of the ECCC
In December 2002, France and Japan sponsored a UN General Assembly Reso-
lution requesting that Annan “resume negotiations, without delay, to conclude 
an agreement” with Cambodia “so that the Extraordinary Chambers may be-
gin to function promptly.”145 The resolution emphasized the importance of en-
suring “international standards of justice, fairness, and due process of law” but 
also welcomed the passage of the 2001 law and its “provision for the role of the 
United Nations,” suggesting acceptance of a subordinate UN role.146 Thirty na-
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tions, including many European states, abstained from the vote out of concern 
that it left the Secretary- General in a weak bargaining position. Nevertheless, 
the resolution passed.
Corell has since expressed resentment that “the UN was forced back to the 
negotiating table” and that “[i]n some respects, our hands were tied.”147 In Janu-
ary 2003, the UN team reengaged, again demanding a majority of international 
judges and a single international prosecutor. The Cambodian Government 
refused, and after further pressure from key member states,148 the UN team 
returned to Phnom Penh in March. In a report to the General Assembly, Kofi 
Annan lamented:
[C]ertain Member States . . . made it clear to me that they expected me not to 
seek any changes to the structure and organization of the Extraordinary Cham-
bers . . . The Government of Cambodia was obviously aware that this position 
had been communicated to me and acted accordingly.149
The UN team did win some concessions— such as a Cambodian pledge not 
to request amnesties or pardons for crimes under the ECCC’s jurisdiction— 
but the revised Framework Agreement was largely a victory for the Cambodian 
Government. It followed the 2001 Law in most respects, retaining a number 
of the same unique institutional features. The ECCC would be a Cambodian- 
majority court “within the existing court structure of Cambodia,”150 the first hy-
brid court with national control of most key positions. It would also be the first 
tribunal split into national and international “sides” with separate hiring and 
reporting structures, including Co- Prosecutors, Co- Investigating Judges, and a 
divided administrative apparatus. It would be empowered to try “senior lead-
ers” and others “most responsible” for the crimes of Democratic Kampuchea— 
language that resulted from extensive negotiations between the two sides but 
failed to produce a meeting of the minds and would lead to further impasses— a 
topic discussed at length in chapter 6.151
Annan expressed serious concerns about the “structure and organization 
of the Extraordinary Chambers” and reported that he “would very much have 
preferred . . . a majority of international judges.”152 He argued that Cambodian 
courts showed “little respect .  .  . for the most elementary features of the right 
to a fair trial” and warned of a record of “interference by the executive with the 
independence of the judiciary.”153
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By contrast, the Cambodian Government welcomed the result. In an address 
to the National Assembly, Sok An characterized the “Cambodian model” as an 
institutional form that could “stand as an example to others in the future.”154 
He said that the ECCC satisfied the government’s three “guiding principles”— 
justice for the victims, maintenance of “peace, political stability and national 
unification,” and “respect for national sovereignty.”155 He added proudly:
[T]he history of international tribunals shows that they were organized by for-
eign judges and initiated and imposed from without. But our mechanism . . . is 
organized within the structure of the Cambodian courts. We have invited the 
international community to join with us.156
Some observers considered the ECCC’s structure the best outcome possible 
under trying circumstances and better than the likely alternatives. The coun-
terfactual question loomed large: What would happen if the UN were to with-
draw from the tribunal? Few outside observers expected a credible domestic 
process, and many anticipated that trials would not occur at all. If so, as scholar 
Craig Etcheson argued, “[t]he Khmer Rouge leadership would die quiet, peace-
ful deaths in their beds, having successfully defended their impunity for their 
entire lives.”157 Scholar Gregory Stanton warned that “perfection is the enemy 
of justice,”158 and Leuprecht agreed— “rather this tribunal than no tribunal.”159
Supporters believed that the Framework Agreement gave the UN enough 
leverage to keep the Court on track.160 Behind this cautious optimism was the 
expectation that the UN would actively ensure the Court’s adherence to inter-
national standards.161 Indeed, Annan asserted that it would be “essential” for the 
UN to “remain engaged in the process of overseeing the implementation of the 
draft agreement” and threatened that “any deviation by the Government from its 
obligations could lead to the United Nations withdrawing its cooperation and 
assistance from the process.”162
Critics were skeptical that the UN could police a Cambodian- led court ef-
fectively.163 Mike Jendrzejczyk of Human Rights Watch argued that it embodied 
“the lowest standards yet for a tribunal with U.N. participation” and that “with 
Cambodia’s judiciary at the center of the tribunal, the agreement ensures that it 
will be politics and not law that dominate the tribunal’s work.”164 An important 
subtext of such critiques was that Hun Sen’s government could exploit a trial 
for political gain— a prospect that many human rights advocates regarded as a 
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step backward for Cambodia. Amnesty International argued that the ECCC’s 
agreed structure would “not only threaten the integrity of the legal process for 
[Cambodia but also] would set a dangerous precedent that could compromise 
fair trial standards for any future international or mixed tribunals . . .”165 Even if 
a majority- domestic court was the best available option in Cambodia, it could 
set an unhelpful example of local control— an issue of particular concern to 
UN officials and human rights groups who anticipated engaging in negotiations 
with other states in the future.
Despite UN misgivings and critiques from human rights groups, the two 
sides signed the revised Framework Agreement in June 2003, and after a do-
mestic political impasse in Cambodia following the 2003 national elections, the 
National Assembly passed an amended domestic law (the “ECCC Law”) creat-
ing the ECCC in 2004.166 It also ratified the Framework Agreement, agreeing 
that it would “apply as law within the Kingdom of Cambodia”167— an important 
concession to the UN insistence that the Agreement carry the legal force of a 
treaty, not just a technical memorandum of understanding.168
The Framework Agreement and ECCC Law undoubtedly created a tribu-
nal that is structurally vulnerable to strong national influence. Its Pre- Trial and 
Trial Chambers have three national and two international judges, while the ap-
pellate Supreme Court Chamber has four Cambodian and three international 
judges. Decisions require an affirmative supermajority vote, meaning that at 
least one international judge must join in every decision169— a provision that 
limits the scope for Cambodian judicial dominance but also prevents interna-
tional judges from driving outcomes by convincing a single Cambodian “swing 
judge.”
The Cambodian Government also controls several key administrative posts. 
Unlike other mixed tribunals, which have had an international registrar to man-
age administrative operations, the ECCC has an Office of Administration (OA) 
responsible for general administrative functions.170 The OA has a Cambodian 
Director and international Deputy Director. The Chief of Public Affairs and 
head of the Victims Support Section are also Cambodian appointees, enabling 
the Government to exert strong influence over public communication. The 
ECCC’s Defence Support Section and a few administrative units are led by 
international appointees.
The ECCC’s appointment mechanism gives the Cambodian Government 
further influence. Although key UN personnel and judges are nominated by 
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the Secretary- General, they are appointed by the Cambodian Supreme Coun-
cil of Magistracy, giving the RGC a mechanism to challenge or resist UN ap-
pointments.171 If foreign court staffers “fail or refuse to participate” in ECCC 
proceedings or the UN withdraws its support from the Court and no foreign 
candidates are identified to fill vacant positions, the RGC may select Cambo-
dian replacements.172 The ECCC Law thus foresees the possibility that, under 
certain conditions, the ECCC could function as a fully national court without 
international staffing.
The RGC’s influence over the Court is not simply a question of numbers. 
It also relates to the general lack of judicial independence in Cambodia and 
the dearth of qualified judicial personnel in a country that is still recovering 
from the relentless Khmer Rouge attack on intellectuals and the lean years that 
followed. Partly for that reason, personal connections have commonly driven 
senior judicial appointments and continue to do so, including at the ECCC. 
The close nexus between senior personnel and the executive branch makes the 
ECCC vulnerable to political interference. Indeed, all high- level Cambodian 
personnel at the ECCC continue to hold important jobs either in the national 
judicial system or in the Government itself.173
The Framework Agreement and ECCC Law left many aspects of the Court 
undecided, including the precise rules and legal principles to be applied, the 
mechanisms for engaging victims, how the Court would be funded, and what 
oversight mechanisms would be put in place— an issue closely linked to con-
cerns about corruption and executive interference, which would later prove to 
be prescient. All of these issues are discussed in subsequent chapters and help 
to illustrate how the Court’s unique (and in some respects ambiguous) institu-
tional form has affected its function.
Explaining the Outcome
The Cambodian Government won significant control over the ECCC due to 
several factors that gave the RGC bargaining leverage. First, discord on the UN 
Security Council blocked the possibility of a fully international court based on 
a Chapter VII Security Council resolution that would override Cambodian ob-
jections. China’s likely veto was the most obvious constraint, but many other 
states also regarded the ICTY/ICTR model as problematic and favored a con-
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sensual arrangement with strong national participation to uphold sovereignty, 
save costs, and connect the process more closely to the surviving local popu-
lation. The fact that the RGC obtained custody of key suspects also made it 
highly unlikely that any international process would be viable without Cambo-
dian consent.
Second, the state of politics in and around Cambodia helped the RGC 
resist UN pressure to consent to a majority- international hybrid court. Do-
mestically, the Cambodian Government had achieved a commanding domestic 
political position by the time the tribunal’s features were negotiated. A victory 
in the 1998 national elections and series of successful measures to co- opt or 
repress their domestic political foes left the CPP firmly in charge and enabled 
its leaders to withstand occasional pressure from opposition parties to consent 
to UN leadership.
Internationally, although Cambodia received considerable amounts of in-
ternational aid, the RGC was less dependent on the United Nations or West-
ern powers for security or political legitimacy than the leaders of East Timor, 
Kosovo, or Sierra Leone when tribunals were established in those postconflict 
settings. A great deal of international pressure would have been required to 
convince Cambodian leaders to cede primary control of the trials. The Unit-
ed States led efforts to establish a tribunal but had limited leverage without 
custody of the defendants. Moreover, U.S. officials had little aid with which 
to bargain, because after Hun Sen seized power in 1997, U.S. appropriations 
legislation barred most forms of direct assistance to the RGC throughout the 
negotiation process.174
Other key donors, such as France and Japan, supported the trials but did 
not condition their aid on RGC agreement to an international- majority court. 
Such donors had multiple strategic and humanitarian interests in Cambodia 
and were loath to spend much political capital trying to force an unlikely change 
in the RGC’s position. For example, France maintained significant investments 
in transportation, hotels, and energy, close ties to the royal family, a range of de-
velopment projects, and an enduring interest in promoting French language and 
culture in its former colony.175 All of these interests militated against a coercive 
approach toward the tribunal talks.
For Japan, aid and a low- key diplomatic approach were means to develop in-
fluence in Southeast Asia and access the region’s markets and resources— often 
in competition with China.176 Japan resisted U.S. demands to suspend aid to 
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Cambodia after the July 1997 coup177 and was Cambodia’s largest development 
aid donor between 1998 and 2004, providing roughly half a billion dollars over 
that period178 and supporting the RGC even during periods of deadlocked tri-
bunal talks.179 Other donors generally followed suit. Cambodia obtained large 
and consistent annual aid packages throughout the process, despite frequent 
criticism from donors on human rights issues— including a pledge of $635 mil-
lion in 2002, when the dispute over the Khmer Rouge tribunal was near its 
zenith.180
A further reason for Cambodia’s negotiating success was that the United 
States and other key governments were adamant about pursuing prosecutions. 
Although the RGC expressed a strong interest in trials as well, Hun Sen’s shift-
ing positions cast doubt on the strength of that commitment. The RGC’s lack 
of urgency in arranging for trials after the UN pullout in early 2002 and its 
decision not to submit the revised ECCC Law to the National Assembly in June 
2003, which led to a lengthy delay, raise doubts as well. At a minimum, the RGC 
was willing to wait.
It is a basic principle of bargaining that the side more prepared to accept 
an alternative to a negotiated agreement enjoys superior leverage in the talks.181 
From a Cambodian standpoint, a breakdown in talks would likely have led to 
one of two acceptable (if not ideal) outcomes: domestic trials without a stamp 
of UN legitimacy or no trials at all. For key states involved in the talks, those 
outcomes would have been much less acceptable. As long as the Cambodian 
Government was willing to wait, an international thirst to see justice done— 
and the absence of easy ways to force Hun Sen’s hand— made it likely that key 
states would pressure the UN side to compromise and undercut the Secretar-
iat’s bargaining leverage. That is precisely what happened. Corell argues that 
there were “many involved behind the scenes,” including several interested states, 
which explains why “the UN Secretariat was obliged to accept features that have 
led to the difficulties that now exist.”182
Conclusion
The ECCC’s first international Co- Prosecutor, Robert Petit, has said: “In the 
end, the victims of the Khmer Rouge got the tribunal that Hun Sen and his 
allies, including other former Khmer Rouge throughout the regime, wanted.”183 
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Critics have argued from the outset that the CPP enjoys too much control over 
the tribunal, allowing it to interfere with and corrupt the process for pecuniary 
or political gain, putting the UN’s reputation at risk, and setting a troublesome 
precedent for future mass crimes courts. Given the Cambodian Government’s 
strong bargaining position, however, a UN- led process along the Sierra Leone 
model was highly unlikely. Etcheson argues that from the standpoint of the tri-
bunal’s key international sponsors, “to a pretty large extent, this deal was about 
as good as could be had under the circumstances.”184
The resulting ECCC is undeniably a cumbersome and fragile institution, 
depending heavily on a government with a weak record of judicial integrity and 
independence and requiring the cooperation of two sides with a long record 
of mutual distrust. Political compromises also left the ECCC with a complex 
structure— including a bifurcated administration, pairs of Co- Prosecutors and 
Co- Investigating Judges, and a Pre- Trial Chamber— that raises serious efficien-
cy challenges.
As the remainder of this book will show, the Court has struggled to carry 
out its functions efficiently given its institutional complexity, and it has often 
been on the verge of falling off of its tracks as political interference, corruption 
allegations, and other integrity concerns test its basic viability. The behavior and 
initiative of individual actors have sometimes helped the Court achieve impor-
tant successes, but the ECCC’s structure has presented even its most talented 





Pairing the Court’s National 
and International Features
All new mass crimes courts involve considerable establishment challenges, from 
the mundane to the extraordinary. Funds must be raised, staff must be hired, 
suitable premises must be equipped, basic administrative procedures and sup-
port must be developed. The court’s procedures and the scope of its jurisdiction 
and authority must be determined. Because foundational documents are politi-
cal compromises inevitably riddled with lacunae, much of the character of a new 
court is created over time through practice instilled by those entrusted with 
decision- making power, such as administrative heads, prosecutors, and judges. 
Appealable rulings may take years to reach finality on key issues— time a court 
with a limited lifespan can ill afford.
The ECCC has faced all these difficulties and more. As the first civil- law- 
based mass crimes tribunal, the ECCC has been required to forge a new legal 
path. Compounding this challenge, its unique hybrid features raised many hur-
dles as Court officials worked to translate the 2003 Framework Agreement and 
2004 ECCC Law into a functioning judicial institution. In particular, ECCC 
officials have had to manage the difficult task of “pairing” the international and 
domestic aspects of the Court. Although that theme pervades all of the Court’s 
operations, this chapter focuses on three distinct sets of challenges that the 
ECCC faced almost immediately after it opened its doors in the summer of 
2006. First, the Court has struggled to run an efficient and transparent judicial 
process in an institution staffed by two pairs of officials with investigatory pow-
ers and comprising two chambers of appeal. Second, it has endeavored to pair 
national and international substantive laws, both of which present interpretive 
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challenges due to the Court’s temporal jurisdiction in the late 1970s. Third, the 
ECCC has had to determine what blend of national and international proce-
dural rules to apply. The difficulty of fusing the tribunal’s various domestic and 
international elements has arguably resulted in the most complex, cumbersome, 
and challenging mass crimes process to date.
The ECCC’s Ambiguous  
Institutional Identity
Many of the ECCC’s challenges are rooted in the fact that it was born with an 
ambiguous legal identity, neither fully domestic nor fully international in na-
ture. Although the Framework Agreement set many of the terms for the ECCC, 
the Court was created by the ECCC Law within the national judicial system, 
making the ECCC the only hybrid court featuring UN involvement to be estab-
lished by an act by a domestic legislature.1 Cambodian Deputy Prime Minister 
Sok An has called it “a national court with international characteristics,” noting 
that it is “firmly located in the national courts but involv[es] both national and 
international law; national and international judges, prosecutors, staff; and na-
tional and international financing.”2 UN Secretary- General Ban Ki- moon has 
described it similarly.3 The ECCC’s Pre- Trial Chamber (PTC) has called the 
Court “a special internationalized tribunal” because “[f ]or all practical and legal 
purposes . . . [it] is, and operates as, an independent entity within the Cambo-
dian court structure.”4 Likewise, the Trial Chamber has found that the ECCC 
“is a separately constituted, independent and internationalized court.”5 “Inter-
nationalized,” an ambiguous term denoting courts with both national and inter-
national legal features, obscures rather than elucidates the Court’s legal status, 
however, as none of the Court’s chambers has explained precisely what this ap-
pellation means.
Neither the Framework Agreement nor the ECCC Law addresses the rela-
tionship between the ECCC and other Cambodian courts. The ECCC has an 
independent structure and specialized jurisdiction, and it incorporates foreign 
staff. It is functionally autonomous, but unlike the Special Court for Sierra Le-
one (SCSL) and Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL), it does not have con-
current jurisdiction with domestic courts or primacy over them.6 Although in 
practice it is unlikely that any ordinary Cambodian court would concurrently 
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seek to indict persons for crimes of the Khmer Rouge era, there is no legal 
prohibition on one doing so, nor is there provision for a jurisdictional conflict. 
The ECCC has neither the power to take a case away from, nor the ability to 
review the decisions of, other Cambodian courts. As found by the ECCC Trial 
Chamber, “There is no line of authority between the ECCC and other courts in 
the Cambodian Judicial system.”7
The ECCC’s legal basis and unclear legal status distinguish it from the 
SCSL and STL. Although the SCSL is also a hybrid court,8 its Appeals Cham-
ber ruled that it is “an autonomous and independent institution” outside of Si-
erra Leone’s domestic judiciary and a “new jurisdiction operating in the sphere 
of international law” that was “vested with juridical capacity” by a treaty between 
the UN and Sierra Leone.9 The STL— set up to address the assassination of 
former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri in 2005 and related offenses— 
has been characterized as primarily international in nature for similar reasons.10 
The ECCC’s legal status is somewhat closer to the models followed in Kosovo 
and Bosnia and Herzegovina, which are primarily domestic but include inter-
national participation.
The ECCC’s legal identity is potentially relevant to many issues faced by the 
Court, such as the choice of procedural rules to apply, the scope of its jurisdic-
tion, and the applicability of Cambodia’s penal code to sentencing. Neverthe-
less, it is likely to remain ambiguous. Unlike the SCSL, no final verdict on its le-
gal character seems possible, because of both the extreme hybridity of the Court 
and the intensely political nature of the question. Instead, the impact of the 
Court’s hybrid status on which legal principles to apply has been determined on 
a case- by- case basis, exposing the Court to allegations of cherry- picking laws 
and rules to achieve desired results.
Pairing Cambodian and UN Investigators: 
Challenges to Efficiency
Although the ECCC is described as a mixed tribunal, it could just as accurately 
be described as a “divided” one. The ECCC is the only court to be split into 
national and international “sides” with separate hiring and reporting structures. 
These unique structural features were intended to accommodate Cambodian 
ownership of the process while insulating the Court from Cambodian politi-
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cal interference and safeguarding its compliance with international standards. 
However, they have created a Rube Goldberg– like apparatus that at times 
seems designed to ensure that few of the aging accused will live until judgment. 
During tribunal negotiations in 2003, the UN Secretary- General argued that 
the ECCC was “structured and organized in a way that was highly complex and 
which afforded ample scope for obstruction and delay in the conduct of their 
proceedings.”11 Former Ieng Sary defense lawyer Michael G. Karnavas wonders:
Did the people negotiating from New York actually know what they were do-
ing? Because I think the locals did. They wanted a process in place that had all 
sorts of safety valves that would allow it to stall or to be controlled at the local 
level. And that’s a major flaw.12
The ECCC is unique in having national and international Co- Prosecutors 
and in having national and international Co- Investigating Judges (CIJs).13 The 
ECCC’s structure grants investigatory powers to both pairs of individuals and 
the offices they co- lead: the Office of the Co- Prosecutors (OCP) and Office 
of the Co- Investigating Judges (OCIJ). Together, the Co- Prosecutors conduct 
preliminary investigations into crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.14 
Unique among hybrid courts, the ECCC retains the French- based civil law 
preference for giving investigative judges the primary investigatory role. The 
Co- Prosecutors open a judicial investigation by sending the CIJs an introduc-
tory submission outlining the facts and naming persons to be investigated.15 
The CIJs can only investigate the facts set forth in the introductory submission 
unless they receive permission from the Co- Prosecutors in the form of a supple-
mentary submission.16 They may also charge persons not named in a submis-
sion after “seeking the advice” of the Co- Prosecutors.17 The Co- Prosecutors thus 
control which crime sites are investigated, while the CIJs make the final decision 
about which persons to send to trial and for what alleged offenses.18
The Framework Agreement requires the “cos” in each office to “cooperate 
with a view to arriving at a common approach,”19 but it also anticipates disagree-
ments. If the national and international heads of the same office cannot agree, 
they may register the dispute and take it before the Pre- Trial Chamber (PTC). 
Former international CIJ Marcel Lemonde has described this as “probably the 
worst structure that you can imagine.”20 The Court also has two distinct appel-
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late bodies— the PTC and Supreme Court Chamber (SCC)— whose decisions 
cannot be appealed. Yet PTC decisions are final only with regard to “co” dis-
putes; SCC decisions are final on all other matters. This duplication of author-
ity allows challenges to be brought four or more times before resolution. PTC 
Judge Rowan Downing has called this remarkably complex system “a waste of 
time which has caused years of delay[.]”21
Two Pairs of Two Investigators
The political decision to endow the Court with two co- equal prosecutors and 
investigating judges presents a serious structural challenge to judicial efficien-
cy.22 Although the Co- Prosecutors’ investigation is intended to be “preliminary,” 
and in the civil law system may be brief, in practice the Co- Prosecutors had over 
one year to investigate due to the judges’ inability to finalize the Court’s rules 
of procedure until mid- 2007.23 This delay is thus not attributable to conflicts 
within the OCP, and it appears that the national and international sides gener-
ally have had a productive relationship despite an ongoing disagreement over 
whether or not to charge additional suspects (discussed in chapter 6). Early 
difficulties in the working relations between the predominantly common law– 
trained staff of the OCP and the civil law– trained staff of the OCIJ have often 
been attributed to their different legal orientations.24
Due to the secrecy of the judicial investigation, it is difficult to determine if 
delays in indicting the first five charged persons were the consequence of the dif-
ferent viewpoints or work styles of the national and international CIJs or other 
factors. The international CIJ at that time has noted that because there are “co” 
heads of the office, “[E]very decision is like negotiating a treaty. In France or 
elsewhere, taking a decision takes half an hour, here we need 8 days.”25 After re-
ceiving the Co- Prosecutors’ first introductory submission, the Co- Investigating 
Judges split accused Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch’s role in the S- 21 detention cen-
ter (Case 001) from the case against the other four charged persons (Case 002), 
citing the need for “expedited resolution.”26 The judicial investigation of Duch 
then took an additional 10 months to close27— resulting in nearly two years of 
investigation of an accused who admitted to most of the facts against him. The 
judicial investigation against the other four charged persons, who contested 
their guilt, took an additional two and a half years28— an investigation almost as 
long as the original life expectancy of the Court.
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Investigating Judges and Mass Crimes Trials:  
Efficiency vs. Transparency
The inclusion of CIJs in the ECCC’s structure has posed challenges to the 
Court’s transparency and efficiency. In adversarial legal systems, the parties in-
vestigate the facts and present their versions of events orally at trial in the light 
most beneficial to their legal interests. In inquisitorial systems, all evidence is 
gathered confidentially by a public official, such as an investigating judge, and 
placed in an evidentiary case file for review by the trial court.29 Although all 
previous international and hybrid courts have been predominantly common- 
law oriented, in theory, the inquisitorial system could have two advantages over 
the adversarial system in mass crimes trials: efficiency and objectivity. An inde-
pendent and neutral official “seeks the truth” by gathering both inculpatory and 
exculpatory evidence in a written dossier30 and presenting all information nec-
essary for the trial judges to reach judgment. An impartial collection of facts in 
a case file could result in a more efficient process and greater historical accuracy 
than the partial view of events offered by adversarial parties.
However, there are conceptual and practical problems with following the 
civil law approach in mass crimes trials. Significantly, the judicial investigation— 
which at least according to the French model is “by far the longest part of the 
case”— is confidential, with the public trial intended only to verify rather than 
fully air the detailed findings.31 Although criminal prosecutions of individuals 
must be focused on particular crime sites and charges and cannot be confused 
with a truth commission process addressing an entire historical period, such 
proceedings inevitably address and establish facts within the context of larger, 
often politicized events. The logic of trying a few top leaders for serious crimes 
so that the public can witness accountability and learn why and how events oc-
curred is undermined if the public cannot see justice in action. Clint William-
son, former UN Special Expert to advise on the UN Assistance to the Khmer 
Rouge Trials, argues:
The idea that having a judicial investigation process behind closed doors would 
speed the process was deeply flawed, because there is so much appetite from the 
public to hear the story . . . a lengthy trial phase is bound to happen.32
The voluminous materials at issue in large- scale atrocity trials also diminish 
the benefits of a judge- led investigation. At the ECCC, the burden of becoming 
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familiar with the structure, workings, and policies of the Communist Party of 
Kampuchea, sifting through the plethora of existing documentary evidence, and 
speaking to the substantial number of potential witnesses of crimes occurring 
over 30 years ago is enormous. In these circumstances, placing all investigative 
responsibility on the shoulders of two co- judges may have offered no advantage 
in the goal of seeking “truth,” as the CIJs’ capacity and time was limited, and 
their findings inevitably selective. They simply could not be expected to con-
duct as exhaustive an investigation as would four separate defense teams and 
a prosecutor’s office, each actively seeking and contesting evidence.33 Moreover, 
because the CIJs were required to assemble a complete case to put before the 
Trial Chamber, their lengthy investigation created a bottleneck preventing the 
entire process from moving toward public trial proceedings.34
Some ECCC officials expected that the Court would combine the best of 
civil law and common law: an efficient judge- led investigation followed by a 
short, somewhat adversarial trial with a few key witnesses.35 The first interna-
tional CIJ initially estimated six months for investigation and three months 
for trial.36 However, due to his decision to not allow defense teams to confront 
witnesses during the investigation,37 the Trial Chamber’s inability to become 
familiar with all the information in the massive case file or apply hybrid rules 
consistently, and the public interest in observing the process, the Court’s trial 
proceedings incorporate a jumbled assortment of inquisitorial and adversarial 
practices undercutting the anticipated expediency of a civil law trial. Former CIJ 
Marcel Lemonde says the idea was to adopt a system to ensure more efficiency 
due to the age of the suspects. However, “the dish was not exactly what we or-
dered.” The ECCC has not held the first civil law mass crimes trial, he suggests, 
because a genuine civil law process didn’t happen.38
Numerous witnesses have been heard— to all appearances both to edify the 
public and to familiarize the Trial Chamber with the nuances of these complex 
cases. Although civil law judges normally direct the questioning of parties and 
selected witnesses, in Case 002 the judges reduced their burden to become ex-
perts with the case file by tasking the parties with primary responsibility for 
questioning judicially selected witnesses.39 Moreover, responding to challenges 
to the fairness of the judicial investigation, the Trial Chamber decided that it 
would place greater weight on evidence supported by oral testimony. In civil law 
jurisdictions, and at many mass crimes courts, trial judges often rely on written 
witness statements in lieu of oral testimony when the statements do not speak 
to the acts or conduct of the accused.40 However, the ECCC Trial Chamber has 
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found that, though witness statements taken by the CIJs are “entitled to a pre-
sumption of relevance and reliability[,]”41 they may be entitled “to little, if any 
probative value or weight” if the witness does not testify at trial due to the lack 
of prior opportunity for confrontation.42 These incongruous results highlight 
the ongoing tension between the desire for trial efficiency and the obligation to 
provide a fair, highly visible, public trial.
The ECCC’s procedure— two separate investigations, preparation of a dos-
sier containing all the evidence, followed by an oral hearing of the evidence in 
court— is both slow and repetitive.43 International Deputy Co- Prosecutor Wil-
liam Smith contends that “[a] party- driven system is better for mass crimes as 
it is the fastest way to get to the truth,” but nevertheless believes, “[I]t is impor-
tant to use the local legal system so the process is relevant.”44 Cambodian CIJ 
You Bunleng argues that although the investigation procedures have been time- 
consuming, the procedures used during trial are more efficient than those of the 
common law system.45 Yet to most observers, the ECCC’s hybrid structure has 
produced the “worst possible outcome.”46 Most ECCC actors agree.47 As Trial 
Chamber Judge Silvia Cartwright has noted, it is indeed “anomalous” that the 
ECCC model necessitates a “full- length judicial investigation and a full- length 
trial.”48
The Pre- Trial Chamber: A Duplicate Appeals Chamber
The ECCC’s inefficiency is due not only to the novel challenge of incorporat-
ing a judicial investigation into a mass crimes context. It also results from the 
incorporation of a pretrial chamber. Under the ECCC Law, the PTC’s only 
responsibility is to decide disagreements between pairs of national and inter-
national Co- Prosecutors or CIJs.49 However, the Internal Rules adopted by the 
ECCC in 2007 expanded the PTC’s jurisdiction to include appeals against or-
ders of the CIJs. PTC decisions are not appealable, but the Internal Rules do 
not address the extent to which its appellate decisions bind the Trial Chamber. 
The Trial Chamber has held that it has “no competence to review decisions of 
the Pre- Trial Chamber.”50 As a consequence, before being finally resolved, core 
questions can be raised at least four times before different judicial bodies: the 
CIJs, the PTC, the Trial Chamber, and the Supreme Court Chamber.51
For example, before Ieng Sary’s death, the effect of his pardon and amnesty 
was addressed by the CIJs twice, reviewed by the PTC twice on appeal, then re-
2RRP 
Pairing the Court’s National and International Features / 49
viewed de novo by the Trial Chamber before it was appealed to the SCC for final 
resolution.52 His defense counsel Michael Karnavas called this a waste of both 
money and effort. “Now I have to jump through four different hoops in order to 
be due diligent so I can say I preserved my record for appeal.”53
The PTC recognized the potential overlap and in general exercised its ju-
risdiction narrowly. It emphasized that questions raised on appeal that are also 
explicitly within the jurisdiction of the Trial Chamber can “be raised and ad-
dressed fully at later stages of the proceedings[.]”54 For example, in response to 
Duch’s request for a remedy for illegal detention by the Cambodian Military 
Court, the PTC determined, “It would not be appropriate for the Pre- Trial 
Chamber to make the statements requested when another judicial body may 
well become seized of this case for trial and will have to make its own decisions 
on the basis of the evidence and the submissions made before it.”55 Similarly, it 
reportedly did not want to “pre- empt” the Trial Chamber’s ruling on the appli-
cation of “Joint Criminal Enterprise” liability to ECCC proceedings.56
This approach has not forestalled repeated rulings on fundamental issues, 
however. In assessing the impact of Ieng Sary’s 1996 pardon and amnesty on the 
appropriateness of his detention, the Pre- Trial Chamber focused narrowly on 
the Court’s ability to hold him in provisional custody and did not reach the un-
derlying jurisdictional issue.57 However, when Ieng Sary again raised the ques-
tion on appeal from the Closing Order, the PTC was obligated to address the 
heart of the matter.58
The defense argued, “Such a fundamental issue as whether the ECCC has 
jurisdiction to try Mr. IENG Sary may not be left for resolution at a later date 
[by the Trial Chamber] when it can be decided now.”59 The PTC agreed, em-
phasizing that by sending Ieng Sary to trial the CIJs had implicitly confirmed 
the Court’s jurisdiction over him.60 “Concluding otherwise would deprive Ieng 
Sary from exercising his right of appeal on a jurisdictional issue that was prop-
erly raised before the Co- Investigating Judges but upon which the later failed 
to make a judicial determination.”61 As a consequence, it issued a ruling on this 
matter in the same decision in which it sent Ieng Sary before the Trial Chamber, 
which was immediately requested to review the issue de novo.
In this and many other instances, the ECCC’s complex hybrid structure has 
compromised the Court’s efficiency.62 As discussed in subsequent chapters, this 
has not prevented the Court from making decisions on sound judicial bases and 
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in a manner consistent with international standards. It has, however, elongated 
a process that has far outlived its original three- year mandate and contributed 
to further delays in trials that are already well overdue.
Pairing International and Cambodian 
Substantive Law: Jurisdictional 
Challenges
In addition to pairing two hybrid investigatory offices and managing a pair of 
appeals chambers, the ECCC has had to couple elements of domestic and inter-
national criminal law. Hybrid substantive jurisdiction is a hallmark of a mixed 
court like the ECCC. The ECCC has authority to try suspects for the domestic 
crimes of homicide, torture, and religious persecution under the 1956 Cambo-
dian Penal Code and the well- known international offenses of genocide, crimes 
against humanity, and war crimes.63 The Court is also mandated to try the novel 
crimes of destruction of cultural property and attacks against diplomatic per-
sonnel; however, these have not been charged, likely because the elements of 
both offenses are unclear.64
Applying both national and international criminal law always introduces 
complexity, but the ECCC faced particular challenges due to the scope of its 
temporal jurisdiction. It is the only hybrid court to prosecute international 
crimes committed in the 1970s, after the Nuremberg trials laid the foundation 
for modern international criminal jurisprudence but well before the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda (ICTY and 
ICTR) developed international criminal law rapidly in the 1990s. As a result, 
the ECCC has had to do more than simply apply two bodies of law: it has had 
to determine the scope of criminal liability for international crimes during the 
1970s and the effect of a domestic statute of limitations. The ECCC Chambers 
did not accept defense arguments mooting the applicability of international 
crimes, but disagreement between national and international judges regarding 
the applicability of the domestic statute of limitations has prevented conviction 
on the basis of national crimes.
Jurisdiction to Apply International Crimes
The ECCC’s ambiguous hybrid form has led to challenges to its authority, as 
defense teams have highlighted the Court’s national character and argued that 
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it lacks jurisdiction to prosecute international crimes and modes of liability. In 
indicting the accused in Case 002, the Co- Investigating Judges found that “[t]he 
question whether the ECCC are Cambodian or international ‘in nature’ has no 
bearing on the ECCC’s jurisdiction to prosecute [international] crimes, provided 
that the principle of nullum crimen sine lege [no crime without law] is respected.”65 
To the contrary, the defense said the issue was “fundamental” to the applicability 
of international crimes and forms of liability in ECCC proceedings.66
Nullum crimen sine lege prohibits the retroactive application of criminal laws. 
The Framework Agreement, ECCC Law, and Internal Rules do not include an 
explicit nullum crimen prohibition, but the Agreement references Article 15(1) 
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which 
states in part: “No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account 
of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence, under na-
tional or international law, at the time when it was committed.” In the Duch 
appeal judgment, the SCC explicitly recognized this provision’s applicability to 
the ECCC.67
The ICTY has held that for international courts to conform to this prin-
ciple of legality, acts that are not criminalized under either domestic or inter-
national law at the time they are committed may not be prosecuted. Moreover, 
the proscribed mode of responsibility or offense must have been sufficiently 
foreseeable and accessible to the accused. This requires that a charged person 
“be able to appreciate that [his or her] conduct is criminal in the sense generally 
understood, without reference to any specific provision.”68 The prohibited act 
may have been proscribed under either conventional or customary law, and need 
not have been criminalized in precisely the same terms in which it is prosecuted 
as long as the underlying conduct is the same.69 The appalling character of the 
act may undercut any claim by the accused that they were unaware that their 
acts were criminal.70
Because the ECCC is the first internationalized court with a temporal ju-
risdiction falling between World War II and the rapid development of interna-
tional criminal law after the Cold War, it is the first to authoritatively define the 
existence and scope of international crimes during that period. The Chambers 
cannot merely assume that each substantive crime and mode of liability placed 
within the Court’s jurisdiction by the ECCC Law complies with the nullum cri-
men principle, but must consider this principle with regard to each substantive 
crime and mode and define its elements accordingly.71
Modes of liability refer to the various ways by which an individual can 
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participate in the commission of a crime, either directly or indirectly. This is a 
crucial concept— particularly in mass- atrocity trials targeting leadership figures 
who may never have personally killed or tortured anyone. At the ECCC, ac-
cused persons may be charged with either direct responsibility or their failure to 
exercise responsibility as a superior. Article 29 of the ECCC Law provides that 
direct responsibility attaches whenever an accused person “planned, instigated, 
ordered, aided and abetted, or committed” a crime over which the Court has 
jurisdiction.
In the Court’s second case the defense teams argued that, because the 
ECCC is a national court, in accordance with Cambodian law’s narrow defini-
tion of nullum crimen sine lege,72 it could only prosecute acts criminalized under 
Cambodian domestic law during the 1975– 79 period.73 In their view, because no 
international crimes or modes of liability were criminalized in Cambodia’s 1956 
Criminal Code, and international law is not directly applicable in Cambodia’s 
dualist system, the ECCC has no power to try them.74
The SCC has not yet considered this Case 002 challenge, but in its Case 001 
judgment it found the international nullum crimen principle applicable to the 
proceedings due to the ECCC Law’s reference to ICCPR article 15, and without 
elaboration followed international jurisprudence in determining that charge-
able offenses may have existed under either national law or international law in-
cluding treaties, custom, or general principles.75 However, the ICTY authority 
cited by the SCC specifically states that the “accessibility” requirement does not 
exclude reliance on customary international law “in the case of an international 
tribunal[.]”76 It therefore remains unclear on what doctrinal basis the SCC has 
found this approach likewise appropriate for a hybrid national court.
Addressing the defense challenge directly, the Pre- Trial Chamber found 
that by giving the ECCC the authority to apply international law in accordance 
with the ICCPR’s formulation of nullum crimen sine lege, Cambodia created an 
exception to the rule of legality under national law.77 It ruled: “Even if the ECCC 
were considered to be a simply domestic court, jurisdiction is not in question as 
long as a law that grants it exists and related requirements are met.”78 Follow-
ing this reasoning, international crimes and modes of liability in existence dur-
ing the temporal jurisdiction of the Court need not have been implemented by 
domestic Cambodian law at that time to be applied by the ECCC.79 The PTC 
thus determined that the nature of the court as national or “internationalized” 
has no bearing on the Court’s ability to apply international law.80 The issue is 
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currently before the Trial Chamber, which has chosen not to issue its ruling 
until judgment.
The defense also raised concerns with regard to the legality of prosecuting 
specific international crimes. Two of their arguments touch on areas of long- 
standing uncertainty in international law. Because of disagreement among the 
ECCC Chambers on the appropriate interpretation of sketchy past precedent, 
even when there is finality for the parties, the legal questions are likely to linger 
for consideration by other courts as well as legal scholars.
Because the Nuremberg Charter required a nexus between crimes against 
humanity and another crime within its jurisdiction (crimes against peace or war 
crimes), there has long been a dispute as to whether this nexus was required 
by international law, and if so, at what point in time the nexus was no longer a 
required legal element. In the Duch case, the Trial Chamber charted new terri-
tory in finding that the customary definition of crimes against humanity from 
1975 to 1979 did not require the existence of a nexus with an armed conflict.81 
However, in considering an appeal from the Closing Order in Case 002, the 
Pre- Trial Chamber reviewed the precedent at length and found that, due to a 
lack of clarity in the law, a nexus was required.82 Reviewing the same historical 
precedent, but with different emphasis, the Trial Chamber once again affirmed 
that no nexus was required.83 This issue will be finally determined by the SCC, 
but due to the restrictive right of interlocutory appeal, not until its review of the 
first Case 002 judgment.84
Because the crime of rape was an enumerated crime against humanity in 
the statutes of post– World War II courts, the ECCC Trial Chamber found 
that it existed as a crime under international law during the temporal jurisdic-
tion of the Court.85 Nevertheless, in Case 001 it characterized the one proved 
instance of rape as the crime against humanity of torture. On appeal, the SCC 
overturned the Trial Chamber’s finding that rape existed as a distinct crime 
against humanity in the 1970s, finding that “[a]lthough rape had . . . been well 
established as a war crime by 1975, its status as a crime against humanity under 
international law had not yet crystallized” until the 1990s.86 Nevertheless, it up-
held the Trial Chamber’s finding that the rape could, and in this circumstance 
did, amount to the crime against humanity of torture.87
In Case 002, the Pre- Trial Chamber likewise found that rape did not exist 
as an enumerated crime against humanity during the temporal jurisdiction of 
the Court and struck the charge from the indictment, instead characterizing the 
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act as falling within the residual category of crimes against humanity of “other 
inhumane acts.”88 Because the first Case 002 trial does not include rape charges, 
there will be no judgment on this characterization unless a second trial is held.
Differences between the Chambers on these questions do not appear to be 
the product of the Court’s hybrid nature but instead of the challenges inherent 
in assessing trends in customary international criminal law prior to its expo-
nential development in the 1990s. Such challenges suggest that, to the extent 
possible, hybrid courts with a limited lifespan and tenuous funding should not 
be tasked with applying novel crimes— as was the ECCC with regard to crimes 
of destruction of cultural property and attacks against diplomatic personnel. It 
is incongruous to expect such courts to both act swiftly and drive the develop-
ment of new law.
jurisdiction to apply international  
modes of liability
The primary controversy that the ECCC has addressed with regard to modes of 
liability is the appropriateness of charging the accused with “committing” crimes 
through their active participation in a common criminal plan, also known as a 
“joint criminal enterprise” or JCE. JCE is a theory of liability first articulated in 
ICTY jurisprudence and, though not listed in the ICTY/R or SCSL Statutes, 
has been found to be contained therein as a form of “commission.” It is used to 
connect high- level accused— the planners, organizers, and ideologues who may 
not be physically connected to criminal acts but were catalysts for them— to the 
lower- level offenders who executed the crimes at their behest. It is particularly 
useful in a situation such as that faced by the ECCC, where those who carried out 
crimes (for example, Duch in Case 001) claim they were acting under duress, and 
those at the top of the organizational hierarchy (the senior leaders in Case 002) 
claim the crimes were committed by errant or overenthusiastic lower- level cadres.
There are three JCE categories.89 All three involve “a plurality of persons” 
acting with a common purpose to commit crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
Court. The accused must contribute to this common plan. Each JCE category 
has a different mental or mens rea requirement. Participants in a JCE- 1 or “ba-
sic” JCE must share the intent to commit a crime within the jurisdiction of 
the court. JCE- 2, also known as “systemic” JCE, is a variant of the basic form 
and is characterized by the existence of an organized system of ill- treatment. 
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Thus far, it has only been found in cases involving prison camps, including the 
S- 21 detention center. To be held liable for JCE- 2, participants must have had 
personal knowledge of the system of ill- treatment and intended to further that 
system. An accused who participates in a basic or systemic JCE can also be held 
responsible for JCE- 3, known as “extended” JCE, for crimes falling outside the 
scope of the plan if it was foreseeable that those crimes would be committed in 
furtherance of the plan and the accused knowingly took that risk. JCE- 3 is the 
most contentious due to the fact that the accused need not intend or play a role 
in the “extended” crime with which he or she is charged.
The status of JCE liability as of 1975 has never been addressed squarely in 
legal proceedings. In the Tadic case, the ICTY determined that JCE has existed 
under customary international law as of 1992. In so doing, it relied primarily on 
post– World War II, pre- 1975 international and domestic precedent. However, 
its reasoning remains highly controversial.
When the issue of JCE arose in the ECCC’s first case, Ieng Sary sought to 
offer submissions on its applicability, even though he was not an accused in the 
proceedings. His defense argued, “The application of JCE liability at the ECCC 
fundamentally affects Mr. IENG Sary because he is alleged [in the indictment] 
to be part of the same ‘common criminal plan’ as Duch. In these circumstances, 
Mr. IENG Sary has a clear interest in the outcome of the appeal[.]”90 The PTC 
noted that Ieng was not a party to the case, and that neither the Internal Rules 
nor the Cambodian Code of Criminal Procedure provides a right for third- 
party intervention. Moreover, the decision would “not be directly applicable to 
Ieng Sary, who will still have the possibility to challenge the application of the 
theory of joint criminal enterprise in [the case] to which he is a party.” 91 A joint 
intervention by co- accused Ieng Thirith, Nuon Chea, and Khieu Samphan was 
similarly rebuffed. The Pre- Trial Chamber reasoned:
[I]t is inherent to courts where several proceedings are pending that a decision 
in one case on a legal issue will guide the court in future similar cases where no 
new circumstances or arguments are raised. It does not result from that situa-
tion that charged persons have the right to intervene in a case file to which they 
are not parties to submit their views on an issue. 92
This ruling was later confirmed by the Trial Chamber, which found no violation 
of “equality of arms,” as this principle “cannot be applied to parties in separate 
and distinct trials.”93
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Although these decisions are based on sound precedent, they disregard the 
fact that the ECCC, unlike other domestic and some international courts, will 
try only a handful of defendants for related crimes. Moreover, Duch, who essen-
tially pled guilty, had little motivation to argue vigorously against the applicabil-
ity of JCE, yet the final ruling was likely to be followed in Case 002, in which it 
would have a major impact. Indeed, the Trial Chamber found that JCE- 1 and 
JCE- 2 fall within the jurisdiction of the Court both in the Duch case94 and also 
subsequently in Case 002.95
The Trial Chamber did not, however, make any findings about JCE- 3 in 
Case 001. When the applicability of JCE- 3 arose in the Court’s second case, the 
Trial Chamber agreed with the Pre- Trial Chamber that the precedent cited by 
the Tadic court was unclear and its legal reasoning was unconvincing.96 As a 
consequence, it ruled that JCE- 3 “did not form part of customary international 
law and was not a general principle of law at the time relevant[.]”97 Although the 
Trial Chamber’s decision is limited to the ECCC’s temporal jurisdiction, it is a 
direct challenge to Tadic’s finding that JCE- 3 existed in customary international 
law at the time that decision was handed down, and thus one of the Court’s 
most notable jurisprudential legacies.
In addition to direct responsibility, Article 29 of the ECCC Law allows ac-
cused persons to be held responsible as superiors for the crimes of their sub-
ordinates if they “had effective command and control or authority and control 
over the subordinate . . . knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was 
about to commit such acts or had done so, and . . . failed to take the necessary 
and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or punish the perpetrators.” All 
international and hybrid courts provide for liability for superior responsibility. 
However, the application of this doctrine to civilian (as opposed to military) 
hierarchies as of 1975 has not been litigated previously.
In the Duch judgment, the ECCC Trial Chamber found the accused, a civil-
ian prison chief, responsible as a superior for international crimes committed by 
his subordinates.98 In Case 002, the accused have argued that superior responsi-
bility did not exist in customary international law during the temporal jurisdic-
tion of the Court, and if it did, it was applicable only to military commanders 
and war crimes. Although finding the post– World War II jurisprudence articu-
lation of the doctrine to be “not always clear or complete” and the application of 
its elements “at times inconsistent and incomplete,” the Pre- Trial Chamber has 
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ruled that this mode of liability existed under customary law by 197599 and ex-
tended to nonmilitary superiors.100 As the Trial Chamber has already accepted 
the applicability of this mode in Case 001, it is likely to uphold this ruling.
Jurisdiction to Apply National Crimes
The ECCC’s ability to try national crimes has been questioned on the basis 
of the domestic statute of limitations. Article 3 of the ECCC Law gives the 
Court the jurisdiction to hear cases involving the crimes of homicide, torture, 
and religious persecution in the 1956 Cambodian Penal Code. The inclusion 
of domestic offenses in a court’s jurisdiction is often highlighted as one of the 
key indicators of a hybrid tribunal. For example, the SCSL Statute provides 
for jurisdiction over domestic offenses relating to the abuse of girls under the 
Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act of 1926 and to the wanton destruction of 
property under the Malicious Damage Act of 1861. According to the Secretary- 
General, this authority was provided “in cases where a specific situation or an 
aspect of it was considered to be either unregulated or inadequately regulated 
under international law.”101
As both the national and international crimes within the ECCC’s jurisdic-
tion are likely to cover the same underlying acts, this was probably not the rea-
son for which both are provided. The inclusion of national law offers a practi-
cal benefit: it allows the prosecution to charge an accused person with both 
international and domestic offenses with different elements, making it more 
likely that they will be able to secure a conviction.102 For example, even if the 
Co- Prosecutors were unable to establish that an accused was responsible for 
murder committed as part of an attack against the civilian population (a crime 
against humanity of murder), they might still be able to prove that he or she was 
responsible for simple murder under the domestic code.103
Domestic law charges may also provide symbolic benefits. Prosecution of 
domestic charges demonstrates that Khmer Rouge leaders violated not only in-
ternational law but also Cambodian law, possibly making the proceedings less 
“foreign” and therefore more meaningful to Cambodians. As noted by the Co- 
Prosecutors in their appeal of the Duch Closing Order, some commentators 
“have argued that charging national crimes will foster a sense of ‘ownership’ of 
the judicial proceedings for the Cambodian judiciary and the population as a 
whole.”104
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At the SCSL, no charges were ever brought for crimes under national law.105 
Comparatively, the ECCC Co- Prosecutors charged all accused in Cases 001 and 
002 with national offenses but were thwarted from pursuing them due to a split 
between the national and international judges on the applicability of the domes-
tic criminal code’s 10- year statute of limitations.
Statute of Limitations for National Crimes
The 1956 Cambodian Criminal Code includes a ten- year statute of limitations 
(SOL) for indicting criminalized acts. The ECCC Law extended the SOL by 
thirty years,106 raising nullum crimen sine lege questions. If the 1956 Law’s SOL 
began running in 1979, the time available for prosecution would have lapsed in 
1989 unless it was “tolled”— suspended because of the Khmers Rouges’ com-
plete destruction of the Cambodian justice system. The prosecution argued that 
the Cambodian judiciary was incapable of prosecuting Khmer Rouge leaders 
from 1979 until at least 1993. If the SOL expired in 2003, its extension in 2001 
would be valid, and the accused could be prosecuted for crimes under the 1956 
Code without violating fair trial standards.
In Case 001, there was a strict divide between the national and international 
judges of the Trial Chamber on the issue, with the national judges opining that 
the Cambodian judiciary continued to be dysfunctional until the establishment 
of the Kingdom of Cambodia in 1993, and the international judges finding that 
the prosecution had not proved that investigation and prosecution of Khmer 
Rouge crimes before that time would have been impossible, not merely chal-
lenging.107 Politically this was a remarkable development, as the Government 
has in the past referenced with pride the 1979 in absentia trial of Pol Pot and 
Ieng Sary. Of greater legal significance, the national judges found they had no 
competence to review the correctness of a 2001 decision by the Cambodian 
Constitutional Council that “in substance” found the limitations period to be 
compatible with the constitution.108
In contrast, the international judges considered the Council’s decision am-
biguous and thus found it necessary to construe national law in light of interna-
tional standards.109 Considering jurisprudence of the European Court of Hu-
man Rights and other national jurisdictions, as well as the recent approach of 
the Cambodian legislature toward statutory limitations in the domestic code, 
they found that the ECCC Law provided an “insufficient basis” to prosecute 
national crimes before the ECCC.110 In the absence of a supermajority of judges, 
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the Chamber found itself unable to consider the accused person’s responsibility 
for national crimes.111
As a consequence of the Trial Chamber’s split decision, the Co- Investigating 
Judges were unable to reach a consensus on how to proceed with national crimes 
in the Case 002 Closing Order. In order to avoid slowing down the proceedings, 
they did not file a dispute but instead by mutual agreement left the matter for 
the Trial Chamber to decide.112 However, the Trial Chamber noted that the 
Closing Order provided neither a description of the material facts on which the 
charges could be based nor the applicable modes of liability.113 For that reason 
it found that the Closing Order failed to inform the accused of the scope of the 
national charges, and they could not form the basis for trial proceedings.114 It 
was therefore unnecessary for them to rule again on the substance of the stat-
ute of limitations argument. As a consequence, the most national of all hybrid 
courts will not be prosecuting any national crimes.
The ECCC’s efforts to pair Cambodian and international criminal law re-
inforce the difficulty of operating an unprecedented hybrid court. Consider-
able time and judicial attention had to be devoted to determining the Court’s 
substantive jurisdiction before trials could be held. The Chambers have is-
sued sound jurisprudence on complex issues of first impression, most notably 
charting their own path on the contentious topic of JCE- 3. However, the Trial 
Chamber’s split decision on the Court’s jurisdiction over national crimes illus-
trates the propensity of national and international judges at the ECCC to fall 
into distinct camps on politically sensitive issues. Although international judges 
have disagreed with each other numerous times, there appears to have been only 
one public instance of Cambodian judges on the same bench disagreeing with 
each other.115 This tendency and its detrimental impact on the Court’s jurispru-
dence is related to the important issue of judicial independence, discussed in 
detail in chapter 6.
Pairing Local and International  
Rules of Procedure
The ECCC faced an even greater challenge in blending domestic and interna-
tional rules of procedure. The Framework Agreement and ECCC Law dictate 
that the ECCC’s procedure must be “in accordance with Cambodian Law,”116 
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with guidance from international procedural rules only where there is a lacuna, 
uncertainty in interpretation, or a question of consistency with international 
standards.117 This provision emphasizes the national institutional character of 
the ECCC and differentiates the Court from international tribunals such as 
the SCSL, which was mandated to apply the rules in force at the ICTR and 
to amend those rules or adopt new ones as necessary.118 However, the signifi-
cance of this distinction diminished after the ECCC adopted its own Internal 
Rules— necessitated by the lack of existing Cambodian procedures. Like other 
hybrid tribunals, the ECCC generally has interpreted and applied its proce-
dures in conformity with international precedent.
More than almost any other feature of the Court, the decision to have the 
Court apply Cambodian procedures— despite the lack of an authoritative code, 
the difficulties of adapting domestic criminal law rules to mass crimes prac-
tice, and the lack of precedent for using civil law rules in mass crimes cases— 
engenders the greatest criticism from Court actors. Although the ECCC is for-
mally part of the Cambodian judicial system, as it grew and evolved through 
practice, it acted more and more like an international court applying a mixture 
of both civil and common law procedures, as well as procedures specific to mass 
crimes courts. In the absence of statutory guidance for many of the novel top-
ics faced by this special court, the only available precedent was the practice of 
the heavily common law– oriented international tribunals, at which numerous 
international ECCC staff had previously worked.119 Nevertheless, Cambodian 
procedures have remained a source of reference and, especially for the SCC, 
often a point of departure. Inconsistent practice in pairing these two sources of 
law by the Chambers led to uncertainty and perceptions of arbitrary or ends- 
driven decision- making. Michael Karnavas says, “Whenever it suits them they 
just create new rules” instead of first looking at what is in place in the Cam-
bodian Code: “By judicial fiat they make these decisions. Today we’re going to 
apply this; tomorrow we’re going to apply that. Just tell me what the rules are so 
I know what to expect and how to proceed.”120
Ieng Thirith Co- Lawyer Diana Ellis says that a hybrid approach to pro-
cedures is “generally not a good idea” because meshing together two different 
culturally based approaches into a coherent system is challenging and time 
consuming.121 Michael Karnavas believes that, in hindsight, it would have been 
better to have modeled the Court’s procedure on the simpler ICTY rules than 
to tinker with the existing system by adding adversarial features, which has cre-
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ated more problems than it has solved.122 Civil Party Lead Co- Lawyer Elisabeth 
Simonneau Fort says detailed rules such as those applied by the International 
Criminal Court, but specifically tailored to the ECCC context, would have been 
most appropriate for a civil law court, and made it easier to apply international 
mass crimes jurisprudence.123 Most interviewees emphasize that domestic pro-
cedures are inappropriate for mass crimes trials and should never have been 
made the basis for the Court’s work.124
Legal Status and Legitimacy of the ECCC Internal Rules
Unlike the core documents of the ICTY, ICTR, and SCSL, the ECCC Law 
does not authorize the judges to adopt or amend the Court’s rules of evidence 
and procedure. As originally conceived, the ECCC was intended to directly 
apply domestic Cambodian rules of criminal procedure and to draw on in-
ternational rules only as needed.125 Article 12(1) of the Framework Agreement 
provides:
The Procedure shall be in accordance with Cambodian law. Where Cambodian 
law does not deal with a particular matter, or where there is uncertainty regard-
ing the interpretation or application of a relevant rule of Cambodian law, or 
where there is a question regarding the consistency of such a rule with interna-
tional standards, guidance may also be sought in procedural rules established at 
the international level.
Until the Cambodian Criminal Procedure Code (CPC) was adopted in August 
2007, Cambodia lacked a comprehensive criminal procedural code for the Ex-
traordinary Chambers to consult. The ECCC negotiators had blindly deferred 
to national procedures that did not yet exist and were unlikely to meet the needs 
of a specialized mass crimes court. For that reason, the ECCC judges almost 
immediately began drafting rules of procedure and evidence specifically tailored 
to ECCC proceedings.
According to the former Co- Chairman of the Inter- Governmental Support 
Group for the Extraordinary Chambers, the Cambodian Government took the 
position that Article 12(1) could be interpreted to grant the ECCC “rule- making 
authority as ‘effectuated guidance’ sought in internationally established proce-
dural rules.”126 In the preamble to the Internal Rules, the judges state that the 
rules were drafted in order “to consolidate applicable Cambodian procedure for 
62 / Hybrid Justice
2RRP
proceedings before the ECCC, and . . . to adopt additional rules where these ex-
isting procedures do not deal with a particular matter, or if there is uncertainty 
regarding their interpretation or application, or if there is a question regarding 
their consistency with international standards.”
Since the adoption of the Internal Rules, there have been challenges to their 
legality. Both the civil parties and defense teams have argued that their adoption 
amounts to an act of legislation in violation of the Cambodian Constitution’s 
separation of powers.127 The Nuon Chea team has emphasized that the ECCC 
is a domestic court that must apply national legislation, with variance from 
Cambodian procedural rules allowed only on a case- by- case basis.128 Nuon 
Chea’s lawyers have argued that the Court’s Internal Rules go far beyond their 
expressed aim to “consolidate applicable Cambodian procedure” and are thus 
ultra vires and without legal force.129
Considering the language of the Framework Agreement and ECCC Law 
and the Court’s status as a Cambodian court, these arguments are compelling. 
Unsurprisingly, however, the Trial Chamber judges (who participated in the 
plenary adopting the Internal Rules) have found that:
While [the Court’s] procedure is in accordance with Cambodian law, the 
ECCC is entitled to adopt its own Internal Rules in compliance with interna-
tional standards, which take into account the specific mechanisms necessary to 
adjudicate mass crimes.130
The judges did not address the allegation that they lack statutory authority to 
convene a rule- making plenary, except to note that “[o]ther international courts” 
have also adopted rules targeted to complex criminal proceedings.131 Moreover, 
they found that the rules of such courts “represent prevailing international stan-
dards in relation to cases adjudicating international crimes” and are consistent 
with the ECCC’s obligation to conduct proceedings in accordance with inter-
national standards.132
The defense also challenged specific provisions of the Internal Rules for 
departing too drastically from the CPC. For example, when the Rules were 
amended in 2008 to narrow the scope of appeal, the Defence Support Section 
(DSS) said, “This means that, at the ECCC, an accused now has a more lim-
ited right of appeal than at any other trial court in Cambodia.”133 Although the 
DSS accepted that the ECCC Law provided the judges authority to “supple-
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ment” Cambodian procedural law in “expressly limited circumstances,” in its 
view the judges lacked legal authority “to depart from the Cambodian proce-
dural law to the extent required to adopt the amendment.”134 To this the judges 
responded by again highlighting the distinct and unique nature of the ECCC’s 
jurisdiction as the basis for their decision to more closely follow international 
practice.135
The CPC is a detailed code drafted by French legal experts and only recent-
ly adopted after years of confusion about the applicable procedures in force.136 
Moreover, it is well documented that Cambodian criminal hearings are often 
abbreviated and fail to comply with basic standards of fairness.137 Thus, in prac-
tice, the procedures that comprise the CPC are to a great extent just as novel 
for many Cambodian lawyers and judges as they are for the international staff. 
It has been notable during trial hearings that the Cambodian Trial Chamber 
Judges often appear more deferential to the views of New Zealand Judge Cart-
wright on procedural questions, including on the appropriate role of civil par-
ties, than to those of her French counterpart Judge Lavergne.138 For this reason, 
the Nuon Chea team’s argument that the CPC “embodies the legal system [their 
client] is most familiar with”139 is not precisely true. Arguably, the decision to 
provide national “ownership” through the application of incipient domestic pro-
cedural law was always a matter of form over substance.
Problematically, the CPC is not even a contemporary representation of 
French law, which has been modified to address European Court of Human 
Rights criticisms and perceived weaknesses in the system— including to mini-
mize the role of the investigating judge.140 Judge Lemonde says, “I regret that 
the French experts gave Cambodia a tool that was obsolete before it was even 
used.”141 Therefore, it bears considering that existing domestic procedure may 
not be the best practice or even one that domestic lawyers support.142 For ex-
ample, in 2000, Sok Sam Oeun, Director of the Cambodia Defender’s Proj-
ect, expressed concern about the incorporation of investigative judges into the 
ECCC structure:
[W]hat worries me most is what will happen if the tribunal law is passed and 
implemented before the function of the investigating judge is abolished from 
the justice system in general. A KR tribunal with an investigating judge will cre-
ate a strong precedent and make the function of investigating judge much more 
difficult to remove in the future.143
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As highlighted by this statement, putting aside the added legal complications 
of applying domestic criminal procedures in the context of a mass crimes court, 
in practice there will be multifaceted and unanticipated interactions between a 
weak national legal system developing after a period of upheaval and an interna-
tionalized court. Giving precedence to fledgling national law as an end in itself is 
questionable, as it may mask more nuanced domestic legal controversies.
Rule- Drafting Controversies
Although both international and national judges accepted the practical need for 
the Court to adopt its own rules, during the drafting process there were sharp 
divisions on topics including the relationship between Cambodian and interna-
tional law144 and how the ECCC would operate within the Cambodian court 
structure.145 The international judges believed that international law standards 
would need to be applied in many cases; however, the national judges argued 
that Cambodian law must have primacy because the ECCC is part of the Cam-
bodian judicial system.146
Some foreign observers believed that the Cambodian judges unified around 
a pro- Cambodian law position because they were ill prepared to argue the sub-
stance of the legal questions involved.147 Others suggested that the primary 
stumbling block was the reluctance of Cambodian judges “to allow internation-
al barristers to conduct a robust scrutiny of the case against the accused” due 
a lack of experience with vigorous defense:148 “After 28 years everyone thinks 
they know who the guilty men are. Just put them in prison.”149 Some, however, 
claimed that the Government was deliberately holding things up. For example, 
in the view of former Khmer Rouge soldier Lath Nhoung, “The court’s process 
is to show internationals that they are working to try [the Khmer Rouge lead-
ers], but actually they will delay the process until they all die.”150 Most incisively, 
many noted that “[t]he government only wants to be part of a process it can 
control[.]”151
This view may be borne out by the national judges’ apparent efforts to scut-
tle the power- sharing arrangement painstakingly negotiated in the Agreement 
and gain control over who would be tried. One of their proposals was that if 
a disagreement arose between the nationals and internationals about whether 
or not to issue an indictment, the person under investigation could appeal to 
the Pre- Trial Chamber for a decision and, if there were no supermajority deci-
sion, the case would not proceed.152 This procedure would not only have directly 
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contradicted the Agreement and Law, but as noted by the American Embassy, 
would have also given the Cambodians “total veto power” over indictments.153
The major issue of public contention was over the scope of defense rights, 
both with regard to the creation of an ECCC defense office and the ability of 
foreign defense counsel to appear in court,154 and to many it appeared that the 
Court would collapse over the impasse. At one point the international Co- 
Investigating Judge stated, “If next month the new rules are not adopted  .  .  . 
[t]hen we would have to examine the possibility of the international judges ask-
ing the UN to withdraw and drop the whole process.”155
President of the Bar Association of the Kingdom of Cambodia (BAKC) Ky 
Tech, who was widely seen to be acting on behalf of the Government, took the 
lead in attacking the draft rules. He argued that “only [BAKC] can approve the 
list of defense attorneys for Khmer Rouge suspects, oversee lawyers’ training 
and discipline them for misconduct.”156 BAKC also demanded that the ECCC 
Defense Unit be renamed the Office of Defense Support and Cooperation and 
instituted under Cambodian leadership.157 At one point the national judges ar-
gued that the rules should not provide for a defense office at all and the BAKC 
should administer all ECCC defense matters.158
The issue was picked up by Deputy Prime Minister Sok An, who argued 
that “the administration, role, and functions” of the ECCC defense office and 
its relationship with the BAKC were not addressed in the Agreement, and the 
appointment of its international head was “insufficiently attuned to the specifics 
of the ECCC and its position ‘within the courts of Cambodia.’”159 He apparently 
sought “to reopen negotiations on the role of that office”— a request rejected by 
the UN.160 After months of strained discussions between the judges and po-
litical interlocutors,161 it was eventually agreed that the newly named “Defence 
Support Section” would consult with BAKC on procedures for assignment of 
lawyers and legal trainings, and that all foreign lawyers would be required to 
register with BAKC.162
The final stumbling block was BAKC’s demand that foreign lawyers pay a 
$500 membership application fee whether or not they were selected as coun-
sel, plus a $2,000 one- time fee and a $200 per- month fee if they were selected. 
Although this issue was technically outside the purview of the judges, the in-
ternational judges threatened to boycott the plenary at which the rules were 
to be finalized if the fees were not lowered. They argued that the high fees 
would reduce the number of foreign counsel interested in applying and lead 
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to defense arguments that the accused had been denied the right to counsel of 
their choice.163 Ky Tech called the threat childish and said it was proof that the 
foreign judges, not the Cambodian Government or the Bar Association, were 
“hindering the tribunal.”164
When the international judges threatened to exclude the BAKC entirely 
from the process of organizing foreign lawyers’ participation unless the fees 
were lowered, the national judges said they would not participate in the Court 
under those circumstances.165 National Co- Investigating Judge You Bunleng ar-
gued, “This tribunal is not the UN’s tribunal so how can [the Bar] be cut out? 
. . . When foreign lawyers come to work in a foreign country, there is interna-
tional law that they must respect the laws of their host country.”166 However, 
many observers viewed the BAKC demand as a form of extortion, especially as 
the Bar was unspecific about how the fees would be used.167 The BAKC even-
tually agreed that foreign lawyers could pay a flat $500 fee.168 At the final May 
2007 plenary, it seemed to some present that the national judges were acting 
under new, more flexible instructions, and for the first time there were “notice-
able points of disagreement among [them]— not on key issues, where all the 
Cambodian judges held firm— but on less contentious matters[.]”169 With the 
final hurdles overcome, the Rules were adopted in June 2007.
Debate over the Hierarchy of Rules
Although the judges acted without explicit statutory authority in adopting the 
Internal Rules, the Trial Chamber has affirmed that the Rules have primacy 
over the Cambodian Code of Criminal Procedure:
The Internal Rules . . . form a self- contained regime of procedural law related to 
the unique circumstances of the ECCC, made and agreed upon by the plenary 
of the ECCC. They do not stand in opposition to the Cambodian Criminal 
Procedure Code  .  .  . but the focus of the ECCC differs substantially enough 
from the normal operations of Cambodian criminal courts to warrant a special-
ized system. Therefore, the Internal Rules constitute the primary instrument to 
which reference should be made in determining procedures before the ECCC 
where there is a difference between the procedures in the Internal Rules and 
the CPC.170
Nevertheless, uncertainty remains regarding when it is appropriate to supple-
ment the Internal Rules by reference to the CPC. Elisabeth Simonneau Fort 
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says that, from a civil law perspective, the Internal Rules are not well written 
and lack sufficient detail to be precise. Moreover it is unclear what to do to fill 
the gaps, as the Court refers sometimes to civil law, sometimes common law, 
sometimes international law, and sometimes Cambodian law.171
The SCC has stated that the civil law rules of interpretation require con-
sideration of a provision’s language, its place in the system including “its relation 
to the main underlying principles,” and its objective.172 However, in a sui generis 
system such as the ECCC, this approach necessarily leads to confusion as to 
how related provisions of the Internal Rules and the CPC should be reconciled, 
as every question is a matter of first impression.173 Indeed in the same decision 
the SCC found that one CPC provision provided no guidance for a similarly 
worded Internal Rules provision, and that a second CPC provision provided 
essential guidance for a differently worded Internal Rules provision.
Internal Rule 68 and CPC Article 249 both establish a four- month limit 
for pretrial detention upon issuance of a closing order indicting an accused. 
The SCC found that, despite their similar time frame, Internal Rule 68 has 
no equivalent in the national code with regard to when this time limit com-
mences if there is an appeal against the closing order. Thus, even though the 
CPC clock starts running when the closing order is issued, the Internal Rules 
should be interpreted to start the clock when the appeal is actually filed, as 
each set of rules “must be evaluated against their systematic background.”174 In 
the case of the Internal Rules this background includes “the gravity of crimes 
and complexity of investigations, the need for greater pre- trial scrutiny over 
the charges and the need to broaden recourse [to appeal] by the defence” to in-
clude, for example, jurisdictional grounds.175 Consequently, “the [CPC] does 
not provide guidance for the matter at hand, as its provisions in the related 
area are not adequate for appeals designed for indictments in international 
crimes.”176
In the same decision, a supermajority of the SCC determined that provi-
sions of the Internal Rules and the CPC should be considered together with 
regard to when a defendant should be detained, as they both must be read “in 
the light of the presumption of liberty.”177 It found that Internal Rule 82(2), 
which provides the ECCC Trial Chamber general authority to release or detain 
an accused, must be interpreted in light of CPC article 306, which explicitly 
requires trial courts to make this decision on the basis of the statutory criteria 
for pretrial detention. Thus, although there is no such requirement in the Inter-
nal Rules, the SCC found that, because of the wording of CPC article 306, the 
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ECCC’s pretrial detention statutory criteria are incorporated into Internal Rule 
82(2).178 Judge Noguchi dissented on this point:
Due to the special mandate, jurisdiction, and structure of the ECCC, there are 
many provisions in the Internal Rules which do not exist or differ from the 
procedures for ordinary domestic cases to be tried before ordinary domestic 
courts. Therefore, the context within which to interpret the Internal Rules is 
first and foremost the Internal Rules themselves. Otherwise, it will be difficult 
for readers of the Internal Rules to know precisely what the procedural rules 
are before the ECCC. .  .  . When the meaning of a particular provision of the 
Internal Rules is sufficiently clear in its own context, recourse to the Code of 
Criminal Procedure is not necessary.179
This practical approach had been followed for five years by the lower cham-
bers and relied on by the parties.180 The SCC’s favored interpretive process is 
arguably one more unnecessary complication for a very complicated tribunal. 
Nevertheless, in undertaking this cumbersome approach, the SCC is show-
ing national procedures the deference they are intended to be shown under the 
ECCC Law and providing a potentially valuable legacy for the national judiciary.
For example, in the Case 001 appeals judgment, the SCC began discussing 
the criteria for civil parties by emphasizing that under the Framework Agree-
ment and ECCC Law, “Cambodian law remains the controlling procedural law 
for proceedings before the ECCC, save where that law is inadequate according 
to the criteria specified in these provisions.”181 Any other approach arguably un-
dermines respect for Cambodian law by merely assuming its inadequacy. In a 
country like Cambodia where compliance with the law is low, this undermines 
not only local confidence in national law but also faith in the rule of law generally.
Next, the Chamber considered the applicable national procedures in ac-
cordance with international standards— such as “the presumption of liberty” 
as discussed above— thereby demonstrating to domestic lawyers the process 
of applying national law in a manner that promotes fair trial rights. The SCC 
noted: “the ECCC, its hybrid nature notwithstanding, acts as an emanation of 
the State of Cambodia and is duty bound to respect international standards of 
justice and generally recognized human rights precepts.”
The Cambodian legal system can derive no benefit from the facial primacy 
of the CPC if this hierarchy is disregarded in practice. The need to grapple with 
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both Cambodian procedures and international procedures promotes inconsis-
tencies in application between Chambers and uncertainty among the parties. 
Nevertheless, this is the hybrid system that the ECCC framers bequeathed. At 
its worst, this structure promotes arbitrary and seemingly ends- driven deci-
sions. At its best, the Court’s unwieldy efforts may contribute to the future do-
mestic application of Cambodian procedures in conformity with international 
fair trial principles.182
Conclusion
From the start, the Court’s civil law orientation and complex structure, its re-
sponsibility to interpret and apply two sets of laws to events in the 1970s, and 
its lack of clear procedures targeted to mass- crimes cases presented significant 
barriers to its efficacy. The challenges of having “two of everything”— including 
prosecutors, investigating judges, appeals chambers, and sets of rules— continue 
to affect its functioning.
This chapter has illustrated some of the particular technical challenges the 
ECCC faced as it began operations and prepared for trial. The ECCC’s struggle 
to pair the two sides of the Court has affected its operations in other important 
ways as well, including a number that have received considerably more civil so-
ciety and media attention. These include the challenge of administering a mixed 
court effectively and transparently, stewarding its resources efficiently, providing 
for the rights of victims and defendants, and dealing with the shadow of politi-





Dual Administration, Oversight, and Funding
International and hybrid tribunals need much more than agreed legal provisions 
and procedural rules to operate effectively. They also require significant funding 
support and functioning bureaucratic institutions subject to sound oversight. 
Every public judicial hearing or decision is akin to the tip of an iceberg; beneath 
the surface are scores of administrative tasks. These are particularly important 
given the complexity and high profile of many of the cases. Teams of staff in-
vestigators must travel to the field, documents must move securely around the 
building, records must be kept, numerous visitors must be led safely in and out 
of the premises, and court personnel must be paid, just to name a few neces-
sary functions. These routine- sounding processes pose significant challenges for 
newly created tribunals that do not have the luxury of relying on preexisting 
administrative practices. Donors and court officials have to act quickly— raising 
money, hiring manpower, and establishing bureaucratic procedures to meet the 
myriad demands of administering transitional justice.
Hybrid tribunals have some potential administrative advantages. Most have 
been located in the country where atrocities occurred. They are thus closer to 
crime sites and potential witnesses, reducing the logistical difficulty and cost 
of mounting field investigations. They also tend to be less expensive, because 
national staffers generally draw lower salaries, and the cost of operations are 
usually lower in postconflict countries than they are in The Hague. The ECCC’s 
proximity to the locus delicti and involvement of Cambodian personnel offer 
these possible benefits.
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Hybrid courts also face serious administrative challenges, however. Each is 
largely sui generis, blending different organizational ingredients from the host 
country and the United Nations and opening space for jockeying between and 
among national and international officials about personnel, resource allocation, 
and procedures. The ECCC’s institutional design contains particularly serious 
shortcomings that would be difficult for appointed court officials to overcome. 
These include a split administrative structure, weak international oversight sys-
tem, and shaky financial foundation. Those institutional features have adversely 
affected the ECCC’s function in areas including human resources, financial 
management, and translation.1
The ECCC’s Managerial and  
Financial Structures
Like many of the ECCC’s institutional features, its administrative setup, over-
sight mechanisms, and funding structures are unique. Its administrative appa-
ratus is divided between national and international “sides,” each funded through 
a separate stream and each reporting to different political masters. David Tol-
bert, former UN Special Expert to advise on the UN Assistance to the Khmer 
Rouge Trials, argues that this represents the “worst possible design” for an ef-
fective Court.2
Two- Headed Administration
At the top of the ECCC’s administrative structure is an Office of Adminis-
tration (OA) responsible for providing administrative support to the various 
organs of the ECCC. The OA wields considerable power due to its role in al-
locating resources and responsibility for providing an array of non- judicial ser-
vices essential for the ECCC’s work. Authority is segregated within the office. 
The Cambodian- appointed OA Director is the tribunal’s top administrator but 
does not have ultimate authority over “matters that are subject to United Na-
tions rules and procedures.”3 That authority belongs to an international Deputy 
Director, who is charged with the “recruitment and administration of all for-
eign staff.”4 The Framework Agreement is silent on how to resolve any conflicts 
between the Director and Deputy Director,5 merely asserting that they “shall 
cooperate in order to ensure an effective and efficient functioning of the ad-
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ministration.”6 The ECCC Law also offers no guidance. In practice, Cambodian 
staff members have generally reported to the Director, and international staffers 
have treated the Deputy Director as their superior.7 This possibility was clearly 
foreseen by the drafters of the Framework Agreement and reduces the likeli-
hood of unity and coherence in the office.8
Beneath the OA are seven distinct administrative sections, each composed 
of a mix of national and international personnel. Cambodian appointees head 
Public Affairs, which manages communication, and the Court Management 
section responsible for records and archives, translation, witness and expert 
support, and related functions. UN appointees lead the units for information 
technology, safety and security, and “general services,” which refers to facilities 
management, transportation, mail, procurement, and related issues. The two 
remaining units— Personnel and Budget & Finance— have two heads each to 
manage their respective sides of the court.9 The ECCC also has two special 
stand- alone administrative units: the Cambodian- led Victims Support Section, 
which manages victim complaints and supports civil parties, and the UN- led 
Defence Support Section, which aids the various defense teams. Thus, at almost 
all levels of administration, the two sides of the Court have been kept separate 
to a significant degree.
The ECCC’s split administrative structure cuts against the established 
norm in international and hybrid courts. Most have followed the example of 
the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda 
(ICTY and ICTR) by establishing registries to provide administrative support 
for the judicial organs of the court. That model centralizes authority under a 
single registrar who makes decisions on personnel and budgetary matters and 
other administrative policies. The International Criminal Court (ICC) has a 
registry, as do the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) and Special Court for 
Sierra Leone (SCSL), which both entrust administrative authority to a UN ap-
pointee.10 The advantages of a registry headed by a UN appointee include the 
efficiency gains from having a single lead administrator and added confidence 
that administrative practices will conform to international standards. In 2006, 
former ICTY deputy prosecutor David Tolbert recommended that the ECCC 
establish a registry atop the ECCC’s administration.11 The absence of a single 
responsible registrar has made it unclear which side of the OA has the author-
ity to lead a particular task and who should be held accountable for it.12 Former 
UN Legal Counsel Hans Corell argues that divided administrative leadership 
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is not a “happy solution” for Court administration, because “you have to have 
somebody who makes decisions.”13
The division of the ECCC’s administration accommodated Cambodian 
sovereignty concerns— indeed, a pair of UN- appointed experts concluded in a 
2007 review of the ECCC’s administration that they perceived no good reason 
for the division of the Court into separate administrative sides except possibly 
“to protect the ‘sovereignty’ of the National Staff side.”14 Even before the tribunal 
began operations, however, critics charged that the structure made the United 
Nations the junior partner to a debased, opaque national judicial system and 
stressed the need for stronger UN oversight to safeguard the Court from cor-
ruption and political interference.15 In fact, U.S. officials cited this as a reason 
for their initial reluctance to fund the tribunal. In 2005, U.S. Ambassador- at- 
Large for War Crimes Issues Pierre- Richard Prosper said:
The U.S. wants to be in the position where we will be able to support this politi-
cally and financially. . . . What we want to avoid is some of the problems that ex-
ist in the ordinary judiciary being transferred to the Khmer Rouge tribunal. . . . 
It must be free from corruption. It must be free from political manipulation or 
influences and must be transparent.16
Those concerns later would prove prescient.
The lack of strong UN leadership within the tribunal was accentuated by 
the appointment of Chinese diplomat Michelle Lee as the first OA Deputy 
Director. Lee lacked experience in court administration, and according to nu-
merous sources, she took a hands- off, deferential approach to affairs within the 
ECCC and on the Cambodian side in particular.17 Soon after the Court began 
operations, concerned UN and donor officials began to press for her removal,18 
which did not occur until late 2007.19
Lee’s replacement, Knut Rosandhaug, has been more involved and has 
forged a more cooperative partnership with acting OA Director Tony Kranh,20 
but Rosandhaug has also been criticized for being too deferential to his Cambo-
dian counterparts.21 According to many staffers, Rosandhaug could have sought 
to play a role more akin to a registrar but has instead emphasized the limits of 
his power.22 The ECCC’s split structure has made it difficult for UN officials at 
the ECCC to lead, but the agency of individual appointees has also had a major 
impact both in the OA and throughout the Court.
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A Split Financing Model
The ECCC’s funding scheme also divides its national and international sides. 
The ECCC Law requires that the salaries and expenses of the Cambodian judg-
es, prosecutor, administrative officials, and staff be “borne by the Cambodian 
national budget,”23 and the Cambodian Government has provided some direct 
financial support. The ECCC may also receive additional voluntary contribu-
tions from foreign governments, international institutions, NGOs, or others,24 
and in practice the Cambodian Government has relied primarily on such con-
tributions for its share of the ECCC’s costs.
The United Nations bears the expenses and salaries of international judicial 
and administrative personnel25 as well as the remuneration of defense counsel.26 
In addition, the United Nations agreed to fund utilities and services, witness 
travel, safety and security provisions, and “such other limited assistance as may 
be necessary to ensure the smooth functioning of the investigation, the prosecu-
tion and the Extraordinary Chambers.”27 The United Nations has met its finan-
cial obligations by soliciting earmarked donations from selected UN member 
states.28
The ECCC’s structure differs considerably from the models of the ad hoc 
international courts and the ICC, which have been able to rely more heavily 
on assessed contributions. The ICTY and ICTR are both funded through as-
sessed contributions from UN member states as part of the UN General Bud-
get, and the General Assembly’s budget committee reviews their budgets every 
two years.29 Both may also receive additional voluntary contributions. The ICC, 
which was created outside of the United Nations umbrella, derives most of its 
funding through assessed contributions by State Parties to the Rome Statute 
but may also receive voluntary contributions from the United Nations and do-
nor states.30 These funding schemes remain subject to shifts in donor prefer-
ences, but much less so than the ECCC model.
The funding structures for other hybrid courts have varied widely. The 
Kosovo Regulation 64 Panels and Special Panels for Serious Crimes in East 
Timor both received funds from the UN peacekeeping authorities that created 
them. The STL is funded 51% through voluntary contributions by UN mem-
ber states and 49% by the government of Lebanon.31 The budget of the SCSL 
depends primarily on voluntary contributions from donor states. The Security 
Council imposed that mechanism to reduce the costs of the proceedings, de-
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spite the objections of UN Secretary- General Kofi Annan, who warned that 
“[a] special court based on voluntary contributions would be neither viable nor 
sustainable.”32
By comparison to its peers, the ECCC’s funding structure is most similar 
to that of the SCSL and has a few distinct characteristics. Like the SCSL, it 
relies heavily on voluntary donor contributions. The risk of that arrangement 
was foreseen when the tribunal was created. In 2003, before the conclusion of 
the Framework Agreement, Annan requested that the UN General Assembly 
fund the ECCC out of assessed UN member state contributions, arguing that 
the Court needed an “assured and continuous source of funding” to meet its 
mandate and that its operation “should not be left to the vagaries of voluntary 
contributions.”33 The General Assembly refused.34
Corell contends reliance on voluntary contributions was a mistake. In ad-
dition to the danger of financial uncertainty and instability, “it’s hard to have 
a credible institution with voluntary contributions,” Corell argues. “Who is fi-
nancing the court? Why?”35 A senior Court official adds that reliance on volun-
tary replenishments increases the Court’s vulnerability to pressure from donors, 
giving a small number of states the power to exercise undue influence.36 Some 
examples are discussed later in this chapter.
More uniquely, the ECCC’s funding structure reinforces the separation be-
tween the national and international sides of the court. International person-
nel are funded through UN channels, while Cambodian personnel are paid by 
the Cambodian Government. In theory, that distinction encourages national 
ownership and burden- sharing, but in practice the Cambodian Government 
has relied almost exclusively on foreign grants. This funding structure makes it 
easy for donors to target assistance to the international side of the court. That 
provides a source of leverage against the Cambodian Government but has also 
caused delays and undermined confidence in the Court’s staying power.
Weak and Separate Oversight Mechanisms
The ECCC was created without a clear internal or external institutional mecha-
nism to oversee its administrative and financial operations. In most interna-
tional and hybrid tribunals, a registrar works under the court’s president— its 
head judicial officer. At the SCSL, the president links the tribunal’s internal 
oversight to external oversight mechanisms by submitting annual reports to the 
UN Secretary- General and the government of Sierra Leone.37
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The ECCC has neither a president nor a registrar. As a partial alternative, 
the Internal Rules established a “Judicial Administration Committee” in 2007 
composed of three Cambodian and two international judges. Under the Inter-
nal Rules:
The Committee shall advise and guide the Office of Administration concerning 
all activities relating to the administrative and judicial support provided to, the 
Office of the Co- Prosecutors, the Office of the Co- Investigating Judges and the 
Chambers, including the preparation and implementation of the budget.38
The OA Director and Deputy Director participate in a “consultative capacity.”39 
The Committee’s authority to “advise and guide” the OA does not, however, in-
stitutionalize its authority or grant it express supervision over the OA’s activi-
ties.40 Thus, the ECCC’s internal oversight structure remains weak relative to 
other institutionalized courts— reflecting the unwillingness of either side of the 
Court to submit to unified authority led by the other.
The United Nations: More Support than Oversight
To a large extent, the United Nations has taken what one senior ECCC official 
calls a “hands- off ” approach,41 accepting a supportive role rather than pushing 
for strong external oversight. The design of the tribunal clearly and deliberately 
limited the scope for UN oversight. Former UN Assistant Secretary- General 
Larry Johnson asserts that the Cambodians’ insistence on “strict equality” left 
the United Nations with “virtually no remit over the Cambodian half ” of the 
Court, and that the split hybrid design erected “a big brick wall that the Cambo-
dians worked to keep up at all times.”42
From the outset, the United Nations put oversight of its side of the tribu-
nal in the hands of the UN Controller rather than the Office of Legal Affairs 
(OLA), which had negotiated the Framework Agreement.43 The apparent ra-
tionale was to focus on cost reduction— one of the purported advantages of 
a mixed court over ad hoc tribunals,44 but in the early years the OLA appears 
to have acquiesced in the Controller’s oversight partly to “wash its hands” of a 
court that it feared would encounter serious problems as a result of its majority- 
Cambodian structure.45
For more quotidian matters, such as recruitment, the Controller relied on 
the Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA). Neither the Control-
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ler nor DESA had experience running a mass crimes court, however. Rather 
than concentrating on judicial management, initial UN oversight treated the 
ECCC much like an ordinary technical assistance project— a narrow and con-
servative reading of the UN’s mandate. Although the OLA became more closely 
involved over time, the lines of oversight remained unclear.
In 2005, the United Nations established a project called the UN Assistance 
to the Khmer Rouge Trials (UNAKRT) to provide technical assistance to the 
Cambodian Government in conducting the trials.46 In 2006, the Cambodian 
Government signed a project document with the UN Development Program 
(UNDP), which administers international funds to the Cambodian side of 
the court. Among other things, that document established a “Project Board” 
chaired by the ECCC’s OA Director and including representatives from UNDP, 
DESA, and the European Community. The Project Board was ill equipped to 
provide strong oversight, however. It was charged with holding only one meet-
ing per year and had no formal legal authority over the ECCC. The fact that its 
chair was the lead administrator at the ECCC also posed a possible conflict of 
interest.47 In 2007, when serious questions arose about the effects of the hybrid 
structure on the OA’s functionality, the UNAKRT spokesperson emphasized 
that “the UN is here to help, not to lead,” and that its mandate to provide mere 
assistance did not allow for a stronger leadership role, which would “require 
high- level political re- negotiation of the court’s founding tenets.”48
Senior UN officials became more directly involved in early 2008, follow-
ing allegations of mismanagement and corruption (discussed below) and with 
the Court’s first trial approaching. Donors and civil society actors also applied 
pressure for stronger oversight mechanisms. A representative of the Japanese 
government, the Court’s top funder, reportedly said that the UN needed to “ex-
ercise more appropriate stewardship of the process” and that while UN staff 
was “hardworking and conscientious, they are not adequately supported by UN 
headquarters.”49 Civil society observers suggested creating a special interna-
tional advisory position and a committee similar to the SCSL’s Management 
Committee to monitor the Court’s administrative and budgetary operations.50
The Cambodian side did not want “a new party to be above the court” and 
insisted that any such post would entitle it to a similar Cambodian position.51 
Clint Williamson, then U.S. Ambassador- at- Large for War Crimes Issues, re-
calls that donors generally supported a “more proactive UN role” but were con-
cerned about “Cambodian receptivity to it.”52 Some— particularly the French, 
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Japanese, and Australians— argued that the UN and key donors could not 
“shove it down the Cambodians’ throats.”53 The UN nevertheless went forward 
in March 2008, unilaterally appointing former ICTY deputy prosecutor David 
Tolbert as a Special Expert to UNAKRT for a period of approximately six 
months.54
The post’s title— the “Special Expert to advise on the United Nations Assis-
tance to the Khmer Rouge Trials”— reinforces UN caution in overstepping its 
bounds. Despite that initial caution, the Special Expert has become a key actor 
raising funds and negotiating with the Cambodian Government on sensitive is-
sues. Craig Etcheson, a former investigator in the Office of the Co- Prosecutors, 
argues that it “quickly became apparent that something like [the Special Expert 
post] was needed” at the ECCC.55 Williamson adds that donors and UN of-
ficials soon came to see Tolbert’s role as a “positive factor” and concluded that 
“the Court was suffering by not having that role,” leading the UN to restart the 
post shortly after Tolbert’s temporary post expired.56 The post has been filled 
since 2010 by a pair of former U.S. war crimes ambassadors— Williamson and 
David Scheffer.57
Inside the Court, an informal mechanism temporarily evolved on the UN 
side. In November 2011, it became public that for six months prior, Trial Cham-
ber Judge Silvia Cartwright, then international Co- Prosecutor Andrew Cayley, 
and OA Deputy Director Knut Rosandhaug held “regular meetings” without 
the presence of the defense. According to Rosandhaug, the meetings concerned 
only administrative and organizational matters,58 and the idea for such meetings 
came from UN Under Secretary for Legal Affairs Patricia O’Brien. He added:
The aim was to add focus to communication between the UN component of 
the ECCC and UN Headquarters. Such meetings would replicate, in an infor-
mal way, the coordination committees that are standard in the other UN and 
UN- assisted tribunals.59
Andrew Cayley reportedly said, “Administrative management meetings such as 
these take place in the ICC, ICTY, and the ICTR. They are normal. If they did 
not take place, these institutions, including the ECCC, would be paralyzed.”60 
The Internal Rules do not provide for such meetings, however, instead creating 
the hybrid Judicial Administration Committee.
Defense lawyers objected, contending that meetings between Cartwright 
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and Cayley raised concerns of judicial bias.61 In seeking Cartwright’s disquali-
fication for the appearance of bias, the Nuon Chea team noted that coordina-
tion councils at other courts are made up of the president, head prosecutor, and 
registrar and “meet pursuant to clearly defined and publicly available terms of 
reference” and are not “ad hoc” bodies.62 The Ieng Sary team likewise contended 
that comparisons with the practice of international courts were inappropriate, 
as the ECCC is a national court with a unique structure, including national and 
international personnel, no president, no registrar, and a prosecutor who, unlike 
at the ad hoc courts, is directly involved in ongoing proceedings.63
The Trial Chamber rejected the defense arguments and found that the meet-
ings resembled other mass crimes tribunals’ coordination councils, which “are 
integral to address the unique administrative challenges faced by international 
tribunals.” It held that “[t]he ECCC confronts certain administrative matters 
which pertain exclusively to the United Nations component of the court,” and 
while the ECCC lacks a presidency, Judge Cartwright fills a similar position as 
Vice- President of the plenary. Moreover, the OA Deputy Director has functions 
“akin” to those of a registrar. Although such meetings are not explicitly provided 
for by the Internal Rules, “nor does the ECCC legal framework debar coordina-
tion by the United Nations component of the ECCC, where required.”64 On 
appeal, the SCC found that to address the “appearance of asymmetrical access 
enjoyed by the prosecutor to the trial judge,” defense representatives should be 
included, but it did not ban the meetings.65 Nevertheless, by all accounts, at 
that point the meetings ceased. Thus, if only for a short time, in the absence 
of formal internal management structures, a less transparent and authoritative 
institutional mechanism emerged to fulfill this function.
Monitoring by Donors
Since the ECCC depends on voluntary contributions, donors have had regular 
opportunities to exert influence on the proceedings. If used wisely, that engage-
ment can strengthen a court’s operations, but at the ECCC donors have gener-
ally acquiesced in a weak structure for donor coordination and oversight. The 
Framework Agreement did not provide a structure for donor monitoring and 
oversight, and most key donors accepted a relatively hands- off role. In 2005, 
the U.S. government proposed establishing a donor management committee 
akin to the one established in the statute creating the SCSL,66 which sets forth 
that:
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.  .  . interested States will establish a management committee to assist the 
Secretary- General in obtaining adequate funding, and provide advice and poli-
cy direction on all non- judicial aspects of the operation of the Court, including 
questions of efficiency, and to perform other functions as agreed by interested 
States.67
The SCSL Management Committee includes representatives from the UN 
Secretary- General’s office, state donors, and Sierra Leone. Its mandate gives 
the committee an opportunity to play a significant oversight role in the SCSL’s 
management. The STL has a similar Management Committee.68
Other key ECCC donors were not enthusiastic about the U.S. proposal. 
The Australian government responded that the Framework Agreement did not 
create such a mechanism and that donors had “missed their chance” to do so:
The current structure of the KRT [Khmer Rouge Tribunal] simply did not al-
low for a Management Committee. . . . The Australians would prefer to monitor 
the KRT through their embassies in relevant countries abroad and through the 
UN. . . . Cambodian political will was key to the KRT’s success . . . and donors 
might send the wrong signal if [they] pushed to take over too much control of 
the process. . . . For Australia, as for the UN, the Agreement— and in particular 
the provision allowing the UN to withdraw— alone provides sufficient inter-
national oversight by making international assistance “contingent on the KRT 
continuing to meet international standards.”69
Instead of a management committee, a group of key donors responded 
to a May 2006 request from Deputy Prime Minister Sok An to create an 
informal group of donors to provide advice and support to the ECCC.70 
The following month, with Cambodian officials in attendance, the French 
and Japanese Ambassadors chaired the inaugural meeting of the “Friends 
of the ECCC” group and laid out several proposals for the Friends group. 
These included holding meetings every other month, limiting the group to a 
nonjudicial advisory role, avoiding a formal institutional structure, keeping 
discussions confidential, limiting participation to governments, and respect-
ing the independence of the ECCC and prerogative of the OA.71 Accord-
ing to a Japanese participant, the Friends group was “non- coercive and non- 
interventional  .  .  . mindful of the sovereign inviolability of the local State 
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from which the local component of the Office of Administration derives” and 
based on the idea that “friendly advice could be more effective than excessive 
pressure and inquisitorial consultations.”72
A U.S. Embassy cable reveals that the Cambodian Government sought 
to exploit differences among donors to prevent an oversight mechanism that 
would favor the UN side of the court:
The Japanese were to have taken on the role as sole chair of the Friends of the 
ECCC; the idea of co- chairing the Friends was Sok An’s. According to the Japa-
nese, Sok An is unhappy with Japanese unwillingness to side with the RGC 
against Michelle Lee and the UN side of OA, and is hoping that the French will 
be more supportive.73
In a March 2007 cable, U.S. Ambassador Joseph Mussomeli expanded on the 
notion that divergent donor priorities weakened the Friends group’s potential 
as a serious monitoring body. Mussomeli argued that the French and Japanese 
Embassies “have shown no willingness to discuss contentious issues” related to 
the ECCC’s administration.74 He added:
The French and Japanese positions are fairly consistent: the Friends should not 
play an activist role; individual missions— if they are so inclined— can intervene 
with the ECCC or the government, but the Friends should not act in any col-
lective diplomatic way.75
Mussomeli also asserted that national political interests were at the heart of the 
hands- off approach to court monitoring. He expressed concern that France and 
Japan were “focusing exclusively on the preservation of their bilateral relation-
ship with the RGC in their discussions about the ECCC” and that Japan was 
especially loath to press the government:
The Japanese position is particularly sensitive due to the balancing act the [Gov-
ernment of Japan] plays with China in Cambodia. The Chinese, Sean [Visoth] 
believes, are placing pressure on the government with respect to moving for-
ward with the Tribunal. The Japanese want the Tribunal to succeed at virtually 
any cost, and therefore will be loathe to put any pressure on the government 
that might make the RGC accord more sympathy to Chinese views.76
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Thus, the donors approached the Friends group as an information- sharing 
device, rarely raising sensitive topics with the ECCC officials present and avoid-
ing collective action despite the fact that “ECCC judges and staff have noted 
that the donors and interested states would be most effective if they could speak 
with a single voice.”77 Donors instead worked through bilateral channels with 
relatively rare exercise of coercive pressure.78 Williamson argues that although 
the Friends group has provided a “very useful” information- sharing function, it 
was invested with too little formal structure and authority and thus does not 
offer a good institutional model for hybrid courts.79
An additional thin layer of donor oversight has operated in New York, 
where a relatively informal “steering group” of representatives of interested 
states, including Cambodia, have met periodically to share information about 
the ECCC, as well as a smaller “principal donors group.” The lines of responsi-
bility between the New York– based group, typically including the legal officers 
of countries’ UN missions, and the Phnom Penh– based Friends group have not 
been clear, and at times wires have crossed.80 More important, neither has had 
authority approaching that of the SCSL Management Committee.
Donors also removed a layer of oversight by shifting toward a model of di-
rect financing of the Cambodian side of the Court. Until late 2009, UNDP’s 
representative office in Cambodia administered most international grants to the 
Cambodian side of the Court. By then, however, donors had increasingly moved 
to provide funds to the Cambodian Government directly.81
The extent to which donors have contributed to the ECCC has clearly af-
fected the nature of donor oversight. During its formative years between 2006 
and 2009, Japan provided nearly 50% of all contributions to the Court, followed 
by Australia at 8% and France at 6%. The United States and United Kingdom 
combined for just 6%. Although the U.S. share rose slightly to 8% by mid- 2013, 
Japan remained the dominant donor at 41%. Perhaps more importantly, Japan 
has accounted for more than 60% of all bilateral donations to the Cambodian 
side of the Court, whereas European states have contributed much less, and the 
United States has not contributed any funds to the national side.82 This is in 
stark contrast to the SCSL, which between 2002 and 2009 depended heavily 
on funds from the United States (29%), United Kingdom (16%), Netherlands 
(12%), and Canada (9%).83 Japan’s relatively hands- off diplomatic approach at 
the ECCC contrasted with the more assertive Anglo- American engagement 
with the SCSL.
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Cambodian Government Oversight
The Cambodian Government also has an oversight mechanism in place for its 
side of the court, headed by Sok An, who has chaired the Royal Government 
Task Force on the Khmer Rouge Trials since negotiations for the ECCC began 
in the late 1990s. In addition to his formal position as chair, Sok An has had a 
close working relationship with key ECCC administrative personnel, such as 
his longtime advisor Helen Jarvis, who headed the Public Affairs Section and 
Victims Unit, former OA Director Sean Visoth, and the omnipresent Rong 
Chhorn, who has filled a number of administrative roles at the Court. Sok An 
has also served as the key interlocutor for senior UN and donor officials on 
sensitive issues facing the Court.84 He and other senior Cambodian officials, in-
cluding Prime Minister Hun Sen, have been much more closely focused on the 
ECCC than anyone at the highest levels at UN headquarters. On the Cambo-
dian side, oversight problems have not occurred due to a lack of engagement— 
they have come from too much political interference.
Structural Handicaps
All new tribunals face challenges when building a new bureaucracy, but the pro-
cess of administering the ECCC has been particularly contentious and problem-
atic. In a private June 2007 report, two UN- appointed experts— former SCSL 
Registrar Robin Vincent and former ICTY Chief of Administration Kevin St. 
Louis— argued that the ECCC’s hybrid administrative structure was “divisive 
and unhelpful” and “serve[d] only to constantly hinder, frequently confuse, and 
certainly frustrate the efforts of a number of staff on both sides of the opera-
tions.”85 They cited divided administrative authority as a serious hindrance to 
core functions such as witness protection, public communications, and docu-
ment translation.
Tolbert notes that the administration was “totally bifurcated” with “little 
communication” between national and international staffers sitting on oppo-
site sides of the hall— an arrangement inimical to the goals of a hybrid court.86 
That bifurcation has caused inefficiency and contributed to frequent misunder-
standings. Within the first year of its operations, the Court came under fire for 
human resources mismanagement and corruption. Each problem arose partly 
from the decisions of individual agents, but the Court’s structural design played 
a key enabling role.
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Functional Challenges: Human Resources
One of the ECCC’s first major administrative problems pertained to human 
resources. Any hybrid court has the difficult task of fusing national and interna-
tional personnel with very different skill sets, experience, work styles, and expec-
tations. International personnel often have stronger formal technical training 
and more experience pertaining to transitional justice, whereas national officials 
generally have superior knowledge of local language, culture, and administrative 
practices. How those skills are prioritized in terms of hiring, pay, and seniority 
is a sensitive matter. It affects the court’s efficiency, the relative standing of na-
tional and international staffers, and staff morale. Control over personnel deci-
sions is thus one of the most powerful levers for influence on the court.
The fact that each side of the ECCC hired its staff separately meant that 
hiring standards and procedures were bound to differ. The UN side used its 
normal formal recruitment process, while OA Director Sean Visoth approved 
a draft summary recruitment manual in June 2006 for the Cambodian side.87 
Both got off to a quick start, leading court monitors from the Open Society 
Justice Initiative (OSJI) to conclude that the ECCC was “coming together faster 
than any other past international tribunal.88 Yet OSJI soon expressed concerns 
to donors about the opacity of Cambodian hiring practices.89 UNDP respond-
ed by requesting an audit focusing on the Cambodian side of the OA.90
Problems on the Cambodian Side
Completed in June 2007, the audit was scathing. It argued that the ECCC’s di-
vided structure inhibited effective management, as international section heads 
were deliberately kept away from recruiting, evaluating, and even keeping track 
of Cambodian staffers’ time in the office.91 It found that out of 29 Cambodian 
personnel files reviewed, 18 staff “did not meet the minimum requirements spec-
ified in the vacancy announcements in terms of either academic qualifications or 
working experience” and that “recruitment was not performed in a transparent, 
competitive and objective manner.”92
The auditors criticized Cambodian staff salaries as well. In 2004, UN and 
Cambodian negotiators had agreed that professional Cambodian staffers would 
be paid at 50% of the UN salary scale used by UNDP, but in 2006 Deputy 
Prime Minister Sok An approved a tax exemption for all Cambodian ECCC 
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staffers, which effectively raised their salaries above anticipated levels.93 The 
audit recommended that the UN lower Cambodian salaries accordingly and 
consider withdrawing from the tribunal if the Cambodian Government resisted 
measures the UNDP deemed necessary to maintain the integrity of the Court. 
Most dramatically, it suggested nullifying all past recruitments and launching a 
new hiring process under “close supervision of UNDP.”94
Cambodian officials issued a response acknowledging “weaknesses” as the 
ECCC began its work but objecting to the “unbalanced” critiques of ECCC hir-
ing practices, the auditors’ decision to cancel key exit interviews, and the audit’s 
recommendation for closer UNDP oversight.95 They viewed control over the 
hiring and management of national staff as part of the RGC’s sovereign author-
ity over its side of the OA— authority recognized in the Framework Agree-
ment.96 The Cambodian reply said the UNDP recommendations were:
completely out of proportion to the issues raised in the report [and] unaccept-
able and non- negotiable to the Cambodian side as to implement them would 
essentially mean a re- negotiation of the entire basis and character of the ECCC, 
as a national court with international participation and assistance already 
agreed in an international treaty.97
The Cambodian Government did not perceive authority for hiring as a narrow 
technical matter. It was a fundamental part of the political deal surrounding the 
Court.
UN officials acknowledged that fact and avoided pursuing structural re-
forms that could arrest the entire process.98 UNAKRT spokesman Peter Foster 
noted that agreement on the tribunal had taken many years and that “we cer-
tainly don’t want to reopen that.”99 He said that the UN could take a stronger 
“leadership role” but “[that] doesn’t necessarily mean that we have to renegotiate 
part of the contract or part of the agreement or change the basic fundamen-
tals of how we’re structured.” Instead, he advocated changes “within the existing 
structure” providing “greater assistance and greater advice to our Cambodian 
colleagues.”100
Criticism of local staff pay and qualifications were also sensitive. As in 
many postconflict environments, there were relatively few national applicants 
with relevant judicial experience. Nevertheless, some Cambodians resented 
the implication that they were less qualified to work at the ECCC or deserved 
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lesser pay. In April 2007, Secretary- General of the Cambodian Bar Association 
Ly Tayseng demanded that Cambodian lawyers at the ECCC should receive 
the same pay as international lawyers. “Cambodian lawyers are more qualified 
than foreign lawyers who don’t speak Khmer and don’t understand the working 
culture of Cambodia,” Ly said. “It’s unfair. It’s discrimination.”101 Trial Cham-
ber judge Thou Mony added that the wage differential demeaned Cambodian 
staffers.102 The ratio did not change, but it revealed a challenge that all hybrid 
tribunals face— adopting pay scales that balance the needs of attracting talent, 
managing costs, and showing respect for local competencies.103
Oversight Failures
The UNDP audit argued that flawed hiring practices were related to the 
ECCC’s split administration and weak oversight, especially on the Cambodian 
side. It noted that the ECCC’s 2007 budget included 80 more staff positions 
than the ECCC and donor representatives planned in June 2006. Although 
ECCC officials “could not provide any justifications for the significant increase 
in the staffing,” UNDP officials were “not aware of the additional posts,” and the 
additional positions had “not given rise to comments or questions by the mem-
bers of the project board.”104 The audit noted the potential “conflict of interest” 
of having the OA Director chair a Project Board intended to oversee and moni-
tor its activities, and recommended that someone else chair the board.105 The 
Cambodian Government objected by arguing that no chair could be “considered 
neutral”— a concession that the OA Director was not— and noting that “the 
Project Board operates on a consensus basis,” preventing the Chair from acting 
unilaterally.106 While correct, that consensus requirement also meant the OA 
Director could block actions by other members of the board.
Oversight by the Friends of the ECCC donor group was also weak, partly 
due to similar structural flaws. In late 2006 and early 2007, the group did not 
even discuss the concerns about the possible mismanagement of human re-
sources “due to the presence of ECCC staff throughout the meetings.”107 The 
structure of the Friends group— comprised only of bilateral donors and the 
ECCC staff, but lacking engagement from other UN agencies or civil society— 
militated against consideration of that serious issue.
Reforms in Human Resource Procedures
While the UNDP audit was ongoing, the ECCC and Project Board took reme-
dial steps. In March 2007, the ECCC’s Personnel Section produced a Personnel 
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Handbook for the Cambodian side of the Court including guidelines on re-
cruitment, pay, promotion, and performance evaluation. The Personnel Section 
revised it in August after the release of the UNDP audit.108 The Project Board 
did not point fingers but noted in September that it was “taking measures to 
boost the ECCC’s capacity.”109 In early 2008, the Project Board commissioned a 
review from the international auditing firm of Deloitte and Touche to assess the 
ECCC’s reforms. Deloitte’s report, issued in April, found major improvements. 
It noted that some “handholding” and “capacity building” would be needed to 
help the ECCC meet international standards, particularly on the national side, 
but praised the “willingness and commitment amongst ECCC staff to meet the 
expectations of the international community” and found that “robust” human 
resources systems had been implemented that would “address previous short-
comings” and “minimize the risk of questionable [human resources] practices 
occurring in the future.”110 It also found that the pay scale for Cambodian staff 
was “at the top of the market” but not unreasonable.111
UNDP and the Project Board issued a press release indicating that they 
were “quite satisfied” and commended the ECCC on its reforms.112 European 
Commission chargé d’affaires Rafael Dochao Moreno, a key member of the 
Project Board, said, “we [now] have a system that can work.”113 Since that time, 
at least two key Cambodian appointees have gotten their jobs without competi-
tive recruitment in violation of the new rules established.114 However, interna-
tional staff has helped select many Cambodian staff members,115 and the Cam-
bodian side of the ECCC has dealt with human resource management more 
transparently and effectively.
Thus, the split administrative structure delayed but did not prevent the de-
velopment of reasonably sound human resource practices. Although oversight 
was weak at the outset and civil society had to take the lead in calling attention 
to problems, UNDP, the Project Board, and the ECCC all responded relatively 
quickly. This qualified success story contrasts with the Court’s handling of the 
more contentious dispute surrounding reports of corruption.
Corruption and Kickback Allegations
Concerns about corruption had been present since the introduction of the con-
cept of a hybrid court in Cambodia. They came to the fore in early 2007, when 
the most salient corruption allegations to face any internationalized court arose 
88 / Hybrid Justice
2RRP
at the ECCC. Media reports and an Open Society Justice Initiative press re-
lease included allegations that Cambodian staffers had to kick back a sizable 
share of their salaries in exchange for their jobs.116 Again, OSJI called for an 
investigation.117 Cambodian officials denied the allegations and accused OSJI of 
“bad faith and bias.”118 Sok An accused OSJI of trying to smear the Cambodian 
Government’s reputation,119 and the Cambodian Government considered clos-
ing OSJI’s local office.120
Considerable evidence supported the allegations. In addition to a video of 
a Cambodian ECCC official describing the kickback scheme, a U.S. Embassy 
cable noted in March 2007 that “some ECCC international staff members are 
well aware that the practice exists because their Cambodian colleagues have told 
them so.”121 Donors were displeased with the public revelation of the allega-
tions. In a meeting with former U.S. Ambassador for War Crimes Issues David 
Scheffer in mid- March, key donors “expressed disappointment over how OSJI 
has conducted itself and precipitated its current problems with the RGC.”122 
French and Japanese officials did not comment or offer “signs of support for 
joint action” in the form of a demarche regarding OSJI’s possible expulsion, 
and Scheffer sought assurance from OSJI that future disclosures of information 
potentially harmful to the ECCC would be given to the Court before the press. 
While donors focused on managing OSJI’s fate and the drafting of the Internal 
Rules, “the allegations over corruption and kickbacks [were] nearly forgotten.”123
The UNDP audit also skirted the corruption issue in the face of Cambodi-
an Government resistance to an investigation. UNDP later issued a statement 
indicating that “[t]he audit did not find evidence [of kickbacks]  .  .  . primarily 
because the allegations pertained to personnel beyond UNDP’s jurisdiction. 
UNDP would have had to obtain irrefutable evidence to address the specific al-
legations.”124 Thus, UNDP did not consider itself entirely barred from address-
ing the corruption issue but chose not to pursue the matter. International judges 
at the ECCC were also aware of the allegations but believed it was not within 
their purview to intervene125— again drawing attention to the hybrid structure 
that set Cambodian administrative matters apart. More reports of the kickback 
scheme surfaced in the media in late 2007 and early 2008.126
In July 2008, the UN set up a new anticorruption scheme for the interna-
tional side of the Court featuring appointment of an international ethics officer 
and a process for receiving and reviewing complaints.127 Although designed for 
the international side of the Court, a number of disgruntled Cambodian staffers 
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confidentially complained to UN officials about ongoing kickback demands on 
employees. UNDP froze the funds it administered to the Cambodian side of 
the tribunal.128 In August, at Special Expert David Tolbert’s request, the UN’s 
Office of Internal Oversight Services began a confidential “review.” Although 
a formal investigation of the Cambodian side would likely have exceeded the 
UN’s legal purview, the “review” was a means to pressure the Cambodian Gov-
ernment to respond to corruption allegations.129 Tolbert found the allegations 
credible and sent a confidential report to the Cambodian Government in Sep-
tember, recommending an RGC investigation.130
Cambodian Government spokesman Phay Siphan denied any corruption 
on the national side and argued that allegations were merely efforts to discredit 
the Government or the tribunal.131 The RGC insisted that it alone had the juris-
dictional authority to investigate allegations against its officials. It did, however, 
issue public assurances, create a new anticorruption committee,132 and name 
two Cambodian “Ethics Monitors” to receive complaints of corruption and re-
port directly to Sok An.
Office of Administration Director Sean Visoth was at the center of the 
controversy. Multiple reports named him as the recipient of kickbacks within 
the office. Tolbert privately recommended Sean Visoth’s removal, and the UN 
Office of Legal Affairs in New York supported him in this.133 Tolbert communi-
cated that recommendation to Sok An in a private meeting.134 Sok An did not 
agree initially but said after some discussion that Sean Visoth would depart 
from the tribunal “on my timetable, not yours.”135 In November, Sean Visoth 
went on extended medical leave and did not return to the tribunal136— a signifi-
cant diplomatic victory for the United Nations.
The Cambodian Government did not acquiesce to an independent UN 
investigation or UN- led reporting process. In February 2009, UN Assistant 
Secretary- General Peter Taksoe- Jensen visited Phnom Penh to meet with Sok 
An, and the two issued a Joint Statement revealing the “essential elements of a 
structure” to prevent corruption, including “parallel national and international 
mechanisms to receive complaints.”137 Their interpretation of that language dif-
fered, however. Taksoe- Jensen argued that Cambodian staffers should be able 
to complain either to national Ethics Monitors or a new UN- appointed inter-
national Ethics Monitor. Sok An insisted otherwise, emphasizing Cambodian 
sovereignty and the plain text of the statement.138
Donors pushed for a swift resolution to the dispute, eager to avoid delays in 
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the first trial as funds dwindled on the Cambodian side of the Court. Some key 
donors favored the Cambodian Government’s position on the anticorruption 
system. The French ambassador said privately that “Cambodia has real argu-
ments,” and his Australian counterpart said, “Cambodia is in the right.”139 Japan’s 
Deputy Chief of Mission argued that donors should provide funds to keep the 
Cambodian side from depletion and that withholding funds had gotten Cam-
bodia’s attention but increasingly looked like “international blackmail.” The 
French and Australian governments agreed, and the U.S. ambassador added 
“moral support.”140 Japan thus injected $200,000 to pay the salaries of 251 Cam-
bodian staff members,141 and Australia requested that UNDP release $456,000 
of its frozen funds.142
Sok An continued to insist on separate anticorruption reporting structures, 
despite a call from the U.S. ambassador urging him to “take the deal.” U.S. Em-
bassy officials concluded that the Cambodian proposal was inadequate and that 
“[i]t may fall to the donors to push the Cambodians to take that next step.”143 
Instead, donors eased off on the pressure. In April, Japan authorized a release of 
a further $4.17 million to the Cambodian side of the tribunal. Late that month, 
key donor states met and converged on taking an “even- handed approach to the 
negotiations” between the UN and Cambodian Government and pressing for 
a prompt resolution involving mutual compromise.144 U.S. Ambassador Carol 
Rodley encouraged donors to “send a message to the UN and Cambodia that, 
as a group, the donors want the two sides to engage seriously and get past the 
one last sticking point in the negotiations”— namely, the mechanism whereby 
Cambodian staffers could issue confidential complaints of misconduct.145
The Friends group issued a public statement in May praising the ECCC’s 
progress on anticorruption measures. Shortly afterward, U.S. Ambassador- at- 
Large for War Crimes Issues Clint Williamson traveled to Phnom Penh to bro-
ker a deal. After consulting with Japanese officials,146 he proposed a model to 
Sok An featuring a single counselor who would receive all complaints. Sok An 
initially objected, assuming that the proposed position would be international, 
but warmed to the idea when Williamson raised the possibility of a Cambodian 
appointee.147 The core donors embraced the proposal the following day.148
During the ensuing weeks, donors and the Cambodian Government dis-
cussed who the appointee would be and the importance of independence.149 In 
August, the Cambodian Government and United Nations issued a press release 
announcing that Uth Chhorn, the Auditor General of Cambodia, would fill the 
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role.150 Uth’s appointment reflected a relatively weak, face- saving UN response 
to Cambodian obstruction and donor ambivalence. One expressed aim of an of-
ficial reporting mechanism was to provide “full protection of staff on both sides 
of the ECCC against any possible retaliation for good faith reporting or wrong-
doing.”151 Uth’s status as a senior Cambodian official undermined the likelihood 
that Cambodian staffers would feel safe reporting malfeasance. Moreover, Uth 
had shown little transparency as auditor- general of a domestic system riddled 
with corruption.152
Since the appointment of the Independent Counsellor in August 2009, no 
new public allegations of administrative corruption have surfaced at the ECCC. 
At the time of Uth’s appointment, a confidential U.S. diplomatic cable asserted, 
“[T]he ECCC is now likely Cambodia’s first corruption- free court.”153 In 2010, 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton noted in a confidential cable that:
[the ECCC had] made considerable progress on strengthening management 
systems and eliminating corruption. Notably, there have been no allegations of 
corruption within the court administration since the removal of Cambodian 
Chief of Administration Sean Visoth in December 2008.154
Thus, international pressure curbed public allegations of kickbacks at the 
ECCC— though anecdotal reports of other types of financial corruption con-
tinue.155 In the best light, the Court’s hybrid composition gave Cambodian staff-
ers a channel through which to complain. Such complaints would have been 
much less likely in a purely domestic court. To some extent, UN and domestic 
responses to the corruption allegations helped infuse international standards 
into a Cambodian judicial entity— an explicit aim of the hybrid model.
Nevertheless, the corruption issue showed more problems than strengths of 
the ECCC’s hybrid structure. Corruption at the ECCC was not predetermined 
by the Court’s hybrid form— misconduct required human agency, as did official 
responses to the allegations— but the tribunal’s structure facilitated corruption 
by segregating the two sides of the Court and providing for weak independent 
oversight. The Court’s structure also hampered UN efforts to deal with corrup-
tion allegations swiftly and effectively.
Despite substantial evidence of the kickback scheme, no serious investiga-
tion was mounted. Faced with the possibility that the Khmer Rouge trials would 
grind to a halt, key donors— above all Japan and Australia— relieved pressure 
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on the Cambodian Government in spring 2009 by releasing funds to the Cam-
bodian side and voicing support for the tribunal’s anticorruption efforts. Those 
decisions helped keep the ECCC functioning, but it also sapped the UN side of 
negotiating leverage and made a serious investigation much less likely.156 Donors 
clearly contemplated that fact. A confidential U.S. cable reported from a Friends 
group meeting in May 2009:
[A]s the French co- chair underscored, it is time for the ECCC to put an end 
to looking backward at past acts of corruption and instead look ahead to the 
real challenges facing the court in order to maintain the international standards 
expected of it.157
The situation was in some respects reminiscent of the negotiations to es-
tablish the tribunal. With the UN and Cambodian Government deadlocked, 
donors prioritized the continuation of the accountability process.158 Donor 
interest in proceeding toward justice was legitimate, both from an efficiency 
standpoint and to pursue long- overdue justice, but the RGC was able to use 
that interest to avoid bargaining concessions to the United Nations. Although 
new anticorruption measures were put in place, past acts were largely swept 
under the rug. Moreover, the anticorruption mechanism established has been 
secretive. In March 2010, Uth announced that he would publish a report of his 
work, but he reversed course in October 2010, when he indicated that UN of-
ficials had instructed him to keep his report confidential.159 Not until October 
2012 did Uth Chhorn establish office hours at the ECCC during which staffers 
can raise concerns.160 It is unclear whether corruption complaints have ceased or 
whether new allegations simply have not come to light.
Functional Challenges:  
Funding and Financial Management
From a financial standpoint, a tribunal’s success depends both on its efficient 
use of funds and its ability to access sufficient funding to meet its legitimate 
needs. One possible advantage of a hybrid court is that proximity to crime sites 
and survivors and reliance on lower- paid national personnel could trim the cost 
of proceedings. Indeed, donor fatigue from the costly ICTY and ICTR con-
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tributed to the emergence of hybrid courts. Yet pursuing lower- cost justice also 
carries risks, as underfunded tribunals cannot meet their stated functions ef-
fectively. Indeed, the tribunals that are not endowed with predictable funding 
streams are likely to be the very ones donors are least committed to financing 
voluntarily.
The ECCC’s unique hybrid structure has contributed to both challenges. 
As discussed in chapter 2, its complex structure has made the Court much less 
efficient than it might have been. On the other hand, the ECCC’s heavy reliance 
on voluntary donor contributions, split funding model, and structural vulner-
ability to problems such as corruption and political interference have under-
mined its stability and contributed to frequent budgetary crises.
Cost (In)efficiency
Hybrid tribunals have been created with the expectation that they will be less 
expensive than fully international courts for the reasons noted above. Like most 
international and hybrid courts, the ECCC has been much more expensive 
than originally foreseen. The annual cost of its operations has risen over time, 
amounting to $173.3 million expended by the end of 2012 (see Figure 1). In a 
country where the annual budget for the entire national judicial system was a 
mere $3.3 million in 2007,161 the cost of the trials has brought criticism. This was 
foreseen early in the process.162 Court officials expect costs to trend downward 
after 2013, but projecting cost savings in future years is a routine— and often 
unfulfilled— part of bureaucratic budget planning.
In 2012, Brad Adams of Human Rights Watch stressed that “[a]fter five 
years and more than $150 million, the court has tried just one defendant.”163 
Helen Jarvis, a key advisor to the Cambodian Government, countered that the 
funds spent were “not a great amount of money.” She added, “It’s about the cost 
of a bridge. Is one bridge worth more than justice for so many? I don’t think 
so.”164
The ECCC has been considerably less expensive than fully international 
courts in terms of total cost but much less of a bargain when one considers the 
number of persons indicted or the number of cases completed by each court 
against charged individuals (see Table 1). Crude cost comparisons between tri-
bunals inevitably gloss over variables that provide legitimate bases for variation. 
Some tribunals perform more complex functions than others, require more ex-
tensive investigations, or operate in more expensive areas due to costs of living 
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or security costs. Start- up costs for a new judicial institution also can be consid-
erable. Still, it is clear that unless its number of completed cases rises unexpect-
edly, the ECCC will not be considered a cost- saving institution.
The ECCC is an expensive hybrid court, even relative to Sierra Leone— 
the most costly mixed tribunal to come before it. This is a lesser problem than 
pursuing justice too cheaply, as shown by the experience of the Special Panels 
for Serious Crimes in East Timor. As David Cohen argues, their trials were 
“[h]andicapped from the beginning by a debilitating lack of resources.”165 Their 
2001 budget was a mere $6.3 million, of which $6 million went to the prosecu-
tion, and only $300,000 was provided to the rest of the court.166 The average 
Fig. 1. Annual expenditures at the ECCC. (Spending in U.S. dollars, unadjusted 
for inflation. Data from the ECCC Financial Outlook, July 31, 2013.)
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TABLE 1. Comparing the Cost of Selected Tribunals
 Estimated Cost  Years of Avg. Cost/ Persons Convicted Cost/Person
Tribunal (at end of 2013) Operation Year or Acquitted Convicted or Acquitted
ICTY $2,330 m 20 $116 m 87 $27 m
ICTR $1,860 m 19 $98 m 63 $30 m
ICC $1,270 m 12 $106 m 2 $635 m
ECCC $173 m 8 $22 m 1 $173 m
SCSL $280 m 12 $23 m 9 $31 m
Source: Data from the ICTY, ICTR, ICC, ECCC, SCSL, and UN websites.
Note: Costs in U.S. dollars (unadjusted for in ation).
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annual budget for the Special Panels between 2003 and 2005 was just $4.8 mil-
lion.167 The Special Panels even lacked an appeals court for nearly two years due 
to a lack of funds.168 Their Serious Crimes Unit was also grossly underfunded. 
Some of its investigators had caseloads including more than 300 murders. For 
months, the Unit had no forensic pathologist despite collecting 30 sets of hu-
man remains for examination.169 A shortage of skilled translators hampered ef-
forts at all judicial levels.170 In May 2005, the Security Council abruptly cut all 
funds for the Special Panels, which shut their doors soon afterward.171 The East 
Timor model was cheap, but it was hardly a model for effective financing.
A more promising example of cost- efficient justice comes from Bosnia- 
Herzegovina. The War Crimes Chamber (WCC) in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
is a tribunal rooted more decisively in the local court system, but with support 
from a minority of international judges, prosecutors, and staff. The WCC has 
had a budget of roughly $20 million per year, similar to the SCSL and ECCC, 
but has eight trial chambers and more than 50 judges processing several hun-
dred cases per year.172 The WCC’s example shows that efficiency gains are in-
deed possible when the host government has the will and capacity to handle 
cases reasonably effectively. In Cambodia, UN officials wisely rejected the pos-
sibility of playing an even more junior part, and higher costs were a predictable 
result of heavier international engagement.
A greater concern than the ECCC’s total price tag is the inefficient use of 
funds that the Court has received, which could usefully have been redeployed to 
other ends— particularly outreach and victim participation. Some of the Court’s 
inefficiency is built into its structure— such as the duplicative investigations and 
appeals discussed in chapter 2 and its cumbersome administrative structure. 
One senior staff member notes that roughly 30% of the ECCC’s budget goes to 
administration— a much higher total than other mass crimes courts.173 In other 
instances, the lack of clear responsibility for tasks has driven up costs.
For example, the Court’s construction of a physical facility was delayed by 
ambiguities in its split authority structure. Under the Framework Agreement, 
the Cambodian Government is to “provide at its expense the premises . . . [and 
provide] utilities, facilities, and other services necessary for their operation.”174 
The United Nations bears the costs for “utilities and services,”175 however, mak-
ing it unclear precisely how to divide responsibilities. Moreover, UN- appointed 
officials believed that their role as guarantors of international standards entitled 
them to intervene in the planning and construction of certain aspects of the 
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facilities— such as the detention center and sites for defense and witness sup-
port services.176 As a consequence, after a full year of operations, the ECCC had 
not finished its courtrooms, installed audio/video equipment, or established an 
effective translation system.177
A Tower of Babel
Translation has also presented a serious challenge for the ECCC. In most mass 
crimes courts, staffers, participants to the proceedings, and observers converge 
from diverse national or ethnic backgrounds. English and French have been the 
dominant currencies of communication. They are the official languages of the 
ICTY and ICTR and the working languages of the ICC. With the exception 
of the SCSL, which adopted English as its official language, hybrid courts have 
had to deal with multiple languages to accommodate strong national participa-
tion. The East Timor Special Panels Court had the greatest burden of four of-
ficial languages: English, Portuguese, Bahasa Indonesia, and Tetum.178 The STL 
uses English, French, and Arabic. The ECCC also has three official languages: 
English, French, and Khmer.
Language issues have bedeviled the Court from its inception. In addition 
to the communication divide that tends to result between many national and 
international officials, the Court’s international side is also somewhat split be-
tween Francophone and Anglophone personnel, not all of whom are mutually 
conversant. At initial training sessions in 2006, French judicial officials com-
plained that sessions were conducted in English and Khmer.179 Years after its 
inception, the ECCC still lacks the capacity to undertake the prodigious task 
of translating all of the documents generated by the parties or referred to in 
their submissions into three languages.180 In May 2009, ECCC administrators 
reported that the Court was still short- staffed by one- third, particularly lacking 
French interpreters. Most Cambodian students now elect to study English as a 
foreign language, making French- speaking translators a scarce commodity. The 
ECCC thus had to resort to a cumbersome “relay system”— Khmer to English 
to French or vice versa— to facilitate discussion with French lawyers on the de-
fense teams.181
One Cambodian staffer laments that translation “has generally been con-
suming more than double” the time that would be required to proceed in a 
single language.182 Craig Etcheson, who served on the staff of the Office of the 
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Co- Prosecutors, agrees that translation has been “one of the greatest challenges 
in the entire exercise” and has been “immensely time- consuming.”183 Translation 
issues have arisen on numerous occasions in the courtroom and prompted re-
peated challenges from the defense, especially the Khieu Samphan team, which 
has demanded complete translations of documents into French and has faulted 
inaccuracies in official translations.184 The Court rejected Khieu Samphan’s re-
quest for a complete translation of materials, reasoning that doing so would 
take too much time,185 but his request that the Court review transcript transla-
tions is compelling, since French is both an official language of the Court and 
the language of his international Co- Lawyers. Khieu Samphan’s Co- Lawyer 
Anta Guissé asserts that some translations have included important mistakes, 
and argues that defense teams should not have to read documents in all three 
languages to be sure of their meaning.186 As with many other aspects of the 
Court’s operations, efficiency concerns and scarce resources are in tension with 
the demands of a fair trial.
The inclusion of three official languages may have complicated the Court’s 
work unnecessarily. Etcheson, like many others, notes that “from an operational 
perspective, it’s hard to think of anyone at the Court who was [or is] solely 
Francophone.”187 One official adds that some ECCC personnel refer to French 
as “the third superfluous language.”188 The decision to include French may have 
been politically expedient for the ECCC, but given the paucity of French- 
language documents and English proficiency of most French lawyers involved, 
in retrospect its inclusion appears to be one of the more avoidable sources of 
inefficiency at the ECCC.
Difficulties in Financial Management
The ECCC’s funding structure has introduced challenges in financial planning 
and management as well. Budgets have to be prepared by the Cambodian and 
international sides separately and shuttled from one side to another for com-
ments and modification as they are reconciled.189 In addition, finances have 
come from a number of different channels. The international side has received 
funds from more than 20 UN member states and a handful of private donors. 
The national side has been funded through contributions from the Cambodian 
Government, direct bilateral aid from more than 10 different donor states, for-
eign aid channeled through UNDP and the Cambodian Government, and dis-
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bursement of multilateral funds managed by the United Nations. Donors have 
differing requirements for their grants to the ECCC, including auditing and 
reporting requirements and grant periods.
The ECCC’s financial management challenges are compounded by the lack 
of a centralized international oversight mechanism. At the SCSL, the Manage-
ment Committee monitors all court finances and reports to the UN Secretary- 
General.190 At fully international courts, reports go to the United Nations. The 
diversity of the ECCC’s funding sources places a heavy burden on the OA’s 
Budget and Finance Unit. Financial management is considerably easier at do-
mestic courts— which receive funds exclusively from the government— or fully 
international tribunals that have their funds channeled through the United Na-
tions.191 The OA must report separately to the Cambodian Government, UN 
entities, and individual foreign donors— consuming resources that could be 
better spent on legal or outreach functions.
Unpredictable Funding Streams
The ECCC has also faced the challenge of unpredictable and sometimes in-
adequate funds arising from its reliance on voluntary donor contributions. Its 
initial budget was determined only after the passage of the ECCC Law. UN and 
Cambodian officials agreed that the two sides would split a budget of $56.3 mil-
lion spread over the tribunal’s three- year expected lifetime. International donors 
would pay roughly $43 million, and the Cambodian Government would fund 
the remaining $13.3 million. That agreement quickly came under strain, how-
ever. After an intergovernmental pledging conference in New York in March 
2005, roughly 90% of the required donations on the international side were in 
place. Japan was the largest initial donor, contributing $21 million.192 Other ma-
jor bilateral donors included Australia, France, Germany, and the United King-
dom.193 The Cambodian Government announced that it could contribute only 
$1.5 million, however.194 Cambodian officials argued that their most important 
contributions would be in- kind donations, such as providing a physical site for 
the tribunal. Foreign donors provided the rest, and this precedent set the stage 
for a series of episodes in which funds for the Cambodian side would nearly 
expire before an international rescue— a game reminiscent of the negotiations 
to create the tribunal.
Just months after the tribunal began operating, it became clear that the 
ECCC would far exceed the rosy initial cost estimates.195 That was not a sur-
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prise, both because such institutions are habitually sold to donors with overly 
optimistic projections and because initial budget plans were based on unreal-
istic estimates by planners with little or no experience managing civil law or 
mass crimes trials.196 Since then, the ECCC has lurched from funding crisis 
to funding crisis. In January 2008, ECCC officials sent a revised budget to do-
nors requesting $114 million more to fund the tribunal’s work through March 
2011. As discussed above, most international donors were unenthusiastic amid 
allegations of mismanagement and corruption. Many demanded justification 
for the increased costs, and some withheld funds to press for reforms to the 
ECCC’s administration, but Australian and French infusions helped keep the 
court functioning.197
The ECCC later shaved its budget request, requesting an additional $46 
million through 2009— $36 million for the international side and $10 million 
for the Cambodian side.198 Pledges from Germany ($4.3 million) and the United 
States ($1.8 million) on the international side and from Japan ($2.9 million) and 
Cambodia ($1 million) on the domestic side and other key donors met some of 
that request, but the tribunal continued to require urgent fundraising to avoid 
depleting its resources.199
Another funding impasse occurred in early 2009 amid the debate over an 
anticorruption mechanism. A Japanese grant of $21 million helped fill the short-
fall on the international side, and as described above, funds on the Cambodi-
an side dwindled before Australia and Japan infused more resources. Further 
crunches occurred in late 2010, when Cambodian staffers had to go without 
salaries pending donor replenishments,200 and similar crises occurred again in 
late 2011, 2012, and 2013.201
In facing funding uncertainties and impasses, the ECCC is certainly not 
alone. The SCSL also was not created under Chapter VII authority and thus 
lacked access to assessed contributions from UN member states.202 Yet the exis-
tence of a donor- led Management Committee and a stronger UN role in the Si-
erra Leone tribunal helped the SCSL access international funds. The UN Gen-
eral Assembly’s budget committee took $16 million from its “subvention fund” 
of unused assessed contributions to help the SCSL through a budget crisis in 
2004203 and again used subvention funds to help the SCSL overcome serious 
funding shortfalls in 2011 and 2012 amid its final trial against Charles Taylor.204 
No such subvention funds have been forthcoming for the ECCC.
ECCC officials and staff present varying views on how funding uncertain-
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ties have affected the Court’s functional efficacy. Cambodian Co- Investigating 
Judge You Bunleng asserts that the funding crises “affect, to some degree, the 
motivation and budget plans of staff and their families,” but staff in the Of-
fice of Co- Investigating Judges still exhibit “high commitment in fulfilling their 
duty” and “do not stop working . . . regardless of getting their salary on time.”205 
Etcheson asserts that in the Office of the Co- Prosecutors, “with one exception, 
our national colleagues bit the bullet and did the work when they weren’t be-
ing paid” but that “it never did them any good in morale,” especially as months 
passed.206 One Cambodian staffer believes that “the international community 
would not let the Court’s work collapse,” so funding rescues are expected.207 By 
contrast, other staff say that funding impasses “really affect the Court’s work,”208 
because staff lose motivation,209 depart, and need to be replaced— which causes 
delays— and because “without clear funding,” the Court’s offices have “unclear 
work plan[s].”210
Both inefficiency and funding crunches have contributed to the underfund-
ing of some important ECCC functions. By the end of 2012, the ECCC em-
ployed 176 international personnel and 292 Cambodians and had spent $173.3 
million since its inception— $131.2 million funded through the UN side, and 
$42.1 million through the Cambodian side.211 By that point, the ECCC had 
spent approximately $135 million for total staff salaries, other staff costs, and 
nonstaff compensation; roughly $25 million for supplies, furniture and equip-
ment, facilities alteration, general operating costs, and various contractor ser-
vices; but much smaller amounts for training, legacy, outreach trips, defense and 
victims support, and experts and witnesses.212
Funding shortfalls have also affected the Court’s core judicial operations. The 
UN has cut many positions to reduce costs but has lost key staff members as a 
result. In October 2012, the Trial Chamber announced that staff cuts required 
it to hear courtroom proceedings only three days each week— a measure it ac-
knowledged would further delay Case 002, its most important trial.213 UN Spe-
cial Expert David Scheffer warned of further impending layoffs, and Secretary- 
General Ban Ki- moon said that if donors did not fill a funding shortfall of 
several million dollars in the Court’s 2012– 13 budget, the crisis “could jeopardize 
the judicial proceedings.”214 Indeed, it has. In December 2012, international Co- 
Prosecutor Andrew Cayley had to tour Europe to help the Court raise funds 
to avoid bankruptcy.215 This is hardly the function one would wish for a pros-
ecutor to undertake in the midst of the Court’s headline trial. In March 2013, 
approximately 20 Cambodian translators and interpreters went briefly on strike 
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after going three months without pay, delaying the proceedings in Case 002 by 
more than a month.216 In July, the Court let 10% of Cambodian staff go to save 
money,217 but new threats of strikes came the following month after still another 
suspension of pay due to gaps in funding for the Cambodian side of the Court.218 
In September, 134 Cambodian staff went on strike for three weeks until a UN 
loan to Cambodia covered their summer back pay. In October, the Cambodian 
Government pledged to fill the $1.8 million shortfall on the national side until the 
end of the year, but further funding gaps are almost certain in 2014.
Throughout the process, the Cambodian Government has funded less than 
20% of the budget for the national side, relying on foreign donors to pay Cam-
bodian personnel at the Court. The hybrid nature of the Court enables the 
Cambodian Government to force donors’ hands, because as Council of Minis-
ters spokesman Ek Tha stressed during one recent pay freeze, “the international 
side will not be able to work without assistance from the Cambodian side.”219 
Some believe the Cambodian Government wants the Court to close. In early 
2013, after national judges and staff had gone nearly three months without pay, 
one Cambodian staffer said: “The government won’t pay these salaries. They 
just want the court to shut down . . . By creating this situation, they just want to 
embarrass the U.N.”220 At a minimum, Cambodian officials have been willing 
to take the risk that the Court will close— or that the proceedings will drag out 
until all of the defendants die— while donors continue to blink first, providing 
just enough funds to keep the national side afloat.
Funding problems relate closely to broader political disputes at the Court. 
In 2011, the ECCC’s administration faced pressure to wind down the work of 
the Office of the Co- Investigating Judges (OCIJ) in order to pour all available 
funds into Case 002. The Defence Support Section was initially refused funds 
for suspects in Cases 003 and 004,221 and more than one donor has reportedly 
sought to earmark funds for Case 002. In October 2012, Scheffer noted that a 
donor had withdrawn its pledge to fill the Court’s 2012 shortfall. According to 
rumors in Court circles, Japan was that donor and withdrew its pledge when the 
UN rejected Tokyo’s request to earmark funds for Case 002 only.222 Earmarking 
for an international court can easily verge into political interference, especially 
when it limits or withholds resources for particular cases. Some human rights 
advocates warned donors against imposing such limits in the lead- up to the 
2012 Session of the Assembly of States Parties to the ICC.223 A court relying on 
voluntary contributions is particularly vulnerable.
Should the ECCC decide to proceed with Cases 003 and 004, the cost of 
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the process will rise again. Indeed, the Court revised its 2012– 13 budget to add 
or reinstate 18 positions in the OCIJ after the new international CIJ Mark Har-
mon arrived in October 2012 and indicated his intention to press forward with 
further investigation of Cases 003 and 004— investigations often stymied dur-
ing the politicized deadlock over those cases since 2009.224 Donor demands for 
earmarks will likely escalate over time, further eroding what little remains of the 
Court’s independent prosecutorial discretion.
Conclusion
The structure of the ECCC has posed serious challenges to effective administra-
tion and financial management. The United Nations agreed unenthusiastically 
to a partnership with a government fixated on maintaining a strong measure of 
political control. The ECCC’s split administrative and managerial structures 
have made it difficult for UN officials to deal decisively with problems arising 
on the Cambodian side of the court. Administrative inefficiencies and impasses 
have also lengthened the process, made it more expensive, and sapped donor 
interest.
The United Nations has sometimes been passive in dealing with adminis-
trative and financial problems at the ECCC, ambivalent about the Court as a 
whole, and unwilling to take strong ownership of a process it does not control. 
This is reminiscent of the situation in East Timor. Former Chief Justice of the 
Special Panels Phillip Rapoza suggests that:
[T]he question of ownership overlapped with the issue of control and neither 
the U.N. nor East Timor wished to take responsibility for what they did not 
consider wholly their own. In that sense, the hybrid process was too much a 
bastard child for either to claim paternity.225
Deputy Director Knut Rosandhaug, the most senior UN administrative 
official, has reiterated the UN’s position that gives considerable deference to 
the Cambodian side of the Court, differentiating the ECCC as “a national court 
with UN backing, whereas other war crimes courts are run by the UN[.]”226 The 
division of authority between DESA, OLA, and UN officials in Phnom Penh 
has also been ambiguous, contributing to the lack of clear international owner-
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ship of difficult administrative decisions.227 Despite the creation of a Special Ex-
pert position, donors generally have taken a hands- off managerial approach as 
well, seldom using the Friends group to exert strong managerial guidance, even 
when such guidance is sorely needed. Without tougher, more concerted donor 
engagement, the United Nations is in a difficult structural position indeed.228
While it is true that changes to the structure of the Court would require 
renegotiation, the UN does have considerable capacity to fulfill its partner-
ship obligations as outlined in the Agreement.229 The international responses 
to human resources mismanagement and the kickback scandal at the ECCC 
show that pressure from the United Nations and donors can drive reforms even 
within a difficult structural environment and in the face of domestic stonewall-
ing. In administration and finance, as in other aspects of the Court’s operations, 
the United Nations and key donors have been eager to trumpet successes but 
too ready to distance themselves from the ECCC when adverse developments 
occur. The structure of the tribunal certainly provides incentives and opportu-




Case 001— Convicting an 
Infamous Khmer Rouge  
Torture Chief
“You Cannot Cover an Elephant with a Rice Basket”
The ECCC’s early challenges— including struggles over procedural rules, ad-
ministrative delays, corruption allegations, and funding shortfalls— tended to 
confirm fears that the Court’s complex hybrid structure would compromise its 
operational effectiveness. Given the ongoing political tension between the na-
tional and international sides in their awkward institutional marriage, it was 
unclear that the ECCC would be able to carry out its most important function 
of delivering credible criminal trials.
The ECCC’s first test was its easiest: the trial against Kaing Guek Eav, bet-
ter known by his alias “Duch.” Duch was the former head of the notorious S- 21 
security center in Phnom Penh, and this chapter’s subtitle— a courtroom quote 
from Duch’s Cambodian co- counsel, Kar Savuth— conveys the widespread 
knowledge of horrific crimes that took place there.1 The ECCC ultimately found 
that at least 12,273 prisoners,2 many of them Khmer Rouge cadres caught up in 
internal political purges, were tortured and executed at S- 21 from 1975 to 1979.3
It was not coincidental that Duch’s trial came first. Donors and Court offi-
cials believed that trying Duch would be the best start for the Court, as his case 
is the “one with the greatest amount of documentation, witnesses, the suspect 
has already confessed, and it would be easy to bring to trial.”4 Signed orders by 
Duch to torture and execute prisoners, the available testimony of former S- 21 
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prison guards and prisoners, and Duch’s own previous admissions all reduced 
the legal and administrative complexity of the case.5 Duch also had not been 
tried or granted any form of amnesty or pardon in the past. It was thus very 
likely that the ECCC could produce a credible conviction.
Just as important, Duch’s trial was not deemed politically sensitive. Unlike 
other key Khmer Rouge suspects, he had few previous dealings with the Cam-
bodian Government or foreign powers. His offenses were concentrated around 
events at S- 21, making it less likely that his trial would feature discussion of 
foreign powers and time periods outside of Democratic Kampuchea (DK). The 
key stakeholders agreed that he should stand trial, making political feuds over 
the case unlikely. The Duch trial was therefore the best- case scenario for testing 
the effect of the ECCC’s unique hybrid form upon its function. If the ECCC 
were unable to try Duch effectively, its ability to manage more difficult cases 
would be doubtful. As it turns out, the trial was largely successful, but not with-
out challenges that raised doubts about the Court’s ability to manage tougher, 
more politically contested cases.
Overview of the duch Case
Although Duch was not one of the most senior Khmer Rouge leaders, he had 
long been identified as one of the individuals most likely to stand trial at the 
ECCC under the rubric of those “most responsible” for crimes of the Pol Pot 
era. He was born in 1942 and became interested in communism while a student, 
spending two years in prison for pro– Khmer Rouge activities. He was freed in 
1970 in a general amnesty of political prisoners after Prime Minister Lon Nol 
overthrew Prince Sihanouk’s government, and rejoined the communist insur-
gency. Within a few years he had set up and was running two Khmer Rouge 
prisons in Kampong Speu— M13 and M99— and had begun perfecting the tor-
ture interrogation techniques he later implemented at the S- 21 (Tuol Sleng) 
security center.
The S- 21 security center was established in Phnom Penh in 1975 after the 
Khmers Rouges overthrew Lon Nol. In 1976, Duch took over as chief, a position 
he held until the Vietnamese army and allied Cambodian resistance fighters 
captured Phnom Penh in 1979. In its judgment, the Trial Chamber found that 
as chief of S- 21, Duch was also in charge of the S- 24 (Prey Sar) work camp and 
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had established the Choeung Ek killing fields, where most of the S- 21 prison-
ers were executed.6 Duch also implemented and refined S- 21’s interrogation/
torture techniques, authorized executions, and personally oversaw the interro-
gation of the most important prisoners.
The first prisoners to arrive at S- 21 were officials and soldiers connected 
to the overthrown Lon Nol regime, but later they comprised primarily Khmer 
Rouge cadres and their families, some foreigners including Vietnamese prison-
ers of war, and S- 21 staff. Nearly all prisoners were tortured until they confessed 
to antirevolutionary crimes and named their “accomplices,” who would then be 
arrested and tortured until they confessed their crimes and named additional 
traitors in turn.7
After the fall of the DK regime, Duch lived among the senior Khmer Rouge 
leaders in Thai border refugee camps until 1984 when he was sent to China to 
teach and changed his name to Hang Pin. When he returned to Cambodia, he 
taught in Banteay Meanchey province until 1995 when his house was attacked, 
either as part of a robbery or a revenge attack, and his wife was killed. At that 
time he moved to Battambang province, where he converted to Christianity and 
joined a local church. During this period he continued to teach and also worked 
in camps along the Thai border with non- governmental organizations.8 In 1999 
he was identified and arrested, and he was thereafter held by the Cambodian 
Military Court for over eight years without trial. In 2007, he was indicted by 
and transferred to the custody of the ECCC.
Although limited to one detention site where primarily Khmer Rouge cad-
res and their families were executed, the Duch trial was of major significance 
in providing the first opportunity for Cambodians to hear public discussion 
and debate on policies of the DK period that resulted in the deaths of nearly 
two million people in only three years, eight months, and twenty days. Duch’s 
confession of his crimes and the Court’s judgment of his actions had potential 
significance even for survivors unconnected to S- 21, as they spoke to the respon-
sibility of the many Khmer Rouge cadres who will never be held accountable 
for other atrocities.
Partly due to the limited points at issue, the Duch proceedings were a suc-
cessful first effort. In general, the Court produced reasonable jurisprudence, 
and it took significant steps to connect the Duch trial to the surrounding sur-
vivor population. These included an unprecedented civil party scheme, which 
engaged nearly 100 survivors of the DK period in the case against Duch, and 
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extensive outreach activities made possible by its in- country location.9 It also is-
sued a credible verdict. On July 26, 2010, the ECCC pronounced the first inter-
nationally recognized conviction of a key Khmer Rouge official for crimes of the 
Pol Pot era, finding Duch guilty of crimes against humanity and war crimes.10
The Court did encounter difficulties related to its institutional structure, 
however. The Duch trial suffered from delays and confusion as the testing 
ground for the ECCC’s complex hybrid structure, the first- time application of 
its mixed civil law and common law rules, and the experimental inclusion of 
civil parties. The case also featured a dramatic split between Duch’s national and 
international lawyers that undermined his defense and a struggle to resolve per-
haps the most politically sensitive issue at the trial— how to account in sentenc-
ing for Duch’s lengthy and illegal pretrial detention by the Cambodian Military 
Court. Each of these issues is examined below.
Duch’s Hybrid Defense
Given the overwhelming evidence against Duch, much of the intrigue at trial 
pertained to the strategies his co- lawyers would mount in his defense. From 
the start, Duch agreed to most of the factual allegations against him;11 the only 
unknown was what sentence he would receive.12 Throughout the trial, Duch’s 
co- lawyers appeared to pursue a joint strategy of pleading guilty to most charg-
es, repeatedly expressing remorse, and cooperating with the prosecution in the 
hope of receiving a reduced sentence. Duch’s international and national lawyers 
took somewhat different approaches, however, leading to one of the most dra-
matic events at the mixed Court at that time: an eleventh- hour split between 
the co- lawyers resulting in two fundamentally different pleas for their client.
International Counsel’s Strategy— Critiquing the Court’s Mixed Rules
Duch’s French international counsel François Roux emphasized Duch’s admis-
sion of most allegations in his continued efforts to seek a pseudo “guilty plea” 
and reduce the scope of evidence introduced against his client at trial. Roux also 
raised concerns regarding efficiency and equality of arms due to the first- time 
inclusion of civil parties in a mass crimes trial, seeking to reduce victims’ impact 
on sentencing. The Trial Chamber struggled to find the right balance between 
fully airing the facts and minimizing the length of proceedings. Debates over 
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the applicable rules provided an early indication of the difficulties of applying 
domestic civil law procedures in a field of law dominated by common law prec-
edent.
Minimizing the Scope of Evidence Presented
The French civil law system does not recognize “guilty pleas” that lead to trun-
cated proceedings; however, during the investigation phase a judge collects all 
evidence and narrows down the issues in dispute. He or she examines witnesses, 
and very few are recalled to testify at trial. This procedure keeps trials short 
and focused. Because of the large amount of evidence at issue at the ECCC, 
“[m]aterial on the Case File is considered evidence and relied on by the Cham-
ber in decision making only where it is put before the Chamber and subjected to 
examination.13 Evidence is considered “put before” the Chamber “if its content 
has been summarised, read out, or appropriately identified in court.”14 Although 
this common law– like innovation arguably makes trial proceedings fairer be-
cause everything is debated in public, it has the potential to negate much of the 
time savings of having a case file, as all evidence must be presented a second 
time at trial.
In an apparent effort to reduce the scope of evidence admitted, Duch’s 
French co- lawyer François Roux often argued that the Internal Rules should be 
interpreted in light of international practice, and Duch’s admissions of respon-
sibility and remorse should be accepted as a type of guilty plea.15 But after 30 
years of impunity for Khmer Rouge crimes, the public arguably had the right— 
and the need— to hear all the facts discussed. This was especially true because 
Duch’s admissions were undercut by their selectivity. He often had perfect rec-
ollection of people and events, but he denied all facts that were not proved by 
documentation16 and became vague and forgetful when the evidence pointed 
to his active and willing involvement in the crimes, such as through personally 
committing torture,17 or going beyond what was required to fulfill his orders.
Although there were doubts about the sincerity of Duch’s public apology on 
the second day of trial, it provoked much- needed discussion and debate among 
Cambodians. Significantly, it was the first ever offered by a senior Khmer Rouge 
official:
Now, I would like [survivors and the families of the dead] to know that I wish 
to apologize, and I would like you to consider my intentions. I do not ask that 
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you forgive me here and now. I know that the crimes I committed against the 
lives of those people, including women and children, are intolerably and unfor-
givably serious crimes. My plea is that you leave the door open for me to seek 
forgiveness.18
Some people believed his remorse was genuine.19 Others were more suspicious. 
Survivor Chheav Hourlay said, “We cannot infer from the confession whether 
he is honest  .  .  . [h]e might have talked to have his sentence reduced or the 
charges dropped[.]”20
The prosecution never recognized Duch’s statements as either a guilty plea 
or as an expression of unqualified remorse. Duch never said, “I plead guilty as 
charged,” but instead fought the charges, arguing, for example, that there had 
been no armed conflict before 1977 and he therefore could not be charged with 
war crimes before that date. As discussed below, he also denied that he acted 
voluntarily— an argument that goes to the heart of his criminality. Due to the 
historic nature of the case, his limited expressions of responsibility, and public 
expectations of hearing all the evidence, the prosecution— and the judges— 
believed it was necessary to have a full trial.
Unsuccessful in limiting the scope of crime evidence put before the Cham-
ber, Roux then sought to limit the prosecution’s character evidence:
And when an accused pleads guilty before an international criminal court— 
please listen carefully— an agreement is struck with the prosecutors, enabling 
the accused to bring forward character witnesses and the prosecutor does not 
challenge them. The prosecutor refrains when someone pleads guilty in com-
mon law— refrains from questioning or challenging character witnesses. That is 
the solution. That is the solution.21
The Trial Chamber did not accept this argument, but as discussed below, Roux 
was able to persuade it that as auxiliary prosecutors the civil parties should not 
have an equal opportunity to challenge Duch on the key issues of character and 
sentencing.
Managing Civil Party Participation
With four civil party teams and at least one national and one international law-
yer per team in Case 001, the defense faced a minimum of eight additional law-
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yers supporting the prosecution in court. The teams began cooperating among 
themselves to a greater extent over time, but they for the most part worked inde-
pendently, resulting in questioning repetitive not only with the prosecution but 
also with each other.22 While some lawyers spoke to individual clients’ interests, 
and thus asked questions perceived as irrelevant, others honed closely to the 
prosecution’s case, contributing to a perception that they were acting as a sec-
ond prosecutorial team.23 Judge Silvia Cartwright called the process of involv-
ing victims “cumbersome” and said that “it has frequently had the unlooked- for 
effect of slowing the trial while not providing for victims’ needs which includes 
achieving timely justice for their suffering.”24
Although many of the complications arising from civil party participation 
in Case 001 have been laid at the feet of the civil party lawyers, the Court itself 
was unprepared to manage their participation and addressed problems only as 
they arose rather than planning in advance. Little forethought was put into how 
the civil party scheme would work in practice; instead, it developed over time 
through trial and error. As one Court monitor has noted: “Many of the prob-
lems that would emerge during the trial seemed to be the result of inadequate 
planning and preparation on the Court’s behalf with regard to the civil party 
process as a whole.”25 Instead of managing civil party representation from the 
outset, the Court blamed the civil party lawyers for not organizing themselves.
Civil party lawyer Alain Werner did not believe the civil parties’ participa-
tion in Case 001 unacceptably lengthened the Duch trial. In his view, consider-
ing that the ECCC is the first international court to apply mainly civil law and 
to include civil party participation, “this trial has shown that the system can cer-
tainly work in theory, maybe with some adaptations” depending on the number 
of accused and civil parties.26 Journalist Thierry Cruvellier opined:
At the end of the day, even though it was messy and the representation was 
often poor, it seems that it did bring to the [Duch] trial a dimension considered 
missing at the other tribunals . . . Anyone who says that this is not an interesting 
experiment here at the ECCC forgets how frustrated the victims were in the 
[International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)].27
A more worrisome problem than duplication and delay was the four civil party 
teams’ impact on equality of arms. Duch’s lawyer argued that although in civil 
law systems there is no question that civil parties are entitled to question all wit-
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nesses and experts, it was inappropriate when there are numerous civil parties 
acting as auxiliary prosecutors:
And so, yes, indeed you have civil law on your side. That’s true. Looking at the 
letter of the law, the law is on your side. But the law is a living organism and, 
more specifically, we all know here that we are in a tribunal that creates law.28
As part of François Roux’s efforts to have Duch’s cooperation and apology 
accepted as a de facto guilty plea, from the early stages of trial proceedings he 
challenged the right of the civil parties to make submissions on sentencing. The 
civil parties argued that facts relating to guilt or innocence cannot be separated 
from facts relevant to sentencing and noted that at the ECCC there is no sepa-
rate sentencing hearing.29 Moreover, they emphasized that neither the ECCC 
Internal Rules nor the Cambodian Code of Criminal Procedure nor other civil 
law jurisdictions preclude civil parties from being heard on sentencing, and that 
as full parties, they have a general right to be heard on any topic.30 They wished 
to draw on the testimony of individual civil parties and discuss topics such as 
the impact of the crimes and Duch’s admissions and expression of remorse on 
the civil parties and their families.31
However, the Trial Chamber said that the ECCC civil party model is based 
on “but is not identical to” Cambodian procedure, because it has been adapted 
to take into account the unique context of complex mass crimes trials with nu-
merous victims, which requires “a restrictive interpretation of rights of civil par-
ties” in proceedings before the ECCC.32 It highlighted the fair trial rights of the 
accused, including to face only one prosecuting authority.33 Ultimately, it found 
that civil parties could not make submissions on or recommendations concern-
ing sentencing, because their right to assist the prosecution is limited to estab-
lishing the guilt of the accused in order to secure their claim for reparations.34
Finding that civil parties could not opine on sentencing, the Chamber tacked 
onto this decision the determination that they also could not question witnesses 
and experts about Duch’s character. In their view, questions relating to character 
relate solely to aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and therefore are rel-
evant solely to sentencing, in which the civil parties had no interest.35
These decisions appeared to be a belated effort to manage civil party in-
terventions by limiting their right to participate as a party. The Duch trial was 
never about proving Duch’s guilt, which he freely admitted. It was from the start 
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only about sentencing. Bearing this in mind, it is arguable that the Chamber 
excluded the civil parties from the most important part of the trial— the heart 
of the matter. It made this decision against civil law practice and the Court’s 
own rules. It seems likely that the judges’ daily experience of watching four civil 
party legal teams repeat prosecution arguments over and over convinced them 
to accept François Roux’s appeal to leave domestic civil law rules behind:
When one is in a national civil law trial where there is an accused who has com-
mitted one murder and when you have one, perhaps two, civil parties applying, 
well, if the civil party lets his or her suffering overflow, that might happen but it 
won’t go any further than that. However, in proceedings such as this one dealing 
with mass crimes, if you have one, two, three, five, 10 or 20 or more civil par-
ties who come and let out their legitimate suffering then we find ourselves in a 
situation that is unimaginable from the point of view of a fair trial because the 
accused is no longer facing one prosecutor but 20, 30, 50 prosecutors.36
Blending Civil and Common Law Procedures
After the Duch trial, major actors offered different perspectives on the results 
of the blending of legal systems. Australian Acting international Co- Prosecutor 
William Smith said, “[T]he conflict between the civil law and common law sys-
tems was ‘more myth than reality’ and that the greater challenge was managing 
the copious evidence.”37 However both the French Co- Investigating Judge and 
the French international Co- Lawyer criticized the Co- Prosecutors for not fol-
lowing civil law procedures.
Former CIJ Marcel Lemonde has repeatedly argued that the prosecutors 
failed to use the judicial investigation in the Case 001 trial sufficiently. In his 
view, as common law lawyers, they “have sometimes given the impression that 
they did not know how to use the investigation file . . . ; if there had been no 
[ judicial] investigation, the trial would probably not have been fundamentally 
different.”38 As his key example, he points to the “reenactment” he staged at the 
Choeung Ek killing fields and S- 21, where Duch was confronted with witnesses 
including former guards and some victims. Lemonde says that at this meeting, 
Duch provided useful information, such as explaining that the S- 21 site had not 
changed since 1979, which was important because a number of people said that 
the crime site may have been manipulated by the Vietnamese.39 However, other 
civil law lawyers say that the CIJ investigation was underutilized at trial because 
Duch admitted most of the charges. Indeed, there is a widespread consensus 
2RRP 
Case 001—Convicting an Infamous Khmer Rouge Torture Chief / 113
that the reenactment had little evidentiary significance, but was primarily— in 
Judge Lemonde’s own words— “a great moment.”40
Comparably, François Roux said that the need for evidence to be heard pub-
licly at trial caused ECCC procedure to evolve as “a combination of both civil 
and common law, which has sometimes led to confusion and dispute.”41 In his 
view, the worst of both systems was sometimes implemented when the parties 
employed common law procedures due to a “lack of understanding” of the civil 
law system.42 Nevertheless, in seeking a de facto guilty plea for his client and 
reduced civil party participation, he likewise advocated a common law approach 
on more than one occasion, albeit in the guise of adapting procedures to mass 
crimes proceedings. He asked the Chamber to be “pragmatic,” “take account of 
the particular context of the Duch case,” and “hand down a specific decision; 
specific to the Duch case.”43 Despite Roux’s frustrations, he appears in accord 
with Trial Judge Silvia Cartwright’s view that the blending of law is part of “a 
move towards ‘a homogenous system’ at the international level” involving the 
adaptation of procedures from both traditions “to ensure they fit the realities 
on the ground.”44
However, in tasking the Court with applying Cambodian procedures, the 
drafters of the Framework Agreement and ECCC Law did not give the Court 
authority to apply hybrid procedures adapted to mass crimes, nor did they give 
it authority to look to the practice of international courts except where there 
is a lacuna, uncertainty, or inconsistency with international standards. From 
the start, the Court has grappled with the reality that, even when such prob-
lems do not exist, domestic procedures are often inappropriate in a mass crimes 
context— where, for example, there is a greater need to publicly demonstrate 
justice being done. At the same time, because international procedures are not 
based in civil law, they do not offer a clear way forward. Although the Internal 
Rules foresee some hybrid solutions, they fail to address many of the problems 
that have arisen, and have created others. As seen in chapters 5 and 7, the ap-
propriate “blending” of systems has been viewed differently by different judges 
and applied differently by each chamber, sometimes resulting in confusion and 
inconsistency.
National Counsel’s Strategy: Mounting Legal Defenses
Some public reluctance to accept Duch’s cooperation and expressions of re-
morse as a guilty plea stemmed from his parallel efforts to diminish his respon-
sibility by arguing that he had no choice but to act as ordered by his superiors 
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in the CPK hierarchy. Although Duch’s counsel never formally argued the ap-
plicability of the legal defenses of duress or superior orders during trial, his 
Cambodian lawyer Kar Savuth raised them during closing arguments, and they 
are thus addressed by the Trial Chamber in its findings. Both of his counsel 
also questioned if Duch was being used as a scapegoat for the crimes of the 
regime. Although they never made a legal case for selective prosecution, Kar 
Savuth made a compelling plea for “fairness” that resonated with many Cambo-
dian survivors. During closing arguments he went further and broke with his 
international Co- Counsel to argue that these factors excluded Duch from the 
Court’s jurisdiction over “senior leaders” and “persons most responsible” for the 
crimes of the DK era. This turn of events paralleled efforts to close Cases 003 
and 004 on the same grounds, generating concern that political opposition to 
more trials might taint the Case 001 verdict.
Superior Orders and Duress: “A Cog in an Unstoppable Machine”
While admitting to gruesome facts and apologizing for his role at S- 21, Duch 
also denied that he acted voluntarily, arguing that he was coerced to carry out 
his superiors’ orders and had no leeway in executing them. On the second day 
of trial, Roux noted that the Chamber would determine “what was the degree of 
autonomy or lack thereon of in Duch in his duties as the head of S- 21?”45 This 
is likely one reason why Duch adamantly denied that anyone had ever been 
released from S- 21.46
Duch portrayed himself as a prisoner of the regime. He said he had been 
“reluctant” to become an S- 21 deputy and that his request to instead work at the 
Ministry of Industry had been denied.47 “[M]y acceptance of duties in the secu-
rity centres, starting with M- 13, was something that I was not able to avoid.”48 “I 
found myself serving a criminal organization which smashed a large number of 
its own people and from which I could not withdraw. I was a cog in an unstop-
pable machine.”49 He said he acted out of fear for his own life and the lives of 
his family.50
International courts do not accept duress as a complete defense to charges 
of crimes against humanity and serious war crimes. For example, in the ICTY 
Erdemovic case in which a Bosnian Serb soldier was found to have taken part 
in a massacre or be killed himself, duress was only taken into account in the 
mitigation of his sentence.51 The International Criminal Court’s Rome Statute, 
which provides the most detailed definitions of defenses among international 
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court documents, does not exclude a duress defense to serious crimes, but de-
fines it as resulting from a threat of imminent death or of continuing or immi-
nent serious bodily harm against someone or another person, where he or she 
acts necessarily and reasonably to avoid this threat, and does not intend to cause 
a greater harm than the one sought to be avoided.52 Thus, consistent with ICTY 
jurisprudence, under this definition the need to protect oneself and one’s family 
would never be a complete defense to participation in the murder of thousands 
of people.
The ECCC Trial Chamber ruled consistent with this international prec-
edent in finding that “[d]uress cannot . . . be invoked when the perceived threat 
results from the implementation of a policy of terror in which [Duch] himself 
has willingly and actively participated.”53 “The Chamber accordingly finds that 
the Accused did not act under duress as Deputy and later Chairman of S- 21. 
Duress as such is therefore irrelevant both in relation to the Accused’s criminal 
responsibility and in mitigation of sentence.”54 Nevertheless, it did consider the 
“coercive climate” during the DK period as a mitigating factor.55
Duch also said he was only acting in accordance with superior orders. For ex-
ample, when asked how he could have viewed mothers with babies as enemies he 
said, “It was not me . . . there was an order[.]”56 Superior orders, which is related 
to duress, is the only defense mentioned in the core ECCC documents; however, 
it is explicitly excluded.57 It has been disallowed as a defense at least since the 
Nuremberg trials but may be accepted as a mitigating factor in sentencing.
Despite the clarity of the law on this point, during closing arguments and on 
appeal Kar Savuth argued that Duch could not be found to be most responsible 
under Cambodian law58 as he was merely acting under superior orders.59 How-
ever, even if Cambodian substantive law were applicable before the ECCC, it, 
like international law, does not recognize an exception for someone who acted 
pursuant to superior orders he knew were unlawful, which the Trial Chamber 
found to have been the case.60 The Chamber also refused to consider superior 
orders as a mitigating factor due to the long span of time over which the crimes 
were committed, the large number of victims, and Duch’s dedication to improv-
ing S- 21 operations.61
Scapegoat: Selective Prosecution
For foreigners who have visited Cambodia, S- 21 is synonymous with the crimes 
of the DK era. The Tuol Sleng Genocide Museum housed at the S- 21 prison 
116 / Hybrid Justice
2RRP
complex and the Choeung Ek killing fields are among the most visited tour-
ist attractions in Phnom Penh. Most Cambodians, however, have never visited 
either one. That began to change only after the ECCC was established, and 
outreach programs brought tens of thousands of students and visitors from the 
provinces to learn about what had transpired. The large cache of documents 
found at S- 21, including forced confessions, has contributed to the site’s notori-
ety and made it the subject of numerous scholarly studies. It is also the primary 
reason why the crimes that took place at S- 21 and Duch’s role in them have 
always been a focus of accountability efforts, and why he was tried first: his guilt 
is inescapable.
As the subjects of the first trial for Khmer Rouge crimes committed dur-
ing the DK period, S- 21 and Duch inevitably became emblematic of the harms 
suffered at that time. Although many of those killed at S- 21 were Khmer Rouge 
cadres, many Cambodians lost family members at other Khmer Rouge prisons 
that shared distressing features with S- 21, including routine torture. In this way 
S- 21 “symbolically represents the larger suffering that people experienced; in 
some sense, it stands in for and embodies their own suffering.”62
Unsurprisingly, the idea that Duch was a “scapegoat” for all DK crimes arose 
at the start of trial. François Roux used the term in its allegorical sense: “No, 
Duch does not have to bear on his head all the horrors of the Cambodian trag-
edy.”63 In contrast, Kar Savuth attempted to argue that Duch was the subject 
of selective prosecution. Throughout the proceedings, Kar Savuth made occa-
sional references to the other 195 chiefs of other Khmer Rouge security centers, 
and especially the fact that more people died at some of those prisons than 
at S- 21.64 “[I]s it fair? Because each person receives that same orders from the 
same Angkar, and each person also conducted torture, executions, and why only 
Duch is brought for trial? And only Duch is the only scapegoat on behalf of 
those 195 chiefs of prisons.”65
In response, the prosecution emphasized that while all persons must be 
treated equally before the law, this does not mean that no one can be prosecuted 
if all others who commit the same crimes are not prosecuted.66 Moreover, they 
argued that the special nature of S- 21 as a central CPK organ made it distinct 
and more important than the other detention centers, even if more people died 
at other prisons.67
Although legally Kar Savuth’s argument was a dead end, to many Cambo-
dians whose families suffered at the hands of other prison chiefs and mid- level 
cadres, it was compelling. One woman whose father had been taken away for 
2RRP 
Case 001—Convicting an Infamous Khmer Rouge Torture Chief / 117
reeducation was quoted as saying, “[t]o me, [Duch] represents all the Khmer 
Rouge[.]”68 Kar Savuth appealed to survivors’ desire to know the truth about 
what happened when he said that if the prosecution could not provide a list of 
everyone who was most responsible and explain why, there would be no jus-
tice.69 And he spoke to their fears when he emphasized that if only a “small fish” 
like Duch— someone who had “only” killed 12,380 people— was prosecuted but 
not those responsible for many more deaths, then what would be the lesson for 
Cambodia? A similar regime could return to power.70 However, he went too far 
when he asked for Duch’s acquittal instead of following Roux’s efforts to seek a 
sentence reduction.
Defense Strategy Split and Implosion
The Duch trial strategy, a fine balance of admission and evasion, was upended 
during closing arguments when Duch’s national counsel, Kar Savuth, chal-
lenged the Court’s jurisdiction over Duch and said that he should be found not 
guilty. In retrospect, there were clear signs from the beginning that Kar Savuth 
and François Roux were not pursuing the same defense.
On the second day of trial, Kar Savuth’s opening statement immediately 
attacked the Court’s jurisdiction over Duch, arguing that there were 14 senior 
leaders and persons most responsible, and Duch was not one of them.71 Instead, 
Duch was merely one of many former heads of security centers who filled the 
same roles and responsibilities, and if he were the only one to be prosecuted 
it would be a violation of the Cambodian Constitution’s protection of equal 
treatment and therefore a violation of Cambodia’s sovereignty.72 Moreover, 
if all senior leaders and all persons most responsible were not identified and 
tried, it would be unjust to prosecute anyone at all, and would fuel the suspi-
cion of former Khmer Rouge cadres that they might be tried next.73 At the Co- 
Prosecutors’ prompting, the judges asked his intent in raising these arguments. 
Kar Savuth responded:
[W]hen the Co- Prosecutors asked whether I challenge the jurisdiction, I am 
not intending to challenge it because I am quite aware already and I could have 
raised it in the initial hearing already if I wished to do so.74
Sometime before closing arguments Kar Savuth— and apparently Duch— 
reversed this position. In offering his final words, Duch gave no hint that he had 
changed his mind, but instead typically offered a history of CPK policies that 
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he apparently believed proved he was merely a cog in its machine. Kar Savuth 
picked up this theme, and following the logic of his opening statement, insisted 
that there were 14 people who were senior leaders or most responsible for the 
crimes of the DK period, and Duch was not among them.75 Moreover, if he was 
among them, so are the other 195 prison chiefs and if he is alone prosecuted it 
would be a violation of the Constitution as well as the 1956 Cambodian Crimi-
nal Code, which (he claimed) established a defense of superior orders.76 In con-
clusion, he requested that Duch be freed from prosecution.77
When Roux spoke the next morning, he made it immediately clear that he 
was taken by surprise by this new tack. “For reasons that will be clear to legal 
practitioners, we have had to review the entire plan of our pleadings after Mr. 
Kar Savuth’s pleadings yesterday afternoon.”78 He also distanced himself from 
the legal arguments:
You have clearly understood that our team has not laboured without disagree-
ments; there have been disagreements. . . . As I can appreciate what my esteemed 
colleague said last night, national laws are not applicable and, therefore, interna-
tional law must prevail. This is a given. In this trial, international law has made 
its introduction into Cambodian national law through our national prosecutor 
and through my esteemed colleague, Mr. Kar Savuth.79
Roux gamely tried to stay on message, arguing that the breach might not 
have happened if he had been allowed to enter a guilty plea on Duch’s behalf, 
with a sentencing recommendation acknowledging his cooperation, recognition 
of responsibility, and genuine remorse.80 He then asked to have these facts, as 
well as the fact that Duch was working within a repressive criminal dictator-
ship, recognized as mitigating factors. Responding to suggestions that the split 
defense position was caused by the defense’s failure to develop a comprehensive 
strategy, Roux denied that the defense had ever had a “strategy,” as this was not 
a civil law concept. Instead, the defense “attempted to convert into a legal frame-
work” Duch’s acceptance of responsibility and desire for forgiveness.81
In an apparent attempt to bridge the rupture, Roux called for Duch to re-
ceive a 10- year sentence: time served. When the prosecution requested clarifica-
tion as to whether they were seeking acquittal, Roux said:
Acquittal was not used this morning— this word was not used. Both defence 
lawyers asked that the accused’s sentence, were he to be found guilty, should be 
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reduced and that he should be freed as soon as possible. . . . He should be freed 
after being imprisoned for ten years and after fully recognizing his responsibil-
ity for the crimes in S- 21.82
Asked what he wanted, Duch said, “I would ask the Chamber to release me.”83 
Pressed as to whether this meant acquittal on all charges or a sentence re-
duction, he referred the question to Kar Savuth, who clarified: “release means 
acquittal.”84
Shortly before the judgment was pronounced, Duch fired Roux,85 the archi-
tect of his trial strategy, and after reportedly seeking the services of a Chinese 
lawyer “who better understands the communist mindset of the Khmer Rouge,”86 
eventually replaced him with a second Cambodian lawyer, Kong Ritheary.87 
“[B]esides the Chinese, there can only be Khmer,” Kar Savuth was quoted as 
saying.88 The new co- counsel team appealed the Trial Chamber verdict on the 
basis of a lack of personal jurisdiction.89
Much speculation has arisen about why the breach occurred. When Roux 
was first appointed, expectations were high. The Defence Support Section 
Deputy said, “I think it’s going to be a great team[.] We’ve got one of the most 
experienced Cambodian lawyers . . . working alongside one of the most experi-
enced international lawyers[.] . . . It’s good for the ECCC[.]”90 After the breach, 
Roux said, “it was surely a mistake to have two co- lawyers and a lead counsel 
system would have been far better.”91 “A detainee is always in his lawyers’ hands. 
It is an impossible situation for him when he has two lawyers who say two dif-
ferent things.”92
This raises the question of whether Roux sufficiently consulted with Kar 
Savuth about a common strategy— in particular after their divergence became 
apparent at the start of trial. Former Ieng Sary Co- Lawyer Michael Karnavas 
has described the “co” lawyer relationship as “like a marriage.” In his view, all 
members of the legal team must feel they have ownership in a collective ap-
proach or it will be a forced marriage and unlikely to succeed.93 As Duch pre-
ferred Kar Savuth’s approach, it also raises the question of whether Roux suffi-
ciently apprised Duch in advance about the defense he sought to pursue and its 
potential sentencing consequences. Kar Savuth likely had better understanding 
of Duch’s views and wishes, linguistically, culturally, and as his legal representa-
tive since the Military Court first detained him in 1999.
The most popular conspiracy theory was that Kar Savuth, who is also a 
lawyer for the family of Prime Minister Hun Sen, had intentionally betrayed 
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Duch at the Prime Minister’s behest. It was obvious that Kar Savuth’s principal 
arguments directly supported the publicly expressed desire of the Prime Min-
ister to limit the number of persons brought to trial. Although Roux originally 
denied that political interference had been the cause, he later appeared willing 
to countenance the possibility:
In substance [Kar Savuth] says, ‘I ask you to render a decision in which you 
will say you are taking care of the three persons you have, not one more[.]’ . . . It 
is exactly the same as the remarks that Hun Sen made some time ago. . . . The 
message [Mr. Savuth] is addressing to the three Cambodian judges is far from 
being neutral. . . . To have such a collapse at the end of the Duch trial, it is after 
all sending a very strong signal: ‘your tribunal is not ours’.94
However, reading the transcripts in hindsight, it is notable that Kar Sa-
vuth several times mentions Meas Muth and Sou Met as among those most 
responsible for crimes at S- 21 and argues that the trial judges failed to take this 
into account or to call them as witnesses.95 As both are reportedly unnamed 
suspects in the Court’s contentious Case 003, it is possible Kar Savuth instead 
thought— and convinced Duch— that he might be able to leverage the Case 
003/004 controversy to put pressure on the judges to acquit. This would have 
fit perfectly with Duch’s view that he was merely a cog in the machine and was 
being unfairly singled out for prosecution.
For his part, Kar Savuth said the rupture “was due to a divergence between 
the defense lawyers on whether to follow domestic or international law[.]”96 He 
wanted to argue Cambodian law, under which (in his view) Duch could not be 
prosecuted for following orders; however, Roux argued international law, which 
does not recognize this defense.97 He also said that Duch fired Roux because 
Roux didn’t understand communist law. From Duch’s perspective, “China is a 
communist country and the Pol Pot regime was communist [and] [c]ommunist 
law is contradictory to free law.”98
Some lawyers have suggested one more possibility: that there was a genuine 
misunderstanding. Roux and Kar Savuth took consistent positions throughout 
the trial, with the difference in their approach assuming significance only when 
the Court asked for a consequential remedy. In the view of then DSS Head 
Richard Rogers, as Cambodia has an undeveloped legal system, it is possible 
that Kar Savuth did not appreciate the legal difference between asking for a 
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sentence of time served and asking for acquittal, as both would result in im-
mediate release. Pushed into a corner, rather than backtrack and lose face, he 
might have felt the need to press forward with his demand for acquittal.99 Nuon 
Chea’s former Co- Lawyer Michiel Pestman says that because Cambodian law-
yers’ approach to strategy is different, “What happened to Roux could happen 
to anyone.”100
The best and perhaps only way to prevent it appears to be Karnavas’s in-
tensive team approach: spending time together, reviewing drafts together, and 
analyzing daily trial developments together, so that everyone has a stake in the 
same strategy. It is an immensely time- consuming process, but Karnavas says 
it’s “magic” when team members come to embrace and advocate as their own a 
strategy that emerges from a deliberative process.101
Verdict and Appeal
The verdict and appeal in the Duch case raised important issues regarding the 
relationship between the ECCC and the Cambodian court system, as well as the 
relationship between Cambodian and international sentencing rules and other 
legal principles. The Trial Chamber judgment showed that a hybrid court can 
satisfy international legal standards when it is able to exercise its authority inde-
pendently. It found Duch guilty, via direct and superior responsibility, of crimes 
against humanity and war crimes (grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions 
of 1949) and sentenced him to 35 years imprisonment, minus 5 years for the 
human rights violation he suffered when detained illegally by the Cambodian 
Military Court prior to his transfer to the ECCC. Due to the negligible amount 
of evidence of Duch’s personal involvement, and inconsistent witness testimony, 
the Trial Chamber found that Duch was not responsible for personally partici-
pating in the commission of crimes.102 After subtracting the 11 years Duch had 
already spent in detention, he was sentenced to serve less than 19 years in prison.
The judgment was generally well reasoned and well received— except with 
regard to the length of sentence, which most Cambodians thought was far too 
short. Cambodian Foreign Minister Hor Namhong expressed his personal 
view that the sentence was too light, but said, “[B]ecause this is the work of the 
Khmer Rouge tribunal the government has no position.”103 In stark contrast to 
his statements regarding Cases 003 and 004, after the announcement Prime 
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Minister Hun Sen said, “I respect the verdict handed down by the court. The 
government has no right to interfere or put any pressure on the court.”104
During the proceedings, Duch had said that he would not run away from 
the crimes he had committed and that Cambodians could punish him how-
ever they liked.105 Further, he would accept any sentence handed down by the 
Court and would not appeal the judgment.106 Nevertheless, before the Trial 
Chamber had announced the judgment, Kar Savuth vowed to appeal if Duch 
was sentenced to even one day in jail.107 On appeal, the prosecution asked for a 
life sentence for Duch, to be reduced to 45 years after taking into account the 
human rights violation he suffered by being held in unlawful detention by the 
Cambodian Military Court before his transfer to the ECCC. The defense asked 
for acquittal and immediate release, and for Duch’s time in detention since 1999 
to be considered a form of witness protection.108 Duch explicitly supported the 
arguments of his defense counsel denying the Court’s jurisdiction.
Impact of National Law on Sentencing
Debate over the relationship between Cambodian and international law in 
ECCC proceedings arose again in the context of sentencing. The prosecution of 
international crimes is unprecedented in Cambodia; there are no national sen-
tencing principles or guidelines.109 However, Article 95 of the 2009 Cambodian 
Penal Code provides, “If the penalty incurred for an offence is life imprison-
ment, the judge granting the benefit of mitigating circumstances may impose a 
sentence of between fifteen and thirty years.”110 The Trial Chamber did not find 
Article 95 to be applicable, noting that it “was doubtful whether . . . the Chamber 
could follow a subsequent national legislative provision in preference to provi-
sions of the Agreement. Such an interpretation could mean that future acts of 
the national legislature concerning sentence might frustrate the agreement.”111
Judge Lavergne dissented on this point in light of the Penal Code provision 
and the International Criminal Court’s similar provision providing for a maxi-
mum term of 30 years when life imprisonment is not warranted.112 Although 
Judge Lavergne did not think the Code was directly applicable to the ECCC, 
he found it particularly relevant for statutory interpretation of the ECCC in-
struments in light of the hybrid nature of the Court and the absence of spe-
cific sentencing guidelines.113 He noted that although the ECCC regime “may 
be deemed sui generis, it is difficult to imagine that it is entirely extraneous to 
domestic law.”114
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At the appeal hearing, Judge Klonowiecka- Milart emphasized this same 
point. Under Cambodian Penal Code Article 10 and the principle of lex mitior, 
a criminal law applies as soon as it comes into force if it is more favorable to 
the accused. If the Cambodian Penal Code were to be found applicable to the 
ECCC in this instance and mitigating circumstances were found, the ECCC 
would be prevented from imposing a sentence of more than 30 years.
The Co- Prosecutors argued that because the ECCC is sui generis, domestic 
law should not be applicable “because ‘the focus of the ECCC differs substan-
tially enough from the normal operation of Cambodian criminal courts to war-
rant a specialized system.’”115 Moreover, the ECCC Law drafters did not ask 
the Court to consider national sentencing standards, whereas that is explicitly 
required by the statutes of courts such as the ICTY, International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), and Special Court for Sierra Leone. Instead, the 
Internal Rules require the sentence to be “in accordance with the Agreement, 
the ECCC Law, and the[] IRs.”116 Additionally, they pointed out that the Penal 
Code is not applicable to special criminal legislation, which in their view must 
be interpreted to include the ECCC Law.117
Judge Klonowiecka- Milart said that she found the Co- Prosecutors’ argu-
ments unconvincing, as the ECCC is part of the national system and there is 
no direct conflict between Cambodian Criminal Code article 95 and ECCC 
Law article 39, pursuant to which the ECCC is authorized to issue a sentence of 
between five years and life imprisonment.118 She noted,
The ECCC Law copiously references the penal code of Cambodia, which by 
the way was the legal basis on which prosecution sought convictions in case 1. 
Moreover, ECCC Law treats national Cambodian procedure as a plane of refer-
ence on procedural matters. This would indicate that ECCC Law is not a stand 
alone piece of legislation, but has to be seen in the context of the legal system.119
In the Supreme Court judgment, a supermajority of the Chamber— 
including all four Cambodian judges and Japanese judge Motoo Noguchi— 
agreed with the prosecutors. The supermajority ruled that the Cambodian 
Code did not apply because it is a law of general application applicable to all 
Cambodian courts, whereas the ECCC Law was created specifically for ECCC 
proceedings. In accordance with the principle of lex specialis, the ECCC Law’s 
sentencing provisions therefore control.120 In support of this, it found that 
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ECCC Law fell within the category of “special criminal legislation” explicitly 
exempt from the applicability of this provision.121
Two international judges disagreed, saying the principle of lex specialis is 
relevant only where two rules sanction similar crimes. Instead, they found the 
2009 Code inapplicable for another reason: because it defines criminal conduct 
under domestic law, and the ECCC established special jurisdiction over inter-
national crimes.122 Nevertheless, they found that the Court should give “sub-
stantial weight” to domestic sentencing practices as the ECCC Law provides 
little guidance, and international guidelines are limited.123 Finally, they argued 
that as the ECCC is part of the Cambodian court system, in the absence of an 
established international standard, “the ECCC should deviate from the Cam-
bodia sentencing regime only where there is a good reason under the circum-
stances.”124 However, this plea for hybridity fell on deaf ears.
Mitigation
Lacking guidance from Cambodian law, the Trial Chamber followed interna-
tional precedent in considering both aggravating and mitigating factors in de-
termining what sentence to impose.125 As aggravating factors, the Court high-
lighted the shocking and heinous character of the crimes and the way they were 
carried out, the defenselessness of the victims (including children), Duch’s abuse 
of power, and his superior responsibility for the crimes of his subordinates. As 
mitigating factors, the Court considered Duch’s general cooperation with the 
Court, admission of responsibility, expressions of remorse, and the potential 
impact of these factors on national reconciliation, as well as his potential for 
rehabilitation and the coercive environment of Democratic Kampuchea.
In considering the weight of these factors, the Chamber emphasized that, 
because of Duch’s last- minute request for acquittal, his many expressions of 
remorse had to be considered “limited”:
The Accused repeatedly made public apologies and expressed remorse for his 
crimes when given the opportunity. The Chamber finds, however, that the miti-
gating impact of his remorse is undermined by his failure to offer a full and 
unequivocal admission of his responsibility. In particular, the Accused’s request 
during the closing statements for acquittal, despite earlier apparent admissions 
of responsibility, diminishes the extent to which his remorse would otherwise 
mitigate his sentence.126
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Nevertheless, in determining the sentence the Trial Chamber concluded that 
there were “significant mitigating factors” mandating the imposition of a term 
of years rather than a life sentence.127 Although the 35- year sentence it issued 
falls within the wide range of sentences meted out by international tribunals— 
which range from the comparatively short sentences of the ICTY to the fre-
quent life sentences of the ICTR128— on appeal the Supreme Court found it to 
be incapable of being reconciled “with the principles governing sentencing” due 
to the gravity of the crimes and particular aggravating factors.129
In making this determination, the Supreme Court Chamber ruled that 
the Trial Chamber’s finding of “significant mitigating factors” was an error of 
law.130 It agreed with the prosecution that Duch’s cooperation was limited, as 
he had made efforts to minimize his personal role in the crimes, sought to 
blame others, and made statements inconsistent with the evidence.131 More-
over, it observed that in his last statement to the Court denying the Court’s ju-
risdiction over him, “he effectively gave up his final opportunity to demonstrate 
the sincerity of his prior statements on remorse and apology.”132 Emphasizing 
that the high number of deaths and the extended period of time over which 
Duch committed his crimes “undoubtedly place this case among the gravest be-
fore international criminal tribunals,” the Supreme Court Chamber sentenced 
Duch to life in prison.133 The Supreme Court sentence is also in accord with 
international precedent, despite the existence of limited mitigating factors134 
and the fact that life sentences are rarely handed down except by the ICTR.135 
As discussed above, however, it is not in accord with current Cambodian sen-
tencing law.
Illegality of Duch’s Military Court Detention
To many, the topic of greatest legal significance in the Duch case, and the deci-
sion most likely to leave an immediate jurisprudential legacy for Cambodian 
courts, was the Trial Chamber’s provision of a remedy for the over eight years 
Duch was detained without trial by the Cambodian Military Court before be-
ing handed over to the ECCC for investigation.
The Trial Chamber, like the Pre- Trial Chamber before it, had determined 
that because of the ECCC’s formal and functional independence from domes-
tic Cambodian courts and lack of connection to the Military Court proceed-
ings, the ECCC could not be attributed with prior violations of Duch’s rights.136 
Nevertheless, the Trial Chamber found:
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The ECCC Law not only authorizes the ECCC to apply domestic criminal pro-
cedure, but also obligates it to interpret these rules and determine their confor-
mity with international standards prescribed by human rights conventions and 
followed by international courts.137
It therefore ruled that the Court has “both the authority and the obligation to 
consider the legality of his prior detention”138 in determining his sentence. Find-
ing that Duch’s prior detention was a violation of applicable Cambodian and 
international law, the Chamber decided that he was entitled to a remedy for this 
human rights violation, the nature and extent of which would be determined at 
sentencing. 139 Implementing this decision in its final judgment, the Trial Cham-
ber subtracted five years from Duch’s sentence as a remedy.140
Due to the existence of routine and legally excessive pretrial detention in 
Cambodian courts, this decision was of major political importance. The Cam-
bodian judges joined in a unanimous recognition of Duch’s human rights viola-
tion, and the implicit censure of ECCC Pre- Trial Chamber Judge Ney Thol, 
who also serves as the president of the Military Court. One commentator not-
ed, “This sort of challenge is unprecedented in modern Cambodian history and 
a great victory for the rule of law.”141
Distressingly, the potential impact of the Trial Chamber’s decision was sub-
stantially muted when a supermajority of the Supreme Court ruled sua sponte 
that the decision to grant Duch a remedy for the violation was an error of law.142 
This outcome was unexpected, as the prosecution had not challenged the re-
duction and it was not discussed on appeal. Then international Co- Prosecutor 
Andrew Cayley was quoted as saying that the prosecution received more than 
it asked for.143 International monitors viewed the outcome as a political decision 
calculated to please the Cambodian public. Rupert Abbott of Amnesty Inter-
national said, “The decision to overturn the legal remedy for Duch’s unlawful 
detention and to provide no alternative may be perceived as a case of public 
opinion trumping human rights.”144 To former DSS head Richard Rogers, it 
also suggested the weakness of the ECCC’s hybrid structure, which allowed a 
bloc of domestic judges and a single international judge to determine a politi-
cally sensitive outcome.145
In the Barayagwiza case, the ICTR Appeals Chamber found that where it 
shares “constructive custody” over an accused detained by a national jurisdic-
tion, it is required to consider whether the length of his prior detention violated 
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norms of international human rights and, if it has, provide an appropriate rem-
edy.146 The Barayagwiza court determined the existence of constructive custody 
by considering “the relationship between [the national state] and the Tribunal 
with respect to the detention of the Appellant.”147 As pointed out by the Duch 
defense, “In February 2002, the charges against Mr KANG and the orders plac-
ing and holding him in detention were based explicitly on the [ECCC Law]” 
and the crimes over which it has jurisdiction.148 Moreover, the ECCC is not 
an international tribunal like the ICTR, but an internationalized court situ-
ated within the Cambodian judicial system. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court 
supermajority considered the Barayagwiza standard narrowly and ruled that 
because the ECCC is an independent entity, absent evidence of its “concerted 
action” with the Military Court, no remedy was warranted.149 Compared to the 
judgment’s otherwise exacting analysis, this decision is supported by surpris-
ingly superficial legal reasoning.
The two dissenting international Supreme Court judges drew attention to 
the fact that the ECCC is not an international tribunal, but a hybrid court, and 
found as a consequence that it was not appropriate to apply the standard of 
“concerted action” but, instead, a “larger principle of shared responsibility.”150 In 
applying this standard, they considered among other factors that the ECCC is 
part of the domestic Cambodian system, established by a Cambodian law, and 
intended to apply Cambodian procedures; the “intimate connection” between 
the period of Duch’s illegal detention and the ECCC proceedings; and the ex-
treme violation of his rights.151
Moreover, they considered the unique position of the ECCC to offer “an ef-
fective remedy that will not frustrate the mandate of the Court.”152 The ECCC 
Law provides:
The Extraordinary Chambers of the trial court shall exercise their jurisdiction 
in accordance with international standards of justice, fairness and due process 
of law, as set out in Articles 14 and 15 of the 1966 International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights [ICCPR].153
As a State Party to the ICCPR,154 the Cambodian Government, including all 
of its branches, is obligated to “respect and ensure to all individuals within its 
territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the  .  .  . Cov-
enant[,]”155 including the right to be tried “without undue delay.”156 The dissent-
128 / Hybrid Justice
2RRP
ing judges noted, “[A] state which unlawfully limits an individual’s physical lib-
erty is obligated to provide an adequate remedy.”157 In their view, this required 
that the ECCC both acknowledge his illegal confinement and reduce his life 
sentence to a term of 30 years:158
Our remedy ensures that KAING Guek Eav’s crimes are strongly condemned 
and forcefully punished. It also ensures, however, that his sentence is consistent 
with internationally recognized standards of fairness and that this Court con-
tinues to serve as a model for fair trials conducted with due respect for the rights 
of the accused.159
It was anticipated that the ECCC would play an important role in bringing 
justice to Cambodia. This includes not only its core mandate of trying the most 
responsible Khmer Rouge leaders, but also in setting an example for the Cam-
bodian judiciary. After the Trial Chamber decision recognizing the violation of 
Duch’s rights, a Cambodian NGO noted, “The approach of the ECCC sets a 
strong precedent to the Cambodian justice system for the universal recognition 
of fair trial rights and how violations of such rights should be acknowledged 
in sentencing.”160 And Judge Nil Nonn, the Trial Chamber’s president, “high-
lighted the problem of lengthy detention without charge [in Cambodia]. . . . He 
noted the solution used in Duch’s case, to reduce his ultimate sentence of im-
prisonment further for a breach of his fair trial rights, and that he would seek to 
implement this when he returned to his national practice.”161
For eight years, Duch was held in detention without any apparent attempt 
to bring him to trial. He is not the only detainee in Cambodia who has been 
held for an extended period without process. The Trial Chamber decision pro-
moted a rule- of- law culture within the national judiciary that would extend far 
beyond the ECCC’s limited mandate and the short period of time during which 
it will be in operation. The Supreme Court Chamber supermajority reversal of 
that decision, while comforting to many outraged Khmer Rouge victims, was 
deleterious to the Court’s legacy for domestic judicial reform.
Civil Party Reparations
At the ECCC, civil party participants are entitled to pursue “collective and mor-
al reparations against the Accused.” At the time of the Duch trial, the Internal 
Rules provided that reparations “shall be awarded against, and be borne by con-
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victed persons.”162 Although the Rules provided as an example of reparations 
“An order to fund any non- profit activity or service that is intended for the ben-
efit of Victims,”163 because the Trial Chamber found that Duch was indigent, it 
rejected most civil party requests as either falling outside the Court’s jurisdic-
tion or lacking sufficient specificity.164 It therefore awarded only the inclusion 
of the names of civil parties and the immediate victims in the final judgment, 
and the compilation and publication of all statements of apology made by Duch 
during the trial.165
The civil party teams argued that if the Court read the Rules to limit repa-
rations awards only to those that could be paid for by Duch, “the promise of 
providing justice through reparations to the victims of S- 21 would be meaning-
less.”166 Instead, they asked that the Court follow international standards and 
practices and encourage the Cambodian Government to fulfill its state respon-
sibility to remedy victims’ harm by setting up a reparations fund or to itself set 
up a voluntary trust fund through the Victims Unit.167
Moreover, they requested that Duch be ordered to write the Government 
letters requesting a state apology and that part of the entrance fees for S- 21 and 
the Choeung Ek killing fields be used to fund reparations awards, the instal-
lation of memorials at S- 21 and Choeung Ek and the transformation of Prey 
Sar work camp into a memorial site, paid visits by civil parties to those sites, 
provision of medical treatment and psychological services to civil parties, dis-
semination of audio and video material about the trial, and the dedication of 
17 public buildings to named victims.168 They emphasized that supposed indi-
gence should have no effect on the reparations order, as Duch may be found to 
have undiscovered assets or may acquire assets in the future. Moreover, non- 
pecuniary and administrative requests to the Government to remedy human 
rights violations should not be considered punishment but a state responsibility.
The Chamber found that it has no jurisdiction over Cambodian or other 
authorities, cannot issue orders that are incapable of enforcement due to a lack 
of specificity, and “at most . . . can merely encourage” outside actors to provide 
victims financial support.169 Although recognizing international principles ob-
ligating states to redress victims of gross human rights violations, the Chamber 
found itself “constrained in its task by the requests before it and the type of rep-
aration permitted under its Internal Rules. Limitations of this nature cannot be 
circumvented through jurisprudence but instead require Rule amendments.”170
Legally, this is unassailable. However, it comes across as disingenuous. First, 
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as discussed above, the Trial Chamber had constricted the participation of civil 
parties at sentencing based in part on the premise that they were primarily seek-
ing to avail themselves of reparations.171 Second, the judges were the ones who 
drafted the Rules and (as discussed in chapter 7) had amended them six months 
earlier to provide expanded opportunities for reparations implementation in 
future cases. Michael Karnavas, like many others, thinks the civil parties got 
nothing and calls the reparations regime “a mockery.”172
The Supreme Court Chamber upheld the Trial Chamber’s reparations 
judgment, noting that the ECCC has a unique reparations regime specifically 
tailored to its “mechanism and mandate[,]” which limits both the relevance of 
Cambodian law and the application of international principles.173 ECCC repa-
rations are “intended to be essentially symbolic rather than compensatory”174 
and to be borne by convicted persons, not the Cambodian Government.175
However, unlike the Trial Chamber, the Supreme Court Chamber began 
with the premise that, notwithstanding the ECCC’s hybrid character, it “acts as 
an emanation of the State of Cambodia.”176 As a Cambodian court, the ECCC 
is “duty bound to respect international standards of justice and generally recog-
nized human rights precepts”— including Cambodia’s international obligations 
to provide an effective remedy for human rights violations.177 Nevertheless, as 
a criminal tribunal, the ECCC has no authority to evaluate Cambodia’s human 
rights compliance.178
Although the Supreme Court reached the same result as the Trial Chamber, 
its reasoning is both more empowering for victims and more consistent with 
the aims of the hybrid model. By assessing the reparations regime from the 
perspective of a national court, it provides an example for the domestic judiciary 
of how to apply Cambodian law in conformity with international standards. 
Moreover, although finding that it lacks competence to assess Cambodian au-
thorities’ compliance with its international obligations to provide an effective 
remedy, it strongly affirms that those obligations must be respected. While the 
Chamber’s narrow holding is lamentable, its reasoning demonstrates the subtle 
yet potentially powerful jurisprudential legacy a hybrid court can provide.
National and International Reactions to the Verdict
The reaction of international observers to the trial proceedings and the Trial 
Chamber’s judgment was largely positive. Although the civil party reparations 
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award was disappointing, trial observers triumphed the sentence’s compatibility 
with international standards,179 and human rights advocates lauded the Cham-
ber for reducing Duch’s sentence as a remedy for the time he spent in illegal 
detention at the Military Court— a noteworthy precedent in a country with 
exceedingly weak protection for defendants.180
Although many members of Cambodian civil society shared this view, anec-
dotal evidence suggests that across the country, a large proportion of the general 
Cambodian public was outraged.181 Many people expressed deference to the 
Court’s decision but clarified that they personally believed the sentence was far 
too lenient. A civil party said,
The final decision rests with the Court. But if I were the Court, Duch would 
receive at least 40 years. Today, if you kill one person, you could be imprisoned 
for life and here we are talking about tens of thousands of lives. This Court was 
established to seek justice for millions of lives lost, millions of tear drops shed 
and, if Duch is released, the whole thing is just meaningless.182
One member of the Cambodian Diaspora offered: “In Buddhism, we believe 
that killing is a gravely sinful act. People should go to hell for killing people. 
Although Duch was sentenced to 19 years in prison in the human world, he will 
have to face hell for years before he’s reborn as a human.” In his view, the ECCC 
was like the 1993 election assisted by UNTAC: although the international com-
munity has spent many millions of dollars to run it, it has not been very benefi-
cial for the Cambodian people.183
Many Cambodians were nevertheless philosophical about the outcome, 
typically noting Duch’s advanced age and the likelihood that even if the sen-
tence was too low, it would be sufficiently long if he died in prison. Others felt 
that his age was irrelevant: “The focus should not be on his age, it should be on 
the crimes committed. He should have been sentenced to life.”184 A minority 
said that only a sentence of death fit his crimes, and among those a few wanted 
him to suffer tortures similar to those he inflicted on prisoners during the DK 
period.
When asked, a few former cadres said that the sentence was too long.185 
However, Soam Met, a former S- 21 guard, and Him Huy, a deputy chief of 
guards at S- 21 in charge of transporting prisoners to the Choeung Ek killing 
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fields, both emphasized that Duch’s judgment of guilt had made their neighbors 
understand that they were not in charge of the prison and that they had also 
lived in fear during that time.186
After the appeal verdict increased Duch’s sentence to life, several local and 
international NGOs had grave concern about the failure of the Supreme Court 
Chamber to remedy the violation of Duch’s rights while he was held illegally 
by the Military Court.187 The Cambodian Center for Human Rights called it 
“a dangerous precedent for the Cambodian judiciary.”188 In contrast, the Friends 
group of donors expressed strong support for the fairness of the verdict.189 
Many Cambodians, and civil parties in particular, were also pleased by the life 
sentence, having never truly accepted that a torturer could be compensated for 
having his own rights violated. One said, “Seeing Duch being sentenced to life 
term imprisonment, I feel so delighted and satisfied with this final judgment. . . . 
I don’t think I am angry with Duch anymore because he is now in and will die in 
prison. He will suffer the way my husband did.”190 Another said:
I am satisfied that Duch has been sentenced to life imprisonment. However, 
I cannot forgive him, given that he killed thousands and thousands of people. 
And my brother was one of those killed there. . . . I feel relieved and, to some 
high degree, get a sense of closure after decades of having been traumatized 
with the legacy of the Khmer Rouge. Duch’s final verdict makes people get a 
sense of closure, and it is a historical lesson for our nation.191
A third civil party offered, “When comparing the reparation and the sentence, I 
think the sentence was more important. Reparation cannot replace what I lost 
during the [Khmer Rouge] regime, nor can it compare with justice. This is what 
I believe.”192
Conclusion
Overall, the Duch trial suggests that the Cambodian model can function reason-
ably well when there is political agreement to prosecute a case and overwhelm-
ing evidence exists. It was a relatively easy test, however, and also evinced some 
of the Court’s structural frailties. In addition to the obvious risk of divergence 
between Cambodian and international co- decisionmakers— as evident in the 
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defense split— it showed the difficulty of merging local and international rules 
and procedures and the cumbersomeness of having individual victims partici-
pate as civil parties.
The Duch trial also portended one of the most politicized issues that the 
ECCC has faced— the question of the scope of the mixed Court’s jurisdiction. 
Kar Savuth’s efforts to shield Duch from liability failed, but they did raise a 
question that has never been adequately resolved: Who should stand trial for 
Khmer Rouge atrocities? Neither national nor international law provides a de-
finitive answer. Instead, 30 years of contentious politics separate Cambodian 
and international approaches toward that question. Kar Savuth was defending 
the wrong case, as there were no political objections on either the national or 
international side to the conviction of his client on solid legal grounds. With 
other suspects in Cases 003 and 004, where political agreement is lacking, the 




Case 002— The Centerpiece Case 
against Senior Leaders
“Cutting the Head to Fit the Hat”
Case 002 is likely to feature the Court’s last trial and is viewed by many as its 
centerpiece. It is considered the most important Khmer Rouge case because it 
involves the four most senior leaders who were alive when the Court was cre-
ated: Nuon Chea, Ieng Sary (now deceased), Khieu Samphan, and Ieng Thirith. 
Many questions about Democratic Kampuchea’s (DK) three- year, eight- month, 
and twenty- day rule have not been answered. Unlike Duch, the defendant in 
the Court’s first case, these leaders have never admitted any responsibility for 
the crimes of that period but instead have blamed the lower cadre and rogue ele-
ments. Their trial offered the first and likely only opportunity to show how deci-
sions made by those at the center of power during the DK caused the deaths of 
an estimated two million Cambodians.
With four accused and thousands of documents in the case file, the pro-
ceedings were often called the most complex since Nuremberg.1 The evidence 
connecting individual defendants to atrocities is less overwhelming than in 
Case 001, and while Duch essentially pled guilty, in Case 002 the defense teams 
mounted vigorous defenses. The case is also more politically sensitive than Case 
001, because unlike Duch, the Case 002 defendants had extensive dealings with 
foreign powers and with the Cambodian Government after the fall of the DK 
regime. All of these factors made Case 002 a much tougher functional test for 
the ECCC judges and prosecutors, who are charged with delivering a fair trial 
and credible justice expeditiously and at an acceptable cost.
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One of the Court’s first hurdles was determining if it had the power to 
try Ieng Sary, who was convicted in absentia in 1979 and granted amnesty and 
pardon in 1996. His challenges to the Court’s jurisdiction tested the hybrid 
Court’s ability to navigate tensions between international accountability norms 
and Cambodian law. All judicial chambers addressed the issue at least once, 
but without final resolution due to the ECCC’s convoluted structure and ex-
traordinarily narrow provision for immediate appeal. The Court’s unique civil 
law approach to investigations has contributed to other problems, leading to 
legitimate defense concerns. In particular, the Court’s heavy reliance on Co- 
Investigating Judges (CIJs), who are endowed with immense responsibility and 
discretion, rendered that office— and the entire investigation— vulnerable to 
charges of incompetence and bias. Decisions by national judges that suggest a 
lack of independence from the Cambodian Government prompted accusations 
of political interference, particularly in connection with the Court’s efforts to 
summon government witnesses.
The ECCC’s inefficiency in getting the case to trial also generated prob-
lems. It resulted in the suspects’ lengthy preindictment detention and prompted 
the Trial Chamber to seek to expedite judgment by severing the indictment 
into a series of “mini trials.” Although “Case 002/01” involved senior leaders at 
the pinnacle of the Democratic Kampuchea hierarchy, the crimes it addressed 
are not representative of the harms suffered by most victims during the Pol 
Pot era. Further challenges arose as trial judges who lack experience managing 
mass crimes trials inconsistently developed and applied hybrid rules, leading to 
procedural confusion and delay. One of the octogenarian accused was severed 
from the case before trial hearings began due to dementia, and another died a 
few months before the end of trial. With additional Case 002 trials unlikely 
due to the advanced age of the two remaining accused and donors’ eagerness to 
conclude the tribunal’s work as soon as possible, the ECCC’s centerpiece case 
is greatly reduced in scope and, regrettably, in its likely significance to many 
survivors.
Background
The Co- Prosecutors elected to try the four surviving senior leaders together, 
both in the hopes of increasing efficiency and to facilitate trying them under 
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the theory of Joint Criminal Enterprise2— among other modes of liability. The 
accused were charged with responsibility for genocide, war crimes, and crimes 
against humanity committed pursuant to a joint criminal plan to implement 
“rapid socialist revolution in Cambodia through a ‘great leap forward’ and de-
fend the Party against internal and external enemies, by whatever means neces-
sary.”3 The Closing Order found that they did so, inter alia, by forcing popu-
lation movement; establishing and operating work cooperatives; reeducating 
“bad elements” and killing “enemies” inside and outside of the party; targeting 
“specific groups, in particular the Cham, Vietnamese, Buddhists, and former 
officials of the Khmer Republic, including both civil servants and former mili-
tary personnel and their families”; and regulating marriage.4 Their positions as 
cabinet- level DK officials and participants in the key decision- making commit-
tees of the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK) gave them the apparent 
capacity to develop and influence those high- level policies.
Nuon Chea is often referred to as “Brother Number Two,” though he has 
denied that he was called this and that he was second in command after Pol 
Pot. He was born in 1926 in Battambang Province, and went to high school 
and took law classes in Bangkok, where he became politically active and joined 
the Communist Party of Thailand. When he returned to Cambodia in 1950, he 
joined the local communist party and became a senior member by 1960. During 
the DK period, he was Deputy Secretary of the CPK and a member of the CPK 
Central and Standing Committees— the key decision- making bodies in Demo-
cratic Kampuchea.5 He was allegedly responsible for military and security af-
fairs, including control over S- 21, with Duch reporting directly to him during 
the last years of the regime. After Pol Pot’s death in 1998, Nuon Chea defected 
from the Khmers Rouges. According to his lawyers, “Nuon Chea disputes the 
charges against him and, notwithstanding his position in the government of 
Democratic Kampuchea, he argues that he had no direct contact with the bases 
and was not aware of what was happening there.”6
Ieng Sary was born in 1925 in Vietnam. He became politically active at Col-
lège Sisowath in Phnom Penh and then studied in France, where he became a 
member of the French Communist Party. He returned to Cambodia and became 
a history professor in 1957, allegedly joining the Khmers Rouges in 1963. During 
the DK period, he was Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs 
and a member of the CPK Central and Standing Committees. He is alleged to 
have either encouraged or failed to prevent the transfer of large numbers of For-
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eign Ministry personnel to the S- 21 detention center. As discussed in chapter 
1, he and Pol Pot were convicted of “genocide” in absentia by the 1979 People’s 
Revolutionary Tribunal, a special court established by the Vietnamese- backed 
government, and sentenced to death and confiscation of all their property. In 
1996, to entice Ieng to defect from the Khmer Rouge movement with thousands 
of his followers, at Hun Sen’s behest King Sihanouk issued a royal decree par-
doning him from the 1979 tribunal’s sentence and providing him amnesty from 
potential prosecution under the 1994 law banning Khmer Rouge membership. 
Ieng moved to Phnom Penh with his wife, Ieng Thirith, and argued that the par-
don and amnesty prevented the ECCC from exercising jurisdiction over him.7 
Ieng Sary died on March 14, 2013, shortly before the end of the Case 002/01 
trial hearings.
Khieu Samphan was born in Svay Rieng province in 1931. He went to France 
to study in 1955, where he was active in the French Communist Party before 
returning to Cambodia to become a professor. In 1962, he was appointed Secre-
tary of State for Commerce in then Prince Sihanouk’s government. Threatened 
with arrest, he went into hiding in 1967 and by the early 1970s had joined the 
Khmers Rouges. From 1976, Khieu Samphan served as head of state (President 
of the State Presidium), taking over this title from Sihanouk. He alleges that, 
like the former King, in this role he was merely a figurehead. He was a member 
of the Central Committee and participated in many Standing Committee meet-
ings, and had duties in the Ministry of Commerce. He disputes allegations that 
he was Chairman of the Party’s Political Office. In 1987, he replaced a retiring 
Pol Pot as the official head of the Khmers Rouges and representative at the 1989 
Paris Peace Conference. After Pol Pot’s death in 1998, Khieu Samphan left the 
Khmer Rouge movement and defected to the Government.
Ieng Thirith was born in Phnom Penh in 1932. She studied at the Lycée 
Sisowath in Phnom Penh and then obtained a degree in English Literature in 
France. She married Ieng Sary in 1951; her sister later married Pol Pot. Ieng 
Thirith returned to Cambodia in 1957 to work as an English professor. During 
the DK period, she was Minister of Social Affairs and Action and a candidate 
member of the CPK Central Committee. She was sent to investigate and report 
on health issues in the Northwest Zone and therefore may have known that 
many Cambodians were starving under the DK regime. She is also alleged to 
have either encouraged or failed to prevent the arrest and execution of ministry 
staff. She denied this during a pretrial hearing and placed all blame on Nuon 
138 / Hybrid Justice
2RRP
Chea.8 Along with her husband, she defected from the Khmer Rouge move-
ment in 1996. The charges against Ieng Thirith were severed from the rest of 
Case 002 immediately before the start of trial hearings after she was found to 
suffer from dementia.
Trying Ieng Sary: Tension between 
International Law and Past  
Domestic Practice
Long before Case 002 began, analysts foresaw that the prosecution of Ieng Sary 
would pose special challenges for the ECCC. As discussed in chapter 1, Ieng 
Sary and Pol Pot were convicted of genocide in absentia in 1979 by the People’s 
Revolutionary Tribunal— a special court established by the Vietnam- backed 
government that ousted the Khmers Rouges. The 1979 tribunal sentenced them 
to death and confiscation of all of their property.9 Years later, as part of a 1996 
deal with the Cambodian Government to facilitate Ieng Sary’s defection from 
the Khmers Rouges with his followers, King Sihanouk issued a Royal Decree 
pardoning Ieng from his 1979 sentence and providing him an amnesty from 
prosecution under the 1994 Law to Outlaw the Democratic Kampuchea Group. 
He is the only Khmer Rouge leader to have received an amnesty, raising obvious 
tensions with international norms against granting amnesty for crimes such as 
genocide.10
As the ECCC is an “internationalized” court, its obligation to recognize 
the validity of the Ieng Sary amnesty has been debated since negotiations be-
gan. The ECCC framers failed to address the effect of the Royal Decree on the 
Court’s jurisdiction, but instead gave the ECCC Chambers explicit authority to 
determine the scope of any preexisting amnesty or pardon.11
After Ieng was taken into custody, he argued that as a consequence of the 
Royal Decree, the ECCC did not have jurisdiction to try him. In brief, he ar-
gued that his amnesty from the effects of the 1994 Law was intended to prevent 
his prosecution for all criminal acts committed by the Khmers Rouges from 
1975 to 1979— the temporal jurisdiction of the ECCC. Similarly, he argued that 
he could not serve any sentence for the underlying acts for which he was found 
culpable by the 1979 tribunal. Moreover, he argued that international law does 
not prohibit domestic amnesties for jus cogens crimes12— those crimes with a 
2RRP 
Case 002—The Centerpiece Case against Senior Leaders / 139
higher legal status implicating, among other state obligations, the duty to prose-
cute or extradite offenders. To the contrary, the Co- Prosecutors argued that the 
pardon only prohibited execution of the 1979 sentence of death and property 
confiscation, and the amnesty applied only to future violations of the 1994 Law, 
which merely criminalized membership in the Khmer Rouge organization. In 
the alternative, they argued that amnesty for jus cogens crimes is not recognized 
under international law.13
There is wide, though not universal, agreement that domestic amnesties for 
serious international crimes are invalid under international law. Acceptance of 
their invalidity is broadest with regard to crimes for which a state has a treaty 
obligation to prosecute or extradite. For example, the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone (SCSL) Appeals Chamber has said:
[G]iven the existence of a treaty obligation to prosecute or extradite an offender, 
the grant of an amnesty in respect of [the international crimes set forth in the 
SCSL Statute] is not only incompatible with, but is in breach of an obligation 
of a State towards the international community as a whole.14
Cambodia has treaty obligations to prosecute or extradite persons who com-
mit grave breaches under the 1949 Geneva Conventions and genocide under 
the 1948 Genocide Convention,15 both of which were charged in Case 002. As 
a consequence of these obligations, the ECCC Trial Chamber found that the 
1996 Decree could not “relieve it of the duty to prosecute these crimes or consti-
tute an obstacle thereto.”16
There is also growing support for the view that domestic amnesties for oth-
er serious crimes, such as crimes against humanity, are invalid under customary 
international law. For example, discussing the effect on the jurisdiction of the 
SCSL of the amnesty clause in the Lomé Peace Agreement between the warring 
factions, the UN Secretary- General said:
While recognizing that amnesty is an accepted legal concept and a gesture of 
peace and reconciliation at the end of a civil war or an internal armed conflict, 
the United Nations has consistently maintained the position that amnesty 
cannot be granted in respect of international crimes, such as genocide, crimes 
against humanity or other serious violations of international humanitarian 
law.17
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The SCSL Appeals Chamber then found that there is a “crystallizing interna-
tional norm that a government cannot grant amnesty for serious violations un-
der international law[.]”18
The ECCC Trial Chamber examined the views of international, regional, 
and state courts, as well as human rights bodies, and agreed that there is an 
emerging consensus that blanket amnesties violate states’ duty to investigate se-
rious international crimes and punish the perpetrators. Notably, it found the 
creation of the ECCC and other hybrid courts to evince the determination of 
states that serious crimes should not go unpunished.19 It therefore concluded, 
“[S]tate practice demonstrates at a minimum a retroactive right for third States, 
internationalized and domestic courts to evaluate amnesties and set them aside 
or limit their scope should they be deemed incompatible with international 
norms.”20 Having previously found that the Royal Decree may have been in-
tended to grant Ieng Sary general immunity for any criminal acts committed 
before 1996,21 the Trial Chamber ruled that, because this is at odds with Cam-
bodia’s treaty obligations and the trend in customary international law, it had 
the discretion to find that the scope of the amnesty excludes the serious inter-
national crimes with which Ieng is charged.22
The Trial Chamber did not make this finding on the basis of the ECCC’s 
hybrid character, but ruled solely on the basis of Cambodia’s state obligations. 
The decision thus strongly affirms fully domestic Cambodian courts’ obliga-
tion to prosecute and punish all persons responsible for serious international 
crimes, and concomitantly the accountability of all those who perpetrate them. 
As Documentation Center of Cambodia (DC- Cam) Director Youk Chhang 
emphasized after Ieng Sary was taken into detention in 2007, “The arrests of the 
most politically untouchable of the Khmer Rouge leaders is a powerful message 
to the people of Cambodia[.]”23 The Ieng Sary defense appealed the Chamber’s 
decision in part on the basis that the Chamber acted ultra vires by evaluating 
not only the scope but also the validity of the Decree.24 However, there will be 
no final determination of this question, because a Supreme Court Chamber 
supermajority found that the issue falls outside the narrow scope of its inter-
locutory review authority.25
The ECCC avoided a politicized showdown over the Ieng Sary pardon 
and amnesty— which some observers feared while the Court was taking shape. 
Though it is troubling that the Supreme Court found it had to wait till judg-
ment to determine whether the Court had the competence to try him in the 
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first place, the lower Chambers’ decisions on this topic were based on reasonable 
jurisprudence and were consistent with the trend in international practice. On 
other issues, however, the Court has run into significant obstacles in managing 
Case 002.
Challenges to the Investigation
Given the nationwide scope of the alleged offenses, investigating Case 002 was 
bound to be a monumental task for the ECCC’s Office of the Co- Investigating 
Judges (OCIJ). There are many potential advantages to a judicial investigation. 
In mass crimes cases, defense counsel have difficulties gathering evidence due 
to a lack of resources and cooperation. In theory, it would be fairer for an im-
partial judge to question witnesses on behalf of all parties and take statements 
under oath that could be used as evidence at trial. A judge- led investigation 
should also be more professional, thorough, and balanced, preventing inter-
views riddled with leading questions and hearsay statements, and ensuring that 
all inculpatory and exculpatory evidence is brought to the fore. Finally, it should 
be more efficient, testing and narrowing the scope of evidence presented at trial.
However, when asked to identify the ECCC’s principal structural flaw, 
many Court officials interviewed for this book immediately named the OCIJ. 
As discussed in chapter 2, having two investigations followed by a full- length 
trial is inefficient. Former CIJ Lemonde believes this duplication resulted “be-
cause the lawyers who were recruited [to implement the system] were mostly 
from countries of common law, in any case it was practitioners who were fa-
miliar with the operation of other international courts and saw no reason to 
change their practice.”26 To an extent this may be true; however, there are also 
more fundamental concerns. Khieu Samphan Co- Lawyer Anta Guissé says that 
in France, where there are questions about a witness’s story, the parties can ask 
for confrontation during the investigative stage.27 Although this appears to be 
true in all modern domestic civil law systems, Cambodian procedures, which 
(as discussed in chapter 2) are based on obsolete French law, do not provide 
for it. At the ECCC, the failure to include the parties in witness interviews has 
necessitated the reexamination of core evidence at trial. To many Court officials 
and analysts, this duplication is the main reason the judicial investigation was 
a wasted effort.
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Investigating judges have enormous discretionary power, which has led 
France and other national judicial systems to limit or eliminate their role.28 The 
Case 002 defense teams have attacked the investigatory process, alleging bias, 
methodological failures, procedural irregularities, and a lack of transparency. 
Their criticisms are directed largely toward the attitudes and professionalism of 
specific judges but have also helped reveal intrinsic weaknesses in the ECCC’s 
institutional capacity to meet the needs of a mass crimes process.29
Concerns about Impartiality
According to the ECCC Internal Rules, the CIJs “may take any investigative 
action conducive to ascertaining the truth. In all cases they shall conduct their 
investigation impartially, whether the evidence is inculpatory or exculpatory.”30 
The power to investigate is exclusive to the CIJs. Concomitantly, the parties are 
prohibited from undertaking their own investigations, though they “are entirely 
free to review any document from any public source in their search for evidence” 
and to request that the CIJs place it in the case file.31 They may also request the 
CIJs to undertake an investigative action they consider “useful for the conduct 
of the investigation.”32 The CIJs have said:
Before this Court, the power to conduct judicial investigations is assigned solely 
to the two independent Co- Investigating Judges and not to the parties. . . . The 
capacity of the parties is thus limited to such preliminary inquiries as are strictly 
necessary for the effective exercise of their right to request investigative action.33
Because the CIJs act independently, they have broad discretion to decide 
whether or not an investigative act is useful.34 In making this evaluation, they 
have no explicit duty to consult with a party requesting an investigative action 
before rejecting it, nor have they done so. The Pre- Trial Chamber (PTC) found 
in one case that it would have been “sensible” for the CIJs to consult the request-
ing party, but it did not reach the question of whether this amounted to an 
obligation.35 Some investigative requests were rejected without adequate rea-
soning, and others were never addressed, obligating the PTC to itself review the 
merits.36 Fewer than 20% of the Nuon Chea team’s investigative requests were 
carried out.37 “You tie our hands, and then you don’t go out and do what you are 
supposed to do,” laments Ieng Sary’s former Co- Lawyer Michael Karnavas.38
At other internationalized tribunals, investigators are not expected to be 
neutral, so there is no presumption that their witness statements will be dis-
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interested, it is difficult to challenge their integrity, and a successful challenge 
is unlikely to infect the entire case. In contrast, at the ECCC the CIJs have 
near- total investigative discretion,39 and thus the fairness of the entire process 
is dependent on their independence and impartiality.40 The CIJs and some in-
vestigators provided easy targets for multiple personal bias challenges. A former 
CIJ investigator alleged that during a weekend meeting at his home Judge Lem-
onde said, “I would prefer that we find more inculpatory evidence than exculpa-
tory evidence.”41 Lemonde responded that if he indeed said that, it would have 
been in jest.42 The defense sought his disqualification, arguing that this state-
ment expressed actual bias,43 but the PTC found that Lemonde’s remark did 
not amount to an instruction to the investigators.44
Co- Investigating Judge You Bunleng was also challenged for appearance of 
bias due to his refusal to summon requested government witnesses, discussed 
below. Moreover, two key CIJ staff members provided fodder for repeated bias 
claims because they had written books that indicated prejudgment, and one had 
also worked in the Office of the Co- Prosecutors for several months during the 
drafting of the initial submission.45 However, the PTC rejected this concern, 
emphasizing that because the CIJs have sole authority to conduct the investiga-
tion, their independence and impartiality safeguard the entire process.46 Finally, 
the defense argued that national CIJ staff members’ presumed participation 
in the kickback scheme discussed in chapter 3 could impact judicial integrity. 
The PTC likewise rejected this allegation, finding that “the allegations that staff 
members possibly have paid money to a superior cannot lead to the conclusion 
that these staff members can influence the Judges to manipulate the outcome 
of proceedings[.]”47 Although none of these challenges succeeded, they raised 
questions about the OCIJ’s impartiality and contributed to doubts about the 
integrity of the ECCC as a whole.
Investigative Capacity and Fairness Concerns
Although the ECCC’s in- country hybrid form has clear investigative 
advantages— such as proximity to crime sites, and witnesses and investigators 
fluent in the local language— the Court struggled to conduct a full investigation 
in Case 002. This is due both to its reliance on CIJs to perform that function 
and to the sheer enormity of potential evidence, which includes forensic re-
mains, witness testimony, and nearly one million pages of documents collected 
by DC- Cam since 1995.
For example, after filing their introductory submission for Case 002, the 
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Co- Prosecutors placed an additional 18,000 documents they had not cited on 
a shared materials drive, because they could not exclude the possibility that the 
documents might include exculpatory evidence. When defense teams asked the 
CIJs to search the drive for exculpatory information, the CIJs emphasized that, 
while they could not arbitrarily exclude evidence they knew to exist, they were 
not “required to conduct an exhaustive search for all evidence; an impossible 
task.”48
A structure that relies on investigating judges arguably carries an inher-
ent bias toward the prosecution’s case— at least when it involves complex mass 
crimes— because the prosecutors furnish vast amounts of information in the 
initial submission. Guissé says, “In the domestic [French] system, as soon as 
an investigative judge is assigned, the prosecution is no longer in charge of the 
investigators. Here the prosecutors had a long time to shape the case; everyone 
is already biased.”49 The CIJs essentially acknowledged this when they said: “The 
logic underpinning a criminal investigation is that the principle of sufficiency 
of evidence outweighs that of exhaustiveness: an investigating judge may close 
a judicial investigation once he has determined that there is sufficient evidence 
to indict a Charged Person.”50 The Pre- Trial Chamber disagreed, finding that 
the judges have a duty to examine all documents in which there is a prima facie 
reason to believe exculpatory evidence may exist before assessing the sufficiency 
of the evidence for trial.51
Yet investigating judges have limited capacity to digest a vast introductory 
submission and pursue extensive further investigation. Former Defence Sup-
port Section (DSS) head Richard Rogers says that due to the complexity of 
Case 002, the CIJs were unable to examine carefully all the documents refer-
enced in the Prosecutors’ introductory submission, let alone develop exculpa-
tory evidence. Rogers contends that, as a practical matter, a mass crimes court 
dependent on investigative judges requires defendants to provide guidance on 
where to seek exculpatory evidence and is therefore incompatible with the right 
to remain silent.52 Michael Karnavas says, “[The CIJs] never did an investiga-
tion; they only did a validation. The investigation was done for them by the 
prosecution.” When the CIJs began, they had nothing but the prosecution’s sub-
mission, and “natural instinct says, let me rely on what has already been done.”53 
Employing investigators from diverse legal traditions may exacerbate this ten-
dency. Arguably, “It’s not in the DNA of investigators from the Anglo- Saxon 
system to look for exculpatory evidence in the sense of the French system.”54 
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Anta Guissé notes that, unlike the practice in France, the CIJs delegated their 
power to investigators without a standardized methodology or code of conduct. 
“The [CIJs] need to take more control over investigators.” She suggests that the 
ideal system may be to let the parties investigate first and then have an investi-
gating judge sift through the evidence they have collected.55
Internal Rule 56(1) provides: “In order to preserve the rights and interests of 
the parties, judicial investigations shall not be conducted in public. All persons 
participating in the judicial investigation shall maintain confidentiality.” The 
confidentiality of the investigation makes it difficult for the public— and even 
the parties— to assess its quality. Former co- counsel for Nuon Chea Michiel 
Pestman argues that confidentiality did not require secrecy from the parties.56 
Repeated refusals by the CIJs to share information raised suspicions that they 
invoked the “fig leaf ” of confidentiality to hide their incompetence as domestic 
law judges unaccustomed to managing an enormously complex investigation.57
The Ieng Sary defense unsuccessfully sought to learn if an overall strategy 
existed and if investigative work was being carried out according to a consis-
tent methodology.58 Among its complaints was that the “[c]ollection of witness 
interviews are arbitrarily placed on the Case File, often months after the inter-
views were conducted, with little or no explanation of how these interviews fit 
into the judicial investigation.”59 Moreover, interviews were riddled with leading 
questions, were not consistently recorded, and some interviewees were ques-
tioned on multiple occasions, suggesting no line of questioning had been devel-
oped in advance.60
Karnavas says that because the defense is not allowed to do its own inves-
tigation, the case file must be a primary source for determining which lines of 
investigation to request. “But over here, with a case of this magnitude, it’s virtu-
ally impossible. Especially when you don’t know what is their process, how they 
are going about doing it.”61 This impeded the parties’ ability to participate fully 
in the investigation. As discussed in the next chapter, concerns that the veil of 
secrecy around the OCIJ was shrouding incompetence and bias grew substan-
tially with the arrival of a new international investigating judge.
Allegations of Government Interference
During the investigative phase of Case 002, another important functional con-
straint on the ECCC became apparent— its inability or unwillingness to call 
certain senior Cambodian officials to testify at the Court. The defense repeated-
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ly sought to have the CIJs interview King- Father Norodom Sihanouk and high- 
level Cambodian officials, including Prime Minister Hun Sen. The Cambodian 
Government resisted, and national judges supported the RGC. The controversy 
again spotlighted the preponderance of domestic judges at the ECCC and their 
susceptibility to political pressure.
The ECCC Internal Rules give the CIJs the explicit authority to issue or-
ders “necessary to conduct the investigation, including summonses,” and “take 
statements from any person whom they consider conducive to ascertaining the 
truth[,]” subject only to the right against self- incrimination of witnesses.62 The 
Trial and Supreme Court Chambers have similar authority, which they may 
exercise at their discretion.63 International CIJ Marcel Lemonde, acting alone, 
found it would be “conducive to ascertaining the truth” to request an interview 
with King- Father Sihanouk. He also summoned several high- level officials to 
appear in closed session on a date when they were available: Senate and CPP 
President Chea Sim, National Assembly President Heng Samrin, Minister of 
Economy and Finance Keat Chhon, Senator Ouk Bunchhoeun, Senator Sim 
Ka, and Minister of Foreign Affairs Hor Namhong.64 None responded.
Caution at International Courts
The ECCC Internal Rules define “summons” as “an order to any person to ap-
pear before the ECCC.”65 Once summoned, witnesses must appear. “In the case 
of refusal to appear, the Co- Investigating Judges may issue an order request-
ing the Judicial Police to compel the witness to appear.”66 The Internal Rules 
provide blanket authority to summon witnesses with no exception. The Inter-
national Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) Rules provide 
similar authority; nevertheless, the ICTY has said with regard to subpoenas 
that they “should not be issued lightly, for they involve the use of coercive powers 
and may lead to the imposition of a criminal sanction.”67 Therefore,
While a Trial Chamber should not hesitate to resort to this instrument where 
it is necessary to elicit information of importance to the case and to ensure that 
the defendant has sufficient means to collect information necessary for the pre-
sentation of an effective defence, it should guard against the subpoena becoming 
a mechanism used routinely as part of trial tactics.68
The SCSL agreed that subpoenas should be used “sparingly” and therefore eval-
uated whether officials’ testimony was both helpful and necessary.69 Referencing 
2RRP 
Case 002—The Centerpiece Case against Senior Leaders / 147
ICTY jurisprudence, the SCSL said that “convenience is not a sufficient justifi-
cation for the issuance of a subpoena, and that when the evidence sought to be 
proffered can be obtained through other means, it would be inappropriate to 
grant such an order.”70
In the Norman case at the SCSL, defendants from the Civil Defense Force 
(CDF) sought to call President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, alleging that Kabbah was 
“commanding, materially supporting, and communicating with various mem-
bers of the alleged CDF leadership” during the war.71 The SCSL Trial Chamber 
found that the accused had failed to identify “with sufficient specificity” how his 
testimony would relate to a charge in the indictment or materially assist their 
case.72 By contrast, in the later Sesay et al. decision, the Trial Chamber found 
that testimony from Kabbah, who by then was former President, could materi-
ally assist the accused in specified ways.73 The concurring opinion of Judge Itoe 
suggested that the result differed because the testimony sought in the Sesay case 
was more directly relevant to the determination of guilt or innocence,74 and the 
court viewed the Norman request as one made solely to embarrass Kabbah and 
expose his involvement in the conflict.75
In his dissent to the Norman decision, Judge Thompson argued that the 
SCSL should adopt a more flexible standard for compelling testimony to up-
hold fairness norms and “ensure that no relevant evidence vital to the discovery 
of the truth is foreclosed by reasons of legal technicalities.”76 His preferred ap-
proach appears close to the civil law standard in the ECCC Internal Rules re-
quiring the CIJs to consider only whether it would be “conducive to ascertaining 
the truth” to issue a summons. In Judge Thompson’s view, it is inappropriate to 
consider in advance whether the evidence a witness may provide is favorable or 
adverse to the applicant as it amounts to “a predetermination of the probative 
value of such evidence.”77 Instead, he believed only prima facie evidence should 
be required to show that the information sought is necessary for the investiga-
tion or trial.78 Similarly, the Ieng Sary team has argued that a “best evidence” rule 
is inapplicable in a civil law investigation.79
Calling Senior Cambodian Officials
As in Sierra Leone, at the ECCC, calling senior officials is a politically charged 
process given the links that many have to the Khmer Rouge period— including 
Prime Minister Hun Sen, who was a lower- level CPK official early in the DK 
period, and King- Father Sihanouk, who served for a year as the regime’s head of 
state and was effectively under house arrest in Phnom Penh for most of the DK 
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period. In rejecting the request to summon Prime Minister Hun Sen, the CIJs 
determined that he was not likely to have useful information on the topics high-
lighted, and moreover many other witnesses who have personal knowledge of 
the events have been interviewed. Thus his testimony would not be useful.80 It 
therefore appears that the international CIJ took factors similar to those high-
lighted by the SCSL into consideration and determined that the persons he did 
summon could provide information conducive to seeking the truth.
In addition to statutory standards, privileges and immunities may limit a 
Court’s ability to issue summons. As Philippe Sands noted in the context of an 
arrest warrant issued against a head of state, lawfulness of process “depends on 
the Court’s powers and attributes and the legal basis upon which it was estab-
lished.”81 The ECCC’s hybrid character makes this analysis more complex than 
it would be for a clearly national or international court.
The request to interview the late King- Father Sihanouk, who passed away 
on October 15, 2012, was particularly controversial. After Cambodia first re-
quested UN assistance to try the Khmers Rouges, Sihanouk said on multiple 
occasions that he would testify to share his experiences.82 In recent years, how-
ever, he expressed a negative view of the Court and unwillingness to participate, 
especially after Court officials declined his 2007 invitation to the Royal Palace, 
which he described as “the only chance for the court to get his input.”83
The Cambodian Constitution provides, “The King of Cambodia shall reign 
but shall not govern. The King shall be the Head of State for Life. The King 
shall be inviolable.”84 Sihanouk retired in 2004 and his son, Sihamoni, assumed 
the throne. That October, the Cambodian National Assembly passed a law 
granting various privileges to Sihanouk and bestowing on him the title “Great 
Valorous King” or “Hero King.”85 Persons close to the royal family argued that 
the 2004 law entitled Sihanouk to “the same immunity he had as a reigning 
King”86 and that calling him to the ECCC would violate the constitution and 
the 2004 law.87 National Assembly Deputy President Nguon Nhel similarly 
asserted that Sihanouk “cannot rightfully be summoned to testify at the tri-
bunal.”88 In contrast, the Asian Human Rights Commission argued that the 
Cambodian Constitution confers immunity on “the reigning monarch and not 
upon anybody else. No act of parliament can confer the same inviolability upon 
former King Sihanouk.”89
To remove any doubt within domestic law, Cambodia’s Constitutional 
Council would need to issue a pronouncement on the legal effect of Article 7 of 
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the Constitution and the 2004 law.90 If the ECCC were an ordinary domestic 
Cambodian court, a Constitutional Council decision would bind it. However, 
because the ECCC is “a special internationalized tribunal,” it might also have 
been necessary to consider whether international law entitled him to immu-
nity from testifying at the ECCC. Realities on the ground made this a moot 
question; absent immense diplomatic pressure, the ECCC lacked the power to 
compel Sihanouk to testify before it. This may explain why the PTC declared 
without analysis that Cambodian law on this question was settled— “[T]he 
King Father cannot be subpoenaed, nor can coercive measures be used against 
him[,]”91— and assumed without question that national law bound the ECCC.
Unlike the King, high- level Cambodian officials are not “inviolable,” but en-
joy waivable procedural immunity from arrest and detention.92 It appears that 
neither the Constitution nor any other Cambodian law offers officials immuni-
ty from testifying at a domestic or international court. Nevertheless, it remains 
possible that Cambodian courts would decide that Prime Minister Hun Sen, 
and possibly other high- level officials, are exempt from process due to the offices 
they hold. Judge Itoe of the SCSL has cited a French case in which the Cour de 
Cassation found that President Chirac was not under any obligation to appear 
as a witness at the pretrial stage of a trial because “the obligation is accompa-
nied by a measure of a constraint . . . and is punished by a criminal penalty.”93 
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Sierra Leone has found that “A serving Head 
of State is entitled to absolute immunity from process brought before national 
courts[.]”94 By contrast, international tribunals have rejected such immunities. 
The ICTY and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) Trial 
Chambers have found that government officials have no immunity from being 
subpoenaed to testify before them95 and may be compelled to attend pretesti-
mony interviews.96 However, they have never found it necessary to subpoena 
incumbent officials after evaluating the statutory requirements discussed above.
There is no indication in the public record that, at least initially, the CIJs 
considered domestic immunities an impediment to summoning the named offi-
cials. According to information released by the Ieng Sary team, national CIJ You 
Bunleng instead objected to the request due to the need to close the investiga-
tion in a reasonable time97— a common refrain of the judges when dismissing 
defense motions. International CIJ Lemonde, acting alone, issued summons to 
the government officials, suggesting that he believed he had authority to do so. 
Court spokesperson Lars Olsen reportedly said:
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I don’t want to get into any speculation about any immunity because we would 
expect that any law- abiding citizens would comply with a summons issued by a 
court of law[.] . . . I would assume that this would particularly apply to people 
representing the very law- making organs that have created this court.98
Nevertheless, Lemonde did not request enforcement after the recipients did not 
respond, apparently raising the issue of their immunity only after the fact.99
Lemonde, following the lead of Judge You, justified his failure to seek en-
forcement on the basis that “coercive measures is [sic] fraught with significant 
practical difficulties, and, in the best- case scenario, would unduly delay the con-
clusion of the judicial investigation, contrary to the need for expeditiousness,” 
leaving it to the Trial Chamber to decide if coercive measures were warranted.100 
He may have decided that coercive action was politically impossible without the 
agreement of the Cambodian Government, as the Cambodian judicial police 
are tasked with enforcement under the ECCC Law and Internal Rules.101 How-
ever, upon review, the Pre- Trial Chamber said that the biggest hurdle was the 
summoned officials’ likely invocation of parliamentary immunity, which would 
at the very least “significantly delay” the proceedings. They therefore agreed that 
the question should be deferred to the Trial Chamber, preserving the right of 
the accused to seek exculpatory evidence at a later date.102
Nevertheless, due to a number of government statements reported in the 
press, the PTC directed the CIJ to assess “whether or not a nexus exists be-
tween RGC discouragement and the actual failure of the summoned witnesses 
to provide statements.”103 For example, Hun Sen reportedly claimed to have per-
sonally vetoed the testimony of “some people,”104 and government spokesperson 
Khieu Kanharith was reported to say:
[T]hough the individuals could appear in the court voluntarily, the govern-
ment’s position was that they should not give testimony. He said that foreign 
officials involved in the court could “pack their bags and return home” if they 
were not satisfied with the decision.105
In response, the CIJs merely noted that Hor Namhong, Cambodia’s Foreign 
Minister, claimed to have disregarded his summons because Judge Lemonde 
acted alone in issuing it, which Hor believed did not meet the necessary formal 
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requirements.106 Without mentioning any of the other witnesses or providing 
any additional reasoning, the CIJs said they did not believe an investigation into 
government interference was warranted.107
On appeal, the PTC was unable to reach a supermajority decision. The na-
tional judges found, in part, that the statements of a government spokesper-
son could not prevent higher- level officials from testifying.108 The international 
PTC judges determined that after considering all of the allegations and their 
sequence, no reasonable trier of fact could fail to find that “one or more members 
of the RGC may have knowingly and willfully interfered with witnesses who 
may give evidence before the CIJs.”109 However, due to the lack of supermajor-
ity agreement, by default the CIJ decision not to investigate remained in effect.
The defense teams have since highlighted government opposition to the tes-
timony of these officials multiple times before the Trial and Supreme Court 
Chambers, with the Nuon Chea team in particular seeking to link these events 
to the Government’s well- documented disapproval of obstructed Cases 003 and 
004,110 discussed in the next chapter. Michiel Pestman’s prediction that the re-
quested government witnesses would not be called has proven true.111 The Nuon 
Chea team continues to contend that the summoned officials are important 
to his client’s case.112 After leaving office, Judge Lemonde said these witnesses 
“clearly had something to say, because they were aware of events and facts for 
which their testimony was important.”113
With little hope that the requested officials would be summoned, the Nuon 
Chea defense team sought to prove government interference by persistently 
interjecting the officials’ names into the proceedings, and being castigated for 
doing so— including having their microphone regularly shut off. For example, 
the team sought to question a witness about a 2004 statement he provided an 
NGO claiming to have seen Hun Sen meet Nuon Chea and other high- level 
DK officials in the 1970s.114 The Trial Chamber, not for the first time, warned 
two international members of the Nuon Chea team against further “miscon-
duct,” including their continual “irrelevant” references to government officials.115 
This strategy severely tested the bounds of advocacy in a country unaccustomed 
to witnessing the exercise of vigorous defense rights and challenges to senior 
officials. Although the team’s escalating antics achieved diminishing returns for 
its client, the effort exposed the vulnerability of the majority- domestic hybrid 
tribunal to charges that it lacked the independence to deliver credible justice.
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More Efficiency and Fairness Problems: 
Lengthy Pretrial Detention and Efforts 
to Expedite Trial
Efficiency has also been a serious challenge to the Case 002 proceedings. De-
spite the ECCC’s in- country location and heavy reliance on domestic personnel, 
it has been hard- pressed to deliver justice swiftly and at a low cost— two of the 
anticipated benefits of the hybrid model. As discussed in previous chapters, the 
ECCC faced long delays establishing itself as an institution, developing rules, 
conducting investigations, and preparing for trial. Those delays raised problems 
for the Court related to lengthy pretrial detention. More recently, cost concerns, 
frustration with embarrassing political disputes, and the fragile health of the 
Case 002 defendants led to increasing donor pressure on the Court to complete 
Case 002 quickly. In an effort to speed the trial, the Trial Chamber split the in-
dictment, likely reducing the impact of the verdict, and held trial in the physical 
absence of the accused, raising fairness concerns.
Pretrial Detention
Some of the early legal challenges before the ECCC related to the charged per-
sons’ lengthy pretrial detention. As a hybrid court, the ECCC has an opportu-
nity to directly influence the Cambodian judiciary’s habitual failure to respect 
detention limits.116 Its jurisprudence generally has followed precedents from 
international courts but leaves mixed lessons for Cambodian domestic courts.
Under the Internal Rules, the ECCC may only provisionally detain a 
Charged Person if there exist both a “well founded reason to believe” that he 
or she has committed the charged crimes and evidence that detention is “neces-
sary” to prevent him or her from pressuring witnesses or victims, colluding with 
accomplices, destroying evidence, or fleeing; or to protect the Charged Person’s 
security or preserve public order.117
The various grounds for finding detention necessary are disjunctive, mean-
ing that the existence of any one alone provides a sufficient basis for retaining 
a charged person in custody. Provisional detention is allowed for one year and 
may be extended only twice.118 The Court found that provisional detention was 
appropriate for all five charged persons in 2007, and extended their detention 
by one year in 2008 and again in 2009. Despite the advanced age of the accused 
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in Case 002 and the length of time that had passed since their alleged crimes, 
the Court refused to release them on bail or allow for home detention. As the 
three- year limit approached, the CIJs made it clear that they would issue the 
Closing Order in time to ensure their detention for trial. Although the Court’s 
jurisprudence has been facially consistent with international standards, it is 
questionable whether it has adhered in spirit, as to all appearances no Chamber 
ever genuinely contemplated the possibility of release. This is troubling due to 
the widespread abuse of pretrial detention in the domestic courts and the po-
tential for a negative precedent.
Human rights bodies such as the European Court of Human Rights, Inter- 
American Commission and Court of Human Rights, and UN Human Rights 
Committee have determined that pretrial detention should be allowed only on 
an exceptional basis.119 The ICTY, ICTR, and SCSL have justified more restric-
tive pretrial detention policies by highlighting the gravity of the crimes charged 
and their inability to ensure the return of an accused released to his or her home 
jurisdiction.120 However, once the ICTY began having a more cooperative re-
lationship with the states of the former Yugoslavia, it increasingly released ac-
cused on bail pending trial. The International Criminal Court (ICC) has also 
granted accused provisional release.121 Neither the ICTR nor the SCSL granted 
provisional release to any accused.
Although the ECCC is located in Phnom Penh, and the Cambodian Gov-
ernment appears well equipped to ensure the return of the charged persons, 
the ECCC has taken a restrictive approach to release. For example, the Pre- 
Trial Chamber held that Ieng Sary and Ieng Thirith must be detained to ensure 
their presence, despite their age, ill health, and failure to flee during the many 
years the tribunal was being established.122 The PTC acknowledged that human 
rights law requires “specific evidence” of a threat to public order but cited only 
an analyst’s view that the proceedings could “lead to the resurfacing of anxiet-
ies” in Cambodia in determining that Ieng Sary’s release “would actually disturb 
the public order”123— a concern the Government has similarly invoked to resist 
charging additional suspects (see chapter 6).
The ECCC also denied Ieng Sary’s repeated requests for hospital or house 
arrest due to his ill health, concluding that it would not satisfy the objectives 
of provisional detention and could jeopardize his safety.124 Neither the Inter-
nal Rules nor the rules of other international criminal tribunals explicitly allow 
provisional release on the basis of health concerns, but in practice other tribu-
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nals have allowed temporary release to a confined medical area in three circum-
stances: when treatment is unavailable at the detention unit or in the host coun-
try, on humanitarian grounds when an accused’s condition is so grave that it is 
incompatible with any form of detention, and when an accused is found unfit 
to stand trial.125 Accused have been released home only in a few cases involving 
inoperable and incurable cancer with a prognosis of at most a few months to 
live.126
With regard to Ieng Sary, the Pre- Trial Chamber held, “There is no evidence 
of an immediate need for long- term hospitalisation and the ECCC Detention 
Facility is properly equipped to provide medical assistance as required.”127 As 
Ieng Sary’s heart condition was neither untreatable nor imminently terminal, 
there was no obligation under international precedent to grant him house ar-
rest. Nevertheless, no international tribunal has tried accused of such advanced 
age, and absent a greater risk of flight or public disorder, it might have behooved 
the Court to create new precedent in this area128— if for no other reason than to 
ensure the accused persons’ continuing fitness to stand trial.
The gradual decline of Ieng Thirith, first noted in 2008,129 may have been 
exacerbated by her four years of pretrial detention.130 The ECCC, like interna-
tional courts, applies the ICTY’s Strugar fitness test, which requires the defense 
to show that the accused’s mental incapacity prevents her from exercising her 
rights effectively at trial.131 Once it became inescapable that Ieng Thirith was 
unable to participate in her own defense,132 the Trial Chamber appropriately 
decided that it must release her.133 The Chamber could not reach a supermajor-
ity, and absent guidance from the Internal Rules on how to proceed, it looked to 
“general provisions of international criminal and human rights law” and found 
that it must follow the interpretation of the law most favorable to the accused.134
On appeal, the Supreme Court Chamber determined that not all possible 
medical steps had been taken to improve her condition and ruled that she 
should remain in detention in an appropriate medical facility for an initial six 
months of treatment.135 When the Trial Chamber decision was announced, 
there were public expressions of distress,136 and the Supreme Court decision 
was seen by many as an effort to appease Cambodian opinion despite the fact 
that her chances of improvement were slight to none.137 She was not sent to a 
suitable mental health facility, as there are none in Cambodia— a legacy of de-
struction of the medical system under the Khmer Rouge regime. As a result, she 
remained in the general ECCC detention facility until September 2012, when 
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the SCC finally released her after three medical experts reassessed her condition 
and found that despite additional treatment her mental health had worsened.138
A final example of the Court’s propensity to maintain the Charged Persons 
in detention was the CIJs’ last- minute push to ensure the Closing Order would 
be issued before the expiration of the three- year maximum provisional deten-
tion period. A 2009 U.S. Embassy cable reported Deputy Director of Admin-
istration Knut Rosandhaug’s concern about “massive political consequences” if 
the suspects had to be released.139 The Closing Order was issued on September 
15, 2010, four days before Nuon Chea’s release would have been mandatory.140 
The Court made clear its awareness of the impending deadline in a press re-
lease explaining the consequences of the issuance of a Closing Order on contin-
ued detention.141 If the Charged Persons had been released, under the Internal 
Rules there would have been no basis for their redetention during trial unless 
they failed to appear.142
Upon issuing the Closing Order, the CIJs had the authority to extend their 
detention four more months until the accused were brought before the Trial 
Chamber.143 Saved by the bell, the Court soon faced another impending dead-
line. Unclear wording in the Internal Rules regarding the impact of an appeal of 
the Closing Order on the four- month limit144 convinced the Pre- Trial Chamber 
that it must issue its decision within the same four months. Practically unable 
to make the deadline, it issued its disposition without providing reasons. The 
Trial Chamber found this to be a violation of the rights of the accused, but not 
severe enough to warrant release.145 The Supreme Court Chamber overturned 
that finding, ruling that the filing of the appeal started a new four- month deten-
tion period, and thus the PTC had issued its fully reasoned decision within the 
required period.146 The accused remained safely in detention awaiting trial, with 
no violation of their rights.
The factors considered in determining the need for provisional detention 
are highly speculative and subjective in their application, and the ECCC has 
not clearly violated international standards in finding the accuseds’ continuing 
detention “necessary.”147 Yet the reasons the Court has provided likely obscure 
its underlying rationale: a reluctance to release the accused due to the horrific 
nature of their alleged crimes, the many years that they have lived in impunity, 
and the adverse public reaction that would accompany their release. Michael 
Karnavas believes the international judges were “intellectually dishonest” in 
their detention rulings:
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My client should have been provisionally released. End of story. By any stretch 
of the imagination. But he wasn’t. . . . [The international judges] have gone along 
to get along, with what might have appeared as smaller battles early on, as op-
posed to taking principled positions. . . . They are always finding creative ways 
to get around [the rules].148
The ECCC’s legacy for the Cambodian judiciary, which routinely disregards 
excessive pretrial detention, is therefore mixed. The Court has strictly complied 
with mandatory detention limits, but it has consistently interpreted the Court’s 
rules to avoid releasing unpopular accused, perhaps demonstrating how judges 
can both facially observe the letter of the law and achieve an ends- driven re-
sult. The predilection of judges to find prolonged pretrial detention necessary 
is likely greater in the context of an in situ hybrid court than a court physically 
removed from the crimes and their societal impact.149 It is an open secret that 
if, as has now come to pass, one or more of the accused die of old age before 
reaching judgment, their preverdict detention may be the only “justice” victims 
receive after 30 long years.
Efforts to Expedite Trial
The slow pace of the proceedings did more than raise pretrial detention issues; 
it put the completion of Case 002 in jeopardy. Using its authority under Inter-
nal Rules, the Trial Chamber decided in September 2011 to separate the pro-
ceedings and hold sequential trials related to different parts of the indictment.150 
The ECCC is the first mass crimes court to contemplate consecutive trials based 
on one indictment.
The Trial Chamber made this decision to reach a timely verdict given the 
advanced age of the accused and many of the victims. Paradoxically, it has also 
greatly limited the relevance of the first trial for Cambodians, as it no longer 
includes many types of harm suffered during the DK regime. Although the de-
cision to divide the proceedings may allow a judgment to be reached before the 
death of more accused, the first mini- trial did not proceed swiftly, partly due to 
many novel procedural questions raised. The age and maladies of the accused, 
which led to problematic efforts to try Case 002/01 without their physical at-
tendance, make a second trial extremely unlikely. If the Court reaches judgment 
in Case 002 only with regard to limited charges, the potential meaningfulness 
of this “centerpiece” case will be substantially diminished.
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Presence and Fitness
Given the age and fragile health of the octogenarian accused, it has long been 
feared that they would not live to see judgment. That concern was realized in 
late 2011, when Ieng Thirith was separated from Case 002 due to a lack of men-
tal fitness, and again in March 2013 with the death of Ieng Sary. Both Ieng Sary 
and Nuon Chea had physical ailments and difficulty concentrating for long pe-
riods, which prevented them from sitting through a full day of trial, leading Ieng 
Sary to request early in the process for trials to be conducted in half- day incre-
ments.151 After trial began, all three accused spent time in the hospital, leading 
to delays in the proceedings.152 Accused Khieu Samphan required hospitaliza-
tion most recently in late 2012, but otherwise has been the most robust of the 
defendants, and the only one to consistently attend full days of trial. Accused 
Nuon Chea was hospitalized twice in 2013 and participated in the last several 
months of hearings from outside the courtroom.
The ECCC, like all internationalized courts, guarantees the right of an ac-
cused to “be tried in his or her presence,”153 though that right may be waived or 
forfeited where there are “substantial trial disruptions.”154 In order to mitigate 
the day- to- day effects of the accused’s ill health, the ECCC set up a special 
room where the accused may watch the trial and instruct their counsel through 
a two- way audio- video link.155 Internal Rule 81(5) provides that the Accused 
may be ordered to participate by video when “the Accused’s absence reaches a 
level that causes substantial delay and[] where the interests of justice so require.” 
Defense counsel have argued that “video- link technology must not be equated 
with physical presence at trial”156 and that if an accused “falls asleep in the hold-
ing cell, that is not active participation. . . . That would be nothing but a charade 
to suggest that he is following the proceedings.”157 Nevertheless, in an effort to 
mitigate the effects of Ieng Sary’s declining health, in late 2012 the Trial Cham-
ber ordered him to participate by video- link from the holding cell despite his 
refusal to waive his right to be physically present.158 The age and ill health of the 
Khmer Rouge defendants thus posed a serious and ongoing handicap not only 
to an efficient trial but also to fair proceedings. Ieng Sary’s lawyers challenged 
the ruling and sought a reevaluation of his fitness for trial;159 however, these 
motions unfortunately became moot when the proceedings against him were 
terminated.
When an accused dies prior to verdict, international courts have uniformly 
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terminated the proceedings,160 depriving victims of a judgment of guilt or inno-
cence, as well as an explanation of the factual basis for the judgment. According 
to an ECCC judge, in theory the Closing Order would have been very beneficial 
as “mini judgment” operating on probability instead of certainty. But because 
the CIJs did not include particulars related to charges it is impossible to tell on 
what facts the charges are based.161
The Split Indictment: Conviction or Truth Telling?
In severing the Case 002 indictment, the Trial Chamber noted that in cases of 
similar complexity at international courts, trial chambers have required as long 
as ten years to reach judgment.162 Its aim was therefore “to limit the number of 
witnesses, experts and civil parties called,” enabling it “to issue a verdict following 
a shortened trial, safeguarding the fundamental interest of victims in achieving 
meaningful and timely justice, and the right of all Accused in Case 002 to an 
expeditious trial.”163 Other mass crimes courts have likewise reduced the scope 
of large indictments; however, in accordance with their adversarial approach the 
prosecution has played the primary role in determining which charges are cut. At 
the ECCC, none of the parties’ lawyers was asked for his or her views in advance, 
despite their many years of mass crimes case experience, as the Trial Chamber 
believed a consultative procedure would itself result in unacceptable delays.164
The first trial, Case 002/01, addresses only the evacuation of Phnom Penh 
and other major cities after April 17, 1975, killings of soldiers and civil servants of 
the defeated Khmer Republic government at the Tuol Po Chrey execution site 
in Pursat Province contemporaneous with the evacuation, the forced migration 
of Cambodians to the DK North and North West Zones from 1975 to 1977, and 
related crimes against humanity.
No co- operative, worksites, security centers, [other] execution sites or facts relevant 
to the third phase of population movements will be examined during the first trial. 
Further, all allegations of, inter alia, genocide, persecution on religious grounds as 
a crime against humanity and Grave Breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 
have also been deferred to later phases of the proceedings in Case 002.165
In a press release announcing its decision to sever, the Trial Chamber justi-
fied the narrow topic selected for the first trial in part by noting, “The forced 
movement of population also affected a very broad cross- section of the Cam-
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bodian population at the time, including a large percentage of civil parties in 
Case 002.”166 Although supporting the purpose behind the severance order, the 
Co- Prosecutors objected to the form:
[T]he charges selected for the first and likely only trial of the Accused would not 
be representative of their alleged criminal conduct, in contrast to international 
practice; it would not promote an accurate historical record; and would dimin-
ish the legacy of ECCC proceedings in advancing national reconciliation.167
Rather than sever the indictment into policy segments, the Co- Prosecutors 
argued the first trial should include representative crimes: the evacuation of 
Phnom Penh as well as crimes at a few security centers, work sites, and coop-
eratives.168
The Ieng Sary team argued that in effect the prosecution was asking the 
Trial Chamber to amend the Closing Order, which is outside the scope of its 
authority.169 This is because, unlike in an adversarial system where the prosecu-
tion has the authority to make deals with the defense and drop charges from an 
indictment, the civil law focus is on finding the “material truth.” Therefore, once 
a formal determination has been made that a crime has been committed, discre-
tion cannot be exercised to dismiss it:170 crimes can only be severed in a way that 
preserves the totality of the Closing Order.171
In the view of some persons interviewed, the Co- Prosecutors should have 
filed a shorter, tighter introductory submission in the first place.172 This criti-
cism has been leveled at most mass crimes courts, where the prosecution, due to 
the massive quantity of information available, “throws a net hoping something 
will stick.”173 Considering the extremely limited mandate of the ECCC, it was 
arguably important to establish a comprehensive record of major crimes in Case 
002, even if some charges are never adjudicated. Moreover, according to one 
civil law– trained lawyer, there is no legal reason why the judges could not have 
severed the facts of the indictment in a more creative and representative manner 
as requested by the prosecution.174 It is also unclear whether the Court had the 
authority to sever the charges and exclude genocide and religious persecution 
from the first case. If the facts of the forced transfer prove religious persecution, 
the ECCC should be able to issue convictions on that basis. Deciding otherwise 
limits the effect of the indictment and amounts to prejudgment.175
Michael Karnavas says:
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Now it’s a race to finish, to convict them before somebody dies. That’s the mad-
ness of this [severance order]. [Is the Court] more interested in getting a convic-
tion, or in getting a cohesive narrative that deals with the issues in a contextual 
manner that allows the Cambodian people to see what exactly happened— why, 
when, and how?176
The severance order reminds Panhavuth Long of a saying by senior Khmer 
Rouge figure Ta Mok during the DK period: “Cut the head to fit the hat.”177 
Victims have expressed concern that the Court will never address some key 
topics, such as the crime of genocide.178 Fourteen months into trial the Supreme 
Court Chamber overturned the Trial Chamber severance order and upbraided 
the Trial Chamber for, among other things, failing to consider the representa-
tiveness of the charges.179 Although the Trial Chamber reconsidered its terms 
of severance from scratch, due to acute awareness of the substantial time already 
spent hearing evidence tailored to the original severance decision and the need 
to reach an expeditious end to proceedings, the narrow scope of charges to be 
addressed in Case 002 remained the same, a fait accompli.180
Mixed Rules and Trial  
Management Problems
The trial in Case 002/1 lasted two years.181 In its press release announcing the 
severance of Case 002, the Trial Chamber speculated: “The advantage of sepa-
ration of proceedings into segments is that each trial will take an abbreviated 
time for the Chamber to complete.”182 The Co- Prosecutors disagreed that the 
severance order would promote efficiency, and they appear to have been proven 
correct.183 The novelty of the severance procedure, as well as the unconsidered 
application of mixed national and international rules rooted in both civil and 
common law traditions, caused significant confusion and delay.184
Due to Case 002’s procedural complexity— including the large number of 
documents and witnesses involved— the parties sought to have management 
meetings before the start of trial.185 These requests were rebuffed in an effort to 
start trial as quickly as possible.186 Although none of the Trial Chamber judges 
has mass crimes trial management experience, they have a propensity to make 
immediate oral decisions without consulting each other, the parties, or their 
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legal officers. Moreover they demonstrated what some called a face- saving re-
luctance to revisit their rulings even when they proved unworkable. As a conse-
quence, procedural debates riddled the trial, and there was widespread criticism 
that the adoption and application of rules was arbitrary and inconsistent. This 
resulted in confusion among the parties and prevented the trial from offering 
an engaging narrative for Cambodians. Just one of the procedural debates that 
consumed trial proceedings is discussed below.187
Questioning of Witnesses
In civil law practice, the judges first question the witnesses and then ask the 
parties if they have additional questions.188 Unlike in Case 001, during which 
the judges each took responsibility for developing expertise on a topic and led 
the questioning of related witnesses, in Case 002 the Trial Chamber decided to 
delegate its responsibility to one of the parties.189 Both defense and civil party 
lawyers believe the judges’ abdication of their responsibility to direct question-
ing resulted in procedural confusion.190
The responsibility to question fell primarily on the prosecution. In the com-
mon law and at the ICTY and ICTR, the prosecution presents its evidence by 
selecting the witnesses it wishes to call, determining the order of their appear-
ance, and preparing witnesses by, for example, comparing prior witness state-
ments and highlighting potential inconsistencies.191 By contrast, in civil law the 
judges control these matters and parties are not allowed to vet witnesses before-
hand.192 As a result of the mixture of these practices, the ECCC Co- Prosecutors 
had to determine solely on the basis of prior statements and evidence in the 
case file what questions to ask of a witness selected by the Trial Chamber. They 
had no ability to proof witnesses in advance to determine the extent of their 
knowledge on the topic at hand or the consistency of their current memories 
with statements made years prior.
For example, two witnesses were on the civil parties’ list to discuss internal 
purges, a subject not included in Case 002/01. Unexpectedly, the Trial Chamber 
called them to provide historical background, and tasked the prosecution with 
primary responsibility for extracting relevant information from them. Michiel 
Pestman believes that after the indictment was split, the Trial Chamber used 
footnotes in relevant paragraphs of the Closing Order to determine whom to 
call rather than asking the parties. Thus, the prosecution was confronted with 
questioning witnesses they did not want to hear. Pestman and others argue that 
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the trial should have started with experts who could establish the overall con-
text of the proceedings.193
While putting parties in charge of questioning, the Court forbade them 
from using leading questions to more efficiently draw out information, even 
when a witness was uncooperative. Leading questions are generally disallowed 
in civil law trials because all witnesses are court witnesses— they are not consid-
ered adverse to any party— and the court does most of the questioning, unlike 
the process in Case 002. However, once the Chamber delegated this role to the 
parties, no justification remained for a blanket prohibition.
The Trial Chamber’s hybrid practice maintained its control over who tes-
tified when and on what topic, yet relied on adversarial questioning (without 
the opportunity for proofing or leading questions) to elicit information. The 
prosecution had the burden of proof, but no control over where the case was 
going.194 The consequence was a lack of coherence: Neither the parties nor the 
Cambodian public understood precisely why some witnesses were called, nor 
what they were expected to contribute to the process. Andrew Ianuzzi, former 
lawyer for Nuon Chea, says, “It’s as if Case 002 was designed to be the most 
boring trial possible.”195
A further problem— resulting more from delays and the severance decision 
than the Trial Chamber’s hybrid rules— has been establishing appropriate lim-
its on what evidence witnesses may present. The Co- Prosecutors argued that 
witnesses scheduled for Case 002/01 who have information relevant to other 
parts of the indictment should be allowed to present it, partly because many are 
elderly and may not be available later.196 The Trial Chamber held that questions 
to witnesses should be “limited to facts relevant to the first trial” but allowed the 
prosecution to make oral requests for further testimony,197 and in practice some 
witnesses were allowed to testify to a broader scope of issues.198 In May 2012, 
the Trial Chamber agreed to a prosecution request to hear elderly witnesses on 
the full scope of Case 002.199 Some expert witnesses were also heard on all sub-
jects.200 As a consequence, the Chamber heard some of the same evidence as if 
the trial had never been split, while the defense only challenged issues related to 
population movement and the Tuol Po Chrey execution site, and the judgment 
should be limited to those facts. Michael Karnavas contended during trial that 
due to procedural controversies and understandable efforts by the prosecution 
to take advantage of unclear rules to place as much evidence as possible on the 
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record in the first case, “Had they not severed, [the hearings] would probably 
be further ahead.”201
Of greater fair trial concern, shortly before the end of hearings, in response 
to prosecution arguments that severance had jeopardized its ability to meet its 
burden of proof, the Trial Chamber suddenly declared, “From the outset, the 
Chamber has ruled that all parties may lead evidence in relation to the roles and 
responsibilities of all Accused in relation to all policies of the DK era”— citing 
only a decision on expert witness testimony.202 The Khieu Samphan lawyers 
called this development “shocking,” arguing that they were “never given the op-
portunity to refute allegations relating to the elaboration and implementation” 
of policies other than forced evacuation, and that the result would be prejudg-
ment of legal issues which are theoretically the subject of forthcoming “mini- 
trials.”203 The repercussions are as of yet unclear, but this development high-
lights the disorder resulting from novel and equivocal procedures.
Barriers to Further Case 002 Trials
Procedural complexities are also likely to prevent the expeditious start to a pos-
sible second trial. The Trial Chamber asserted that it selected the subject matter 
“to ensure that the issues examined in the first trial provide a basis to consider 
the role and responsibility of all accused, and to provide a foundation for the 
remaining charges in later trials.”204 As the Co- Prosecutors have noted, the only 
way for the Trial Chamber to adopt facts established in the first trial into a 
subsequent trial would be through judicial notice of adjudicated facts or res ju-
dicata.205 However, it is unclear whether the Trial Chamber has the ability to 
take judicial notice of adjudicated facts, as it has previously found “no legal basis 
in the Law on the Establishment of the ECCC or in the Internal Rules for the 
Chamber to take judicial notice of adjudicated facts . . . before the ECCC.”206
Moreover, neither mechanism would likely be available in Case 002/02 until 
the Supreme Court Chamber issued its final judgment on Case 002/01, as some 
rulings of the Trial Chamber may be overturned. In the Duch case, eighteen 
months elapsed between the issuance of the trial and appeals judgments. The 
Trial Chamber has held that there is no impediment to using a trial verdict as a 
legal and factual foundation for a second trial without waiting for the Supreme 
Court judgment.207 Even if this were possible, it is questionable how the Trial 
Chamber could draft a complex foundational judgment while overseeing a new 
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trial.208 In the Duch case, the Trial Chamber took over eight months to draft 
the judgment. With limited charges being addressed, and the very real potential 
that another accused could die before judgment is handed down, there is little 
likelihood that much of the Khmer Rouge era will ever be addressed by the 
ECCC.
Conclusion
In its most important case, the ECCC faced dilemmas common to international 
and hybrid tribunals as they carry out their judicial functions: how to deliver 
justice efficiently while observing fair trial norms and attempting to develop a 
factual narrative that addresses the needs and demands of survivors. These chal-
lenges were accentuated by its hybrid form, which has rendered the Court sus-
ceptible to accusations of bias and political interference and contributed to pro-
cedural delays and confusion. Both the common law and the civil law systems 
have mechanisms refined over the years to promote both fairness and efficiency. 
When civil and common law features are haphazardly combined, however, a 
schizophrenic process results and jeopardizes both objectives. The fact that the 
ECCC’s investigatory and trial judges lack prior experience managing complex 
criminal trials has only exacerbated the problem.
Pestman argued that the blending of legal systems and inconsistent rule ap-
plication has produced troubling unpredictability.209 Elisabeth Simonneau Fort 
added that personalities play an important role as the Court swerves between 
“some civil law, some common law, and then some civil law again.”210 Guissé 
said the reason the rules were constantly changing had less to do with the civil 
law/common law mix and more to do with the judges, who lack experience 
working in other international jurisdictions.211 Karnavas called the trial process 
“chaotic” and contended, “They are trying to have it every which way: It’s the 
French system, it’s not the French system, it’s the national system, it’s the ICTY. 
Whenever it suits them they are constantly changing the rules as the game is 
being played.”212 Although these concerns have not irreparably tainted the Case 
002 proceedings, they do pose serious risks to the case. The ECCC’s experience 
shows the folly of creating special rules for a hybrid court with such a narrow 
mandate and limited lifespan. For trials to proceed smoothly and expediently, 
specific, clear, established rules tailored to a mass crimes process must be in 
place at the start of any future hybrid court process.
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In addition to concerns about fairness, the ECCC’s functional challenges 
led to questions about its capacity to deliver meaningful justice for the myriad 
Cambodians who have suffered from the atrocities of the Pol Pot era. Neither 
international nor hybrid courts can function as truth commissions and address 
all historical harm. Of necessity, they must focus on particularly serious crimes 
and the responsibility of a limited number of persons. As discussed in chapter 1, 
the ECCC’s jurisdiction was intended to be narrow, focusing on senior Khmer 
Rouge leaders and others “most responsible” and on crimes committed in Cam-
bodia between April 17, 1975, and January 6, 1979.
The Case 002 defense teams sought to broaden the historical discussion. 
Son Arun, Cambodian Co- Lawyer for Nuon Chea, argued that “[o]ne needs a 
full picture of these facts in order to properly assess the acts and intentions of 
the DK leaders when they came to power.”213 Pestman argued that Nuon Chea 
had essentially admitted ordering the evacuation of Phnom Penh, and the trial 
should focus on evaluating his legal justifications.214 The Court resisted efforts 
to focus on topics such as the U.S. bombardment of the civil war era, Vietnam-
ese intervention, and abuses by various Cambodian factions outside of the DK 
era. Trial Chamber President Nil Nonn issued a directive informing all parties 
that:
Background contextual issues and events outside the temporal jurisdiction of 
the ECCC will be considered by the Chamber only when demonstrably rel-
evant to matters within the ECCC’s jurisdiction and the scope of the trial as 
determined by the Chamber.215
The reluctance to discuss those topics owes partly to politics, but it also obvi-
ously represents the pressure of time. It has taken over 30 years to bring the ac-
cused to trial, and the pressure has been intense to reach a verdict quickly. The 
severance order further limited the scope of the historical discussion, leaving 
doubt about whether it offered Cambodians a meaningful slice of “truth.”
All mass crimes courts struggle with the need to balance the obligation to 
prevent undue delay in the proceedings with the need to provide a compre-
hensive, coherent narrative of events. There is little purpose in holding a small 
number of exemplary trials if a judgment is never reached, or if a judgment is 
so narrow that it fails to resonate with the affected population. Slobodan Milo-
sevic’s death before verdict on a massive indictment created an impetus toward 
narrower indictments and shorter trials. However, this approach, as exemplified 
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by the ICC’s Lubanga single- charge indictment, risks being nonrepresentative 
of the victims’ primary concerns.216 The ECCC’s Case 001 addressed one de-
tention center at which primarily Khmer Rouge cadres and their families were 
killed. The Case 002 indictment has been split in an effort to reach judgment 
quickly primarily on one narrow topic— mass population movements. As of 
October 2013, with Case 002/01 closing arguments underway, it appears doubt-
ful that most of the story of the senior leaders of Democratic Kampuchea will 
ever be told in a judicial forum, and an enormous gap will remain in the official 
legal record. This is of particular concern because, as discussed in the next chap-
ter, it is unlikely any other persons will be tried by the ECCC.
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Cases 003 & 004— The Politics  
of Personal Jurisdiction
“No Gain in Keeping, No Loss in Weeding Out”
The presumptive lack of independence and experience of Cambodia’s judges, 
and the contentious politics between the Cambodian Government and United 
Nations, led many to write off the ECCC from the beginning. However, when 
not directly addressing topics that challenge the wishes of the Cambodian Gov-
ernment, the hybrid Court’s decisions for the most part have been made on 
sound judicial bases consistent with international standards.1 In stark contrast, 
efforts to pursue several more suspects in Cases 003 and 004— which the Cam-
bodian Government deems politically unacceptable— have engendered unten-
able decisions, procedural improprieties, and credible allegations of obstruction 
of justice. Defense lawyers in Case 002 have pointed to this debacle, arguing 
that all of the Court’s work, including the investigation of the Khmer Rouge 
senior leaders, is tainted by political interference,2 while the United Nations 
and donors have largely shirked the problem in their determination to make 
Case 002 a “success.” The dispute procedures and supermajority rule were put 
into place precisely to address the potential impact of government interference 
at the Cambodian- majority court. However, in practice these rules have proven 
an inadequate substitute for an independent and impartial judiciary.
The dispute in Cases 003 and 004 revolves around personal jurisdiction. 
Since the first five ECCC suspects were arrested, there has been pressure from 
human rights advocates, both Cambodian and international, to charge more 
people. In 2008, UN Special Representative Yash Ghai speculated:
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[A]lthough the jurisdiction of the ECCC was restricted to ‘senior leaders of the 
Democratic Kampuchea and those who were most responsible for the crimes 
committed,’ if only the persons currently in the custody of the ECCC are ac-
cused, the people may not feel that this is adequate. The real test will be if a 
suspect in or close to the government is brought before the ECCC.3
The Open Society Justice Initiative (OSJI), the most active international court 
monitor, took the lead in pressing for more indictments:
Given the sheer scale of the atrocities that occurred during the Khmer Rouge 
period, limiting prosecutions to five individuals would surely seem inadequate 
to those who survived Khmer Rouge era atrocities and would risk creating 
the perception that five individuals were in effect scapegoats for the crimes of 
others[.]4
After the Co- Prosecutors made public their dispute over whether to investigate 
more people, OSJI emphasized that additional investigations would “test[] the 
ability of the court to operate free of political interference,”5 and the Cambodian 
Human Rights Action Committee argued that failing to act independently and 
exercise its mandate to investigate more persons would “undermine the impact 
and legacy of the court.”6
In this way, some observers have framed Cases 003 and 004 as a key test of 
the Court’s overall legitimacy. The Cambodian Government appears to see the 
cases as a different kind of test— a challenge to its resolve and primary politi-
cal control over the process. The dispute highlights fundamental questions for 
those seeking lessons from the ECCC model: Is a hybrid court that is subject to 
political interference better than a purely domestic process or no trials at all? As 
Judge Geoffrey Robertson wrote at the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL):
If the structure of any body purporting to exercise judicial power is so funda-
mentally flawed that its judges may realistically be perceived as puppets moved 
by purse strings or the politics of their progenitors or paymasters, then it cannot 
be acknowledged as a “court” at all.7
All mass crimes tribunals involve political decisions to some degree. At what 
point do politically imposed constraints rob a tribunal of credibility? And when 
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should the United Nations participate in an institution vulnerable to domestic 
executive influence?
Those who see the exercise of judicial independence as a key barometer of 
the Court’s success or failure will judge it largely by how it functions at its most 
vulnerable in Cases 003 and 004. Others, including people who have spent years 
seeking justice for victims, regret that the effort to prosecute more than five has 
overtly politicized the entire process, put the centerpiece Case 002 in jeopardy, 
and threatens to eclipse the Court’s potentially positive legacy for Cambodia.8
Who Should Be Tried?
Deciding whom to try has been a recurrent challenge for mass crimes courts. 
Evidence generally permits far more prosecutions than tribunal architects deem 
politically and financially desirable, but limiting the scope of prosecution risks 
creating a false narrative in which a handful of individuals are held responsible 
for collective wrongs while others go free.9 The ECCC, like the SCSL, was de-
signed to focus on a relatively narrow field of suspects.10 As discussed in chapter 
1, both the United Nations and Cambodian Government were loath to expand 
beyond a modest number of former Khmer Rouge officials. They did not seek 
agreement on a specific number, however, which might have resulted in a fur-
ther negotiating impasse and certainly would have curbed the independence of 
the Co- Prosecutors and Co- Investigating Judges (CIJs).
The Framework Agreement and ECCC Law limit the Court’s mandate to 
officials who were either senior leaders of Democratic Kampuchea (DK) or 
persons most responsible for the crimes committed from 1975 to 1979.11 At the 
SCSL, a “greatest responsibility” requirement has been interpreted as a guide-
line for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion and not a threshold jurisdiction-
al requirement.12 Similarly the ECCC Supreme Court Chamber has ruled that 
the criteria of “senior leaders” or others “most responsible” are not jurisdictional. 
Instead:
[They] operate exclusively as investigatorial and prosecutorial policy to guide 
the independent discretion of the CIJs and Co- Prosecutors as to how best to 
target their finite resources in order to achieve the purpose behind the establish-
ment of the ECCC.13
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Although this statement might suggest that the Office of the Co- Prosecutors 
(OCP) and Office of the Co- Investigating Judges (OCIJ) have equal discretion 
in determining whom to prosecute, the functional relationship between these 
offices suggests otherwise.
Discretion to Charge
In the French civil law system, as in the common law system, the prosecutor has 
discretion to decide whether or not to initiate a prosecution after considering 
not only “the legal basis of the case” but also “the appropriateness of prosecu-
tion.”14 “At any point in the investigation, the prosecutor may decide to drop the 
case, either because the prosecution is time- barred by statute, or by exercise of 
the discretion to prosecute[.]”15 At the ECCC and other international and hy-
brid courts designed to prosecute a limited number of offenders for widespread 
crimes, prosecutorial discretion is even broader.16 There are no explicit limits on 
prosecutors’ exercise of discretion beyond each court’s jurisdictional mandate, 
the professional obligations of prosecutorial independence, and the (usually 
quite limited) opportunities for judicial review of their decisions. Importantly, 
the ECCC Internal Rules state: “Co- Prosecutors shall be independent in the 
performance of their functions and shall not accept or seek instructions from 
any government or any other source.”17
The scope of CIJ discretion is less clear. It is not described in the core 
ECCC documents; but it is circumscribed by the rules governing the investiga-
tion, in particular those defining the relationship between the functions of the 
Co- Prosecutors and the CIJs. Importantly, although the Co- Prosecutors may 
investigate any crimes they believe to be within the jurisdiction of the Court, 
the CIJs can only investigate the facts set out in prosecutorial submissions.18 In-
deed, they must investigate those facts.19 The international Pre- Trial Chamber 
judges have said:
[T]he applicable Rules .  .  . imposes [sic] upon [the CIJs] a legal obligation to 
conduct a judicial investigation into “the crimes under the jurisdiction of the 
ECCC,” which means that the obligation to investigate is directed toward the 
criminal acts set out in the . . . Submissions.20
However, after completing the investigation, they do not have to follow the 
Prosecutors’ submissions in deciding whom to charge.21 They have the authority 
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to charge anyone named in the introductory submission or, with the permis-
sion of the Prosecutors, anyone else against whom there is sufficient evidence 
of responsibility.22 They also do not have to follow the Prosecutors’ submissions 
in deciding to indict or dismiss a case.23 Nevertheless, their discretion is not 
unlimited: they may dismiss a case only in three circumstances:
a) The acts in question do not amount to crimes within the jurisdiction of 
the ECCC;
b) The perpetrators of the acts have not been identified; or
c) There is not sufficient evidence against the Charged Person or persons of 
the charges.24
The Pre- Trial Chamber has found that “this decision does not involve the exer-
cise of any discretionary power; when circumstances as prescribed [in this rule] 
are present, the Charged Person should be indicted in relation to these acts.”25 
Thus it is arguable that unless, after investigating, the CIJs find that the crimi-
nal acts do not fall within the jurisdiction of the Court, they cannot dismiss an 
active case solely because they disagree with the Prosecutors’ selection of who 
is most responsible for the crimes. The CIJs’ function is precisely to determine 
who should be charged, and then to do so.26
“Senior Leaders and Those Most Responsible”
The jurisdictional dispute hinges partly on the narrow interpretive question of 
who qualifies as “senior leaders” and others “most responsible” for DK atrocities. 
Cambodian CIJ You Bunleng, former international CIJ Siegfried Blunk, and 
national Co- Prosecutor Chea Leang have all expressed public doubt about the 
Court’s jurisdiction over the Cases 003 and 004 suspects due to their “compara-
bly lower rank.”27 To the contrary, Blunk’s successor, Laurent Kasper- Ansermet, 
issued a decision finding that that the suspects in Case 003 squarely meet the 
Court’s personal jurisdictional requirements.28
International courts emphasize two primary considerations when deter-
mining whether persons fall within criteria similar to the ECCC’s “senior lead-
ers and those most responsible” standard: the “leadership or authority position 
of the accused, and [the] sense of the gravity, seriousness or massive scale of the 
crime.”29 These factors are not considered in isolation, but holistically. For ex-
ample, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
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has allowed referral of an accused to local courts when his crimes were “limited 
in scope both geographically and temporally, and in terms of the number of 
victims affected,” and he did not have “any rank of military significance” or a 
political role.30
“Senior leaders” is not a fixed term referring only to those in the highest 
echelons of power. The ECCC Supreme Court Chamber has found the term 
to be “sufficiently flexible that it may not necessarily be limited to former mem-
bers of the CPK and/or Standing Committees.”31 Likewise, in construing the 
term “most senior leaders”— a narrower category than the one applicable before 
the ECCC— the ICTY has found that is not restricted to the “architects” of an 
“overall policy” forming the basis of the crimes: “Were it true that only cases 
against military commanders, who were at the highest policy- making levels of 
an army . . . [met this criteria], this would diminish the true level of responsibil-
ity of many commanders in the field and those at the staff level.”32
The term “most responsible” further broadens the scope of who may be 
prosecuted to include persons who were in less senior positions yet played a 
significant role in grave crimes. The UN Group of Experts noted:
The list of top governmental and party officials may not correspond with the 
list of persons most responsible for serious violations of human rights in that 
certain top governmental leaders may have been removed from knowledge and 
decision- making; and others not in the chart of senior leaders may have played 
a significant role in the atrocities. This seems especially true with respect to certain 
leaders at the zonal level, as well as officials of torture and interrogation centres such 
as Tuol Sleng.33
Likewise, in designing the SCSL, UN Secretary- General Kofi Annan defined 
the term “most responsible” to include, in addition to the political or military 
leadership, “others in command authority down the chain of command . . . judg-
ing by the severity of the crime or its massive scale.”34 The Appeals Chamber of 
the International Criminal Court (ICC) has emphasized that “individuals who 
are not at the very top of an organization may still carry considerable influence 
and commit, or generate the widespread commission of, very serious crimes.”35 
A former ICTY prosecutor has said similarly:
[S]ome individuals who have no particularly important functional role may 
have distinguished themselves in committing numerous crimes in the most 
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overt, systematic or widespread manner . . . [s]uch individuals often play a great 
role in setting the example and encourage . . . the commission of other gruesome 
crimes.36
Thus, international legal precedents do not compel the ECCC to construe the 
terms “senior leaders” and “most responsible” narrowly; they give the ECCC 
prosecutors and judges considerable discretion to investigate suspects at a “com-
parably” lower level than the most senior leaders.
Maintaining Peace?
Due to the large number of suspects who potentially fall within the personal 
jurisdiction of mass crimes courts, international prosecutors also consider sub-
jective factors in determining whom it is most appropriate to charge— factors 
including the possible societal effects of prosecutions. At the ICC, the pros-
ecutor is explicitly mandated to consider “the interests of justice” once she has 
established that jurisdictional requirements have been met.37 In the case of the 
ECCC, the UN Group of Experts advised that the future Khmer Rouge pros-
ecutor should “as a matter of prosecutorial policy  .  .  . exercise his or her dis-
cretion regarding investigations, indictments and trials so as to fully take into 
account the twin goals of individual accountability and national reconciliation 
in Cambodia.”38
French civil law does not appear to provide investigating judges with dis-
cretion to consider nonobjective factors in determining whether to indict or 
dismiss a case. Notably, the ICC Pre- Trial Chamber— a body with quasi– civil 
law power to review prosecutorial decisions— has the authority to evaluate the 
interests of justice only when the prosecutor decides not to continue with an in-
vestigation or prosecution solely on this basis.39 Conversely, it is not authorized 
to consider subjective factors for the purpose of second- guessing the prosecu-
tor’s decision to proceed.40
As the ECCC Law contains a similar statutory presumption that investiga-
tions and prosecutions shall move forward, it is arguable that even if the CIJs 
have some measure of discretion allowing them to dismiss a case in the interest 
of justice, its scope should be viewed quite narrowly. Because the ECCC is the 
first mass crimes court to include an investigating judge, this question has never 
been addressed. Due to the politically charged context in which it has arisen, 
the answer is highly vulnerable to the political interests of those seeking to drop 
Cases 003 and 004.
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The primary Cambodian Government justification for limiting the number 
of suspects has been consistent: prosecuting too many suspects could lead to 
renewed civil war.41 National Co- Prosecutor Chea Leang, echoing these objec-
tions, has said additional investigations are inappropriate in part due to “Cam-
bodia’s past instability and the continued need for national reconciliation[.]”42 
She argued that although no violent reactions had yet occurred due to ECCC 
proceedings, “If prosecutions of lower- ranking officials were to be initiated . . . 
‘ex- members [of the Khmers Rouges] and those who have allegiance to the 
Khmer Rouge Leaders may commit violent acts.’”43
However real such worries may have been in the past, there currently ap-
pears to be little if any basis for concern.44 The arrest and indictment of the 
first five accused provoked no significant disturbances or threats, nor did the 
public leak of the names of suspects in Cases 003 and 004. ECCC officials have 
traveled to Khmer Rouge strongholds and held outreach events to assure for-
mer guerrillas that the scope of prosecution will remain narrow. Moreover, the 
Khmer Rouge organization is defunct, and there is no evidence that the Case 
003 or 004 suspects have the capacity or desire to organize resistance.45 In a 
2009 survey, more than half of Cambodians interviewed expressed no concern 
about potential public disorder if more suspects were investigated, as they have 
confidence in the Government’s ability to control any disturbances.46
Chea Leang may be correct that, “[i]f investigations could be extended to 
all such low- ranking suspects, there ‘would be many more suspects of this level 
to be prosecuted,’ which could ‘adversely affect the stability of Cambodia’ and 
cause a ‘frightening situation of unrest in Cambodian society,’ particularly among 
those holding equivalent ranks.”47 However, no Court official has suggested pur-
suing investigations beyond Cases 003 and 004. Moreover, it is notable that in 
the one case where a question of accountability vs. peace has squarely arisen— 
the 1996 amnesty of Ieng Sary— the full Trial Chamber apparently found the 
issue to be of such minimal concern that it did not bother to address it. It merely 
noted that the amnesty “may have been a useful tool in ending the conflict,” as 
Ieng’s defection resulted in the reintegration of a large number of Khmer Rouge 
combatants, promoting the restoration of peace.48 However, in finding the De-
cree inapplicable to ECCC proceedings, the Chamber did not feel compelled to 
consider the effect of its decision on the potential for a re- eruption of violence. 
Instead, as discussed in chapter 5, it focused solely on Cambodia’s obligation to 
prevent impunity. Former Co- Investigating Judge Marcel Lemonde says,
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[T]he Government tended to play the card of reconciliation when it felt that 
the process was getting out of its control and could have undesirable side effects 
politically for it. . . . One therefore had the impression that the alibi of peace was 
a convenient way to prevent the Tribunal from going into areas where it should 
not go.49
More than Five?
Debates at the ECCC over peace and justice and who qualifies as “senior leaders” 
or persons “most responsible” have sharpened to a focus on numbers: Should 
the Court try five or ten former Khmer Rouge suspects? Panhavuth Long of 
the Cambodian Justice Initiative sees the numbers debate as differing perspec-
tives on the meaning of accountability. He says, “For internationals, justice must 
be seen to be done. For nationals, it is enough if justice is done. Internationals 
would say there is justice if there are more cases. Nationals say what’s the dif-
ference between one or two or three cases. One and two are enough symbols 
of justice.”50 Although both the United Nations and Cambodian Government 
intended only a small number of prosecutions, the criteria they established do 
not limit the appropriate number of suspects to five.
A strong argument can be made that additional prosecutions would con-
tribute to the fulfillment of the ECCC’s mandate.51 As Margaret deGuzman 
argues, selecting whom to prosecute at mass crimes courts involves “expressive” 
choices about the norms and types of victimization that trials emphasize.52 Any 
limited number of Khmer Rouge trials will imply primary responsibility for 
those charged, result in impunity for all others, and omit important facts from 
the official judicially sanctioned narrative. However, a modest number of ad-
ditional trials could expand meaningfully on the facts revealed in Cases 001 
and 002— which focus on Tuol Sleng, forced movement, and the Phnom Penh 
policy leadership. Additional trials could examine crimes that took place at co-
operatives and work sites, such as forced marriage; how the Communist Party 
of Kampuchea (CPK) operated at the regional level and in the military; and 
how the overall machinery of the DK regime worked. Such trials would also 
serve to stress— albeit in a limited way— the crucial norm that superior orders 
are not excuses for grave human rights abuses.53
Unlike other internationalized courts, the ECCC is not coupled with do-
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mestic trials or a truth commission,54 and national courts will not pursue DK- 
era crimes once the ECCC closes. Many Cambodians have expressed their in-
terest in the larger historical narrative, and while the Court cannot pretend to 
be a truth commission, the cases it decides to hear offer an opportunity to tell a 
slightly broader story than what is popularly known.55 With all that has been in-
vested in the ECCC process, and with no further chances for justice, four or five 
further prosecutions hardly seem excessive. The struggle over additional sus-
pects has once again highlighted tensions between national and international 
officials and challenged the viability of the hybrid enterprise.
“Too Many Names”: The Co- Prosecutors’ Disagreement and First Test 
of the Dispute Settlement Rules
In 2008, former international Co- Prosecutor Robert Petit decided to initiate 
two new judicial investigations and named six additional suspects.56Although 
the targets of these investigations are still officially confidential, their names 
have been widely reported in the media, and they are alleged to be “among the 
most brutal implementers of the policies set up by the Khmer Rouge leader-
ship[.]”57
In Case 003, they are Sou Met, former commander of the air force and a 
member of the Assisting Committee of the Central Committee of the CPK; 
and Meas Muth, former commander of the navy, who was allegedly either a 
member of the Central Committee or a member of the Assisting Committee of 
the Central Committee, and is said to have controlled the port town of Kam-
pong Som (present day Sihanoukville) and its coastal islands.58 Both are alleged 
to have had responsibility for internal purges resulting in the deaths of possibly 
tens of thousands of persons, among other crimes. Sou Met died in June 2013. 
Van Rith, the last DK Minister of Commerce, was also a suspect in Case 003, 
but he died in 2008 and was removed from the case.
In Case 004, there are three suspects. Ta An, former Deputy Secretary of 
the Central Zone among other positions, is alleged to have led a group of cadres 
from the Southwest Zone to purge and replace cadres in the Central Zone, and 
to have had responsibility for forced labor worksites and prison centers, as well 
as for committing genocide against the Cham Muslim population. Ta Tith, for-
mer Acting Secretary of the Northwest Zone among other positions, is alleged 
to have purged and replaced the existing Northwest Zone cadre acting together 
with the deceased Ta Mok aka the Butcher. He is also allegedly responsible for 
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prison and execution sites, as well as forced labor sites. His crimes overlap with 
that of Im Chaem, former Secretary of Preah Net Preah District among other 
positions, who is allegedly responsible for purging the area under her control. 
She faces charges of overseeing prison and execution sites, and forced labor at 
the notorious Trapeang Thma Dam. Together these suspects may be respon-
sible for over 100,000 deaths and other crimes.59
Unable to reach an agreement with national Co- Prosecutor Chea Leang to 
forward the initial submissions in these cases, Petit filed a notice of disagree-
ment between the Co- Prosecutors and asked the Pre- Trial Chamber to resolve 
the dispute.60 The ECCC Internal Rules provide that in the event of a disagree-
ment between the Co- Prosecutors, either one may record the disagreement, and 
bring it before the Pre- Trial Chamber. The Pre- Trial Chamber must settle the 
dispute by an affirmative vote of at least four judges. If there is no supermajority 
decision, “the prosecution shall proceed.”61
The Pre- Trial Chamber took nearly a year to decide the dispute; however, 
an affirmative vote by four of the Pre- Trial Judges could not be reached: the 
three Cambodian judges voted against the investigations and the two interna-
tional judges voted in favor.62 This was the first of many Case 003/004 PTC de-
cisions, all divided on national/international lines.63 Due to the failure to reach 
a supermajority, the international Co- Prosecutor’s request for judicial investiga-
tion was allowed to proceed by default. Acting international Co- Prosecutor Bill 
Smith forwarded the two new introductory submissions to the CIJs, empha-
sizing that he had “no plans to conduct further preliminary investigations into 
suspects at the ECCC.”64
There was a widespread perception that both Chea Leang and the national 
PTC judges did not act impartially in rejecting the additional cases, but instead 
followed the lead of the Government, which has consistently opposed charging 
new suspects.65 Prime Minister Hun Sen expressly told visiting UN Secretary- 
General Ban Ki- moon that Case 002 would be the last trial as “case three is 
not allowed.”66 Information Minister Khieu Kanharith said international staff 
seeking to investigate Cases 003 and 004 should “pack their bags and return 
home.”67 Government spokesperson Phay Siphan said: “We will stand our 
ground regarding the ECCC. There will be no case 003 or 004. The government 
doesn’t want failure; that’s why it only allows Case 002 to take place.”68 Foreign 
Minister Hor Namhong told French diplomats, “[O]nly Cambodia can decide 
how many additional suspects the Khmer Rouge tribunal will prosecute.”69
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This was not the first time Co- Prosecutor Chea Leang had opposed inves-
tigating more than five. In its first submission, the OCP originally planned to 
charge six suspects, including Van Rith; however, the day before they filed, Chea 
Leang suddenly claimed there was not enough evidence against him.70 The in-
ternational side found this argument unconvincing because she had already 
read— or should have read— the introductory submission numerous times over 
the previous weeks.71
Nevertheless, in this instance the “co” dispute mechanism worked as intend-
ed,72 the investigation moved forward, and by all accounts the disagreement 
did not damage the relationship between the Co- Prosecutors or impact their 
ongoing work.73 In retrospect, it is notable that the national and international 
Co- Prosecutors issued joint press releases about their dispute74 and have never 
criticized each other in public.75 Debate became increasingly acrimonious as the 
matter reached the Office of the Co- Investigating Judges.
Co- Investigating Judges’ Dispute Round 1: Agree to Disagree
Cases 003/004 were transferred to the OCIJ in September 2009; however, that 
office took little action until the summer of 2010. On June 2, 2010, international 
Co- Investigating Judge Marcel Lemonde wrote to national Co- Investigating 
Judge You Bunleng:
On several occasions in the last months, we discussed the way we were planning 
on conducting the investigation in case file 003 and case file 004 (. . .) I thought 
we agreed on the immediate signing of a Rogatory Letter, to allow the investi-
gators to start “crime base” investigations in several crime sites (.  .  .) for three 
weeks now, this Rogatory Letter has been ready for signature. I was therefore 
surprised to hear you say, on 28 May 2010, that you needed more time to sign it, 
since the content is extremely simple (. . .) if this Rogatory Letter has not been 
signed on Friday 4 June at noon, I will be compelled to officially acknowledge 
our disagreement, with all of the negative consequences this might lead to.76
Although both judges then proceeded to sign the Rogatory Letter on June 4, 
You Bunleng crossed off his signature on June 7, telling Judge Lemonde that he 
would reconsider moving forward with these cases only after the completion 
of the Case 002 Closing Order in September, as that should be the priority, 
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but also referencing the potential effects on “the current context of Cambodian 
society as a whole.”77
The timing of Judge You’s decision to withdraw, as well as his reasoning, 
led to speculation that he had done so because of political pressure from the 
Government. This is because also on June 7, after an ECCC UN spokesperson 
publicly announced that both judges had signed the Rogatory Letter, an Interior 
Ministry spokesperson responded by saying that the Court could try only five 
persons. “Not six. Just five. The court must secure the stability and the peace of 
the nation.”78 A few days later Judge Lemonde issued a new Rogatory Letter, 
and acting alone gathered some witness statements before his departure from 
the Court in December 2010.79
Co- Investigating Judges’ Dispute Round 2: Agree to Dismiss
Judge Lemonde was replaced by reserve Judge Siegfried Blunk. In February 2011, 
the CIJs jointly issued a joint press release in response to media speculation that 
Case 003 was being actively investigated. They said that they were not conduct-
ing field investigations but instead focusing only on documents available in the 
Case 001 and 002 case files.80 Then in April, the CIJs summarily closed the Case 
003 investigation, issuing a one- sentence press release that provided no infor-
mation for potential civil parties who now had just 15 days to join the case and 
request final investigative actions before the judges ruled on whether to indict 
or dismiss.81
In response to this glaring lack of information, new international Co- 
Prosecutor Andrew Cayley released a statement providing basic facts about the 
charges and crime sites at issue, the criteria to join as a civil party, and notifica-
tion of the impending deadline for civil party applications— which he sought 
to have extended six weeks due to the lack of notice.82 The CIJs ultimately ex-
tended the deadline; however, they made that announcement public one day 
before the expiration of the new deadline.83 When asked if he thought victims 
had been unfairly prevented from joining Case 003 due to a lack of information, 
Judge Blunk reportedly said they had “ample” opportunity to receive informa-
tion about the case from the Victim Support Section84— although the CIJs had 
provided that office with no information to distribute. Seized with an appeal 
by a rejected civil party applicant, the international Pre- Trial Chamber judges 
highlighted:
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[N]o civil party applicant has been in a position to effectively exercise the right 
to participate in the judicial investigation expressly provided for under the In-
ternal Rules and . . . this situation appears to result, to a significant extent, from 
a lack of information surrounding the investigation in Case 003.  .  .  . Refus-
ing them the possibility to participate in the investigation may deprive the Co- 
Investigating Judges of important information in their search for the truth, lead-
ing to an incomplete investigation and raising doubts about its impartiality.85
Cayley, who had access to the case file, publicly stated his view “that the 
crimes alleged  .  .  . have not been fully investigated.”86 Blunk had interviewed 
only around 20 witnesses, including Duch, who had confirmed that the sus-
pects in Case 003 were assistants to the Central Committee and members of 
the standing committee of the General Staff, and said that one was his equal in 
rank and had been responsible for sending people to S- 21.87 The CIJs had not 
even spoken to the suspects or examined all crime scenes.88
In closing the case, the CIJs had emphasized that the case file contained 
“more than 2.000 pieces of evidence, comprising more than 48.000 pages.” 
However, it was later revealed that OCIJ’s national staff had stuffed it with 
documents from the Case 002 case file on the eve of dismissal to make it ap-
pear that more work had been done.89 The international PTC judges slammed 
the CIJs for inconsistencies in the way they handled the investigation and enu-
merated procedural irregularities in the filing of documents.90 They also noted 
“significant unexplained delays in processing documents and placing these in 
the case file[.]”91 Other sources have revealed that rogatory letters authorizing 
the collection of statements were issued only after potential witnesses were in-
terviewed, “perhaps offering the judges the chance to pick and choose which 
testimony to enter into the record and which to ignore.”92
“Case File 003 was closed against the unanimous oral and written advice 
given to the Co- Investigating Judges from the international side of the Office.”93 
Blunk reportedly threatened his staff with disciplinary action for disloyalty 
when they raised their concerns with the UN Secretary- General.94 When the 
UN took no action, all six UN legal officers in the OCIJ quit.95 Investigator 
Steve Heder, a respected expert on Democratic Kampuchea, released portions 
of his resignation letter:
In view of the judges’ decision to close the investigation into Case File 003 ef-
fectively without investigating it, which I, like others, believe is unreasonable; 
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in view of the UN staff ’s evident growing lack of confidence in your leadership, 
which I share; and in view of the toxic atmosphere of mutual distrust generated 
by your management of what is now a professionally dysfunctional office, I have 
concluded that no good use can or will be made of my consultancy services[.]96
Likely due to the enormous amount of negative publicity over events in 
Case 003, the CIJs did not close Case 004. In June 2011, Andrew Cayley an-
nounced that he had requested additional investigative actions in that case and 
filed a supplementary submission based on civil party claims.97 In October, 
Judge Blunk shocked everyone by abruptly resigning, claiming that perceived 
government interference in Cases 003 and 004 may lead people to question 
his independence and the integrity of the proceedings.98 Council of Ministers 
spokesman Phay Siphan said, “He failed to understand the wisdom of set-
ting up the ECCC, which is the partnership between the government and the 
UN . . . We still stand on our ground regarding the ECCC. There will be no case 
003 or 004.”99 Months later, Judge You Bunleng recalled that he and Blunk had 
“a common judicial approach with almost 100 percent agreement.”100
Co- Investigating Judges Dispute Round 3: “A Breach of the Agreement”
According to the terms of the Agreement and Law, Judge Blunk should have 
been automatically replaced by the reserve international Co- Investigating Judge, 
Laurent Kasper- Ansermet. ECCC Law Art. 27 new provides, “In the event of 
the absence of the foreign Co- Investigating Judge, he or she shall be replaced by 
the reserve foreign Co- Investigating Judge.”101 Nevertheless, Kasper- Ansermet 
was hindered from taking office. Although the Secretary- General selects the 
international judges, the power of appointment resides with the Cambodian 
Supreme Council of Magistracy (SCM),102 which first refused to convene and 
then upon meeting failed to confirm his appointment.103
The Government denied that Cambodia had any obligation under the 
Framework Agreement to make the appointment, ironically claiming that to 
force the SCM to do so would amount to judicial interference. A Council of 
Ministers official said:
The word ‘must’ is not properly used. The word is ‘should’. . . . Must means to 
force. We cannot force our independent and highest institution. When the 
word ‘must’ has been used, it seems that we interfere into the jurisdiction of the 
independent Supreme Council of the Magistracy.104
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Kasper- Ansermet had already been appointed and sworn in as a reserve judge 
by the SCM in February 2011, however.105 The Framework Agreement does 
not require him to be appointed again to assume his functions, and in fact the 
purpose of having reserve judges is to assume the responsibilities of an absent 
colleague.106
The Cambodian Government nevertheless sought to prevent Judge Kasper- 
Ansermet from taking office, citing concerns about his active “tweeting” during 
the Blunk uproar, including reposting articles critical of the way Cases 003 and 
004 had been handled by his predecessor. When the SCM finally met, it de-
cided against his appointment, echoing the Government’s concerns:
[T]he meeting reached the view that Judge Laurent Kasper- Ansermet’s posting 
of a considerable number of documents on his Twitter account . . . specifically 
concerning Cases 003 and 004 . . . would appear to violate the Code of Judicial 
Ethics, the Internal Rules and legal principles . . . [by] compromising the confi-
dentiality and integrity of investigations by the public circulation of five names 
connected [to these cases]  .  .  . and criticizing both of his own colleagues  .  .  . 
[which] could have an adverse impact and cause confusion or doubts regarding 
[his] impartiality[.]107
The United Nations argued that the ethical concerns about Kasper- Ansermet 
were unfounded, called the SCM decision a breach of the Framework Agree-
ment,108 and insisted that Kasper- Ansermet was entitled to immediately carry 
out the responsibilities of his office.109 However, UN officials did not reach a 
political agreement with the Cambodian Government allowing him to conduct 
his work unimpeded.
The national side of the Court, following the lead of Judge You Bunleng, 
never recognized Judge Kasper- Ansermet’s authority to act and continually in-
terfered with his efforts to investigate Cases 003 and 004.110 You Bunleng took 
the position that Kasper- Ansermet “does not have legal accreditation to under-
take any procedural action or measure with respect to the Case Files[.]”111 From 
nearly the moment Judge Kasper- Ansermet arrived in Phnom Penh, he and You 
Bunleng issued vitriolic dueling press releases,112 and Judge Kasper- Ansermet 
claimed to be impeded by the national side at every turn.113 For example, the 
Acting Director of Administration told a national staff person not to accept a 
summons from the judge during an internal investigation, and the president of 
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the PTC refused to accept the filing of a dispute with Judge You. On instructions 
from Judge You, the case file officer refused to place Judge Kasper- Ansermet’s 
orders in the case file and ignored his orders to grant access to the Case 003 case 
file to the lawyers of civil party applicants. Moreover, Kasper- Ansermet was 
denied access to the seal of office— the symbol of his authority to file decisions; 
as well as drivers, transcribers, and interpreters.114 Frustrated by the obstruction 
and a complacent UN administration, he resigned in May 2012.115
A Lack of Resolution
The SCM swiftly appointed a fourth international CIJ, Mark Harmon, who 
inherited an unenviable set of challenges,116 and— no doubt conscious of his 
predecessors’ contentious tenures— has taken pains to stay out of the public eye. 
In his first year of office, he unilaterally reaffirmed Kasper- Ansermet’s authority 
to act (including his re- opening of the Case 003 investigation and notification 
to all suspects of their right to counsel), unilaterally informed potential wit-
nesses and civil parties of new crime sites he is investigating in Case 004, and 
unilaterally granted Case 003 and 004 case file access to recognized civil party 
lawyers.117 However, these actions were taken without the support of his Cam-
bodian counterpart, the national side of the Office is not assisting his investi-
gative efforts, and the Pre- Trial Chamber judges remain split down national/
international lines.118 As of October 2013, Cases 003 and 004 have languished 
in the OCIJ for more than four years, and there has been no indication that 
they are proceeding to trial. As the deadlock continues, the Case 003 and 004 
suspects have expressed little fear of going to trial.119
With Cases 003 and 004 in the hands of the OCIJ, the ECCC no longer 
has the luxury to debate whether or not the prosecution of more suspects is 
necessary for the Court to fulfill its mandate, or is a necessary test of the Court’s 
legitimacy. Because these cases exist, the rules must be followed in determining 
whether they go to trial or are dismissed, or it will taint the rest of the Court’s 
efforts. Former international Co- Prosecutor Andrew Cayley has emphasized, 
“[C]ases 003, 004, need to come to some kind of legitimate conclusion. There 
needs to be due process. The law needs to be followed. The rules need to be fol-
lowed. Otherwise it’s going to create a huge mess in the court.”120 Former Ieng 
Sary Co- Lawyer Michael Karnavas says, “It would be terrible if at the end of 
the day everything is discredited because the process is flawed— because a lot of 
good things are happening, a lot of good rulings are being issued.”121 However, 
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in Cases 003 and 004, procedures continue to be bent and broken, and delays 
and obstruction have prevented them from proceeding normally, despite the 
existence of rules intended to address exactly this type of political impasse.
Procedures Intended to Safeguard  
against Political Influence
As discussed in chapter 1, international officials anticipated that Cambodian 
personnel at the ECCC would be vulnerable to government pressure on politi-
cally sensitive topics. They therefore insisted on the adoption of rules to insulate 
the Court from the possible consequences. In particular, the Framework Agree-
ment and ECCC Law allow one Co- Prosecutor or Co- Investigating Judge to act 
alone to push an investigation forward, and no Chamber can make a decision 
without the support of at least one international judge.
These rules have featured prominently in the proceedings. The national and 
international Co- Prosecutors have registered two disputes, and the national 
and international CIJs have sought to register several. The PTC has had numer-
ous split decisions pitting three Cambodian judges against two internationals— 
all on topics on which the Cambodian Government expressed strong public 
contemporaneous opinions, leading to enduring allegations of political interfer-
ence.122 However, rather than resolving the problem of interference, the dispute 
and supermajority rules have diminished incentives for international actors 
to criticize and confront it. The hybrid Court was designed in expectation of 
government meddling, and its coping mechanisms have had the unforeseen ef-
fect of entrenching political interference as a tolerable feature of the institution. 
Moreover, in their application, the rules have themselves been manipulated for 
political ends, demonstrating their inadequacy as a substitute for independent 
and impartial judges.
Effect on the Ability of “Co” to Act Alone
The United Nations wanted the ECCC, like other internationalized courts, to 
have only one international prosecutor to ensure that government interference 
would not inhibit investigations. When the Cambodian Government refused, 
UN negotiators fell back on a mechanism to allow one Co- Prosecutor or CIJ to 
act alone when political disputes arose.123 However, as described in the Internal 
2RRP 
Cases 003 & 004—The Politics of Personal Jurisdiction / 185
Rules, the dispute procedures are complex, creating opportunities for disparate 
interpretations of their effect. Prior to the CIJ’s closure of Case 003, no one had 
seriously questioned the ability of a “co” to act alone; however, when the inter-
national Co- Prosecutor publicly challenged the validity of the decision, those 
who sought to bury the case reinterpreted the rules to frustrate the intent of the 
drafters and prevent any forward action.
The ECCC Internal Rules state that both “cos” share joint responsibility in 
carrying out their duties and are expected to work by consensus.124 The ECCC 
core documents provide authority for one to act alone under certain circum-
stances; but the scope of that authority in practice is not always clear. According 
to the Internal Rules, “Except for action that must be taken jointly under the 
ECCC Law and these [Internal Rules],” the Co- Prosecutors/CIJs “may delegate 
power to one of them, by a joint written decision, to accomplish such action 
individually.”125 The only provisions that mandate joint action govern the Co- 
Prosecutors’ and CIJs’ ability to release public information about otherwise con-
fidential actions.126 Thus every other action may potentially be delegated to one 
Co- Prosecutor or one CIJ acting alone.
When delegation is not possible because of a disagreement between the “cos,” 
Internal Rules 71 and 72 govern the authority to act alone. The “cos” may record 
the nature of the disagreement and within 30 days may bring it to the Pre- Trial 
Chamber for resolution. Even when a disagreement is recorded, one “co” nor-
mally may act alone without going to the PTC, or while waiting for the PTC 
to rule on a recorded dispute.127 For example, the CIJs recorded a disagreement 
related to the timing of the Case 003/004 investigations on June 9, 2010.128 Al-
though this disagreement was never brought before the PTC, a Rogatory Letter 
to investigate in Case 003 was signed only by Judge Lemonde, who proceeded 
with the investigation on his own authority.129 In specified exceptional cases, the 
PTC must decide before unilateral action may commence, but even in such cases 
one “co” may proceed 30 days after a disagreement is recorded if the opposing 
“co” did not put the dispute before the PTC.130
Although “either or both of [the “cos”] may record the exact nature of the 
disagreement,”131 the PTC has found that, because of the presumption to move 
forward with the subject of a disagreement, the obligation to record it logically 
falls on the disagreeing party.132 This fact, together with the use of the word 
“may,” suggests that a decision to record is discretionary. If no disagreement is 
filed, the party seeking to investigate or prosecute may act alone toward that 
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goal. Indeed, the entire PTC has found that “the Co- Investigating Judges are 
under no obligation to seize the Pre- Trial Chamber when they do not agree 
on an issue before them, the default position being that the ‘investigation shall 
proceed’[.]”133
Despite this unanimous jurisprudence, in politically charged Case 003, the 
ability of a prosecutor or investigative judge to act alone was flatly rejected for 
the first time by Judges Blunk and You and all the national PTC Judges. In 
May 2011, international Co- Prosecutor Andrew Cayley, acting on his own, filed 
a request for additional investigative actions in Case 003 in an effort to ensure 
the case would not be dismissed without a proper investigation.134 The CIJs 
rejected Cayley’s request, finding that the Internal Rules “leave no room for . . . 
solitary action” except by delegation of power or after the registration of a dis-
agreement.135 On appeal, the international PTC Judges reaffirmed the Court’s 
previous rulings in a split decision:
The Internal Rules indicate that the use of the procedure provided to settle dis-
agreement is not mandatory but rather optional. In other words, it is a matter 
of discretion as to whether the disagreement procedure is utilized by either or 
both Co- Prosecutors and to what extent a matter is taken.136
However, the national Pre- Trial Chamber judges agreed with the CIJs without 
acknowledging or providing any reasoning for their departure from the Cham-
ber’s prior decisions.137 Because there is no presumption to move forward with 
an investigation when there is no disagreement between the CIJs, the CIJ order 
dismissing the request remained in effect.
Likewise, in the dispute between Judges You and Kasper- Ansermet, Judge 
You argued that neither judge had the authority to put documents in the Case 
003 case file because the two “cos” must agree to file documents.138 To the con-
trary, Judge Kasper- Ansermet and the international PTC judges have empha-
sized that his actions are “fully enforceable.”139 Although this view is legally cor-
rect, because the national side refused to acknowledge Judge Kasper- Ansermet’s 
judicial authority, it appears that none of Judge Kasper- Ansermet’s efforts will 
be officially recognized unless they are adopted by Judge Harmon. As Judge 
Kasper- Ansermet learned the hard way, the formal capacity to act alone does 
not ensure that national staff in the OCP or OCIJ will cooperate or assist in 
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the work of their international colleagues.140 Former UN Legal Counsel Hans 
Corell argues, “The [Court’s main structural] problem isn’t the investigating 
judge or prosecutor; it’s the ‘cos.’”141
Supermajority Rule
The supermajority rule, intended to serve as a bulwark against government in-
terference, was a prerequisite for UN willingness to participate in a Cambodian- 
majority court. When a judicial investigation was opened in Cases 003/004, the 
U.S. Embassy called it a “vindication” of the supermajority rule.142 However, in 
subsequent disputes the rule has been insufficient to protect the Court from 
political interference. The rule does not address all politically driven scenarios 
that have arisen. As foreseen by OSJI, the rule suffers from two potential prob-
lems that have since become realized: “the potential for delay and judicial dead-
lock” and “ineffectiveness in critical circumstances.”143 Hans Corell recalls, “The 
supermajority scheme was mind- boggling to someone with courtroom experi-
ence. . . . The idea of introducing such a cumbersome procedure . . . as a judge I 
had concerns.”144 More problematically, it appears to have had the antithetical 
effect of shielding political decision making from accountability.
When the two Co- Prosecutors or two CIJs file a disagreement about wheth-
er or not to move forward with a prosecution or investigation, if there is no su-
permajority agreement by the PTC in deciding the dispute, there is a presump-
tion that the prosecution or investigation shall proceed.145 However, even in its 
first “successful” application in the Co- Prosecutor dispute, PTC disagreement 
reportedly led to a four- month postponement in announcing the split national/
international decision,146 resulting in a one- year delay in sending it to the OCIJ.
Efforts by the international Co- Prosecutor to seek investigative action and 
by civil party applicants to participate during Judge Blunk’s tenure were blocked 
by the CIJs and a divided PTC. This made political interference appear both 
conspicuous and intractable, because a joint decision by the CIJs will stand if 
there is no supermajority agreement by the PTC. Consequently, when Judge 
Blunk joined together with his counterpart Judge You to bury Case 003,147 a di-
vided PTC was incapable of overturning their eccentric and politically suspect 
opinions. Negotiators did not foresee the possibility that both CIJs would act 
together to derail an investigation “due to political or other influence.”148 With 
similar effect, when there were serious concerns about interference with the 
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summoning of government officials in Case 002, the international PTC judges 
had no power to initiate an investigation in the face of joint CIJ inaction and the 
opposition of their Cambodian colleagues.149
Thus one flawed premise of the supermajority rule is that “UN judges will 
behave perfectly.”150 As an example of the inherent problem with this presump-
tion, former head of the Defence Support Section Richard Rogers highlights 
the Supreme Court Chamber supermajority decision overturning Duch’s pre-
trial detention remedy. He says that this action should have required agreement 
by a majority of unbiased judges; instead it was (theoretically) decided only by 
one. This gives too much power to the one international who joins with the 
nationals. More than one impartial judge is needed for important decisions be-
cause sometimes he or she can be wrong.151 Although the dissenting opinions 
of the international PTC judges have served an important role in highlighting 
serious problems in the way politically sensitive issues have been handled by the 
OCIJ, they were powerless to overturn the deplorable legal reasoning.
Of potentially greater concern, when Blunk’s successor Judge Kasper- 
Ansermet sought to revive Case 003, the Cambodian PTC president prevented 
the PTC from hearing the issue in an apparent effort to avoid the effect of the 
supermajority rule. When Kasper- Ansermet submitted two disputes in Case 
003 to the PTC, Judge Prak Kimsan, the President of the Chamber, returned 
the Records of Disagreement to the Acting Director of Administration with-
out providing an opportunity for the full Chamber to hear the issue, stating 
that the “‘PTC judges’ had met . . . and that they had not ‘reached their consent 
to take into account their consideration of the substance of those documents,’” 
based on Judge Kasper- Ansermet’s lack of legal authority.152 The two interna-
tional PTC judges issued a joint opinion in which they disclosed that, follow-
ing deliberations on the disagreement, the President had returned the docu-
ments without their knowledge or consent, and had refused their request to 
withdraw his memorandum.153 Judge Prak said that the national judges thought 
the matter was “only administrative” and outside the jurisdiction of the PTC.154 
He blamed Kasper- Ansermet’s “invalid” efforts to bring the dispute for creating 
“unprecedented confusing procedures before the Pre- Trial Chamber, leading to 
settlement irregularity[.]”155 However, the international judges believed it was 
their judicial duty to issue a reasoned decision. Unlike their national colleagues, 
they found the disagreement admissible, found that Judge Kasper- Ansermet 
had the authority to bring it before the Chamber, and ruled that because the 
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PTC could not reach a supermajority decision he had the authority to proceed 
with his investigative actions.156 Then, when Kasper- Ansermet sought to have 
Judge Prak disqualified from the case due to his obstruction, Judge Prak again 
refused to pass this request on to the rest of the Chamber,157 leading to stale-
mate and acrimony in the PTC.
If incumbent international CIJ Mark Harmon should decide to send 
Cases 003 and 004 forward to the Trial Chamber, there could again be ob-
struction. Decisions to convict must be made by supermajority.158 As noted 
by negotiator David Scheffer, this ensures that “[w]ith respect to due pro-
cess rights, no defendant will be convicted without the vote of at least one 
international judge.”159 However, while the supermajority rule may prevent 
the conviction of an accused against whom there is inadequate evidence, it 
cannot stop a Cambodian block from acquitting a culpable accused. More-
over, as demonstrated by the Trial Chamber’s original impasse on the conse-
quences of Ieng Thirith’s mental fitness (discussed in chapter 5), there is no 
guidance as to how a split Trial Chamber should proceed on any issue except 
conviction. Based on past experience, where such a split occurs on a politi-
cally sensitive topic, there will be no will to iron out a compromise, as was 
possible on that occasion.
Potential for delay, deadlock, and obstruction aren’t the only concerns that 
parties have with the supermajority rule. Many say it makes political interfer-
ence more difficult to address, co- opting the international judges in the process. 
Michael Karnavas argues that the rule put pressure on the international judges 
to “go along to get along,” with what appeared to be smaller battles early on, 
making it harder for them to take principled positions when larger battles arose 
over Cases 003 and 004:160 “The sad truth is that through inaction, or in the 
spirit of being diplomatic, the international judges have been . . . complicit in[] 
re- enforcing certain systemic weaknesses embedded in Cambodian courts.”161 
Likewise, Panhavuth Long says that international staff have a principle of “don’t 
rock the boat” instead of ensuring that the proceedings meet international stan-
dards. “Maybe instead they are just legitimizing the [flawed] process.”162 Former 
Nuon Chea Co- Lawyer Michiel Pestman contends that everyone working at 
the ECCC knows about political interference and accepts it, tainting every as-
pect of the Court’s work. “The Trial Chamber international judges have never 
dissented on any ruling. They must be afraid everything will collapse if they 
point out problems.”163 Former CIJ Lemonde emphasizes:
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Cambodian judges are in the majority and at any time they can remind us that 
we are in Cambodia, we cannot do what we want, they are at home, and believe 
me, they care to remind you if you forget it. So this is a permanent structural 
difficulty.164
Richard Rogers asserts that although the supermajority rule was intended 
to protect against the lack of independence of the national judges, it in fact en-
trenches it. Because it is seen as a systemic “safeguard,” the international judges 
avoid addressing independence issues head on. He notes that UN Legal Coun-
sel Patricia O’Brien has said that judges have “different approaches,” suggesting 
that some act more independently than others. However, this is a clear violation 
of the right to be tried by independent and impartial judges.165
Thus Far, a Failed Test
The national/international split over whether more persons should be charged 
has, as predicted, been the major test of the Court’s hybrid character. The dis-
pute resolution rules worked as intended in solving the Co- Prosecutors’ dis-
agreement. However, when the cases moved to the OCIJ, which is tasked with 
conducting the bulk of the investigation and deciding if the cases should go to 
trial, the Cambodian judges, with the apparent collusion of an international 
judge, sought to avoid the presumption to move forward with the investiga-
tion through inaction, irregular practices, and untenable decisions, debasing the 
rights of all of the parties166 and the reputation of the entire Court in the pro-
cess. According to reports, “the rapidly deteriorating situation . . . has embroiled 
almost all offices, splitting staff down national and international lines in respect 
to cases 003 and 004.”167 The experience of the ECCC demonstrates that future 
hybrid courts should not use work- around rules to address a lack of judicial 
independence and impartiality. Instead, all judges selected, whether national or 
international, must be presumptively unbiased.
Judicial Independence and Impartiality
The potential for hybrid courts to become politicized makes the need for pro-
fessional, independent, and impartial judges all the more critical. The superma-
jority rule appears discredited as a mechanism for avoiding the fundamental 
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obligation to select judges who are independent and impartial. Hans Corell says 
that, due to the Court’s structural flaws, “We had to hope that appointees to key 
positions would comport with the standards and ethics required.”168 However, 
the actions of Judge Blunk have raised concerns about the vetting process for 
international judges participating in hybrid courts and highlighted the impor-
tance of selection and election procedures for all serving judges, whether na-
tional or international.
Process of Selection, Election of Judges
International ECCC judges are selected by the United Nations Secretary- 
General, but all ECCC judges are appointed by the Cambodian Supreme 
Council of Magistracy (SCM)169— a constitutionally independent judicial 
body170 that makes all judicial appointments for Cambodian courts. However, 
the SCM is not independent of the Government.171 Moreover, SCM members 
include four ECCC personnel, including Co- Prosecutor Chea Leang and Co- 
Investigating Judge You Bunleng. You Bunleng was himself promoted to Presi-
dent of the national Court of Appeal extraconstitutionally— not by the SCM, 
but at the request of the executive branch.172
The United Nations released a list of candidates short- listed for judicial po-
sitions in November 2005. This encouraged civil society calls for a transparent 
Cambodian process.173 Nevertheless, the national selection process went ahead 
“in a closed manner with no input from civil society.”174 There is evidence that 
all the national ECCC judges and prosecutors were preapproved by the Cam-
bodian Prime Minister Hun Sen, rather than selected by SCM.175 As noted 
by Mark Ellis, “In effect, the incorporation of Cambodian selection procedures 
into the ECCC is tantamount to similarly incorporating the system of patron-
age that cripples the domestic judiciary.”176
Although the selection of international judges is more transparent, there 
have long been calls for reform of the process for appointment. Cherie Booth 
and Philippe Sands note that selection “is often a highly politicized affair, with 
some of the most independent and qualified candidates being passed over by 
the electing bodies, usually comprised of states. Once elected, there is the po-
tential problem that some judges may find it difficult not to be loyal to their 
own states.”177 As part of UN efforts to improve the transparency and quality of 
selections, the ECCC was the first court for which it accepted nominations not 
only from States, but also from anyone else (including self- nominations), which 
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were entered into a database by OSJI.178 Also for the first time, candidates were 
interviewed by a panel of experts,179 including two ICTY judges and UN Of-
fice of Legal Affairs staff. This new procedure “is said to provide a better guar-
antee than previous mechanisms of the selection of impartial and professional 
officials.”180 Nevertheless, it did not lead to the selection of many judges with 
mass crimes experience, nor did it prevent the selection of Judge Blunk, who, 
when asked his motivation for coming to the ECCC, said it was to share the 
experience he gained working at the hybrid tribunal in East Timor.181 However, 
serious concerns have been raised about the quality of some of the international 
judges who served in East Timor, as well as the quality of their decision mak-
ing.182 It can be hoped that the track records of international judges are more 
thoroughly vetted in the future.
Judicial Qualifications and Disqualification
The potential lack of independence of the Cambodian judges was a key concern 
during negotiations to establish the Court due to entrenched and pervasive cor-
ruption in the national judiciary, where verdicts are commonly decided on the 
basis of political influence and bribery.183 In a 2010 interview, Trial Chamber 
President Nil Nonn reportedly said: “We also have problems because judges 
aren’t independent in Cambodia— [government officials] threaten and put 
pressure on judges, the judges accept money, so all this is not very good.”184
The ECCC Law states:
The judges of the Extraordinary Chambers shall be appointed from among the 
currently practicing judges or are additionally appointed in accordance with the 
existing procedures for appointment of judges; all of whom shall have high mor-
al character, a spirit of impartiality and integrity, and experience, particularly in 
criminal law or international law, including humanitarian law and human rights 
law. Judges shall be independent in the performance of their functions, and shall 
not accept or seek any instructions from any government or other source.185
The appointed Cambodian judges were criticized for a lack of judicial in-
dependence, competency, and qualifications.186 Several had rendered politically 
suspect verdicts, one reportedly lacked a degree in law, and one lacked any ju-
dicial experience. All of the national ECCC judges concurrently serve in the 
national judicial system, and some have been high- level members of the ruling 
party.187
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While serving at the ECCC, nearly all of them have been the subject of un-
successful defense disqualification challenges. The Internal Rules provide:
Any party may file an application for disqualification of a judge in any case in 
which the Judge has a personal or financial interest or concerning which the 
Judge has, or has had, any association which objectively might affect his or her 
impartiality, or objectively gives rise to the appearance of bias.188
As pointed out by Richard Rogers, the supermajority rule, which presumes that 
the national judges are not independent, renders meaningless the entire concept 
of “appearance of bias” for the ECCC.189
For example, Judge Ney Thol was challenged on the basis of, inter alia, his 
membership in the ruling party and his participation in cases with suspect 
progovernment outcomes. The Pre- Trial Chamber applied the test established 
by the ICTY Appeals Chamber for appearance of bias: “The circumstances 
would lead a reasonable observer, properly informed, to reasonably apprehend 
bias.”190 It found that merely because a judge is a member of a political par-
ty doesn’t create an inference that his decisions are politically motivated. The 
Chamber also highlighted that the ECCC has no institutional connection to 
the Cambodian judicial system, and the judges take an oath of office. Moreover, 
the defense had not provided authority “for the proposition that a judge’s analy-
sis in a different case could suggest bias in the case currently being heard” or 
evidence that he had acted on instructions from the ruling party.191
Trial President Nil Nonn was challenged on the basis of a 2002 interview 
in which he admitted taking money from parties to disputes over which he pre-
sided.192 The Trial Chamber also denied this application, stating, “[D]isquali-
fication pertains to bias against a particular accused in relation to a particular 
case, and cannot be used to lodge a general complaint about the fitness of an 
individual to serve as a judge.”193 It noted that overall fitness for judges could 
only be determined by the SCM under Cambodian law, as “[n]o relevant mech-
anisms are provided in the ECCC Law and Agreement” for either discipline or 
removal.194 As a consequence, the Court lacks competence to address “general 
questions of judicial independence and integrity” or “alleged deficiencies in na-
tional mechanisms designed to uphold the independence of the judiciary”195— 
an apparent oblique reference to the SCM’s well- known lack of independence, 
discussed above.
In all of these challenges, the ECCC, like fully or preponderantly interna-
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tional courts, has emphasized the presumption of objectivity arising from the 
“internationally agreed” selection criteria and the judicial oath.196 However, as 
discussed above, it is not clear that at the ECCC these criteria were met in spirit, 
let alone in fact. Moreover, as emphasized by SCSL Judge Robertson, factors 
such as “the content of the judicial oath or the application of statutes contain-
ing proper international standards  .  .  . cannot, even collectively, legitimize an 
arrangement which produces undue pressure.”197 He advocates that “reasonable 
observers” be credited with “a fairly hard- nosed appreciation of how institution-
al pressures and ‘old boy networks’ can operate” and says, “The standpoint of an 
experienced journalist or human rights researcher may not be inappropriate” in 
assessing appearance of bias.198
The likelihood of the Court disciplining itself became even more hollow 
when, as discussed above, Pre- Trial Chamber Judge Prak Kimsan returned 
Judge Kasper- Ansermet’s order seeking his disqualification, “without delibera-
tion or consultation” with the international judges of the PTC.199 A letter from 
the two international PTC judges to the Judicial Administration Committee 
( JAC), announcing that they were recusing themselves from the (nonexistent) 
proceedings due to their prior critical comments, and requesting that it appoint 
two judges to sit in their place, was then rejected by the JAC, which failed to 
convene a panel to hear Kasper- Ansermet’s allegations.200
Although the participation of international judges was expected to com-
pensate for national judges’ lack of experience and impartiality, all parties to 
Case 002 have expressed frustration that most of the international judges— and 
all of the Trial Chamber judges— do not have the necessary mass crimes trial 
experience to efficiently and fairly direct the proceedings.201 The lack of requi-
site experience of many international judges is a common cause of concern at 
mass crimes courts202 but is arguably indispensable at a hybrid tribunal where 
the international judges are by definition serving in order to ensure procedural 
fairness. Hans Corell emphasizes, “It’s absolutely necessary that [appointees] 
have courtroom experience,” adding that he is very critical of how ICC judges 
are appointed, as that court’s proceedings are too long and costly due in part to 
a lack of good courtroom management.203
Notably, the required qualifications for ECCC judges— persons who are 
judges or who are appointed in accordance with “existing procedures”204— are 
extraordinarily low compared to other internationalized courts, which custom-
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arily require qualification for one’s home country’s “highest judicial office” and 
competence in either national or international criminal law.205 At the hybrid 
Kosovo tribunal, the standard for placement on the judicial roster is even high-
er: an advanced university degree, a minimum of ten years criminal law experi-
ence including five as a judge, and familiarity with human rights standards.206 
Although all of the international ECCC judges are more qualified than required 
by the listed criteria, greater emphasis on mass crimes trial experience when se-
lecting qualified candidates would be the best practice for future hybrid courts.
Political Interests and Hybrid Courts
Cambodia is unique compared to other postconflict states where hybrid courts 
are likely to be established due to the length of time that has passed since the 
end of the Khmer Rouge regime, the end of the fighting, and the establishment 
of a new government. UN Special Representative Yash Ghai has noted: “[P]ost- 
conflict development, with which the international community has been closely 
associated, has led to the formation of a strong state[.]  .  .  . Its monopoly of 
force has endowed it with enormous capacity for coercion, balanced by neither 
legislature nor judiciary.”207 As a consequence, the government of Cambodia is 
well entrenched.
Nevertheless, executive control over the judiciary, including the de facto 
power to appoint and remove judges,208 is a problem endemic to most post-
conflict states, and one that makes hybrid courts vulnerable to domestic po-
litical influences. In Cambodia, as in many other countries, as a consequence 
“[p]rosecutorial and judicial functions are subordinated to the executive in po-
litical cases or cases involving powerful interests, and judges’ rulings are too of-
ten influenced by money.”209
However, the Cambodian Government is not the only stakeholder with a 
political interest in the outcome of ECCC proceedings. At the ECCC, as at 
other mass crimes courts, the United Nations and donors both have interests 
that they can leverage to influence proceedings, albeit in a more subtle fashion. 
Politicization of international and hybrid courts is not unusual; in fact it is the 
norm.210 Journalist Thierry Cruvellier notes, “Tribunals are always a reflection 
of the power of those who support it.”211
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Control by the Conflict State
It is not entirely clear why the Cambodian Government has opposed Cases 003 
and 004. Analysts have speculated that senior officials of the Cambodian Peo-
ple’s Party (CPP) are either concerned about former Khmer Rouge colleagues 
being implicated, believe the issue could be exploited by rival domestic politi-
cal factions, are thumbing their noses at the United Nations, or are concerned 
about the Court’s potential to continue in perpetuity, much as the foreign NGO 
community that arrived with the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia in 
1992 has justified its bloated presence for more than 20 years.
However, there is a general consensus that, for a variety of reasons, CPP 
leaders want to control the process and the narrative that the trials create. As 
noted by the UN Group of Experts in 1999:
To the extent that fair trials may reveal a different historical picture from that 
asserted by the Cambodian People’s Party, with the involvement of additional 
people, the Government may have concerns about a tribunal over which it does 
not exercise control.212
UN negotiator Hans Corell reportedly handed the Secretary- General a note 
during the negotiations stating:
The Cambodian Government does not intend to allow a free, fair, and non- 
selective trial process of all Khmer Rouge leaders living in its territory, but rath-
er a carefully monitored process under its full political control.213
Indeed, in 2000 Hun Sen said explicitly: “The ones who committed crimes, 
genocide, and cooperated with crimes and genocide should be punished, not 
the ones who overthrew the genocide.”214
At international tribunals, conflict states have also sought to influence 
the proceedings. For example, the government of Uganda referred the “situa-
tion concerning the Lord’s Resistance Army” to the ICC, apparently seeking 
to exclude the culpability of government forces from review. The prosecutor 
informed the government that his office would instead be “analyzing crimes 
within the situation of Uganda by whomever committed.”215 Nevertheless, his 
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decision to announce the referral jointly with the Ugandan president has been 
heavily criticized as undermining the population’s perception of the court’s in-
dependence.216 No doubt suspicions of bias have been buttressed by the lack 
of public information suggesting that government forces were ever investigated 
for their crimes.217 Rwanda has been notorious for using the threat of nonco-
operation to get its way with the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR), including in its successful effort to prevent the tribunal from issuing 
indictments against members of the government’s Rwandan Patriotic Front 
forces accused of committing crimes against humanity as they drove the geno-
cidal Hutu regime out of power.218
Because international tribunals are structurally independent, they have had 
greater ability to resist or redirect such pressures, in particular where the United 
Nations or donor states have supported their efforts. Even where conflicting 
state agendas have impacted decisions of whom to charge, the process of judging 
those who are ultimately taken into custody has been less obviously impacted.219
Interests of the United Nations and Donor States
Foreign states, in particular donors, also have interests in mass crimes proceed-
ings.220 For example, China has not been in favor of the ECCC from the start 
due to its close ties with the DK regime.221 However, even states that support 
and fund the ECCC have bilateral and financial interests that they prioritize 
over positions of principle, leading to action— or inaction— that has appeared 
to condone Cambodian Government interference. As discussed in chapter 3, 
the Australians have twice announced donations to the national side of the 
Court during credibility crises, in effect supporting the Government’s refrain 
that there is “no problem.”222 With similar effect, Japan and France, originally 
the two largest Court funders, reportedly “gave their blessing” to government 
plans to kick OSJI out of the country when it revealed the kickback scheme, 
even though David Scheffer and others believed that this would be a breach of 
the Agreement.223
Judge Blunk’s willingness to close Case 003 without a genuine investigation 
led to speculation that the United Nations and/or donors had either explicitly 
or implicitly given him directions to get rid of it.224 The Cambodian Center for 
Human Rights said, “[Blunk’s] actions raise the question of whether the United 
Nations has conceded to the demands of the RGC and is now acting to prevent 
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any further cases from going to trial and to ensure the closure of the ECCC with 
the conclusion of Case 002.”225 This perception has been fed by reports (and 
long- standing rumors) that donors attempted to “intervene directly with Blunk 
and Cayley multiple times— by phone and in person” on Cases 003 and 004.226 
Clearly donors have a financial motivation to get rid of these cases, as acknowl-
edged by U.S. War Crimes Ambassador Stephen Rapp, who also reportedly 
spoke to Blunk. He has said, “We expect people . . . to be making decisions that 
you can’t pursue every case. We want them to make them on a proper basis with 
an understanding that resources are limited and they need to prioritize.”227
The potential to influence judicial decisions is greatest when there are vol-
untary and thus irregular contributions. One commentator has said, “[P]erhaps 
the most pernicious form of influence is control over the budget of the court 
by the organ that constitutes it.”228 Hans Corell has noted that a prosecutor’s 
discretionary powers are “very much related to circumstances, not least a will-
ingness at the political level to support the institutions, including the provision 
of adequate funding.”229 Thus, when Cases 003 and 004 were forwarded to the 
CIJs, Court sources assumed that the judges, already busy with Case 002, would 
“await decisions by UN donors on additional resources for Case 003” before 
spending their existing “precious” resources on the investigation.230 Moreover, 
the Deputy Administrator “desiring to cut costs where possible” spoke to the 
“Friends” group about “transferring case 003 to the domestic court to further re-
duce the total amount required for the tribunal”231— after the cases were already 
in the hands of the CIJs and thus subject to a judicial process outside the scope 
of his authority. It would have been obvious to anyone in Cambodia that this 
step would be the equivalent of dismissing the case for political reasons232— 
exactly what the supermajority rule was intended to prevent.
At the SCSL, an accused challenged the independence of the Court, argu-
ing that its voluntary funding structure and the involvement of state donors in 
a Management Committee that provided assistance to the Secretary- General 
on nonjudicial matters could result in political pressure on the Chambers. The 
Appeals Chamber said the appropriate test was “whether such funding arrange-
ments leads [sic] to a real likelihood that the court will be influenced by such 
arrangements to give decision, not on the merits of the case, but to please the 
funding body or agency.”233 In particular, the Chamber emphasized the impor-
tance of the fact that at the SCSL judicial remuneration is not contingent on 
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voluntary payments but instead protected from funding inadequacies.234 In his 
separate opinion, Judge Robertson suggested:
Courts which are so starved of funds that they cannot do justice should close 
themselves down rather than continue under the expectation that sufficient 
funding will be forthcoming only if they render verdicts acceptable to the fund-
ing body.235
Such tainted verdicts should be seen to include the dismissal of existing cases 
not on their legal merit but based on budgetary concerns.236
This highlights a related method of donor pressure: the imposition of a 
completion strategy that “gives a clear directive to Prosecutors that limits their 
prosecutorial discretion”237 or to Chambers to speed up proceedings. One com-
mentator has reported that donors “constantly” tell ECCC officials that they 
want to see a completion strategy.238 At the ICTY, one judge has made an ex-
plicit link between that court’s completion strategy and decisions by the Ap-
peals Chamber to depart from existing jurisprudence protecting the fair trial 
rights of accused:
[The Majority] Decision unfortunately follows the trend of other recent de-
cisions of the Appeals Chamber which reverse or ignore its previously care-
fully considered interpretations of the law or of the procedural rules, with a 
consequential destruction of the rights of the accused . . . The only reasonable 
explanation for these decisions appears to be a desire to assist the prosecution 
to bring the Completion Strategy to a speedy conclusion.239
Assuming that the United Nations and donors did not give Blunk license 
to shut down the cases, their failure to publicly address the serious dysfunction 
in the OCIJ— voiced by numerous staff, judges, and observers over a period of 
months— and investigate the serious and well- documented allegations240 had 
the effect of sanctioning the conduct of that office and continued RGC obstruc-
tion.241 For example, when Judge Blunk resigned after months of public allega-
tions of improprieties, the UN merely thanked him for his service;242 and when 
Judge Kasper- Ansermet resigned after being stymied by the Cambodian side 
for six months— in what the UN itself had called a breach of the Agreement— 
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the United Nations issued a brief statement expressing “serious concern.”243 As 
noted by Amnesty International:
What is at stake here is the UN as the key driver of international justice. If it 
keeps using strong words but never takes any action .  .  . it demonstrates that 
interference by the [RGC] will win . . . and impunity overrules accountability.244
Former OSJI monitor Clair Duffy has said that it is “partly because of these 
general statements about the importance of the court’s independence [instead 
of real engagement] that the crisis facing the court has worsened.”245
For example, when UN Legal Counsel Patricia O’Brien visited Phnom Penh 
during the scandal over the premature closure of Case 003, she “strongly urged” 
the Government to stop making statements opposing Cases 003 and 004, but 
did not mention interference as such.246 Ou Virak, president of the Cambodian 
Center for Human Rights, said that “the tone of his meeting [with her] indi-
cated that the UN did not want an investigation into the OCIJ, with UN staff 
seemingly focused on the fallout such a probe might have on the pending trial of 
the senior leaders of the Khmer Rouge.”247 She reportedly told Ou, “‘Look: We 
do take this issue very seriously, we are considering all options very carefully[.]’” 
Nevertheless, because an investigation into interference could open the door to 
defense challenges in Case 002, the UN had made a preliminary decision not 
to undertake an investigation.248 She repeated this position at an American Bar 
Association meeting in Washington, DC.249 The message is: “The Court [i.e. 
Case 002] has to succeed”250 at whatever cost. The impact of O’Brien’s mixed 
messages may be seen in the government response to her visit. A spokesperson 
alleged that when she met with the Deputy Prime Minister, she had merely 
complimented the tribunal on its “good work.”251
Conclusion
David Scheffer has noted that the ECCC operates at “greater risk of institu-
tionally collapsing than any other international or hybrid court.”252 In 2003, 
UN Secretary- General Kofi Annan emphasized that under the terms of the 
Agreement, “any deviation by the Government from its obligations could lead 
to the United Nations withdrawing its cooperation and assistance from the pro-
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cess.”253 Some local and international human rights advocates have called on the 
United Nations to consider withdrawing due to Cambodian Government inter-
ference.254 That possibility appears to have given the United Nations little lever-
age because the Cambodian Government knows that a UN pullout is highly 
unlikely. Donors are keen to see their investment in Case 002 pay off. Moreover, 
a UN withdrawal would not necessarily disadvantage the ruling CPP, which 
would likely cite the move as another example of international perfidy requiring 
the CPP to shoulder alone the Khmer Rouge legacy.255
UN participation was intended to ensure that the ECCC would meet in-
ternational standards, but where the United Nations is unable or unwilling to 
fight for those standards, a hybrid court is left to the mercy of national inter-
ests.256 The split authority between national and international leadership at the 
ECCC makes the Court particularly vulnerable to RGC interference and makes 
the problem difficult for the UN to address. Indeed, the tribunal was designed 
precisely to limit the scope for UN action. However, this structural barrier is 
compounded by the fact that UN officials, unhappy with the institutional ar-
rangement since the outset, have been loath to take strong ownership of what 
has become a sinking hybrid vessel. The United Nations has interpreted its 
mandate narrowly, acting too much like a technical assistance provider and not 
enough like a founding partner.
One interviewee notes that, although the UN administration says it is just 
here to “assist,” that is merely an excuse. In his view, “the UN needs to assist by 
leading. [Internationals] were brought in because theoretically they know what 
to do.”257 UN ambivalence has translated into relative passivity and allowed the 
process either to stagnate, or— when political interests are at stake— to be con-
trolled by the Cambodian side. As Judge Rapoza noted in the context of the 
East Timor Special Panels, “if you don’t buy it, you don’t own it.”258 The ECCC 
features enough UN involvement to pose the UN serious reputational risk, but 





Recognizing Victims as Case Parties
One of the main arguments in favor of in- country hybrid tribunals is that they 
facilitate robust victim participation. Victims can more easily observe or par-
ticipate in the proceedings, which offer them an opportunity to engage in truth- 
telling, contribute to the search for justice, and otherwise seek empowerment 
and a degree of personal and collective reconciliation. Addressing the rights and 
needs of victims— including the right to accountability for atrocities and the 
right to the truth— has been one of the core stated objectives of all mass crimes 
courts. Locating a hybrid tribunal beside the survivor population gives it a po-
tentially formidable functional advantage in that regard.
The ECCC has developed an unprecedented scheme for victim participa-
tion. In addition to involving victims as witnesses and complainants, the ECCC 
is the first internationalized mass crimes court to follow the civil law practice 
of including victims as parties in the proceedings. For that reason, there is no 
direct precedent for it to follow, requiring it to forge its own path and establish 
new law that will in turn guide the decisions of future courts. Acting Director of 
Administration Tony Kranh has said that “[v]ictims’ participation is one of the 
areas in which the ECCC is breaking new ground and setting new standards for 
courts with international support and involvement.”1
Notwithstanding frequent self- laudatory rhetoric, the ECCC has strug-
gled to manage its expansive victim participation scheme. The Court’s under-
resourced Victims Support Section (VSS) has been hard- pressed to respond 
to thousands of victim complaints and provide other services. The novel civil 
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party scheme has been even more difficult for the Court to administer. Unlike 
some aspects of the Court’s work, victim participation has not been hobbled by 
political feuds between its national and international sides. Rather, the ECCC’s 
challenges in this area reflect relative UN neglect, a tepid Cambodian commit-
ment, and the inherent difficulty of involving myriad survivors in the process. 
The Court’s example suggests that an in- country mixed tribunal cannot ful-
fill its potential for victim participation without ample resources and advance 
planning. The ECCC also shows that however meaningful individual civil party 
participation may be, it is unlikely to be practicable in mass crimes proceedings.
Genesis of Civil Party  
Participation at the ECCC
The ECCC’s civil party scheme is one of its most notable innovations. The man-
dates of previous mass crimes tribunals, including the International Criminal 
Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda (ICTY and ICTR) and the 
hybrid Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), provided a role for victims only 
as simple witnesses. Critics argued that these courts missed an opportunity to 
provide victims a more central role in the proceedings.2 ICTY Prosecutor Carla 
Del Ponte told the Security Council:
The voices of survivors and relatives of those killed are not sufficiently heard. 
Victims have almost no rights to participate in the trial process, despite the 
widespread acceptance nowadays that victims should be allowed to do so. . . . It 
is regrettable that the Tribunal’s statute makes no provision for victim partici-
pation during the trial, and makes only a minimum of provision for compensa-
tion and restitution to people whose lives have been destroyed. . . . We should 
therefore give victims the right to express themselves, and allow their voice to be 
heard during the proceedings.3
In response to such critiques, the Rome Statute was drafted to include a role 
for victims to participate directly at the International Criminal Court (ICC).4 
In formulating these provisions, the drafters looked back to the UN Declara-
tion of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power of 
1985,5 a watershed document for the victims movement.6 Although the Decla-
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ration is not legally binding, it is the first international instrument to establish 
minimum standards for crime victims. It affirms that victims should have both 
“access to the mechanisms of justice” and the ability to receive redress for their 
harms.7 At the ICC, victims do not have the full rights of a party but are con-
sidered “victim participants.” The Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) offers 
victims a similar participatory role, while the Extraordinary African Chambers, 
much like the ECCC, will include civil parties based on a domestic law model.8
Neither the 2003 UN- Cambodian Framework Agreement nor the 2004 
law establishing the ECCC set forth any participatory role for victims in the 
proceedings. There is only one offhand reference in the ECCC Law, which re-
quires the Supreme Court Chamber to decide on appeals by victims from deci-
sions of the Trial Chamber.9 However, as a former French colony, Cambodia’s 
modern legal system has its roots in the French civil law tradition. Unlike in 
common law countries, where civil actions are brought separately from criminal 
actions, civil law countries based on the French model often provide a role for 
victims as a party to the public proceeding. Because the ECCC was mandated 
to apply Cambodian procedures, NGOs and other observers expected that the 
Court would include civil party participation.
According to former U.S. Ambassador- at- Large for War Crimes Issues Da-
vid Scheffer, who helped negotiate the Framework Agreement:
[The ECCC] was never conceived by those who negotiated its creation as an 
instrument of direct relief for the victims[.] . . . The victims’ numbers are simply 
too colossal and the mandate and resources of the ECCC far too limited to 
address the individual needs, including the award of reparations, for so many 
victims.10
Reportedly, most of the ECCC’s international judges agreed that it would 
be unwise to follow the French model on this question. Their major concern was 
the Court’s ability to provide reparations. The accused likely would be found 
indigent, and the ECCC would have no power or funding to provide redress. 
Some found it problematic that due to the large number of victims in Cambo-
dia, in theory almost everyone might qualify to be a civil party. Why privilege 
only victims with the knowledge or affluence to file a civil claim? Instead, most 
international judges favored recognizing the needs of victims by including them 
as “injured parties” or “subsidiary prosecutors,” a mode of participation in some 
civil law countries that is separate from any compensation claim.11
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Nevertheless, the first international Co- Investigating Judge, Marcel Le-
monde, and one of his legal advisors pressed for the adoption of a civil party 
scheme modeling French law.12 Japan, the largest ECCC funder, was worried 
about the added financial burden a civil party scheme would impose,13 but 
France— also a major donor to the Court— supported the scheme. Cambodian 
judges, although initially hesitant about the extra work involved, became ame-
nable because the scheme would apply Cambodian law.14
The Internal Rules, adopted in 2007, provide victims the opportunity 
both to submit complaints to the Co- Prosecutors15 and to participate in the 
proceedings as civil parties with the right to “symbolic and moral” reparations. 
The ECCC thus became the first mass crimes process to include victims as full 
parties.16 Because the ECCC’s unprecedented victim participation scheme was 
not anticipated in the Court’s framework documents but instead designed from 
scratch by independently acting judges, this ambitious experiment was vulner-
able from the outset to resource constraints. There was no money in the bud-
get for civil parties, no vision of how the scheme would work in practice, and 
relatively few people at the Court— or in the United Nations or Cambodian 
Government— interested in prioritizing the effort to ensure its success.
Victim Administration
In public relations efforts, the ECCC Office of Administration (OA) has of-
ten emphasized the historic importance of the Court’s victim participation 
scheme— in particular when countering bad publicity or seeking funds. For ex-
ample, as corruption allegations mounted in 2008, OA Deputy Director Knut 
Rosandhaug asserted to donors in New York “that the Tribunal will be remem-
bered for its novel approach to victim participation[.]”17 In practice, however, 
the United Nations and international administrators at the ECCC offered lim-
ited support for victim participation due to concern about the financial and ad-
ministrative burden it entailed. Without strong UN interest and engagement, 
the Court’s support for victims became increasingly nationalized18 with little 
international involvement or oversight.
Weak Institutional Support
Reportedly, the original budget for the ECCC had an attached note explaining 
that UN planners, fearing that victim participation would cost too much, ex-
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plicitly rejected funding a victims unit.19 Nevertheless, the 2007 Internal Rules 
instructed the OA to establish an autonomous Victims Unit (VU) and provide 
it administrative support. The mandate of the VU— later renamed the Victim 
Support Section (VSS)— encompasses maintaining a list of eligible lawyers 
who wish to represent victims, facilitating victims’ representation, conducting 
outreach to victims, and helping victims submit complaints and civil party ap-
plications.20
In October 2007, the ECCC issued a Practice Direction on Victim Partici-
pation outlining relevant procedures and establishing an application form.21 As 
a consequence of its late creation, the VU had neither a budget nor a chief until 
2008. By the time it started functioning, it faced a large backlog of complainant 
and civil party applications but lacked the personnel and procedures to respond 
in a timely fashion.22 With little funding or staff, the mundane task of process-
ing thousands of application forms overwhelmed the VU and limited its capac-
ity to provide victims a broader range of services. The VU had few resources 
to conduct outreach to potential victim participants or to support their legal 
representation in proceedings.23 From the beginning, the VU was perceived by 
many— in particular the OA— as little more than an administrative processing 
unit,24 and it was actively discouraged from conducting outreach.
In the absence of a well- resourced Victims Unit, a few Cambodian NGOs 
conducted victim participation tasks,25 and were also discouraged from reach-
ing out to large numbers of victims. OA international Deputy Director Knut 
Rosandhaug expressed concern about the capacity of the VU to process large 
numbers of applications and suggested that NGOs seek quality and not quan-
tity. This approach both recognized serious practical limitations on involving 
large numbers of victims and demonstrated a clear policy preference for sup-
porting perceived “core” legal functions of the court. One report on the early 
phases of the Court’s work confirms:
A number of interviewees felt that the unit was never properly supported by 
the ECCC’s administration, one of whom suggested that this may have been 
because of a fear of escalating costs and difficulties in securing sufficient funding 
for the structure of the court as it then stood without the added complication of 
a fully- staffed and fully- operational Victims’ Unit[.]26
As a consequence of resource constraints, of the millions of victims who might 
have chosen to participate in ECCC proceedings, only a small fraction were in-
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formed of their right to take part. A large majority of those learned their rights 
through NGOs, which served as their primary connections to the Court.27
Of the ECCC’s 479 staff members in 2011, only 28 (including a single inter-
national staffer) served in the Victims Support Section, and 3 served in the newly 
created Civil Party Lead Co- Lawyer Section.28 Aside from associated staff sala-
ries and overhead, the Court had only spent $300,000 on victims support since 
its inception and only about $1.5 million on total travel— an essential cost for 
conducting nationwide outreach to victims.29 The Court’s 2010 funding shortfall 
had led to cuts to the Victims Unit and no backfilling of some vacant jobs.30
After November 2008, the VSS was primarily supported by earmarked 
contributions to the Cambodian side from the German Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs through the German Society for Technical Cooperation (GTZ), now 
reconstituted as the German Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ). As 
of February 2012, Germany had contributed 1.9 million Euros to the VSS, but 
in 2010, OSJI noted the OA’s failure to dispense German funds:
The Office of Administration has been reluctant to authorize planned expen-
ditures by the VSS because of the court’s overall budget concerns. The need for 
improved VSS leadership is dramatically illustrated by the fact that the court 
was required to return over $340,000 in December 2009 to the German Tech-
nical Cooperation (GTZ), because it had not been programmed or spent in 
accordance with the grant under which it was given.31
That impasse supports a conclusion that the OA has had other spending priori-
ties and has been loath to spend resources on victim participation. Dedicating 
less than 10% of its overall personnel and expenditures to those functions has 
compromised one of the chief potential advantages of Cambodia’s in- country 
hybrid court.
Nationalization of Victim Participation
Although unstated in the Internal Rules, it was agreed that the Head of the VU 
would be a Cambodian and the Deputy a UN appointee. However, over time 
the unit has been increasingly nationalized. As of August 2013, despite being 
almost entirely funded by German earmarked contributions, the VSS had one 
international consultant funded by GIZ pursuant to an agreement with the 
national side, but no UN expert on victim participation and reparations.32
The first national and UN staff to head the unit were criticized for neglect-
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ing the timely processing of victim participation applications. Nevertheless, 
they were widely considered to be knowledgeable about victims’ issues and dedi-
cated to supporting a strong role for victims. Both left after little more than a 
year. Former civil party Theary Seng alleges that Rosandhaug “drove away” unit 
head Keat Bophal.33 According to a leaked U.S. diplomatic cable and anecdotal 
accounts, Keat also faced resistance from the Cambodian judges, who “[did] not 
favor victims coming forward as civil parties.”34
When the UN deputy left, the OA was slow to post the opening and recruit 
her replacement, and the position was vacant for nearly a year. Her successor 
lasted less than a year and was never replaced. This position was eliminated en-
tirely in the 2010– 11 budget, which found that a UN deputy was “no longer war-
ranted,” because “the Victims Unit is staffed predominantly under the National 
Component, and has adequate human resources to support its programme of 
work.”35 Since that time, with the exception of a few international consultants, 
the office has been fully staffed by Cambodians.36
The second person to head the office was Helen Jarvis, the former OA Chief 
of Public Affairs. She is a key advisor to Deputy Prime Minister Sok An, which 
raised concerns about her independence.37 Her lack of experience working with 
victims,38 avowed Marxist- Leninist views, and Australian origins prompted 
complaints from survivors.39 One civil society leader said, “I myself— and I am 
a victim— I would want a Cambodian person to represent me.”40 Indeed, it was 
awkward for a hybrid tribunal not to entrust the leadership of a victims unit to 
a Cambodian survivor. Nevertheless, Jarvis worked hard to prove herself, and 
due to her government connections she was more successful in fighting for re-
sources.41
Jarvis’s replacement, Rong Chhorng, also lacked experience working with 
victims. He was transferred while remaining head of the Personnel Unit.42 He 
has since occupied other ECCC jobs concurrently, as well as holding down his 
position as secretary- general of the Cambodian Council of Ministers’ National 
Committee for Population and Development.43 Rong’s multiple roles again 
raised concerns about the political independence of the VSS. Nevertheless, 
when the Office of Lead Co- Lawyers was created in 2010 to represent civil party 
interests, Rosandhaug immediately delegated all UN administrative power over 
that office to Rong for two years.44 This made the Office dependent on the VSS, 
contrary to its establishment as a functionally independent unit in the amended 
Internal Rules.45
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Lack of institutional support for robust victim participation can be explained 
largely by the additional time, money, and effort required, but the Government 
also has incentives to control victims’ input into the ECCC. Some prominent 
victims affiliated with the political opposition have vilified the Government and 
its role in the ECCC process.46 Such victims could undermine the Cambodian 
People’s Party’s self- portrayal as the party responsible for ridding Cambodia of 
the Khmers Rouges, either by painting the Government as an obstacle to UN- 
led justice or by naming perpetrators who are now members of the Govern-
ment. One observer recorded speculation that the Cambodian judges’ initial op-
position to including a role for civil parties was a reflection of the Government’s 
“fear of encouraging people to submit new evidence.”47
This fear can be noted in the reaction to Prince Sisowath Thomico’s declara-
tion of intention to file a complaint against a government official for the death of 
his parents. A news account speculated:
Following the prince’s example, countless relatives of Khmer Rouge victims 
could follow suit and launch their own individual complaints, disrupting the 
UN and government’s carefully- scripted plans to try only a handful of top ex- 
leaders[.]48
That possibility reportedly made those with past Khmer Rouge associations 
“uneasy.”49 Although the ECCC Law and Internal Rules do not allow com-
plaints to trigger ECCC investigations automatically, it was anticipated “that 
much finger- pointing could be expected from other victims’ families.”50 The re-
alization that victims’ voices could propel the process forward in unforeseen and 
politically unfavorable directions may be one reason why the national side has 
eagerly filled the void left by the UN’s abdication of responsibility.
Whatever the cause, the consequence is a lack of international input, includ-
ing the expertise the hybrid model was intended to offer. Panhavuth Long of 
the Cambodia Justice Initiative believes it is positive that the VSS has become 
nationalized because it empowers national staff to be the ones taking care of vic-
tims. He says, “They understand the issues of victims, they know their audience.” 
At the same time, he notes that the nationals have no independent capacity— 
planning, skills, or will— to deal with the enormous number of victims.51 There 
is no UN presence contributing capacity, ensuring the work meets international 
standards, or providing checks and balances on decision making, and the office 
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is widely viewed as nontransparent and nonconsultative.52 One court monitor 
found a few years ago that “the section as a whole has suffered from inadequate 
strategic planning and leadership and has not been fully effective in carrying out 
the expanded mandate given to it with the revised internal rules in February 
2010.”53 As discussed below, this assessment remains valid.
An Office for Civil Party Support
As originally conceived, the VU “facilitated” victim representation but had no 
resources to develop a legal aid scheme comparable to the one established for 
the accused.54 As a consequence, victims participating as civil parties were im-
mediately at a disadvantage in finding qualified lawyers to protect their inter-
ests in the proceedings. In the Court’s first case, legal representation was ar-
ranged through partnerships between those NGOs who had assisted victims 
in filing civil party applications and attorneys who either acted pro bono or 
received funding from sources outside of the Court.55 National civil party law-
yers in Case 001 highlighted “serious problems of funding, lack of office space 
and resources, and limited opportunities to see all their clients who may live in 
far- flung provinces all around Cambodia.”56 Everyone on civil party co- lawyer 
Karim Khan’s team worked pro bono except for his Cambodian counterpart, 
who received a small grant from the British Embassy. He says, “A Court can’t 
operate on charity; it must operate on the basis of professionalism.”57
Due to perceived problems in the civil party scheme in Case 001, in par-
ticular the large number of legal teams and the repetitive nature of argumen-
tation, in February 2010 the Internal Rules were amended to make the trial 
process more efficient for Case 002. Among the changes was the establishment 
of a court- funded Civil Party Lead Co- Lawyers Section,58 headed by one na-
tional and one international.59 The Co- Lawyers have “[u]ltimate responsibility 
to the court for the overall advocacy, strategy[,] and in- court presentation of 
the interests of the consolidated group of Civil Parties during the trial stage 
and beyond.”60 In doing so, they are required to ensure effective organization of 
the civil parties “whilst balancing the rights of all civil parties and the need for 
an expeditious trial within the unique ECCC context.”61 Whereas the original 
Internal Rules gave civil parties the right to legal representation but did not 
mandate it,62 since this rule change civil parties may only participate as individu-
als at the pretrial stage and at trial must be represented by the Lead Co- Lawyers 
as part of a single, consolidated group.63 This change was made due to concerns 
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about the efficiency of the process and the fairness to the accused in Case 002, 
to which thousands of applicants sought to be joined.64
Who Should Qualify as a Civil Party?
The question of which civil parties to admit to the ECCC’s cases points to a 
crucial dilemma for any hybrid court— how to promote robust victim partici-
pation without compromising undue efficiency or prejudicing the proceedings 
against the accused. The ECCC’s proximity to the crimes facilitates the involve-
ment of survivors. However, in a country with millions of victims, the breadth 
of the criteria adopted for civil party participation impacts not only which of 
many victims may participate but also the Court’s practical capacity to admin-
ister justice— a major concern for a hybrid tribunal funded through voluntary 
contributions and expected to deliver a swifter, less costly form of justice than 
its purely international peers.
ECCC jurisprudence on admissibility has suffered from the lack of initial 
vision of the appropriate role civil parties should play in the proceedings. To a 
certain extent this is understandable due to the novelty of the endeavor. As at all 
new courts, innovations must be perfected in practice, not only on paper. Never-
theless, the ICC experience should have provided an early indication of some of 
the inherent challenges of mass victim participation. Documentation Center of 
Cambodia (DC- Cam) Director and survivor Youk Chhang has called the lack 
of planning “a legal experiment at victims’ expense.”65
Although apparently not clear to all parties in advance, the admissibility stan-
dards applied in Case 001 are sound and in conformity with the Internal Rules 
and Cambodian procedures. In Case 002, the Court applied these standards 
arguably too inclusively together with a broad definition of victimization that 
allowed most applicants to participate. Paradoxically, this development occurred 
contemporaneously with decisions in Case 003 that disregard the Internal Rules 
and the Court’s own jurisprudence in an apparent effort to prevent victims from 
meaningfully contributing to a politically controversial investigation.
Determining Who Is a Victim of the Crime
At the time the Internal Rules were adopted, the only explicit requirements 
for civil party status were a “physical, material or psychological” injury received 
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as a “direct consequence of the offence” that was “personal and [had] actually 
come into being.”66 Language in the Practice Direction on Victim Participation 
soon clarified that “[a]ny victim of a crime coming within the jurisdiction of 
the ECCC may join the proceedings as a civil party in a case concerning that 
crime[,]”67 suggesting that a causal link must be shown between a crime charged 
and the harm suffered.68 Some argued this was an additional requirement un-
duly restricting the definition, but a subsequent revision of the Internal Rules 
clarified:
Civil Parties must demonstrate as a direct consequence of at least one of the crimes 
alleged against the Charged Person, that he or she has in fact suffered physical, 
material, or psychological injury upon which a claim of collective and moral 
reparation might be based.69
The Supreme Court Chamber has since found that “[t]his clarification does not 
entail a change in the substance of the definition of civil party”70 and is consis-
tent with both Cambodian law and international standards.71
When the Duch verdict was announced, the Trial Chamber also ruled on 
whether the admitted civil parties had proved that they were victims of harm as 
a consequence of Duch’s actions at specific crime sites.72 Of the 92 civil parties 
who participated throughout the Duch proceedings, 24 had this status revoked 
when the Trial Chamber found that they had not sufficiently proved that they 
or their family members were victims of security centers under Duch’s control, 
or that they had “any special bonds of affection or dependency” with direct S- 21 
victims.73 According to research conducted by the Transcultural Psychosocial 
Organization, the day after the verdict reading, those rejected “reacted with in-
tense emotional distress” and viewed it as shameful and a personal failure “as 
they could not fulfill the felt obligation to seek justice for the spirits of their 
relatives.”74 The Supreme Court Chamber upheld this criterion but disagreed 
with its application in specific cases by the Trial Chamber and admitted 10 more 
persons as civil parties.75
An Over- Broad Approach to Case 002
In Case 002, nearly 4,000 victims applied to be civil parties, and nearly half 
were rejected. On appeal, a supermajority of the Pre- Trial Chamber took a 
broadly inclusive approach, joining an additional 1,728 applicants to the case.76 
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First, they noted that the Internal Rules do not require a link between the injury 
and the facts investigated, but instead between the injury and “one of the crimes 
alleged.”77
While the facts investigated are limited to certain areas or crime sites, the legal 
characterizations of such facts . . . include crimes which represent mass atroci-
ties allegedly committed by the Charged Persons by acting in a joint criminal 
enterprise together and with others against the population and throughout the 
country.78
As a consequence, it was not necessary for applicants to link their injuries to 
crime sites in the Closing Order, which “serve only as examples in order to dem-
onstrate how all these centres and sites functioned throughout Cambodia.”79 The 
Pre- Trial Chamber accepted the applications of victims who suffered from the 
implementation of the criminal policies charged in the Closing Order, including 
in areas of the country where specific crime sites were not investigated.80 The 
effect of its decision was to allow nearly 4,000 civil parties to join Case 002.
Judge Marchi- Uhel dissented in part from this decision, arguing that the 
Chamber’s acceptance of victims who were not alleging harms related to the 
specific crime sites named in the indictment was legally inappropriate and 
would undermine the role of the consolidated group, delay the process, frustrate 
civil parties who met the specific admissibility requirements, and disappoint 
wrongly admitted civil parties who would not have the harms they suffered dis-
cussed at trial.81 She found that the broader interests of victims could instead 
be addressed through the new scheme for nonjudicial measures, discussed later 
in this chapter.
The full Pre- Trial Chamber also adopted a broad perspective of the nature 
of victimization from international crimes and the resulting psychological im-
pact on victims. The PTC held that victims who witnessed mass atrocities 30 
years ago could still experience a high level of fear and that “psychological injury 
should be considered within the specific context of the Cambodian society in 
general and especially of its nature and organization during the period of the 
[Communist Party of Kampuchea] regime.”82 The Chamber found that because 
fear was instilled collectively, indirect injury could occur even if the direct victim 
was not a family member but was a member of the same persecuted group or 
community.83 Further, the Chamber adopted a presumption that members of 
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the same targeted group or community will have suffered psychological harm as 
a result of the injury to the direct victim.84 A supermajority found that under 
the new scheme for civil party representation (discussed below), admitting a 
large number of victims participating as a consolidated group would not affect 
the rights of the accused.85
French Co- Lead Lawyer Elisabeth Simonneau Fort agrees with Judge 
Marchi- Uhel that the PTC took an overly permissive approach to Case 002 
civil parties, who must be subjected to reasonable admissions criteria to dis-
tinguish them from the general victim population.86 Jeanne Sulzer, a former 
Legal Officer in the Lead Co- Lawyers Section, asserts that the Court’s incon-
sistent approaches to admission created inefficiency: had her office known the 
PTC would apply admissions criteria so loosely, it could have spent its resources 
gathering testimony rather than parsing thousands of applications.87
After the PTC’s admissibility decision, the Trial Chamber severed the Case 
002 indictment in anticipation of holding more than one trial on the crimes 
charged. As discussed in chapter 5, the case is limited to “population movement 
phases 1 and 2,” including the forced evacuation of Phnom Penh and the Tuol 
Po Chrey execution site. As a consequence, alleged criminal policies related to 
genocide, forced marriage, cooperatives, worksites, security centers, and forced 
movement from the Eastern Zone have been excluded from the first Case 002 
trial. In making the decision to sever, the Trial Chamber stated that because (as 
discussed in the next section) civil parties no longer participate as individuals at 
trial but instead as a consolidated group with collective interests, “limiting the 
scope of the facts to be tried during the first trial . . . has no impact on the nature 
of civil party participation at trial[.]”88
Civil party lawyers disagreed. Because Case 002/01 would only address a 
limited range of offenses— rather than the policies “throughout Cambodia” ref-
erenced by the Pre- Trial Chamber— numerous civil parties could have been ex-
cluded from the consolidated group.89 Out of the 3,864 civil parties, only about 
750 were admitted due to harm related to the forced movement at issue in Case 
002/01.90 However, the new Internal Rules make the PTC’s admissibility deci-
sions final, and the Trial Chamber has let all victims participate by default.91 If 
they have not suffered harm from one of the crimes charged in the case, how-
ever, their inclusion as civil parties devalues the significance of that standing. 
Judge Marchi- Uhel’s admonition that overadmission would undermine the role 
of the consolidated group therefore appears prescient.92 Nevertheless, Simon-
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neau Fort believes that civil party participation in Case 002/01 could still be 
meaningful if civil parties were clearly informed that they may not hear their 
specific harms discussed, may not be able to speak in Court, and may not have 
their names listed in the judgment. For some civil parties, being in Court and 
experiencing participation is more important than legal nuances.93
Restricting Civil Party Access to Case 003
While the Chambers were loosening the criteria for participation in Case 002, 
the CIJs constricted it in Case 003 to such an extent that all but direct victims 
would be rejected. With regard to an applicant whom the OCIJ had already 
accepted in both Cases 001 and 002, and whose harm was unquestionably fac-
tually linked to the crimes alleged in Case 003, CIJs You Bunleng and Siegfried 
Blunk found against all precedent and logic that the murder of his brother at 
Tuol Sleng was not the direct cause of his psychological injury. Instead there 
was an intermediate causal link: “the death of his brother.”94 Acknowledging the 
fact that they had already accepted him as a civil party in previous cases, the 
CIJs said that the prior decision had been made under great time pressure, and 
that at the time the judges had failed to consider causation in depth.95
Soon afterward, Judges You and Blunk rejected a woman who had been 
forced to marry during the Democratic Kampuchea period, and whose hus-
band had then been forced to labor at Kampong Chhnang Airport (a crime 
site in Case 003) before being tortured and executed at S- 21 prison. Although 
she likewise had been previously admitted in Cases 001 and 002, they reasoned 
again that she was not harmed by the crime committed against her husband, 
but instead by an intervening cause: his forced labor.96 Adding insult to injury, 
they found it “highly unlikely” that she experienced psychological harm from 
her husband’s forced labor 34 years ago and surmised that she had claimed this 
“based on unsound advice by a third person.”97 Finally, they said that she should 
not be admitted because she was already a civil party in Cases 001 and 002.98
These findings directly contradict the Court’s own jurisprudence and all in-
ternational and national standards relating to victim participation.99 In Case 
002 dicta, the full Pre- Trial Chamber has rejected the standard applied,100 and 
on appeal, the international PTC judges eviscerated the OCIJ’s reasoning.101 
Although these decisions are discredited, they have nevertheless contributed to 
the lack of consistency between Chambers, and a concern that civil parties are 
not taken seriously. Yet the CIJs’ approach to victim participation in Case 003 
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was consistent with other evidence of their efforts to quickly bury the investiga-
tion and eliminate costs arising from Cases 003 and 004.
The ECCC’s struggles to apply admissibility criteria doubtlessly derive in 
part from the judges’ recognition that most Cambodians are victims, and a le-
gal decision to charge one crime site over another is an unsatisfactory basis for 
excluding those who wish to participate in seeking justice after more than 30 
years. The judges are also aware that the time required for making individual 
determinations and hearing appeals for thousands of victims can easily over-
whelm the resources of a court.102 One judge estimated that defense challenges 
to even 1,000 civil party claims would last at least eight months.103 Donor de-
mands and the age of the Case 002 defendants— and many victims— both mili-
tated strongly toward reducing the amount of judicial time devoted to the civil 
party scheme. In the face of these pressures, rather than regulate the number of 
admitted civil parties, the judges redrafted the rules to limit the scope of their 
participation.
Limiting Civil Party Roles and 
Representation
In the midst of the Court’s first case, efficiency concerns and worries about 
equality of arms led the ECCC to reduce the scope of individual civil party 
participation, for example, eliminating their right to speak and removing their 
freedom to select legal representation for trial proceedings. Changes were neces-
sary to allow even a fraction of the 4,000 civil party applicants to participate in 
Case 002, but the changes reduced the robustness of the mechanism, making 
the victims’ role look less like that of a full party and more like a participant. In 
that sense, the ECCC has been forced to adapt its ambitious initial model in a 
direction that converges toward the practice of the ICC. Although this outcome 
was a necessary move toward efficiency, there is a general consensus that too 
much was promised too early and then taken away. Former OCP investigator 
Craig Etcheson argues that for a mass crimes court, “one of the greatest chal-
lenges is the problem of managing expectations,” and the ECCC has been “more 
or less a complete failure” on that score— mainly due to its management of civil 
party participation.104
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Reducing the Scope of Civil Party Participation
Victims may participate as civil parties in ECCC proceedings by “supporting 
the prosecution” for the purpose of seeking “collective and moral reparations.”105 
Under the Internal Rules, civil parties have many enumerated participation 
rights, including to request investigative actions, to lodge appeals and partici-
pate as a party therein, to call witnesses, to have access to the case file, to respond 
to preliminary objections, to question accused, to exercise the right of audience, 
to make written submissions, and to make closing arguments.106 Their par-
ticipation has made important contributions to the proceedings, most notably 
the addition of forced marriage charges to the Case 002 indictment,107 and the 
decision of the international prosecutor to request the investigation of crimes 
against the Kampuchea Krom minority in Case 004.108
Nevertheless, the right of victims to participate must be balanced against the 
right of the accused to a fair trial, including the right to be presumed innocent 
and the right to be tried without undue delay.109 As noted by one commentator:
If the victims were able to exercise [participation] rights freely without any con-
trol by a judge, the proceedings could last indefinitely, infringing the rights of 
the accused. The number of victims in cases of war crimes and crimes against 
humanity often runs into the thousands or even tens of thousands. Further-
more, the nature of the damage they have suffered adds to the emotive power 
of their intervention in the proceedings. If not controlled, their participation 
could therefore interfere with the smooth conduct of trials and the rights of the 
accused, as well as the search for truth.110
The European Court of Human Rights has recognized that the scope of 
civil parties’ right of access to court proceedings may be limited “[h]aving regard 
to the role accorded to civil actions within criminal trials and to the comple-
mentary interests of civil parties and the prosecution . . . , their roles and objec-
tives being clearly different.”111 However, “these limitations must not restrict or 
reduce a person’s access in such a way or to such an extent that the very essence 
of the right is impaired[.]”112 Moreover, any limitations must pursue a legitimate 
aim and have “a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means 
employed and the aim sought to be achieved.”113
The first request to limit civil party participation at the ECCC arose when 
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the defense objected to four civil parties participating in a hearing on Nuon 
Chea’s appeal against the CIJ’s provisional detention order. The Nuon Chea 
team, citing ICC jurisprudence, argued that civil parties should only be allowed 
to participate in the trial, and not during pretrial proceedings, because they did 
not have a personal interest in the outcome.114
At the ICC, victims are not considered “true” parties but are limited to pre-
senting their “views and concerns .  .  . at stages of the proceedings determined 
to be appropriate by the Court” where their “personal interests are affected.”115 
Therefore, “participation is not a once- and- for- all event but rather [is] decided 
on the basis of the evidence or issue under consideration at any particular point 
in time.”116 In contrast, at the ECCC, once a victim is found to meet the Internal 
Rules’ criteria to join a case as a civil party, he or she is a full party to the pro-
ceedings with rights similar to those of the accused, including extensive rights 
to participate during the investigative process.117 As emphasized by an ICC Ap-
peals Judge:
The right of victims to participate enunciated by article 68(3) [of the Rome 
Statute] has no immediate parallel or association with the participation of vic-
tims in criminal proceedings in  .  .  . the Romano- Germanic system of justice, 
where victims in the role of civil parties or auxiliary prosecutors have a wide- 
ranging right to participate in criminal proceedings.118
In ruling on the Nuon Chea challenge, the ECCC Pre- Trial Chamber found 
that the text of the Internal Rules, read in light of the Cambodian Code of 
Criminal Procedure, was clear that, unlike victim participants at the ICC, “Civil 
Parties can participate in all criminal proceedings, which includes the procedure 
related to appeals against provisional detention before the Pre- Trial Cham-
ber.”119 Nevertheless, the scope of civil parties’ right to participate equally in pro-
ceedings has been reduced over time to limit the right of individual victims to 
speak in court, make opening statements, or make submissions on sentencing 
and character.
Right to Speak in Person
Under the original version of the Internal Rules, there were no specific lim-
itations on civil parties speaking for themselves at any time during proceed-
ings, except for closing statements.120 However, early in the proceedings, the 
Pre- Trial Chamber restricted civil parties’ right to speak in person.121 During a 
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Nuon Chea detention appeal hearing, a civil party made remarks that “largely 
amounted to a victim statement” and were consequently disregarded by the Pre- 
Trial Chamber in making its ruling.122 At the subsequent Ieng Sary detention 
hearing, when the PTC prohibited her from speaking personally, she summarily 
dismissed her lawyer but was still not allowed to speak. Judge Downing dis-
sented, noting a conflict between Internal Rule 23, granting a general right of 
appearance, and Rule 77(10), providing that only lawyers for the parties may 
make observations. Because the civil party was now unrepresented, he found it 
unfair not to permit her to address the Court.123 A group of unrepresented civil 
parties submitted that they must be able to exercise all of their rights under the 
Internal Rules, even if unrepresented.124 Recognizing that unrepresented civil 
parties “may be unrepresented not through choice, but for financial reasons,” 
the Chamber said “legitimately” unrepresented civil parties could personally ad-
dress the Court when their interests and those of the prosecution were different 
and advance notice was provided.125
No situations arose again where unrepresented civil parties sought to speak 
before either the Pre- Trial or Trial Chambers. With the changes to the legal 
representation regime discussed below, representation by the Lead Co- Lawyers 
at trial is now mandatory. Although the Cambodian Code of Criminal Proce-
dure allows oral submission by civil parties during trial, whether represented or 
not,126 a blanket prohibition was codified in the Internal Rules: “When the Civil 
Party is represented by a lawyer, his or her rights are exercised through the law-
yer.”127 This limitation is necessary in light of the large number of victims who 
participate in proceedings. Nevertheless, it prevents the active participation of 
victims unless they are called to provide evidence.
In the Duch trial, 22 of the initial 93 civil parties were called by the Court 
to share their experiences.128 A common refrain was the momentousness of vic-
tims’ opportunity to express themselves directly to Duch— often to reject his 
pleas for forgiveness. For example, Ou Kamela, the daughter of an S- 21 victim, 
said in a letter read in Court, “On behalf of my father, I refuse to express the 
slightest amount of pity. On behalf of my father, I request that justice be handed 
down.”129 When asked how his clients had felt after providing testimony to the 
Court, civil party lawyer Alain Werner said, “About 20 Civil Parties recounted 
their experiences in Court, and it is difficult after just these hearings to make 
a global assessment of their experiences. I know that some of my own clients 
were very relieved immediately after their testimony and some even felt empow-
ered.”130
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Indeed, the testimonies of civil parties— including accounts of Tuol Sleng 
by well- known survivors such as Bou Meng and Chum Mey— provided some of 
the most powerful moments in the Duch trial. Their ability to confront the ac-
cused in court helped forge a connection between the hybrid court and the com-
munity of survivors in which it operates. In the Case 002 trial, only 32 of 3,864 
civil parties had the opportunity to share their experiences in their own words.
Right to Make Opening Statements
In both Case 001 and Case 002, civil party representatives sought the opportu-
nity to make opening statements and had their requests denied.131 The ECCC 
Internal Rules limit this right to the Co- Prosecutors and the accused.132 The 
Chamber has highlighted that Cambodian law also does not provide this right 
to civil parties.133 However, civil law practice, including Cambodian procedure, 
does not provide any party an opportunity to make opening statements, as the 
proceedings are not adversarial. The civil parties thus argued that a fair appli-
cation of the Cambodian Criminal Procedure Code would exclude all parties 
from making opening statements, and that it was discriminatory to limit the 
right to two of three parties.134 To respect the parties’ equality of arms and the 
symbolic significance for the nearly 4,000 civil parties, they asked the Trial 
Chamber to exercise its discretion to give them 30 minutes to make preliminary 
remarks.135 However, this was summarily rejected by the Trial Chamber, which 
ruled with evident irritation: “The Chamber reiterates that there is no legal basis 
in the ECCC legal framework for granting the Co- Lawyers’ request.”136 Even the 
defense teams have expressed dismay at this unequal treatment.137
At the ICC, representatives of victim participants have the potential right to 
make opening statements, and have in practice.138 It is unclear why the ECCC 
does not also grant that right, as time limitations could be imposed to encour-
age expediency. The judges drafted the rules, so their finding that they have no 
choice because “that’s what the rules say” is not compelling. Because civil parties 
are entitled to equal rights as parties, the failure to issue a reasoned decision ex-
plaining why they are not entitled to participate equally on this symbolically im-
portant occasion makes the ruling appear arbitrary and perhaps discriminatory.
Right to Make Submissions on Sentencing and  
Question Witnesses about Character
In the Duch case, the Trial Chamber emphasized the defense’s right to equality 
of arms when it departed from civil law practice and precluded the civil parties 
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from making submissions on sentencing or questioning witnesses and experts 
about Duch’s character. Judge Lavergne dissented on both rulings, finding them 
to be “inconsistent with the law currently applied before the Chambers” and to 
“misrepresent, for no valid reason, both the role and the meaning of Civil Party 
participation.”139 Although recognizing the need to adapt Cambodian proce-
dures to the challenges of prosecuting mass crimes, he asked:
How far can one go without breaching the spirit of the law, or fundamentally 
distorting the meaning of the involvement of the Civil Parties before the ECCC 
and the purpose of the trial as a whole[.]140
In his view, civil parties, as equal parties to the proceedings, are entitled to par-
ticipate at all stages, except where expressly limited.141 Due to their “personal 
knowledge” of the accused, they may be in the best position to provide the 
Court relevant character information, and in fact during the Case 001 trial they 
had on a number of occasions asked witnesses and the accused questions related 
to character.142
Judge Lavergne also looked to ICC jurisprudence to assess international 
practice. Although he found it to be generally supportive of his views, at the 
time the ICC had not completed any cases and the evidence was fragmentary. 
Subsequently the ICC Trial Chamber issued its first verdict of conviction and 
invited the prosecution and the legal representatives of victims “to file written 
submissions on the procedure to be adopted for sentencing .  .  . and the prin-
ciples to be applied by the Chamber when it is considering the appropriate sen-
tence to be imposed[.]”143 Likewise, at the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, victims 
may, with the authorization of the Trial Chamber, make impact statements at 
the sentencing stage of proceedings.144
The Role of Civil Party Lawyers
As noted earlier in this chapter, the ECCC amended its rules governing civil party 
representation, requiring that they be part of a single consolidated group repre-
sented by the Lead Co- Lawyers at trial. International Civil Party Lead Co- Lawyer 
Elisabeth Simonneau Fort has said the change “can permit a kind of coherent and 
strategical defence, avoiding opposite positions or repetitive pleadings.”145 Over-
loaded by the number of victims seeking to participate in its cases, the ICC ap-
pears to be moving toward a similar model due to its perceived potential for im-
proving efficiency, reducing costs, and improving the quality of representation.146
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Nevertheless, obligatory representation eliminates the right of a party to 
select his or her own lawyer. Moreover, it no longer takes the individual needs of 
the civil parties into consideration. Under the prior Internal Rules, “the distinct 
interests” of each victim as well as the potential for conflicts of interests had to 
be considered before the Court could decide to designate a common lawyer.147 
Now, though civil parties still retain individual counsel, their primary in- court 
representation is predetermined with no such assessment.
Under the revised rules, civil party lawyers’ control over the representation of 
their clients is substantially diminished once trial proceedings begin. Although 
the Lead Co- Lawyers are expected to “seek the views of the civil party lawyers 
and endeavor to reach consensus in order to coordinate representation[,]”148 
there are no mechanisms in the Rules governing disputes or procedures by which 
a dissenting civil party lawyer can make his or her views known to the Court or 
secure a remedy for a conflict of interest between civil party groups.149 Instead 
of directing the representation of their clients, they are expected to provide sup-
port to the consolidated group that is “mutually agreed” and “coordinated by” the 
Lead Co- Lawyers, including “oral and written submissions, examination of their 
clients and witnesses and other procedural actions.”150
The system was first tested when a civil party lawyer sought to submit a 
proposed witness and civil party list directly to the Trial Chamber. She argued 
that the document was “not the common interest” of the consolidated group, 
and therefore fell outside of the Lead Co- Lawyer’s mandate; however, the 
Trial Chamber rejected it because it was not signed and sent by the Lead Co- 
Lawyers.151 In requesting the Chamber to accept the documents as a belated 
filing, the Lead Co- Lawyers noted, “[S]ome of [the Civil Party lawyers] still 
believed that with the power of attorney they have the rights to submit motions 
as individuals.”152
The rule change also severs the civil party attorney- client relationship. The 
civil party Lead Co- Lawyers derive their powers only from the Internal Rules,153 
and civil party lawyers are now unable to represent their clients’ interests in 
court, such as by making oral or written submissions, without agreement from 
the civil party Lead Co- Lawyers. Concomitantly, civil parties are unable to hire 
or fire the Lead Co- Lawyers, to determine the overall objectives of their legal 
representation, or to participate in deciding the means of carrying out those 
objectives. Instead: “Ultimate responsibility to the court for the overall advo-
cacy, strategy and in- court presentation” falls to the Lead Co- Lawyers,154 who 
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represent the interests of the consolidated group, not individual civil parties.155 
As noted by an ICC Judge with regard to victim participation at that court:
Even if these common legal representatives organize themselves to take instruc-
tions from a great number of victims, it will be very difficult if not impossible 
to relay these instructions to the court. In those circumstances, can legal rep-
resentation be anything more than symbolic? And if it is only symbolic, how 
meaningful can it be?156
With such a broad scope of authority, the Lead Co- Lawyers have the au-
thority to shut some or all civil party lawyers out of the trial process. One civil 
party lawyer expressed frustration at the Lead Co- Lawyers’ “seemly arbitrary” 
rejections of submissions she sought to file on behalf of her clients:157 “We have 
NO body to complain to about whatever decision they take. We are fully in 
their hands. They do not have only a coordinating role, they decide which con-
tent is submitted and which is excluded. They have uncontrolled power.”158 De-
spite such complaints, which are likely inevitable given the balance of authority 
in the new scheme and the strong views of legal representatives advocating on 
behalf of their clients, it appears that the Lead Co- Lawyers selected have made 
every effort to follow the intent of the rules and work collaboratively in recogni-
tion of the enormous workload involved.159
The Trial Chamber has occasionally appeared dissatisfied with this inclu-
sive approach and has made decisions limiting the participation of civil party 
lawyers. For example, the Chamber classified medical reports regarding accused 
Ieng Thirith and Nuon Chea as strictly confidential and limited distribution 
specifically to the Lead Co- Lawyers, with authorization for them to share the 
documents only with civil party lawyers specifically tasked with providing sup-
port to the consolidated group.160 The Lead Co- Lawyers argued that all civil 
party lawyers should be granted access, as under the new regime decisions re-
garding strategy and drafting of submissions is a collective and joint decision 
of the group.161 The Lead Co- Lawyers “can not discharge their primary duty of 
consultation and seeking a consensus in order to consolidate representation . . . 
if the civil party lawyers do not have access to procedural materials.”162 Moreover, 
without access, civil party lawyers cannot defend the interest of their clients.163
A supermajority of the Trial Chamber rejected the request, finding that 
the Lead Co- Lawyers were not required to obtain the consensus of civil party 
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lawyers in all circumstances.164 Judge Laverne dissented, saying that restricting 
access from some party counsel is at odds with Cambodian law.165 Moreover, 
he argued that merely because at the trial stage the civil parties act as a consoli-
dated group, this does not alter the civil party lawyers’ responsibilities to their 
clients.166 He rejected the view that representation at the trial stage was not a 
shared responsibility, and called the measure “discriminatory” and “undeniably 
prejudicial to the adequate representation of the Civil Parties’ interests[.]”167
The Trial Chamber also pressed the Lead Co- Lawyers to be the only civil 
party voices in Court. One way it made this apparent is by seeking to limit the 
number of lawyers who could speak for each team on particular issues, which 
though intended to improve efficiency, also directly impacts the opportunity of 
individual civil party lawyers— and their clients— to participate.168 The Trial 
Chamber has also expressed displeasure when lawyers other than the Lead Co- 
Lawyers speak in Court.169
Moreover, the Trial Chamber has at times appeared irritated that the civ-
il parties intervene separately from the prosecution. Although the civil party 
teams “assist the prosecution,” they do not collaborate, and their interests are 
different.170 In one instance, the international Lead Co- Lawyer made a brief 
interjection, and when the prosecution also sought to make a small point, the 
President took more time than their statements to admonish him:
What is on your mind, Mr. Co- Prosecutor? Do you have anything else to add? 
Can you organize yourself amongst the parties to express your objections or 
comments in order? And, as you know, the Lead Co- Lawyer is on the support 
side of the Prosecution, and on the other side is the Defence, and if you keep 
taking turn, this morning session would not be efficient. I believe you need to 
organize yourself so that your objection shall be done once and together to 
make it more efficient, as we shall adhere to the principle of proceedings— a fair 
trial proceeding.171
International Lead Co- Lawyer Elisabeth Simonneau Fort has said, “Sometimes 
it is clear that the [Trial] Chamber considers that civil parties have not such an 
important role as a party[.]”172
Changes to the civil party scheme were necessary for efficiency and argu-
ably to avoid breaching the equality of arms. Etcheson argues that the civil 
party scheme in Case 001 was “absolutely untenable and did a lot to discredit 
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the whole idea of civil party participation.” Case 002 was “much closer to the 
mark” in striking the right balance between active victim participation and the 
need for fair and efficient proceedings, and the idea of lead colawyers “makes 
perfect sense,” but the Court may have overcompensated for the flaws of Case 
001 and cut back too dramatically on civil parties’ time in court.173 The result is 
that civil parties no longer participate as individual parties in the trial proceed-
ings.174 They instead form part of a collective group of victim participants with 
no direct connection to the lead lawyers who represent them.
Reparations and Nonjudicial Measures
Reparations
The effort to provide reparative justice has presented the ECCC with further 
challenges. Like other international and hybrid courts, the ECCC is designed 
with a primary institutional focus on criminal trials rather than reparative mea-
sures.175 The limits of hybrid courts are compounded by expectations of cost 
efficiency. Pursuant to the Internal Rules, the ECCC, in contrast to the ICC, 
has no authority to grant individual reparations, only “collective and moral.”176 
The Trial Chamber has noted:
[T]he ECCC lacks the competence to award individual monetary compensa-
tion to Civil Parties. . . . Such departures from national law were considered nec-
essary in view of the large number of Civil Parties expected before the ECCC 
and the inevitable difficulties of quantifying the full extent of the losses suffered 
by an indeterminate class of victims. Reparations before the ECCC were there-
fore intended to be essentially symbolic . . . rather than compensatory.177
As discussed in chapter 4, at the time the Case 001 verdict was issued, the ECCC 
Internal Rules only authorized reparations “awarded against, and . . . borne by 
convicted persons.”178 The Trial Chamber found that it had no jurisdiction to 
order Cambodian authorities to provide reparations to civil parties, and that at 
most it could “encourage” the Government and other entities to offer financial 
and other forms of support. The Chamber also said that no legal mechanism 
existed “allowing the ECCC to substitute or supplement awards made against 
[accused] with funds provided by national authorities or other third parties.”179 
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The accused was found indigent, and the Trial Chamber awarded civil parties 
only the inclusion of their names and those of the immediate victims in the final 
judgment, and the compilation and publication of statements of apology made 
by the accused during the trial.180
In anticipation of the ECCC’s second trial, the judges expanded the Court’s 
authority to provide reparations, giving the Trial Chamber the authority to rec-
ognize a specific project designed in cooperation with the VSS that has secured 
sufficient external funding.181 When the Trial Chamber provided initial obser-
vations about the types of requests that may be entertained, it notably excluded 
the possibility of a trust fund being established to financially compensate civil 
parties.182
At the behest of the Trial Chamber, the Lead Co- Lawyers have identified a 
prioritized list of reparations projects, which have been accepted by the Cham-
ber “in principle” if sufficient funding is secured in advance: (1) Government rec-
ognition of a new remembrance day for Khmer Rouge victims; (2) the creation 
of three to six public memorials acknowledging the harms of Case 002 civil 
parties; the funding of mental health services for Case 002 civil parties includ-
ing (3) testimonial therapy and (4) self- help groups; (5) a mobile exhibition 
with short films and live testimonials by civil parties; (6) a permanent exhibition 
space with documents, multimedia testimonials and artistic displays to preserve 
civil party accounts of the harms they suffered; and (7) a booklet explaining the 
ECCC judicial process, civil party participation, and the crimes encompassed 
in Case 002.183
In addition to proof of sufficient outside funding, before final endorsement 
the Trial Chamber requires, when relevant, proof of the Government’s willing-
ness to support the projects, and additional specificity (such as who will be re-
sponsible for project implementation, the projects’ duration, and whether the 
participation of non- governmental organizations listed as partners is depen-
dent on available funding).184
According to Simonneau Fort, shortly before closing arguments there were 
only “a very small number of [financial] sponsors” for the requested projects. 
An unnamed advisor to a mental health NGO collaborating with the VSS on 
a reparations project says the problem lies “in part” with VSS: “There are no 
staff [there] who are actually experienced enough to deal with project manage-
ment . . . proposal writing, dealing with donors and all that. . . . Also, [there is] 
probably a lack of motivation to really go forward and systematically and ef-
2RRP 
A Historic First / 227
fectively address it with potential donors.”185 Any failure to sufficiently develop 
and fund reparations programs in accordance with the Internal Rules thus also 
stems from the UN side’s unwillingness to dedicate international expertise to 
the running of this office.
Civil party lawyer Nushin Sarkarati notes that, under the revised rules, ev-
erything proposed for reparations must be essentially completed before judg-
ment and the ECCC will merely rubber- stamp the completed project. She 
argues that this sets a horrible legal precedent, as reparations should be paid 
for either by the convicted person or by the state, not by NGOs through third- 
party funding. Most concerning, the Court is putting the burden on victims 
to design and fund reparations themselves. She says, “The Court is essentially 
allowing concerns over the implementation of an award to belie an appropriate 
judgment on reparations. I hope no [other] court adopts this system.”186
The splitting of the indictment in Case 002 has also changed the import 
of reparations, which are intended to “acknowledge the harm suffered by civil 
parties as a result of the commission of the crimes for which an Accused is 
convicted” and “provide benefits to the Civil Parties which address this harm.”187 
However, if only civil parties with harms related to crimes in the severed in-
dictment are entitled to reparations, many in the consolidated group would be 
excluded. At the urging of the civil party lawyers, the Trial Chamber has there-
fore decided that reparations requests that do not result in enforceable claims 
against a convicted person, but are instead funded externally under the new 
rule, may benefit all civil parties in the consolidated group.188 As a result, the im-
plementation of this aspect of the civil party scheme has also moved the ECCC 
toward a collective victim participation model, and away from the recognition 
of individual victims as “parties” to the proceedings.
Nonjudicial Measures
In discussions with NGOs before the civil party role was revised, the Senior 
Judicial Coordinator and the reserve international Trial Chamber judge empha-
sized that restrictions on the role of civil parties would be balanced by expand-
ing the mandate of the VSS to reach out more broadly to the general victim 
population.189 A new Internal Rule was therefore adopted, which provides:
The Victim Support Section shall be entrusted with the development and im-
plementation of non- judicial programs and measures addressing the broader 
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interests of victims. Such progress may, where appropriate, be developed and 
implemented in collaboration with governmental and non- governmental organ-
isations external to the ECCC.190
Judge Silvia Cartwright said the judges believed that nonjudicial measures 
“will be a major legacy of this Tribunal.”191 The Open Society Justice Initiative, 
a key Court monitor, explained:
This development is important because, as stated previously, large numbers of 
Cambodians who do not become formal civil parties are victims of the Khmer 
Rouge and have an interest in the same kinds of information and services of-
fered by the court to civil parties. . . . Examples of additional activities planned 
by the Victims Support Unit pursuant to its expanded mandate include pre-
senting public forums with court officials, providing the opportunity to view 
proceedings, and disseminating information about the nature of the cases be-
fore the court.192
However, these ambitions have not been realized. Over two years later, 
the VSS “ha[d] not yet even identified what non- judicial projects it will pur-
sue or clearly differentiated these measures from court- ordered reparations.”193 
The nonjudicial program manager told a local paper, “We have a mandate on 
this, but we are not really implementing, so we need to facilitate and then work 
with NGO partners to implement these non- judicial measures[.]”194 The VSS 
Chief responded to criticisms by noting that the unit had since late 2011 been 
implementing a two- year joint project with local NGOs on “Promoting Gen-
der Equality and Improving Access to Justice for Female Survivors and Vic-
tims of Gender Based Violence under the Khmer Rouge Regime.”195 Moreover, 
“[s]imilar projects” had already been implemented by a number of NGOs, 
“which could be seen as [Non- Judicial Measures] projects.” 196 It thus appears 
that in most cases, the VSS will merely put its stamp of approval on projects 
planned and executed by NGOs.197
Although the Trial Chamber has noted that VSS projects developed dur-
ing the life of the Court may eventually turn into a form of Court- sanctioned 
reparations upon conviction,198 they are two separate, if potentially overlap-
ping, Court mandates. Nevertheless, with the creation of a “Reparation and 
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Non- Judicial Measures” team, and efforts to create a foundation to fund the 
implementation of both, they have been welded together, and are stagnating as 
a result. The Open Society Justice Initiative has said that to effectively imple-
ment this broader mandate, international input and expertise is required, but as 
discussed above, there is currently no UN reparations expert within the VSS. 
Initial hopes that with its expanded mandate the VSS would undertake basic 
outreach to the general victim population during the trial proceedings appear 
guaranteed to remain unrealized.199
Conclusion
Victim participation was bound to be difficult for the ECCC, especially after 
the judicial creation of an unprecedented civil party scheme that neither the na-
tional nor international side of the Court fully embraced. Some questioned the 
feasibility of transposing this domestic civil law practice to a mass crimes court. 
Others questioned the additional effort and funding required for what they 
viewed as a peripheral endeavor. The scheme was disadvantaged from the start 
due to general neglect, and the haphazard manner in which it was implemented 
in the Court’s first case caused delays, confusion, and sometimes dashed victim 
expectations.200 In Case 001, many of the relatively small number of civil parties 
involved were able to participate directly in the proceedings, which appears to 
have been meaningful and even cathartic for most of the civil parties involved.201
Since that time, the participation rights of civil parties— and their lawyers— 
have been reduced in anticipation of the practical realities of accommodating 
thousands of victims into the Case 002 proceedings. Now participating indi-
rectly and represented as a group, the system is functioning more efficiently, 
but it is questionable if civil parties in Case 002 are still accorded the rights of 
“parties” or will have the same quality of experience as those who joined Case 
001.202 Indeed, the primary ECCC lesson for future internationalized courts 
may be the impracticability of individual civil party participation in mass crimes 
proceedings.203
Sulzer suggests that instead of individuals, perhaps organizations and as-
sociations with common interests should be accorded party status in future 
proceedings— a model building off mass claims processes in both the common 
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and civil law and the expanding role of victims’ organizations in postconflict 
societies.204 Ieng Sary’s former international lawyer, Michael Karnavas, suggests 
a two- phase trial: upon conviction, a restitution hearing could be held during 
which victims are given a genuine opportunity to be heard.205 Both proposals 
take into account the need to design future hybrid tribunals with realistic ex-
pectations of the forms of victim participation that a tribunal can manage ef-






A strong link to the society most affected by atrocities is arguably central 
to achieving many of the expressed objectives of hybrid and international 
tribunals— such as deterring future crimes, developing legal norms and institu-
tions, ministering to victims’ needs, and providing an official account of past 
atrocities.1 In addition to cost considerations and sovereignty concerns, the hy-
brid model is premised in significant part on the notion that in situ proceedings 
with strong national participation help connect survivors to the criminal pro-
cess and build institutional ties that promote local judicial reform.2
In a 2004 report to the Security Council, UN Secretary- General Kofi An-
nan laid out that argument clearly, writing that hybrid in situ tribunals have im-
portant benefits, “including easier interaction with the local population, closer 
proximity to the evidence and witnesses and being more accessible to victims.”3
Such accessibility allows victims and their families to witness the processes in 
which their former tormentors are brought to account. National location also 
enhances the national capacity- building contribution of the [ ] tribunals, al-
lowing them to bequeath their physical infrastructure (including buildings, 
equipment and furniture) to national justice systems, and to build the skills of 
national justice personnel. In the nationally located tribunals, international per-
sonnel work side by side with their national counterparts and on- the- job train-
ing can be provided to national lawyers, officials and staff. Such benefits, where 
combined with specially tailored measures for keeping the public informed and 
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effective techniques for capacity- building, can help ensure a lasting legacy in the 
countries concerned.4
The ECCC touts those advantages, emphasizing that unlike the International 
Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda (ICTY and ICTR), 
the Khmer Rouge trials provide for “full national involvement in the trials” and 
are “held in Cambodia, conducted mainly in Khmer, open to participation by 
Cambodian people and reported via local television, radio and newspapers.”5 
The ECCC also asserts that its proceedings present “an excellent opportunity to 
bolster the understanding of the criminal trial process within Cambodia.”6 This 
chapter examines the extent to which the ECCC’s hybrid institutional struc-
ture, high level of national participation, and in- country location have in fact 
contributed to effective outreach to survivors, capacity- building, and judicial 
reform.
The Related Functions of  
Outreach and Legacy
Mass crimes courts tend to cluster activities that promote social engagement 
and impact under the overlapping umbrellas of “outreach” and “legacy.” Neither 
term has a single standard definition, but outreach normally refers to a bundle 
of communication activities that inform and engage the affected population. 
Outreach functions are closely linked to public affairs and media relations but 
are not synonymous. Outreach implies at a minimum dissemination of basic 
information about court processes, but preferably goes further to promote dia-
logue with victims and their communities in terms they can understand.7 For 
example, the International Criminal Court (ICC)’s public information strategy 
defines outreach as:
[A] process of establishing sustainable, two‐way communication between the 
Court and communities affected by situations that are the subject of investiga-
tions or proceedings. It aims to provide information, promote understanding 
and support for the Court’s work, and to provide access to judicial proceedings.8
Effective outreach can enhance a tribunal’s legacy by demonstrating best judicial 
practices and building public trust in the rule of law. For example, Ou Virak, 
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President of the Cambodian Center for Human Rights, has noted that out-
reach, including media coverage and public attendance at hearings, “can play a 
role in demonstrating and developing an understanding of core fair trial rights 
and the processes and procedures of a court operating based on international 
standards of justice.”9
The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) 
defines legacy as a court’s “lasting impact on bolstering the rule of law in a par-
ticular society, by conducting effective trials to contribute to ending impunity, 
while also strengthening domestic judicial capacity.”10 This definition encom-
passes professional development, the provision of physical infrastructure, ca-
talysis of domestic legal reform, and development of local confidence in the rule 
of law. A positive legacy thus depends both on a court’s “demonstration effects” 
and capacity- building measures.
Outreach
It is often said that justice needs to be seen to be done.11 However, outreach has 
been a weakness of international tribunals and is not an automatic strength of 
hybrid courts. Outreach in postconflict states inevitably faces serious obstacles, 
although they vary from case to case. Low levels of literacy and poor informa-
tion infrastructure have been consistent hurdles for international and hybrid 
courts. Political resistance to these courts in certain communities has been a 
challenge in most instances as well12— a concern in Cambodia with respect to 
former Khmer Rouge strongholds in the northwestern parts of the country.
Mixed institutional design presents the same risks of political discord and 
ownership struggles over outreach initiatives as are evident in other aspects of 
hybrid courts’ functions. Moreover, as with international courts, hybrid courts’ 
budget and staffing allocations, and perceived institutional priorities, have con-
sistently favored core judicial functions, giving short shrift to programs that 
share their work with the public.13 The ECCC is no exception, and thus the 
natural advantages that its location and composition afford have been tempered 
by shortcomings in its institutional design, endowment, and political will.
Positive and Negative Precedents
By the time of the ECCC’s creation, a number of lessons could be drawn from 
the courts that preceded it. Outreach proved to be a major deficiency at the 
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ICTY and ICTR. Neither tribunal launched an outreach program until 1998, 
several years after they were created. By that time, both had suffered reputation-
al damage partly due to criticism from local government authorities suspicious 
of their activities.14 In Rwanda, a 2002 survey showed that eight years after the 
ICTR’s establishment, 87% of respondents indicated that they were not well 
informed about the tribunal or knew nothing at all about it.15 The ICC also 
got a slow start. It provided few funds for outreach, tried to adopt a low- profile 
presence in countries in which it conducted investigations, and relied on brief 
“fly- in- fly- out” visits to provide public information.16
The Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) demonstrated that in- country 
hybrid courts can have significant advantages in terms of outreach.17 SCSL of-
ficials began connecting with the public almost immediately, setting the ambi-
tious goal of visiting all of the major towns in each of Sierra Leone’s 12 districts 
in the first four months after the Court’s creation. There was virtually no mass 
media in Sierra Leone, so outreach teams had to travel around the country to 
keep the population informed.18 Led by Prosecutor David Crane and Registrar 
Robin Vincent, they achieved this by holding town- hall meetings— day- long 
affairs preceded by meetings between court outreach officials and local elders 
or chiefs.19 The SCSL also deployed outreach officers to each of the country’s 
districts and added outreach officers in Liberia and Guinea for the Charles Tay-
lor trial.20 The fact that the prosecutor’s office began the outreach process at the 
SCSL led to some public conflation between the court and the prosecution.21 
Once an outreach team was assembled, however, it took responsibility, and by 
2004 the entire outreach staff was Sierra Leonean. By 2009, it had a dedicated 
Outreach Office with 17 officers and was reportedly conducting 272 outreach 
programs per month in Sierra Leone and 16 per month in Liberia.22 It created 
a booklet entitled Special Court at a Glance to explain the tribunal in simple 
illustrated terms, as well as weekly radio programs with updates on the court 
proceedings, and screenings of short video trial segments.
The SCSL nevertheless faced funding challenges that limited its ability to 
do much more than disseminate basic information about the court, especially 
outside of the capital.23 The SCSL’s management committee decided not to 
fund the outreach program at all, and indeed outreach never appeared in the 
court’s budget, forcing staff to find finances elsewhere.24
Not all in- country hybrid courts have been as effective at disseminating in-
formation. In East Timor, the underfunded and understaffed Special Panels for 
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Serious Crimes (SPSC) never created either a general public affairs or outreach 
office for the court. The Serious Crimes Unit (SCU) made only modest efforts 
to reach out to victims, some of whom became highly critical of the process.25 A 
single staff person was assigned, among other duties, to serve as the public af-
fairs officer for both the SPSC and SCU.26 The United Nations considered out-
reach primarily a Timorese responsibility, but Timorese officials showed little 
interest or initiative.27 The SPSC’s most substantial outreach effort occurred in 
2005 when the deputy Prosecutor General for Serious Crimes visited 11 com-
munities to explain why the United Nations had decided to end the trials.28 The 
Timorese experience shows that effective outreach is not an automatic function 
of proximity or hybridity— it requires financial and political support.
The Institutional Structure for Outreach at the ECCC
Despite the relatively clear lessons provided by preceding tribunals, the ECCC 
was designed without explicit institutional provision for outreach. The Frame-
work Agreement and ECCC Law say nothing about the Court’s outreach to 
victims and the general population. Before the Court began operations in 2006, 
UN and Cambodian officials agreed to create a small public affairs office. A 
Cambodian appointee would head the office, reflecting the logic that national 
ownership can help connect survivors to the process as well as the Govern-
ment’s desire to control public information. To head the office, the RGC se-
lected Australian- born Helen Jarvis, an advisor to Deputy Prime Minister Sok 
An with close ties to the government. She worked alongside UN- appointed 
Public Affairs Officer Peter Foster and Cambodian- appointed Press Officer 
Reach Sambath.
The history of public feuds between the United Nations and Cambodian 
Government and the inherent sensitivity of public information functions— 
especially in a postcommunist state such as Cambodia— made outreach an 
obvious potential battleground at the Court and an area in which the hybrid 
institution would likely be strained. Foster notes that “the UN’s expectations for 
the mixed [public information] and communication office were low,”29 as UN 
officials anticipated struggles over how the ECCC’s work would be portrayed.
It was also unclear how the Court would prioritize goals such as informa-
tion provision, support for victims, survivor participation, and critical engage-
ment. NGO outreach advocates urged the ECCC to move beyond a “transpar-
ency model” focused on information provision toward an “engagement model” 
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premised on social dialogue,30 but doing so would entail resource commitments 
and openness to possible public critiques. Craig Etcheson, a former investigator 
in the Office of the Co- Prosecutors (OCP), recalls that different ideas on what 
forms of outreach to prioritize “manifested themselves all along at the ECCC” 
and became sources of “constant struggle.”31
Institutionally, the Court divided outreach functions and assigned respon-
sibilities to two distinct offices, though neither was invested with the express 
mandate or resources to prioritize extensive two- way public dialogue. In 2007, 
the ECCC judges formalized the public affairs office with the passage of the 
Internal Rules, which provided that the OA “shall establish a Public Affairs 
Section which shall have the duty of disseminating information to the public 
regarding the ECCC.”32 As discussed in chapter 7, the Internal Rules also estab-
lished a Victims Unit (VU) headed by a Cambodian with an international dep-
uty, responsible for “[assisting] the Public Affairs Section in outreach activities 
related to victims,” such as planning public forums with Court officials, sharing 
information with victims, and arranging for survivors to visit the proceedings.33 
These offices are formally independent of each other.
Although the Public Affairs Section (PAS) and the Victims Unit— later 
renamed the Victim Support Section (VSS)34— both undertake outreach func-
tions, neither is a dedicated outreach office per se. Their mandates overlap to a 
certain extent, but in practice, the PAS has concentrated on what it calls the 
“macro” approach to outreach— focusing on public information and a broad 
audience of donors, NGOs, and the general population.35 The VU/VSS has 
primarily taken a “micro” approach of facilitating participation by civil parties 
and complainants in the Court proceedings.36
The Court’s Outreach Functions37
The ECCC’s mixed composition and in- country location have offered signif-
icant advantages for outreach and led to important successes, but the Court 
never reached its full potential. The early decision not to compete with NGOs 
for funding was the most important initial constraint on effective Court out-
reach, but over time the key concern for NGOs and activists became a lack 
of institutional will to engage in two- way communications with the broader 
victim population, especially at times when the ECCC was wracked by political 
divisions. The Court’s mixed structure also presented a significant impediment 
to institutional accountability, as both UN and Cambodian officials have been 
loath to speak for the entire Court on sensitive issues.
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Scarce Funding and Reliance on Civil Society
Like other mass crimes courts, the ECCC’s initial budget provided scant fund-
ing for public affairs and little funding for travel to conduct outreach activities. 
Helen Jarvis and Peter Foster presented this as a conscious decision to leave 
outreach to NGOs and focus PAS efforts on public relations. The decision may 
have been driven by a lack of willing funders. Foster asserts that the restrictions 
on the outreach budget “came from all sides, the UN, the donors and the Cam-
bodian officials.”38 However, to a large degree, the budget for outreach was kept 
small within the ECCC due to the fact that Cambodia had a developed NGO 
sector with some organizations well- equipped to assist in outreach and help the 
Court conserve resources.39
Indeed, civil society was more developed in Cambodia than in Sierra Leone 
or East Timor, and to date at least 15 civil society groups have worked with the 
ECCC on outreach in a variety of areas.40 Thus, in November 2006, OA Direc-
tor Sean Visoth told the Friends group of donor states that most of the ECCC’s 
challenges stemmed from the lack of funds to support public outreach trips and 
encouraged donors to fund NGO projects if outreach was to be successful.41 
However, former ICTY official David Tolbert cautioned U.S. officials that the 
underfunded outreach scheme would be “detrimental to any hopes for a legacy 
effect of the ECCC on Cambodia’s judicial system.”42
The ECCC received modest additional resources for outreach activities in 
2007 when the Swiss government paid for an international Outreach Officer for 
one year.43 In 2008– 9, the PAS budget increased,44 partly due to the efforts of 
new PAS chief Reach Sambath to secure Cambodian Government funding to 
bring members of the public to observe proceedings. By 2011, the Court had five 
Cambodian staff positions in outreach alongside two UN- appointed officials, 
in addition to six Cambodian staffers within the VSS assigned specifically to 
outreach.45 Yet resources remained limited and dwindled after the Duch trial. 
In 2011, the budget for outreach— which had grown to approximately 500,000 
dollars per year— was slashed due to fewer planned outreach sessions, and not 
all of the funds in the budget were actually received or spent on outreach. Out-
reach functions also suffered significant cuts as part of the Court’s “austerity 
measures” in 2013.46
The ECCC’s slim outreach budget was predicated on its ability to lean heav-
ily on local civil society organizations throughout the process to spread word 
about the tribunal.47 Early in the Court’s lifetime, the Open Society Justice Ini-
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tiative (OSJI) established monthly informational exchange meetings for NGOs. 
The Public Affairs Section was soon attending and “using their [outreach] pro-
grams as a vehicle for public outreach.”48 Christoph Sperfeldt, who worked first 
as an advisor to the Cambodian Human Rights Action Committee and later 
with the VSS, recalls: “Cambodian NGOs filled the gap and dominated the 
field of outreach until at least 2009, after which the Court gave further attention 
to its outreach program.”49
Partnering with NGOs was a sensible strategy, as NGOs have extensive 
field networks and experience in local communities and are able to operate at 
relatively low costs. However, some experts suggest overreliance on civil society 
had drawbacks. Sperfeldt argues that “the lack of an outreach strategy among the 
ECCC and civil society created problems with developing consistent messages 
about the Court,” as well as managing victims’ expectations.50 Moreover, some 
civil society groups found it difficult to engage with the ECCC on outreach due 
to the lack of a “focal point within the Court,” such as an NGO liaison officer,51 
as well as PAS’s preference for public relations over dialogue. Scholar Mychelle 
Balthazard notes research indicating that mass media is a more efficient means 
of communication than specific community outreach activities— especially at 
the beginning of a process— and says, “The absence of an early [ECCC] mass 
media campaign and the focus on community meetings was a limitation of rely-
ing too much on NGOs.”52
NGOs started losing outreach funding after 2010, perhaps partly due to 
the increase in PAS activities, particularly bringing large numbers of persons to 
observe Court proceedings. Currently, there is little available funding for civil 
society to complement Court activities, reportedly in part due to the fact that 
state donors do not want to fund outreach related to Cases 003/004.53
Printed and Online Outreach Materials, Radio Program
One of the first public outreach initiatives was the creation of a booklet entitled 
“An Introduction to the Khmer Rouge Trials” with basic information about the 
Court. The booklet was designed to be accessible to ordinary Cambodians, with 
lean text and engaging images. In spring 2008, the ECCC launched a helpful 
monthly newsletter called The Court Report in English and Khmer including 
updates on various aspects of its work, later posting it online and using NGOs 
to help distribute it.54 After the Duch verdict, the Court produced a short and 
simple leaflet on his verdict, and in June 2013 the Court produced a booklet on 
how to become a civil party in Cases 003 and 004.55 The ECCC has also built 
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and maintained a sophisticated website with a wealth of information and Court 
documents. Independent of the Court, the “Cambodia Tribunal Monitor,” co-
hosted by the Northwestern University School of Law and the Documentation 
Center of Cambodia (DC- Cam), provides live online feeds of the proceedings 
and relevant documents and analysis.56
These efforts have made information about the Court quite easy to find 
for Cambodians and foreigners with Internet access. They appear to have had 
a relatively small impact in the countryside, however, due to high rates of func-
tional illiteracy, the limited numbers of booklets printed, and uneven distribu-
tion across the country.57 Posters and stickers about the Court also advertise its 
activities with the obvious drawback of extremely limited content in the form 
of a single phrase or slogan.58 In November 2011, the Court launched its first 
radio program, offering weekly highlights of the Court’s Case 002 trial hearings 
and a call- in program with guest speakers.59 Regrettably, that program had to 
be suspended in late 2012 for lack of funds but was relaunched for Case 002/01 
closing arguments.60
Village Forums
Other PAS initiatives have tried to build broader public understanding through 
trips to provincial villages, schools, and public forums. The Court’s proximity 
to survivors and involvement of Khmer staff indisputably raised its capacity to 
conduct these forms of outreach. A few outreach events have been instigated 
and organized by the Court. For example, in early 2008 the Co- Investigating 
Judges planned a town hall– style outreach meeting in the former Khmer Rouge 
stronghold of Pailin, largely to put potential witnesses at ease, followed by a 
PAS effort to distribute informational materials in the area.61
Most village forums related to the ECCC process have been led by civil 
society organizations, however. NGO enterprise has increased the remit of out-
reach activities to include education and dialogue beyond the Court’s in- house 
capacity.62 Activities that build on the ECCC’s mandate to address broader 
themes are part of a “multiplier” effect that has enabled NGOs to use the trials 
as a portal through which to address other topics, including some that had long 
been taboo.
For example, the Center for Social Development (CSD) held a series of 
public forums involving various ECCC officials, including dialogue on “justice 
and history” and “reconciliation and healing” alongside question- and- answer 
sessions with selected Court officials.63 DC- Cam also organized a series of vil-
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lage forums including ECCC officials to educate the public about the tribu-
nal and encourage dialogue about the Khmer Rouge experience.64 The Khmer 
Institute for Democracy, human rights group ADHOC, and others have also 
organized outreach sessions.65 Although all organizations except DC- Cam cut 
general outreach activities in 2010 when less donor funding became available, 
some continued to broadcast radio shows or distribute newsletters, and others 
focused their scarce resources on civil party participation.
Public Access to the Proceedings
Among the most noteworthy aspects of the ECCC’s outreach has been its 
success— often through NGO partnerships— in making the trial proceedings 
publicly available. The ECCC is designed to be accessible to the public. The 
Framework Agreement emphasizes that openness is a mechanism for ensuring 
fairness and “credibility of the procedure.”66 The ECCC Law therefore mandates:
Trials shall be public and open to representatives of foreign States, of the 
Secretary- General of the United Nations, of the media and of national and in-
ternational non- government organizations unless in exceptional circumstances 
the Extraordinary Chambers decide to close the proceedings for good cause in 
accordance with existing procedures in force where publicity would prejudice 
the interests of justice.67
The Internal Rules provide further that, with certain exceptions, “[t]he Office of 
Administration shall ensure a public broadcast of the trial hearings.”68 Neither 
international law nor Cambodian domestic law requires that criminal trials be 
broadcast publicly.69 Thus, in adopting the rules, the ECCC judges took an un-
precedented step toward promoting transparency.
Relative to other international and hybrid courts, the ECCC has been ex-
tremely active in arranging for public visits to the courtroom gallery and tribu-
nal premises, arranging for free public transport to the premises or partnering 
with civil society groups. This became a particular focus of Reach Sambath, 
who replaced Helen Jarvis as head of the PAS in June 2009. The ECCC has 
the largest public viewing gallery among mass crimes tribunals with nearly 500 
seats. The gallery was full nearly to capacity each day during the Duch trial70— a 
marked contrast to the experience of fully international courts— and has also 
had a regular stream of attendees for Case 002 hearings. This is also a striking 
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improvement over the SCSL, which in its early years often had just 10 to 20 
people in the public viewing gallery— primarily court reporters and relatives of 
the accused.71
Significant numbers of people have also participated in the Khmer Rouge 
Tribunal Study Tour Program, which involves a one- day village information 
session, followed by a one- day tour of the ECCC, Tuol Sleng Genocide Muse-
um, and Choeung Ek Killing Fields (time permitting). More than 31,000 people 
observed the Duch trial in 2009, including approximately 4,000 who came to 
the Court for the reading of the verdict in the case. Scholars Kheang Un and 
Judy Ledgerwood argued on the eve of the Duch verdict:
While Cambodians and concerned foreigners have been divided on the value of 
the tribunal, particularly given the hybrid nature of the tribunal and the limited 
number of prosecutions, the public education value of the trial of Duch has 
been worth the expense and difficulties faced thus far.72
Between the start of the Duch trial in 2009 and the end of 2011, an impres-
sive 111,543 people visited the Court, either to see live proceedings or as part 
of a Study Tour.73 In all, nearly 100,000 people attended the 212 days of Case 
002 trial hearings held from November 21, 2011, to July 23, 2013.74 Of these, 
over 83% were Cambodians who availed themselves of the ECCC’s provision of 
free transportation for group visits.75 Former Cambodian Public Affairs Officer 
Huy Vannak says, “Villagers are proud to have been to Court; to them it’s like 
visiting Angkar Wat temple.” He also notes that although many government 
officials would never bother to attend a domestic judicial hearing because they 
are not seen as important, ministers have visited the ECCC. “These things help 
change the attitude of [ordinary] people toward courts. It will encourage them 
to bring cases to court and change their perception of judges.”76
Of course, outreach is not only a question of numbers. Its success also de-
pends on how well informed individuals are about the process. One Cambodian 
ECCC staffer repeats a commonly heard criticism that the Court’s outreach is 
“only successful [in terms of ] the quantity but not the quality,” arguing that the 
public only understands general facts about the Court but has difficulty fol-
lowing complex factual and legal issues “even [if ] they are in the courtroom.”77 
Huy acknowledges that the PAS has focused more on the quantity of visitors 
than the quality of their individual learning experiences.78 Although more than 
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200,000 Cambodians have visited the Court, it lacks a budget to enable them 
to stay overnight in Phnom Penh. Villagers who live in distant provinces must 
as a consequence travel overnight to reach the Court early in the morning for a 
full day of activities, becoming tired and losing focus before returning to their 
homes late that night.79 This makes it difficult for villagers from remote areas, 
including many minority groups, to attend. Nevertheless, Huy argues that there 
is value in bringing large numbers of Cambodians to witness proceedings be-
cause “they feel like they own the process.”80
Outcomes in Public Knowledge and Understanding
The ultimate measure of success in outreach is the extent to which the public— 
including victims of Khmer Rouge atrocities and their families— are able to 
understand the process and derive meaning from it. Although it is too early to 
draw definitive judgments about the ECCC’s impact on the Cambodian popu-
lation, studies on public opinion allow interim assessments to be made. A 2008 
survey conducted by the Human Rights Center at the University of California 
at Berkeley provided impetus for the Court to redouble its outreach efforts. 
Although most respondents who knew of the ECCC viewed it favorably, 39% of 
those surveyed were unaware of the Court, and a further 46% had little knowl-
edge of the tribunal.81
A second Berkeley survey indicated increasing public knowledge. By 2010 
the number of people with no awareness of the ECCC dropped to 25%, and the 
percentage of people reporting “moderate or higher” knowledge of the Court 
rose from 15% to 25%.82 Two- thirds of respondents were able to identify the 
ECCC as a hybrid court in 2010, in contrast to roughly one- half in 2008.83
Several factors likely contributed to this improvement, including expand-
ed NGO programs, the start of the Duch trial in 2009, and greater interest 
and coverage on the part of local media. Some credit certainly belongs to the 
ECCC, which coordinated media and public access to the Court. The PAS set 
up live video feeds to the proceedings. With PAS support, Asian International 
Justice Initiative and Khmer Mekong films also produced a weekly television 
show called “Duch on Trial,” which appeared on Cambodia’s leading television 
network. Nearly one- quarter of people responding to the 2010 Berkeley survey 
reported watching “Duch on Trial.”84
On the other hand, the attention paid by the regular Khmer- language me-
dia to the ECCC has been minimal and inconsistent. Journalists tend to cover 
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the Court on a big news day, such as the first day of trial, but then attention 
tapers off. Moreover, often the local media merely reproduces content from PAS 
press statements without adding any analysis. In this way, the PAS controls 
the message, and Cambodians generally have no knowledge of internal court 
debates unless they read the English- language Cambodia Daily or Phnom Penh 
Post newspapers.85
As mentioned above, the PAS was established primarily to conduct me-
dia and public relations— a narrower and less resource- intensive function than 
outreach. Due to its narrow mandate, it operates more like a press office than 
an outreach office. The primary consequence is that it has never prioritized en-
gaging victims in two- way conversations. Thus, while an impressive number of 
people have witnessed Court proceedings and know the Court exists, there is 
little if any evidence that outreach efforts lead participants to understand the 
process in any depth. Even people who are interested in the ECCC’s work often 
have unrealistic expectations about what it can achieve.
Some Cambodians hoped that international participation in the Court 
would bring “complete justice” and understanding about what happened to the 
country and to their families, and result in reparations and compensation. The 
Court has largely failed to temper these expectations by explaining why and how 
it makes decisions that shape the scope of what will be addressed at trial and af-
fect the participatory rights of victims. For example, the PAS did not distribute 
any information about how the Case 002 indictment was split into different trial 
segments, why this was done, and what the impact would be on the story told at 
trial. Eight months after severance, some civil parties said they didn’t understand 
how or why the case had been divided.86 Panhavuth Long of the Cambodian 
Justice Initiative says, “Court officials always say, ‘The role of the court is to pros-
ecute. It’s your problem you don’t understand what’s going on because you don’t 
ask and don’t turn on your TV.’ But you can’t betray your constituency.”87
Challenges of a Split Public Affairs Section
In addition to resource constraints, ECCC outreach sometimes has faced chal-
lenges in managing a single coherent and credible message between the two 
sides of the Court. Its divided outreach structure, like so many of its elements, 
leaves it acutely vulnerable to conflict between its national and international 
halves. Tasks and authorities were vague from the outset, and “official lines of 
responsibility were very unclear.”88 The PAS was initially less divided than other 
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aspects of the Office of Administration (OA), due both to its small size and to 
the fact that its members generally saw eye- to- eye on the importance of out-
reach and public dialogue.89 Yet there were significant differences in Cambodian 
and international approaches to outreach at the Court.
According to Foster, the PAS had support from essentially all international 
officials at the ECCC and most of the judges. Senior Cambodian administrators 
and Court officials appeared to “not understand the impact of communication 
and outreach fully and had some reservations about the level of transparency for 
which we were advocating,” although they “did not interfere with our work” and 
became appreciative in some cases.90 The two sides also favored different styles 
of communication. Foster asserts that “[s]enior Cambodian officials saw it as 
a mostly one- way communication flow to give information, while the interna-
tional side understood it as more of a two- way dialogue.”91
Both its small budget and the abundance of “bosses” that its Cambodian 
personnel are required to satisfy have constrained the national side of the PAS, 
making it more reactive than proactive and compromising the staff ’s ability to 
assert independence and forge unified messages.92 When controversies have 
arisen, the PAS has reflected the broader division between the two sides of the 
Court, with the national Press Officer authorized only to speak on behalf of the 
Cambodian side, and the UN- appointed Press Officer entitled only to speak for 
the international side.93 Foster argues that the challenges faced by the PAS were 
closely tied to the structure of the Court:
The split administration . . . was a nightmare. Everything was duplicated, lines 
of responsibility were not clear, there was a clear division between national and 
international staff in terms of working conditions, rights and protections, and 
most frustratingly, there were often strong disagreements over key issues be-
tween senior officials, leaving the [public affairs] office struggling to find a way 
to work with a single voice. This was most clearly evident from the corruption 
scandal.94
In such instances, the lead Cambodian and UN public affairs representatives 
have sometimes contradicted one another as they speak for their respective 
sides. For observers of the Court, and particularly for ordinary Cambodians, 
dueling press releases have caused confusion and reduced confidence and trust 
in the process.95
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A particularly notable example occurred in June 2010, when UN Legal 
Communication Officer Lars Olsen announced that “the first investigative acts 
in Cases 003 and 004 [had been] taken [on the previous] Friday in the form of 
confidential rogatory letters [. . .], which were signed by both [Co- Investigating 
Judges].”96 In response, Cambodian Interior Ministry spokesman Lt. Gen. Kh-
ieu Sopheak reiterated the government’s opposition to the new prosecutions, 
citing Hun Sen’s warnings of possible unrest. “Just only the top five leaders [are] 
to be tried,” he said. “Not six. Just five.”97 As discussed in chapter 6, the next 
day, Cambodian Co- Investigating Judge (CIJ) You Bunleng struck his signature 
from the rogatory letters and returned them to his international counterpart, 
Marcel Lemonde, with a note explaining that he no longer believed it was “op-
portune to take action in Cases 003 and 004.”98
That evening, ECCC Public Affairs Chief Reach Sambath issued a state-
ment on You Bunleng’s dissociation from the rogatory letters, describing the 
media statement based on Lars Olsen’s comments as “non- basis information.”99 
Although Reach Sambath originally said that his statement was issued in con-
sultation with the UN side of the office, soon afterward, he acknowledged 
publicly that his media alert “was unilaterally sent on behalf of the national 
component of the court  .  .  . without consultation or advance information to 
the international component of the ECCC.”100 That admission was an evident 
attempt to mend relations with his UN counterparts, but showed that on the 
most sensitive subjects, the PAS, like the rest of the Court, would break down 
into its two component sides.
Transparency Concerns
Some of the Court’s most important work has been confidential, leading to di-
minished public transparency and limiting the information outreach officials 
can provide.101 That issue is directly tied to the structure of the Court— the 
ECCC’s adoption of a civil law model of confidential investigations necessar-
ily shrouds some of its work in secrecy.102 According to Panhavuth Long, this 
prolonged period of concealment contributed to unrealistic victim expecta-
tions about what the Court would be able to address. He says, “The moment 
the investigation becomes public it contributes to realistic expectations. . . . It is 
[the Court’s] responsibility to manage expectations and if they don’t it is a bad 
model. You can’t go back and undo expectations.”103
The parameters of confidentiality were tested by counsel and journalists 
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who have sought to keep the public informed about procedural controversies. 
For example, when the CIJs closed Case 003 with a one- sentence press state-
ment, the international Co- Prosecutor released public information about the 
crime sites and his additional investigative requests, and was rebuked for acting 
beyond his authority.104
The Court has occasionally threatened to sanction persons who have re-
vealed nonpublic information, relying on a provision in the Internal Rules al-
lowing it to discipline anyone who “interferes with the administration of jus-
tice.”105 For example, in 2009, the CIJs warned Ieng Sary’s defense counsel for 
publicly releasing confidential documents— their own motions related to their 
client’s health and strictly legal issues— on a public website.106 The team had 
questioned the Court’s selective publication of documents, suggesting that the 
CIJs were “suppressing Defence filings which may be embarrassing or which 
call into question the legitimacy and judiciousness of acts and decisions of the 
judges” under the “fig leaf ” of confidentiality.107 Both civil parties and the Co- 
Prosecutors supported the team’s underlying request for greater transparency. 
Nevertheless, to date there is a lack of clarity and, in the view of some parties, 
a lack of consistent reasoning as to why some motions and decisions are made 
public (with redactions if necessary) and others remain confidential.108
Although some degree of confidentiality is legitimate, the Court has ap-
plied its coercive power inconsistently and primarily in relation to revelations 
associated with judicial interference.109 For example, in 2010 the Court threat-
ened to sanction reporters who referenced confidential documents from Pre- 
Trial Chamber (PTC) proceedings that alleged political bias at the Court.110 
In 2011, the PTC judges issued a press release similarly threatening journalists 
with sanctions amid the Case 003/004 dispute, as media reports referenced 
two leaked prosecutorial submissions describing the crimes of the five new 
suspects,111 whose names first had been made public by an enraged civil party 
months previously. The release of the submissions was an egregious (though not 
unprecedented) breach of the Court’s confidentiality rules and a potential dan-
ger to witnesses named therein. However, it also revealed the depth of internal 
frustration over the CIJs handling of the cases and failure to share basic infor-
mation with the public about its work through the Public Affairs Section.112
Problems related to corruption and judicial interference have led to an ex-
tended media focus on those issues, discouraging judges and other Court of-
ficials from participating in outreach events, and consuming time and resources 
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that could otherwise have been used to educate the public about the ECCC’s 
activities. Moreover, scandals and crises provide strong incentives for Court of-
ficials to defend the institution and reduce transparency, which can undermine 
the credibility of its communications as a whole.113 For example, when ECCC 
staff, Court monitors, and the media were all alleging that the CIJs had closed 
Case 003 without fully investigating, the PAS Court Report contained only a 
sanitized discussion of Court investigation procedures, neglecting to mention 
the existence of the raging controversy.114 According to civil society advocates, 
the Court’s early lack of outreach and information on Cases 003 and 004— even 
after the suspects’ names were leaked to the press in early 2011— is a major rea-
son why fewer victims have submitted complaints and civil party applications 
for those cases.115
These events have contributed to an impression that the ECCC seeks to 
prevent unflattering information from emerging about the tribunal, which risks 
diminishing the credibility of the Court’s own informational functions.116 Nev-
ertheless, Huy Vannak points out that the ECCC is the first court in Cambodia 
to have a public affairs section, and this makes it more transparent than other 
Cambodian courts. He says that Cambodians “know almost everything” about 
what is going on, and this provides a good model for building rule of law.117
Overall Outreach Performance
To the extent that the ECCC faced funding challenges in outreach, it was large-
ly able to surmount those challenges by relying on NGO initiatives. The depth 
of understanding that many Cambodians have of the process is shallow, but the 
Court and its civil society partners together have made impressive progress in 
terms of the number of individuals they have reached and the range of outreach 
mechanisms they have designed. Most ECCC officials rightly consider outreach 
to be one of the Court’s relative successes.118
Yet the Court’s other functional problems— the slow pace of the proceed-
ings, corruption allegations, and political interference— put its outreach efforts 
in jeopardy. Chandra Lekha Sriram notes that in Sierra Leone, “outreach, and 
perhaps the image of the Court generally, suffered from an obstacle beyond its 
control— embedded biases and preconceptions. For at least some who view the 
Court as politicized, it is possible that no amount of outreach will change their 
minds.”119 That is a real risk to the ECCC as well. Although the ECCC is for-
tunate to have had relatively strong public support in Cambodia to date, that 
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support could erode if the Court is not perceived to produce independent and 
impartial judicial results.
Legacy
The United Nations has participated in hybrid tribunals with the explicit goal of 
strengthening national judicial systems. In a 2010 report to the Security Coun-
cil, UN Secretary- General Ban Ki- moon noted that the purpose for creating 
the SCSL and ECCC “includes the strengthening of the local judicial system.” 
In East Timor and Kosovo, “[b]uilding capacity was one of the principal aims,” 
and at the Bosnian War Crimes Chamber, the “aim was to build the capacity of 
judges, prosecutors and staff.”120 Kofi Annan expressed the expectation that the 
ECCC should have “considerable legacy value, inasmuch as it will result in the 
transfer of skills and know- how to Cambodian court personnel.”121
The potential of hybrid courts to leave a stronger positive legacy than off- 
site international courts is only that— a potential. Proximity to the survivor 
population and local judiciary can backfire and create a negative or “reverse” leg-
acy by draining talent from the local system, diverting attention from the need 
for domestic reform, or producing shoddy trials that undermine public confi-
dence in national courts.122 There are also legitimate concerns among tribunals’ 
staff and donors that hybrid courts are not the right institutions to lead efforts 
at local capacity- building, because doing so diverts scarce human and financial 
resources from their main task of conducting complex criminal trials.123
Indeed, capacity- building has been a challenge at other hybrid courts. Like 
its hybrid peers, the SCSL was justified partly on its capacity- building poten-
tial. Former Registrar Robin Vincent argued that the SCSL could provide three 
types of legacy to Sierra Leone: brick- and- mortar infrastructure, human re-
source development, and institutions.124 Its constitutive documents include no 
mention of legacy, however. Modest legacy initiatives were late to emerge, and 
contact between the Special Court and ordinary courts was limited, leading a 
key trial monitor to conclude that the SCSL had “fallen far short of expectations 
in contributing to national legal development.”125 The mixed panels in Kosovo 
suffered from shortfalls in resources and difficulty recruiting experienced inter-
national staff that hampered capacity- building.126 For similar reasons, the Ti-
morese Special Panels have also been criticized for failing to exercise their full 
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capacity- building potential.127 Elena Baylis argues that, with respect to legacy, 
“hybrid courts have thus far failed to fulfill their promise.”128
The Lack of a Legacy Mandate or Office
Perhaps in part due to concerns about limited resources, the Framework Agree-
ment, ECCC Law, and Internal Rules include no explicit mention of the Court’s 
legacy and do not mandate the ECCC to undertake specific activities to build 
local capacity or encourage domestic legal reform. The Internal Rules include 
only a single such provision, requiring the Defence Support Section (DSS) to 
“[o]rganize training for defense lawyers in consultation and cooperation with 
the BAKC” (the Bar Association of the Kingdom of Cambodia).129 With the 
exception of the DSS, the absence of a clear legacy mandate has contributed to 
uncertainty among ECCC officials regarding who has the authority or responsi-
bility to lead capacity- building activities and other legacy initiatives.130 The lack 
of a specific mandate allows Court units to be entrepreneurial and capitalize on 
opportunities for legacy projects,131 but in practice Court officials have tended 
to prioritize work associated with the criminal cases and other mandated Court 
functions.132
The ECCC’s Legacy Functions
In August 2009, OSJI issued a damning interim conclusion about legacy efforts 
at the ECCC:
One of the primary justifications for locating the court within the Cambodian 
court system was the hope that it would leave a positive legacy on rule of law 
reform in Cambodia. This does not appear to be happening in any material 
way. Capacity building, developing model practices for domestic courts, and 
providing an example of justice that meets international standards and defies 
impunity are often cited as goals of the ECCC. Yet these goals are unlikely to 
be met without a sustained and concerted effort from senior court officials and 
political will from the government. Unfortunately both appear to be lacking . . . 
Little has been done by the court to build the understanding or capacity of legal 
professionals and personnel outside of the ECCC.133
Despite the lack of a formal legacy mandate, in early 2010 the ECCC established 
within the OA a Legacy Advisory Group to discuss issues related to the Court’s 
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legacy and a Legacy Secretariat to decide upon and execute strategies.134 In early 
2010, the OHCHR also established a post for a Legacy Officer to work with 
the ECCC. Both the Advisory Group and Secretariat are composed of a mix 
of national and international officials, but neither group has been very active 
to date. According to one senior court official, the 30- member Advisory Group 
“is more or less set up to fail,” having as of fall 2012 completed only a 12- page 
memorandum on meeting procedures.135 Due to a lack of leadership, neither 
side has demonstrated the will or ability to take on responsibilities beyond the 
Court’s narrow judicial mandate. Although some international personnel seek 
to engage in legacy initiatives, senior UN administrators want legacy to be the 
responsibility of the national side, leading to an overall lack of accountability.136
The potential residual benefits of hybrid courts for domestic legal systems 
are commonly classified into at least four types: physical infrastructure and ma-
terials, professional development, law reform, and promotion of a rule- of- law 
culture.137 ECCC contributions to each are discussed briefly below.138
An Informational Legacy
The ECCC is contributing to two archival efforts: a physical repository for 
ECCC records— “The ECCC Documentation Center”— to be housed in a new 
building paid for by the Japanese Government, and a virtual repository of Court 
and NGO documents called the “Virtual Tribunal” (VT) that will be based at 
that location.139 The VT project is being created as a joint project by the ECCC 
together with the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, the War Crimes 
Studies Center at the University of California at Berkeley, and the East- West 
Center in Honolulu.
Although other online tribunal resources exist— most notably the Court’s 
own website and the Cambodia Tribunal Monitor— the Virtual Tribunal proj-
ect would include additional multimedia interactive and educational features 
specifically designed for domestic capacity- building. It thus offers a potentially 
valuable resource for a new generation of Cambodian law students and scholars, 
as well as other interested survivors.140 Although Internet penetration remains 
low in outlying areas of Cambodia, it is increasing steadily, especially among the 
university and secondary school students most apt to join the ranks of the legal 
profession.
Like other areas of the ECCC’s work, the creation of a physical legacy en-
tails political considerations and a meeting of the minds between national and 
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international officials. In the case of the Virtual Tribunal, the United Nations 
has deferred to national leadership. In its 2012– 13 budget proposal, the ECCC 
requested no funding for the international side of the tribunal for legacy but 
$905,000 for the Cambodian side over a two- year period, “particularly related 
to the Virtual Tribunal.”141 It also requested five new posts, all on the national 
side of the Court, focused on developing the Virtual Tribunal.142 None of that 
budgetary request was approved, and the proposed Legacy Component has re-
ceived no funding or personnel.143 UN disengagement and denial of funds show 
that legacy remains a low priority at the ECCC and suggests donor disinterest 
in (or distrust of ) the proposed Cambodian- led legacy program.
Strong national participation in legacy functions is entirely appropriate, 
but the absence of UN involvement will enable the Cambodian Government 
to control the content of the Virtual Tribunal site and other legacy programs, 
and to exclude information it considers controversial or unfavorable. Given the 
contentious politics surrounding the tribunal and current weakness of the rule 
of law in Cambodia, that poses a considerable risk to the endeavor. There is 
also concern that expensive and centralized legacy projects are highly suscep-
tible to graft, and that some government officials seek to pursue them for that 
purpose.144 This has implications both for donor interest and the willingness 
of those implementing these projects to see them through in a way that makes 
them meaningful for ordinary Cambodians.
Capacity- Building
Both international appointees and Cambodians working at the ECCC con-
sistently emphasize that the skills development of individuals working at the 
ECCC will be a Court legacy. A number cite the advantages of hybrid legal 
teams— both in terms of efficacy and knowledge sharing. Former head of the 
Defence Support Section Rupert Skilbeck emphasizes the complementary na-
ture of the skills of local and international lawyers.145 International lawyers gen-
erally have taken the lead on written submissions— which are not a prominent 
part of normal Cambodian practice— and help develop their Cambodian coun-
terparts’ ability to engage in effective legal drafting and reasoning. Cambodian 
lawyers play more prominent roles in witness interviews and review of Khmer- 
language materials, providing social and historical context that helps educate 
their UN- appointed peers.146 Lawyers practicing at the ECCC, such as Karim 
Khan who led a civil party team in Case 001, say their work has been facilitated 
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immensely by the presence of Cambodian lawyers.147 They speak the three lan-
guages of the Court and understand the evidence, the context, and the factual 
matrix (i.e., setting) best. They also best understand Cambodian procedures— 
the foundation of the Internal Rules.
Unsurprisingly, skill sharing and knowledge transfer have occurred most 
readily when nationals and internationals have worked together— which has 
not been the case in all ECCC offices, with some physically segregated on op-
posing sides of the hall. The Office of the Co- Prosecutors has been praised for 
making a concerted effort to have mixed local and international teams work-
ing together to share their knowledge. Etcheson notes: “From the beginning, 
both Robert Petit and Bill Smith emphasized the need for close cooperation. 
To a great extent, Chea Leang and [her deputy] Yeth Chakrya reciprocated that 
point of view.”148 Although OCP personnel often “spoke metaphorically about 
the two sides of the hall,” they decided early in the process to integrate the office, 
with the international side hiring some Cambodian staffers and vice versa.149 
The OCP also initiated a staff “happy hour” every Friday afternoon, which one 
former Cambodian staff member cites as an important mechanism for generat-
ing office unity. He says, “each side had a different boss with a different agenda, 
but the happy hour built team spirit.”150
Etcheson argues that while “organizational change happens on a generation-
al scale,” at the ECCC “technical transfer has been quite marked” and cites the 
example of the uses of precedent. At the time of the ECCC’s inception, there 
were few if any records of judicial decisions in the country, and judges relied 
largely on oral traditions and their own past experience. At the ECCC, “national 
colleagues began to understand the need for precedents in deciding complex 
legal questions.”151
OA Director Tony Kranh emphasizes regularly that Cambodians who work 
at the Court will be an asset to the Cambodian legal system when they return.152 
Indeed, both ECCC advocates and some Cambodians point to the possibility 
that norms and practices at the ECCC will “trickle down” to the domestic judi-
cial system.153 Cambodian defense and civil party lawyers involved in the ECCC 
proceedings have by all accounts improved their knowledge of relevant laws and 
procedures and their skills as advocates, and they continue to practice as part of 
the local bar association. In a legal system with limited capacity, though they are 
only several in number, their ability to train others could have a nonnegligible 
impact. For example, Judge Nil Nonn, president of the Trial Chamber, has said 
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that he has appreciated learning from the “reasoning culture” of his international 
counterparts on the bench and would seek to raise capacity of Cambodian judg-
es he trains in the future.154 Nevertheless, it is not clear incidental job training 
alone can generate an ECCC capacity- building legacy.
Court monitor Heather Ryan has been more circumspect about the likeli-
hood that capacity will “trickle down”:
[S]ome transfer of skills has already resulted from the ECCC structure of hav-
ing experienced international judges, prosecutors, and defence counsel working 
side by side with Cambodian counterparts, who are less experienced in complex 
criminal cases. As the first trial progressed, there was visible improvement in the 
skill demonstrated by the Cambodian trial judges and counsel for the parties . . . 
However, it remains to be seen if, and how, they will be able to transfer these 
skills when they return to the domestic court setting.155
OA Deputy Director Knut Rosandhaug has similarly noted that the fruits of 
capacity- building will be seen only when the ECCC finishes its work and na-
tional staff return to the domestic system.156
The Court has undertaken only modest efforts to train non- ECCC per-
sonnel. Targeted education and training initiatives have primarily involved one- 
off workshops, conferences, and lectures, as well as a few internships, but little 
has been done to formalize the capacity- building process. Skilbeck argues that 
the ECCC’s capacity- building potential will be unfulfilled absent considerably 
more concrete institutional focus on training activities.157 The DSS— the only 
part of the ECCC with a specific mandate to that effect— has indeed been ac-
tive. Its legacy program is organized around three pillars: training sessions for 
Cambodian defense lawyers who will practice at the ECCC, internal training 
seminars, and an outreach program to draw attention to defense rights in the 
NGO community and general public.158 It has worked with the OHCHR to 
organize a months- long training for Cambodian law students about fair trial 
rights.159 Many of those programs have been arranged with civil society orga-
nizations. The OCP has also offered training sessions to local prosecutors, and 
the ECCC offers a range of internship programs for aspiring Cambodian law-
yers and judges.160 However, prosecutors and civil party lawyers have empha-
sized the limits on their offices’ possible investment in capacity- building given 
the workload associated with the main criminal cases.161
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Demonstration Effect: A Model Court?
Another means of promoting the rule of law is by setting a positive example 
for local courts to emulate.162 UN and Cambodian officials, donors, and the 
Trial Chamber have described the ECCC as a “model court.”163 Deputy Prime 
Minister Sok An has said more specifically that the ECCC can serve as a “model 
court” for the Cambodian domestic system.164 The extent of its ability to serve 
that function is questionable given the comparatively minuscule resources of 
local courts,165 the very different types of legal cases they hear, the existence of 
powerful incentives to engage in corruption and bow to political pressure, and 
the mixed example the ECCC has set in those regards.
Some observers stress that the Court is setting an important example for 
the domestic courts by promoting fair trial concepts— including in particular 
the presumption of innocence and equality of arms166— and the adoption of 
procedures that promote transparency, certainty, and accountability. In national 
courts, decisions do not include legal reasoning or citations to authority justify-
ing arrest, detention, or indictment; there are no replies to motions; no active 
defense; no initial hearing for an accused who may spend an extended period in 
pretrial custody before seeing a judge. Witnessing how the ECCC handles such 
issues is exposing both the legal community and the public to fair trial practices 
and may provide an example of best practices.167
For example, former Ieng Sary Co- Lawyer Michael Karnavas argues that, 
because the ECCC is part of the national court system, its jurisprudence can 
serve as a model for how domestic courts should be applying international 
fair trial principles incorporated into Cambodian law through the Constitu-
tion.168 One Cambodian staffer anticipates that domestic courts in Cambodia 
might follow the ECCC’s example by holding an initial hearing before the facts 
are presented.169 Panhavuth Long notes that the Nuon Chea defense strategy, 
which included pointing fingers at the Government, would be unheard of in 
Cambodian courts. He says, “If this defense happened in a national court the 
lawyers would be disbarred. The process teaches professionalism, and provides 
an example of how judges should behave.”170 Concomitantly, others note that 
President Nil Nonn is widely respected for the authoritative manner in which 
he leads the Trial Chamber’s proceedings, and say observers’ ability to hear his 
pronouncements in Khmer makes him a positive role model, building pride in 
the national judiciary.171 Moreover, CIJ You Bunleng has already instituted some 
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changes to practices at his second job at the Court of Appeals, including the 
introduction of a witness room, an audio system, and a computerized case file 
system to “protect the rights of victims and accused.”172 He is also promoting 
the creation of a judicial registry to manage administrative matters— which are 
currently the responsibility of individual judges and their clerks— as well as the 
publishing of decisions online.173 Judge You believes the ECCC will have both 
direct and indirect impacts, including capacity- building and modernizing the 
procedures followed by Cambodian courts.174
There is little evidence yet of ECCC impact on the Cambodian judiciary 
as a whole. Many Court personnel and analysts emphasize that such change is 
a “multi- generational project.”175 One Cambodian staff member at the ECCC 
thinks that “there will be an impact, but very little,” because improving the Cam-
bodian domestic legal system has less to do with formal laws and procedures 
than with individual choices to participate in a culture of judicial corruption.176 
Similarly, a former staff member says that judicial reform will take many years 
and must begin with individuals. He asserts that some procedures Cambodians 
have learned working at the ECCC will carry over— but not when politics takes 
precedence. In his view, the fact that Sean Visoth is still technically the Director 
of OA is a perfect example of the tension between politics and justice and the 
barriers to judicial reform: the Cambodian Government does not acknowledge 
that Visoth is corrupt, just as corruption is unacknowledged as a problem in 
local courts. He argues, “It’s never going to change. The Government doesn’t 
want to look bad so they used other excuses for his departure.”177 Ou Virak 
has likewise emphasized that whatever role the Court plays in developing local 
skills and knowledge, there will be little change “without a fundamental shift in 
the government’s commitment to the rule of law.”178
Cambodian judicial reform cannot be accomplished simply through techni-
cal training or new laws.179 States taking part in the Council on Legal and Ju-
dicial Reform have long seen the continued failure to adopt three fundamental 
laws regulating different aspects of an independent judiciary to be the major 
stumbling block preventing implementation of best practices throughout the 
country. However, Cambodia has passed 400 laws since 1993, including 16 in 
2011 alone,180 and most laws remain unenforced or unevenly enforced by the ju-
diciary. The largest barrier to rule of law is a domestic legal culture characterized 
by executive dominance, patronage, and corruption.
Regrettably, the ECCC’s institutional weaknesses, including inconsistent 
256 / Hybrid Justice
2RRP
application of the rules and susceptibility to corruption and political interfer-
ence, reinforce negative realities in the local judicial system. These have unques-
tionably been the “Achilles’ heel” of the Court’s efforts to date to leave a positive 
legacy.181 Michael Karnavas argues that if a court wants to leave behind a rule- 
of- law legacy and induce people to trust the courts, it needs “uniformity, consis-
tency, and predictability.” He notes that if the parties feel uncertainty about the 
ECCC’s rules, the public doubtless does as well. “Are we not teaching additional 
skills to our local counterparts on how to avoid the application of the rule of 
law? I think that this is going to be the darkest part of this legacy.”182 This is 
echoed by a former national ECCC staff member, who wonders if the Cambo-
dian Government’s increased invocation of procedural formalities will be used 
to mask political ends. He says: “When you give them a knife, they can use it.”183
Numerous court observers also have questioned the impact of the Court’s 
handling of Cases 003 and 004 on its legacy. Professor Sophal Ear has said that 
the Court will have a negative legacy if the UN lets political interference go 
unchallenged:
If the Cambodian Courts have any sort of lesson from that experience, it would 
probably be that even though you involve the international judicial process, you 
can still undermine them and go around their will and do whatever you want 
and get away with it.184
Nevertheless, questions of accountability— why crimes are not investigated and 
the persons responsible brought to justice— and corruption of process, which 
regularly arise in ordinary Cambodian court proceedings often without raising 
a stir, are a topic of debate in the context of the ECCC. Although Jeanne Sulzer 
also worries about the potential for a negative legacy, she finds it hopeful that 
the Government is discussing impunity issues. She notes that even though it 
does not support its views with strong legal reasoning, it is being forced to jus-
tify its position.185
Impact on Cambodian Reality and Perceptions
Thus far, there is no evidence that the ECCC proceedings have impacted the in-
cidence of corruption and political interference in ordinary Cambodian courts. 
Although the Cambodian National Assembly passed a long- dormant anticor-
ruption law in 2010,186 judicial corruption remains endemic. In 2012, Cambodia 
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finished 157th in the annual Transparency International rankings on corrup-
tion— a ranking that has not changed appreciably in recent years.187
It is therefore surprising that there is some evidence suggesting ECCC pro-
ceedings have contributed to a modest shift in public perceptions of the rule of 
law. A striking 72% of Cambodians surveyed in 2010 said that they had more 
trust in the law than before the Duch trial, and the numbers reporting general 
trust in the court system rose from 36% to 52%. However, 68% reported that 
going to court involved paying bribes to judges (up from 61% in 2008), and 82% 
said that involving the police in disputes meant paying bribes (up from 77%).188 
If the substance of the domestic judicial system remains unchanged, it is unlike-
ly that any bump in public trust arising from the Duch trial will be long- lasting.
Cambodians have been relatively sanguine about the ECCC itself— perhaps 
reflecting both their support for the Court’s general aims and the nature of the 
limited information most have received. The Berkeley surveys showed that both 
before and after the Duch trial, large majorities of Cambodians expressed high 
opinions of the ECCC. In 2008, 67% of respondents said that they believed the 
Court was neutral, 67% said they believed the judges would be fair, and 87% 
supported having the ECCC involved in responding to what occurred during 
the Khmer Rouge period.189 In 2010, 75% of respondents perceived the Court as 
neutral, 79% saw it as fair, and 83% wanted it involved in the response to Khmer 
Rouge crimes.190 Most also believed that the ECCC would have a positive im-
pact in terms of promoting national reconciliation (from 67% in 2008 to 81% in 
2010), rebuilding trust in Cambodia (from 71% to 82%), and bringing justice to 
Khmer Rouge victims and their families (74% to 76%).191
A further survey, conducted in 2011 by the Cambodian human rights group 
ADHOC and Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, revealed strong support for 
the Court among Case 002 civil parties as well. The survey focused on 414 
ADHOC- assisted civil parties, including 120 designated Civil Party Represen-
tatives who have served as “focal points” for the participation of nearly 2,000 
others. Most were interviewed shortly before the initial Case 002 hearing, and 
the results were striking. More than 90% believed that the ECCC would bring 
justice to them and their families, build trust in Cambodia, and promote rec-
onciliation; more than 70% said the Court was doing enough for victims; and 
nearly 90% perceived the ECCC as neutral and its judges as fair.192 Respondents 
generally demonstrated considerable knowledge about the Court proceedings, 
getting their information from a range of sources including television and radio, 
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ADHOC and other NGOs, contact with their lawyers, and meetings with gov-
ernment and Court officials.193 Whether the Court’s subsequent challenges have 
affected civil party support for the process is unclear.
These public surveys provide some reason for optimism at the Court. For-
mer UN Legal Counsel Hans Corell argues that despite the ECCC’s structural 
flaws and functional challenges, Cambodians have welcomed the trials, and 
thus the Court “has had a function in Cambodia.”194 If the ECCC is successful 
in convincing Cambodians that Case 002 is a success, many Cambodians may 
judge it to have contributed to a positive legacy for the country. However, if the 
public survey data reflect an uninformed public’s inflated expectations about 
what the Court will accomplish, reaching judgment in Case 002 may not be 
enough to overcome their disappointment.
A Catalyst for Social Change?
Like any mass crimes court, the ECCC is at best an important part of a broader 
social process of dealing with past atrocities. The ECCC’s core functional re-
sponsibilities pertain to administering criminal justice and associated outreach 
and legacy functions, but its ultimate social impact will depend largely on the 
extent to which its limited judicial process can help catalyze, unlock, or facilitate 
other social activities conducive to healing.
Panhavuth Long argues that if it is agreed that the existence of a tribunal 
is not the end of the process, then the ECCC is a good start. Cambodians are 
discussing whether crimes were committed, the voices of the victims have been 
heard, and there is potential accountability for Democratic Kampuchea (DK) 
crimes. He says that after the Court is concluded, there will be ongoing debate 
about the regime. “Even though the hearing is not telling you everything, it will 
enable you to understand somehow about who is Angkar.”195 Youk Chhang, a 
leading accountability advocate who heads DC- Cam, believes that the Court 
exists at a fortuitous historical moment. Older Cambodian politicians are be-
ginning to retire, and the Court is creating space for new people and new ideas 
to “break the circle.” He says that, in the past, discussions of the Khmer Rouge 
era were ideological and controlled by elites; but with the creation of the ECCC, 
all segments of society are able to present their views as equals, contributing to 
decentralization and increased tolerance for freedom of expression.196
Thus, to date, one of the ECCC’s greatest contributions is only tangentially 
related to its mandate— serving as a catalyst for public discussion on topics that 
were formerly taboo in many corners of Cambodian society. Foremost among 
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these is the discussion of the Khmer Rouge period itself, which shockingly re-
ceived only a sentence of treatment in official Cambodian history books until 
very recently. As former UN Special Expert Clint Williamson argues, “proceed-
ings at the Court have brought this issue front and center” in the Cambodian 
media and helped legitimate it as a topic of public education and discourse.197 
Youk Chhang believes the impact of this discussion will be far- reaching: “By 
opening a dialogue on some of the most sensitive and controversial parts of 
their history, Cambodians have been forced to confront basic questions on hu-
man rights, the rule of law, and the relationship between a government and its 
people.”198
NGOs have used the ECCC process as a springboard for a number of 
important educational initiatives. For example, DC- Cam and the Ministry of 
Education have launched an expansive Genocide Education Program through-
out Cambodia, embedding Khmer Rouge history as a core part of public high 
school and college curricula.199 This has been particularly important in a coun-
try where 70% of the population was born after the Pol Pot era. DC- Cam has 
also used a variety of media including films, books, magazines, photo exhibi-
tions, and radio programs to educate Cambodians about DK history, often pre-
senting such information in village forums while also collecting applications for 
participation in the ECCC legal proceedings.200 The Transcultural Psychosocial 
Organization (TPO) has conducted outreach through events and radio to raise 
awareness about trauma, including trauma inflicted under Khmer Rouge rule, 
and has provided therapy to some survivors in connection with the proceed-
ings.201 This is also of great significance in a country where knowledge of mental 
health issues is lacking and the availability of professional services is woefully 
inadequate. Although these initiatives are not directly related to the Court, the 
existence of the Court has in many ways made them possible by generating 
interest among Cambodians in confronting the consequences of the DK period.
Conclusion
The potential for strong outreach and legacy functions is key to justifying the 
risks of in- country hybrid courts— especially one like the ECCC, in which the 
United Nations grudgingly accepted a role as junior partner to a government be-
set by corruption, judicial incapacity, and political interference. Most interview-
ees identify the Court’s in- country location as beneficial, with one senior UN 
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appointee at the ECCC describing it as “an overwhelming positive.”202 Yet many 
aspects of the ECCC’s function predictably have suffered as a result of its hybrid 
form, and it has not been a financial bargain. Outreach and legacy are among 
the few aspects in which its function ought to exceed that of fully international 
courts or fully domestic proceedings with minor UN technical support.
With respect to outreach, ECCC efforts have been a qualified success. The 
Court and supporting NGOs have managed to make the proceedings acces-
sible to the public on a scale unseen at previous tribunals. Despite confiden-
tiality limitations, the existence of the PAS has contributed to robust media 
coverage of the proceedings. When compared to the outreach efforts of other 
international and mixed tribunals— admittedly not a high bar— the Court has 
performed reasonably well— but not up to its full potential.
All mass crimes courts outreach efforts suffer from a lack of adequate re-
sources, due to the perception of some that this task falls outside of “core” func-
tions and is an extra expense. A court created to try only five or ten persons can 
be judged a success only if the public understands what it is doing. Due to short 
life spans and narrow personal jurisdictions, a hybrid court process is inevitably 
symbolic and thus must achieve more than reaching judgment. Panhavuth Long 
says, “The trials are not only to prosecute those most responsible. There is also 
a moral obligation to educate people about how the regime operated, create a 
historical record and contribute to reconciliation.”203 Although a hybrid court’s 
locale certainly promotes information “trickling down” to the population, a well- 
developed outreach program is critical to ensuring a positive court legacy and 
should be counted among its indispensable functions.
Despite indications of relatively strong public support and evidence that 
the Court has played a useful role in catalyzing discussion about the Khmer 
Rouge era, the ECCC’s legacy remains highly uncertain. Its impact on the mod-
est number of Cambodian ECCC personnel may well have some salutary ef-
fects, and the record the Khmer Rouge trials create will be useful for a genera-
tion of Cambodian law students, but the ECCC will not catalyze seismic legal 
reform in Cambodia— an unrealistic demand of any hybrid court, especially 
in a state with entrenched power structures such as Cambodia. Although the 
ECCC could prioritize legacy activities more purposefully, it must also attend 
to myriad other functions. The most important of these is to hold trials that 
will set a positive example of due process, judicial integrity, and impartiality. The 




The ECCC has evoked a wide range of reactions from Cambodian survivors. 
At times, they have been strongly positive. On the day the Supreme Court 
Chamber handed down a life sentence to Duch, civil party Bou Meng said, “I 
am fully relieved and fully satisfied with the court’s ruling. 100 percent . . . This 
court is a good model for the world.”1 Sopheap Chak, program director for 
Cambodian Center for Human Rights, said, “today is quite historic for Cam-
bodia . . . It is a long- awaited resolution for the victims of Khmer Rouge.”2 Sur-
veys continue to show that large majorities of Cambodians support the ECCC’s 
work even though the Court has not addressed— and almost certainly will not 
adjudicate— the crimes that most survivors suffered individually.
Yet the ECCC has had a precarious existence, often teetering on the preci-
pice of collapse. Inefficiency and recurrent political impasses have eroded the 
patience of many Cambodians, especially those most informed about the pro-
cess. Amid corruption and mismanagement allegations, scholar Sophal Ear, a 
survivor of the Pol Pot era, expressed frustration with the “theater of the absurd” 
taking place at the Court and lamented that “the tribunal was essentially hi-
jacked to advance domestic and international agendas.”3 As political interference 
engulfed Cases 003 and 004 and as scope for victim participation narrowed in 
Case 002, prominent former civil party Theary Seng withdrew from the process 
and called the ECCC “a political farce, and irredeemable sham”4— citing govern-
ment obstruction and UN failure at “fulfilling its duties, and more than that 
[helping] enable the impunity.”5
International observers have also rendered increasingly bleak assessments of 
the tribunal. In an early 2012 report, Mark Ellis of the International Bar Asso-
ciation, an “early supporter” of the ECCC who still supports its “overall mission,” 
lamented that “a growing number of problems” undermine “the very legitimacy 
of the court.”6 Scholar Peter Maguire argues that the Court is perilously close 
to failing:
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Even if there is no third case, a credible trial of Khieu Samphan, Ieng Sary, 
Noun Chea and Ieng Thirith, would make it possible to overlook the court’s 
many failings. If Cambodia’s E.C.C.C. cannot try the surviving Khmer Rouge 
leaders before they die, the “mixed tribunal” should be considered an expensive 
farce never to be tried again.7
Now only two defendants remain in Case 002, and if the Court is not seen to 
have delivered a sound trial and reasonable verdicts, few analysts will consider 
the ECCC anything more than a costly failure.
From the perspective of those seeking to address impunity in Cambodia, 
the ECCC’s highly flawed structure was arguably the best of an unappealing 
menu of institutional options. David Scheffer, one of the prime architects of the 
ECCC, argues that “there is no question that the ECCC was an experiment, but 
one for which there really was no viable alternative after years of negotiations.”8 
He adds:
It’s a humbling exercise for the international community. You’re dealing with 
a sovereign government. You don’t necessarily get to dictate the process. You 
have to negotiate the process . . . In the aftermath, it’s extremely easy for critics 
to point out all the mistakes. But let’s talk pragmatically about how you achieve 
justice.9
Given the Cambodian Government’s strong bargaining position, a UN- led 
court was unlikely to win Cambodian consent. The likely alternatives to the 
ECCC— crude domestic trials by a discredited court system or the absence of 
charges altogether— would likely have been worse, and advocates for the Court 
had good reasons to take risks in pursuing accountability for some of history’s 
most heinous crimes. Whether or not the ECCC completes Case 002 effec-
tively and pulls at least modest success from the jaws of possible failure— and 
whether it thus justifies consuming funds and political capital that could have 
been expended on other initiatives— the Court must be judged in relation to 
realistic counterfactuals.
Of course, addressing impunity in Cambodia is not the only impetus be-
hind international involvement in the Khmer Rouge tribunal process. It is also 
part of a broader effort, led by international criminal lawyers, to entrench and 
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enforce accountability norms. From that perspective, the ECCC has been more 
problematic, because its functional shortcomings damage the UN’s reputation 
and could undermine the credibility of mass crimes processes in general. To 
some UN officials and human rights advocates, the Court also sets a “dangerous 
precedent” for international criminal justice,10 perhaps encouraging other states 
to demand majority- domestic courts.
Hans Corell, who as the lead UN negotiator objected to the ECCC’s struc-
ture, asserts, “I did not want . . . the U.N. emblem to be given to an entity that 
did not . . . represent the highest international standards,”11 and adds, “everything 
I warned against has been happening.”12 Corell argues that many of the Court’s 
problems “could have been avoided with a majority of international judges and 
a single prosecutor and investigating judge,” which would have made the court 
“a different creature.”13 Looking forward, Corell would “immediately discourage 
anything like [the ECCC].”14
The Court’s structural handicaps have indeed contributed to inefficiency 
and credibility problems, and the Cambodian case thus offers some clear les-
sons: the Court’s divided, cumbersome structure should not be mimicked, and 
the United Nations should resist arrangements in which it plays junior partner 
to a national judicial system with dubious capacity and independence. It is im-
portant to go beyond these headline lessons, however. Many of the ECCC’s 
problems— such inefficiency, jurisdictional debates, and barriers to effective 
outreach and capacity- building— reflect common challenges in mass crimes 
trials that are likely be present even in better- designed courts. Many are also 
problems of agency more than reflections of the Court’s peculiar structure, and 
in this respect the Court’s experience also bears some important (if unfortu-
nate) parallels with proceedings at other mass crimes courts. The Khmer Rouge 
proceedings offer insights into a number of ways in which these challenges can 
be addressed.
International Standards of Justice?
Officials and analysts have justified UN involvement in the Khmer Rouge trials, 
like UN participation in other hybrid courts, partly to ensure compliance with 
international standards of justice. The ECCC has issued many decisions in line 
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with international precedents. Due to their more extensive formal legal training 
and experience, international judges at the Court have tended to take the lead 
in drafting opinions and formulating the legal rationales for decisions. On ju-
dicial matters that do not affect clear domestic political sensitivities, the ECCC 
has functioned much like a fully international court— open to legitimate legal 
challenges but demonstrating a good faith effort to follow established norms of 
accountability and due process.
Applying the Court’s procedural rules has been a challenge, however, and 
the Court has breached international standards over highly politicized issues, 
especially the jurisdictional dispute. These flow foreseeably (though not inevi-
tably) from the ECCC’s structure and have been the Court’s greatest weakness 
to date, undermining its judicial credibility despite its many sound decisions on 
less contentious issues.
The Need for Predictable and Targeted Rules
The novelty of a civil law– based approach to mass crimes cases and the awk-
ward fusion of Cambodian and international procedures via the ECCC’s Inter-
nal Rules have led to inconsistency in the application of the rules. The absence 
of predictable rules arguably violates the basic due process rights of defendants 
and exposes the ECCC to charges of cherry- picking to achieve desired outcomes.
Basing a hybrid court’s rules partly on national procedures may facilitate 
local capacity- building by helping to illustrate sound application of local pro-
cedures,15 but it has proven highly problematic in Cambodia. The use of na-
tional procedures as a point of departure at the ECCC was part of an overall 
government effort to assert ownership and control over the process— a kind of 
home- field advantage. Sovereignty arguments are weak in this regard, however, 
especially when local rules are half- formed and unfamiliar to local lawyers.
Domestic rules are also not tailored to mass crimes cases, and in states 
emerging from conflict, they will seldom if ever be suited to handle such cases 
without major modification. That is certainly the case in states like Cambodia, 
where domestic rules were ill- equipped to manage the complex Khmer Rouge 
trials. In practice, hybrid courts will inevitably look to international precedent, 
so the lesson for designing future mixed courts is to use existing international 
procedures as a base. These can be customized to fit country conditions, but 
the International Criminal Court (ICC) and other existing courts (including 
the ECCC) should be able to provide a strong template, obviating the need to 
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reinvent the wheel with each new hybrid court— a process that created delay in 
addition to fairness concerns at the ECCC.
An Independent Majority on the Bench
More serious deviations from international standards of justice have occurred 
when the Court’s judges and other key personnel have locked horns over politi-
cally sensitive topics. Corruption has been an important concern, but even more 
damaging has been the evident political interference in Cases 003 and 004. The 
Cambodian Government has offered no strong justification for its public op-
position, and the United Nations has evaded its responsibility to ensure an in-
dependent process through legal fig leaves— arguing that it cannot interfere in 
an independent judicial process even amid widespread and credible allegations 
by ECCC staff that the process is not independent.
The supermajority rule adopted at the ECCC— an effort to mitigate the 
risks of a majority- domestic bench— has been ineffective as a stopgap measure. 
Indeed, the supermajority rule has arguably contributed to the problem by sug-
gesting that political interference is an inherent part of the process, embedding 
that expectation in how the Court functions, and reducing incentives for in-
ternational actors to confront it. These problems exemplify what many critics 
of the ECCC’s hybrid structure asserted during its creation: the imperative of 
having a strong independent majority on the bench.
Independent judges need not be foreign, but in practice governments that 
lack the capacity to hold credible domestic proceedings are often the same gov-
ernments that lack judicial independence. Mass crimes cases invariably have 
great local political importance, making domestic judges all the more vulnerable 
to political pressure. The ECCC shows how controlling that pressure can be 
and how badly it can damage the perceived integrity of the judicial process. Be-
yond the issue of sovereign control, the ECCC provides almost no evidence that 
having a majority of domestic judges on the bench improves the Court’s func-
tion or its public legitimacy or legacy. A court does not need a national majority 
to communicate the active involvement and ownership of the host government. 
Architects of future mixed courts should therefore adopt a strong presumption 
in favor of international majorities on the bench. Doing so will not render a 
tribunal immune from political influence— international judges can also be sub-
jected to pressure— but offers a much better model than the majority- domestic 
system at the ECCC.
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Retaining Judges with Relevant Training and Expertise
The ECCC example also shows the importance of selecting a greater number 
of judges with expertise in international criminal law and, even more impor-
tant, experience managing complex criminal cases. “It’s absolutely necessary 
that they have courtroom experience,” asserts Corell.16 In postconflict states, 
there is unlikely to be a large number of judges with relevant training. Hybrid 
courts should select international judges with mass crimes experience. In some 
instances, as in Cambodia, many international judges also lack such experience, 
contributing to uncertainty in rule application and inefficiency— an issue that 
has plagued the ECCC and other hybrid courts and undermines much of the 
purpose for international involvement.17 Although judges with international 
criminal experience have been difficult for hybrid courts to recruit, the prolif-
eration of tribunals should ease that constraint somewhat.18 Tribunals should 
also invest in capacity- building on the front end, immersing judges in training 
in The Hague or elsewhere for several months before commencing cases.19 The 
up- front costs of such preparation would likely be more than offset in efficiency 
savings and more effective, credible jurisprudence.
The Question of Jurisdiction
The Cambodian Government insisted on a majority of Cambodian judges and 
other elements of control partly to guard against an overly zealous prosecution. 
National concerns about controlling the scope of prosecution are not necessarily 
illegitimate, and international actors often share those concerns, but they must 
be addressed more clearly in negotiations over the statute for a hybrid court. 
The question of jurisdictional bounds is one of the most difficult to resolve in 
creating any mass crimes tribunal. Judicial independence requires allowing the 
prosecutor some discretion to “follow the evidence,” but in mass crimes courts 
there normally will (and must) be limits imposed by political decision- makers. 
The ECCC is a painful example of what happens when two passengers embark 
on a journey together without a sufficiently clear agreement on their destina-
tion.
The result of the failure to reach a political agreement has been overt po-
litical interference during the judicial proceedings, which has undermined the 
ECCC’s legitimacy and caused costly, inefficient delays. The most obvious inter-
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ference has occurred on the Cambodian side, but weary donors and the United 
Nations have exercised the power of the purse strings in a manner that could 
also be construed as political interference.
Some of the problem could be resolved by designing a court’s structure 
to give the domestic government less control, but even majority- international 
courts have faced jurisdictional disputes, as in the cases of East Timor and 
Sierra Leone. The governing documents for a hybrid court cannot spell out a 
precise list of suspects to minimize this challenge, which would be an intoler-
able constraint on prosecutorial discretion. They must, however, be premised 
on mutual understanding about what would constitute “red lines.” The United 
Nations should not agree to a mixed tribunal in the future— and donors should 
not force it to do so— without a candid assessment of the political boundaries 
that its partner is apt to impose.
Advantages in Efficiency?
The ECCC’s experience shows that hybrid courts with substantial UN par-
ticipation do not automatically deliver major cost savings. From a financial per-
spective, the Court has been much more “international” than “domestic.” It has 
been vastly more expensive than a domestic proceeding would be and much 
less cost- efficient than the Bosnian War Crimes Chamber or even the more 
comparable Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL). On a per- defendant basis, 
it is even more costly than the International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda 
(ICTR) or the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Generous pay packages and benefits 
for personnel have contributed, and the Cambodian experience suggests that 
managing the merger of staff at a mixed court will more likely lead to cost infla-
tion on the national side than savings on the UN side.
The financial situation at the ECCC is certainly an improvement on East 
Timor, which was crippled from birth by a lack of funds. Hybrid courts are 
sure to fail if they are created simply to avoid the costs of credible justice, and 
the ECCC’s ability to marshal nearly $200 million for the accountability pro-
cess is largely positive. Resource allocation and management is a bigger problem 
than the total price tag. The ECCC has dedicated too few resources to the vi-
tal functions of outreach and victim participation, which its location and form 
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empower it to conduct effectively. Resources for those tasks would be much 
more abundant if the Court were not saddled with structural inefficiencies and 
plagued by delays and political impasses.
Avoiding Unnecessary Duplication
To a considerable degree, the ECCC’s inefficiency stems from its messy and 
duplicative structure, a result of successive political compromises and a lack of 
foresight about the functional effects of dividing the Cambodian and interna-
tional sides and fusing civil law and common law features. The ECCC’s separa-
tion of national and international staff in key legal and administrative offices 
is one of its most glaring deficiencies, reducing efficiency and overall organiza-
tional cohesion. Hybrid teams can be advantageous in some respects, coupling 
staff with complementary skills, but the ECCC shows convincingly that two- 
headed arrangements should be avoided. A hybrid court with a single integrated 
investigation office and registry would be able to function much more efficiently 
and decisively.
The fusion of civil law and common law has also produced redundancy. In 
theory, the idea of investigating judges has appeal as a way to improve efficiency. 
Former international Co- Investigating Judge Marcel Lemonde contends that 
they may still “represent the future” of international criminal trials and attri-
butes many of the ECCC’s troubles with the OCIJ to common law lawyers who 
weren’t familiar with the civil law system and in some cases “had no desire to 
become familiar with it.”20 Even if future mass crimes tribunals were to focus on 
hiring judges and prosecutors with civil law experience, the ECCC proceedings 
suggest that mass crimes cases will often be too large for one judicial office to 
investigate completely, creating an institutional logjam. In addition, mass crimes 
trials will almost inevitably entail an expansive courtroom process— and thus 
a second full vetting of the evidence— given survivors’ compelling interest in 
observing a public proceeding. At the ECCC, the absence of a defense right 
to challenge the evidence in a pretrial proceeding made a lengthy trial phase 
imperative from a due process standpoint as well. Although this latter problem 
could be corrected by allowing a pretrial defense challenge, the architects of 
future mass crimes proceedings would be wiser to avoid investigating judges 
altogether. Their role has created problems due to inefficiency, fairness, and 
credibility— too much of the process at the ECCC has hinged on the percep-
tion of their competence and impartiality.
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Lemonde describes the structure of the “cos” and the complex dispute res-
olution scheme as “a bit monstrous” and “a model of inefficiency,”21 and many 
other Court officials agree. Even if future courts include co- prosecutors and/
or investigating judges, there is little apparent utility in having a separate pre-
trial chamber whose decisions are neither final nor appealable. The ECCC’s 
Pre- Trial Chamber also has had too much overlapping responsibility with 
other chambers, requiring multiple appeals and wasting both funds and time. 
If a pretrial mechanism does exist, its authority must be circumscribed to a 
relatively narrow range of functions, such as reviewing indictments and deal-
ing with pretrial detention issues. The Special Tribunal for Lebanon, in which 
one international judge serves as a pretrial judge performing these functions, 
provides a more efficient model.22 So do the ICC’s pretrial chambers, which 
have limited authority to review the pretrial phases of the investigation, ensure 
the pretrial rights of the accused, and confirm charges.23 The ECCC’s problem 
of multiple appeals bodies also suggests that parties should have a direct right 
to appeal pretrial rulings to the appeals chamber, the decisions of which will be 
final and binding on the trial chamber. Such a mechanism, which exists at the 
ICC, would offer ample due process with much more efficiency.
Part of the reason why such a cumbersome system was adopted is that rela-
tively few of the people most crucial to the negotiations for the Court were 
practiced courtroom lawyers with mass crimes experience. Former international 
Co- Prosecutor Robert Petit argues,
[The ECCC] was a cut- rate court. It was designed by people who had insuf-
ficient knowledge of the actual court process. Then it was cut up by accountants 
in terms of structures, staffing, and budget . . . [I]f you had wanted to devise a 
court that wouldn’t work, you would be hard pressed to find a better model.24
Corell agrees. “People involved in this kind of process should listen closely to 
persons with courtroom experience . . . listen to those with courtroom experi-
ence,” he asserts, repeating the point for emphasis.25
Unifying Court Leadership
One of the most common complaints from ECCC personnel is the lack of de-
cisive leadership under the ECCC’s two- headed structure. Future hybrid courts 
should have a court president and registrar with the authority needed to drive 
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through key decisions and impose administrative and budgetary discipline. The 
individuals chosen to occupy those and other key positions also matter. The 
ECCC has benefited from having a few personnel with expertise in Khmer 
Rouge history, as well as a number of officials and defense counsel with ample 
experience at other hybrid and international courts. Funds would also have 
been better spent, however, if officials experienced in judicial administration 
had occupied key administrative positions from the start. The president and 
registrar must be viewed, inside and outside of the building, as credible and 
competent in the working of a mass crimes court. They do not necessarily need 
to be international appointees, but given the limited number of likely candidates 
in states emerging from conflict, they usually should be.
Strengthening Oversight Mechanisms
Many of the ECCC’s problems are related to the weak oversight structures in 
place for the Court. The United Nations is deeply involved in the Khmer Rouge 
trials but has been reluctant to exert firm ownership of the process. This is close-
ly related to the lack of clear lines of authority. Among multiple UN entities and 
personnel involved— the Office of Legal Affairs, Controller’s Office, Department 
of Economic and Social Affairs, UN Development Program, the Special Expert, 
and the UN- appointed Deputy Director of Administration— it has often been 
unclear who is in charge, confusing and weakening administration.
As the saga over Cases 003 and 004 drags on, Rupert Abbott and Stepha-
nie Barbour of Amnesty International argue that although the United Nations 
has used “strong words” regarding Cambodian political interference, it has been 
guilty of a “lackluster response.”26 Brad Adams of Human Rights Watch has 
accused the United Nations of “burying its head in the sand.”27 When the UN 
Secretariat does not “buy into” a hybrid court fully, it is likely to have weak, 
indecisive management, which contributes to financial inefficiency and admin-
istrative irregularities. The United Nations and donor states need to decide in 
advance whether to own a process or to distance themselves from it. The ECCC 
shows the reputational and financial problems of going halfway.
If international actors decide to invest heavily in a hybrid court, there needs 
to be a formal process of donor oversight. Donor states are not stewarding their 
taxpayers’ money well when they agree to fund a court that they cannot or do 
not meaningfully supervise. Supervision does not mean overreach into judicial 
functions— it means ensuring that money is productively and transparently 
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spent. The ECCC example also shows that donors should fund a hybrid court as 
a single entity rather than setting up financial structures that reinforce divisions 
and add to uncertainties and delays. In general, the best model for any mass 
crimes court is to be funded through UN- assessed contributions but subjected 
to rigorous and regular questioning on costs from a dedicated UN office with 
expertise in the management of mass crimes cases— an office that still does not 
exist after two decades of UN involvement in international criminal tribunals.
A Stronger Nexus to Survivors?
Without major cost advantages and with the risks that the hybrid model poses 
to judicial standards, the justification for mixed courts must rest to a large ex-
tent on their potential connection with the survivor population and societal 
contribution in the state where atrocities occurred. The ECCC’s performance 
suggests that hybrid courts can confer those functional advantages but that 
mixed personnel and an in- country presence by no means guarantee effective 
victim participation or capacity- building functions.
Outreach to the General Public
The ECCC’s ability to connect with victims and the general Cambodian popula-
tion has been one of the clearest functional advantages flowing from the Court’s 
in- country setting. Although the ECCC has not met its full outreach potential 
or achieved the SCSL’s level of success— which has been the best among mass 
crimes trials to date— it has exceeded the fully international courts and the Spe-
cial Panels in East Timor.
The Court’s divided structure and unclear lines of responsibility posed mod-
est obstacles to outreach from the start, but the main barrier to its effectiveness 
has been the decision by donors and Court management not to fund outreach 
adequately. The Court’s problems in other areas, such as the corruption scandal 
and evident political interference, have also affected outreach adversely by forc-
ing Court officials to play defense and distracting attention away from positive 
elements of the ECCC’s judicial example.
When the ECCC has had sufficient funds, it has been able to conduct ef-
fective outreach in partnership with Cambodia’s well- developed NGO commu-
nity. Its efforts to ensure strong public participation in the courtroom have been 
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unparalleled, and its use of diverse media and civil society networks has allowed 
information to reach many of Cambodia’s poorly connected communities. Cru-
cially, the ECCC proceedings have served as a vehicle for raising awareness 
about issues ranging from human rights to mental health, and they have sig-
naled that it is now acceptable to speak publicly about the Khmer Rouge period 
and to educate youth about it. The ECCC has not led most such efforts, but 
its participation has magnified their impact by offering an official imprimatur.
Even when the Court has struggled through successive crises, it has set a 
positive example of transparency by comparison to national courts and may 
increase popular expectations of transparency in domestic proceedings. While 
there are mixed views of the ECCC, especially among better- informed observ-
ers and members of the opposition parties, general public support for the pro-
cess has been strong.28 Yet inefficiency, corruption, and political interference 
have turned many international and Cambodian observers against the Court, 
and further problems could lead it to fail the public’s expectations for a credible 
judicial process.
In sum, public outreach at the ECCC has been far from perfect, but it has 
been a relative success compared to most mass crimes courts. It shows some im-
portant advantages of in- country hybrid proceedings but also the need to fund 
such efforts appropriately if future hybrid courts are to provide social benefits 
that justify their administrative and jurisprudential risks. Moreover, the Cam-
bodian case shows the importance of supportive NGO networks in outreach 
activities— a lesson vital for national courts, hybrid tribunals, and above all for 
the ICC, which conducts its trials far from the locus of atrocities.
Engaging Victims
The ECCC’s victim participation scheme, featuring a novel system enabling 
some victims to join the proceedings as civil parties, has been an important 
experiment for mass crimes courts. The attention that the ECCC’s ambitious 
scheme drew to victim’s needs is a positive aspect of its performance and legacy 
and contributes to a general trend of international criminal courts to incorpo-
rate victims in accountability processes. The participation of civil parties in the 
Duch trial, while inefficient, succeeded overall in giving victims a central place 
in the related processes of justice- seeking, truth- telling, and empowerment. 
However, moving beyond that small universe of victims, the larger numbers 
2RRP 
Conclusion / 273
of potential civil parties in Case 002 has taxed the Court’s resources and led 
to inconsistent and sometimes unfair rulings. The ECCC’s difficulties suggest 
that a system of direct civil party participation will often be untenable at a mass 
crimes court. Limited participatory rights— such as those existing at the STL 
and ICC— offer a more realistic path forward, coupled with a process that en-
sures victims are able to share their stories as witnesses and complainants.
Any victim participation scheme is apt to fall flat if it is not strongly sup-
ported by donors. The Court’s meager capacity to issue “collective and moral 
reparations” undercuts public expectations regarding its ability to provide vic-
tims with relief. The efforts of the underfunded Victim Support Section to cor-
respond with many thousands of general Khmer Rouge victims also highlights 
that even in a state with a large and active NGO community, a hybrid court can 
only engage victims meaningfully if it has the resources to do so. There will nec-
essarily be significant constraints on what volume of funds are available, putting 
stress again on the need for more efficient structures for judicial administration.
Delays and inefficiency have also led to a further problem at the ECCC with 
regard to victim involvement: the Trial Chamber’s decision to split the Case 
002 indictment and proceed with a trial that is not representative of the harms 
endured by most Cambodian survivors. For a mass crimes court with limited 
personal jurisdiction and finite resources to connect meaningfully to large num-
bers of survivors, its trials need to present a compelling narrative relevant to 
their experiences.
Capacity- Building and the Rule of Law
Hybrid courts like the ECCC naturally result in some transfer of skills be-
tween national and international personnel. Current and former personnel at 
the Court assert that mixed legal teams worked well and provided opportuni-
ties to play to their comparative advantages and to develop skills. The fact that 
some Cambodians are being trained at the ECCC and remain engaged— or will 
later engage— with the local judicial system makes this a nonnegligible positive 
outcome of the Khmer Rouge trials. Of course, this function need not be lim-
ited to hybrid courts. The ICC should look for opportunities to expand the in-
volvement of personnel from states emerging from mass crimes and to provide 
technical assistance to proceedings conducted by national governments with an 
evident commitment to fair proceedings. A capacity- building focus flows di-
274 / Hybrid Justice
2RRP
rectly from the ICC’s complementarity principle, which stresses its mandate to 
complement the exercise of sovereign judicial authority.
The ECCC’s broader effect on the Cambodian judiciary or rule of law is 
much less apparent. Major change in the domestic legal system in the near 
term is unlikely, and as of yet there are few signs that the ECCC’s role as a 
“model court” is translating into better function in Cambodia’s ordinary courts. 
Other hybrid courts have not fared particularly well on this score, suggesting 
that the capacity- building potential of mixed tribunals is modest at best with-
out dedicated resources and programs. Perhaps the ECCC’s most promising 
example for the rule of law in Cambodia has been the demonstration— for the 
most part— of fair trial rights through a vigorous defense and procedural safe-
guards.29 The ECCC also provides a valuable resource to Cambodian educators, 
students, and practitioners, many of whom are already using its voluminous 
documentary record and outreach materials to study various points of law. For 
the ICC and other mass crimes courts, a key lesson is to provide the public with 
clear and relevant information, even though doing so will often lead to critiques. 
A tribunal’s functions do not all need to be successful to be useful as a catalyst 
for dialogue and reflection on what it means to have a rule of law.
Negotiating the Terms of  
Future Mass Crimes Courts
The design and operation of mass crimes courts are invariably the products of 
complex negotiations and ongoing political and financial compromises, and the 
motivations of the actors vary. The capacity and will of the host government 
matter greatly, and the Cambodian case shows plainly how difficult it is to build 
and run an effective tribunal when the host government is more focused on 
political control than a credible and independent judicial process. When a host 
government rejects the types of institutional features and personnel choices that 
would optimize a court’s function, as the Cambodian Government did, mount-
ing effective trials is difficult indeed.
For this reason, some human rights advocates have argued that the 
United Nations should have avoided the Khmer Rouge trials altogether. Doing 
so would have protected the United Nations from involvement in troubled pro-
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ceedings and might have averted a further blemish on the reputation of inter-
national criminal justice, but it would also have forfeited an importance chance 
to promote accountability for some of history’s most egregious offenses. The 
UN should not easily walk away from opportunities to forge workable hybrid 
arrangements, even in difficult cases like Cambodia; the alternative of dubious 
domestic proceedings— or no trials at all— would sometimes be much worse. 
The Cambodian case does not justify an end to hybrid courts; rather, the most 
constructive lessons to draw from the ECCC are ways that some of the prob-
lems of structure and agency adversely affecting the Court could be fixed, even 
when working with a difficult sovereign partner. Although the ECCC will be 
the only mass crimes proceeding in Cambodia in the foreseeable future, the 
United Nations and international justice advocates will surely deal with chal-
lenging conditions again.
One lesson to draw from Cambodia is that the United Nations and key 
donors need to be more concerned with, and more informed about, the prospec-
tive function of a mass crimes court during the design phase. Representatives of 
the United Nations, major donor states, and civil society come to the table with 
diverse agendas and typically engage in horse- trading that leads to overly com-
plex structures and mandates that the realized court will lack the funding and 
capacity to meet effectively. Thoughtful reflection on the implications of design 
features can reduce (if not eliminate) this problem. Including negotiators with 
mass crimes court experience is imperative.
The inclusion of investigating judges and three official languages have cre-
ated foreseeable challenges that should have been weighed more heavily during 
negotiations. In some cases, design flaws have resulted partly from a failure to 
spell out specific provisions during the negotiations. For example, the ECCC’s 
civil party scheme began with too many legal teams offering largely redundant 
contributions in court. The judicial structure enabling certain legal issues to 
be raised four times, including Pre- Trial Chamber review of orders by the Co- 
Investigating Judges, has been unnecessarily cumbersome as well. Both of these 
problems arose from the Internal Rules, which were drafted by judges seeking 
to fill lacunae in the tribunal’s constitutive documents with little explicit author-
ity and official oversight.
These technical aspects of the Court are not easily detachable from the 
political rivalries that ran throughout the negotiations, which largely explains 
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why such inefficient features were adopted. At least some such problems can 
be avoided, however, if negotiators concentrate on their interests in an effective 
proceeding, not just their narrower interests in exerting influence over a particu-
lar aspect of the proceedings. Increasing efficiency would have gone a long way 
toward improving the ECCC’s performance and public legitimacy, and those 
who design other courts should take heed.
Enhanced efficiency would not eliminate problems such as corruption and 
political interference, however, and the Cambodian case demonstrates that 
international negotiators should insist on stronger institutional safeguards— 
citing the ECCC’s problems as support for such demands. The ICC was not an 
option for Cambodia given its temporal jurisdiction, but in the future the threat 
of ICC action will often be available in negotiations, which could help overcome 
unreasonable assertions of host government prerogative. Donor states also need 
to be committed to ensuring necessary safeguards, because without their back-
ing, the UN Secretariat usually has little independent leverage. Donors have 
ample incentive to reflect carefully on the functional implications of the design 
features they endorse, as they will bear the ultimate bill for the proceedings that 
result.
Even if international officials and civil society leaders engage thoughtfully, 
there will be cases in which an acceptable hybrid arrangement is simply unavail-
able. Where a host government has custody of suspects and enjoys the political 
clout to resist a credible judicial process, the UN should be circumspect about 
offering its explicit imprimatur to the court, which risks diluting the already 
compromised standards of international criminal justice. When all measures to 
ensure an adequately designed hybrid court have been exhausted, the United 
Nations would be wiser to provide only limited technical support. That would 
allow UN officials to threaten to exit credibly and to disengage, if necessary, 
without bringing the process to an end. Donors should not force the UN Sec-
retariat to enter into a majority- domestic hybrid arrangement, and if they dis-
agree fundamentally with UN experts, they should participate through other 
channels.
When a deal is concluded for a hybrid court, however, the United Nations 
needs to engage actively and assertively to uphold standards of administrative 
integrity, judicial independence, and due process. The Cambodian case shows 
the danger of ambivalent and halting UN engagement, which can lead to pas-
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sivity and become a form of collusion in a substandard process. Worse still, 
where the United Nations fails to defend core principles such as transparency 
and judicial independence, it risks contributing to a negative legacy, both for 
the country involved and for the UN system itself. If the United Nations and 
enough of its key members do commit themselves to defending international 
standards, hybrid courts can have a valuable role to play alongside the ICC and 
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 116. Framework Agreement, supra note 1, art. 12(1). See also ECCC Law, supra note 
63, arts. 20 new, 23 new, and 33 new. Comparatively, the SCSL Statute provides that in 
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Procedure Act, 1965, of Sierra Leone.” SCSL Statute, supra note 6, art. 14(2). The SCSL 
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¶ 27 (Nov. 21, 2003).
 117. See Framework Agreement, supra note 1, art. 12(1). See also ECCC Law, supra note 
63, arts. 20 new, 23 new, and 33 new.
 118. See SCSL Statute, supra note 6, art. 14.
 119. See, e.g., You Bunleng, supra note 45 (highlighting the challenge of applying Cam-
bodian procedures in a court comprising staff and judges from diverse legal traditions); 
Judge Lemonde Remarks, supra note 33 (saying the ECCC’s civil law system was applied 
by actors who are not familiar with it and do not want to discover or understand it); Inter-
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 120. Karnavas interview, supra note 12. See also Ieng Sary’s Response to the “Co- 
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Addressed to KHIEU Samphan and IENG Sary,” Case No. 002/29- 09- 2007- ECCC/TC, 
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 122. Karnavas interview, supra note 12.
 123. Simonneau Fort interview, supra note 119.
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 125. See Letter from Sok An, Senior Minister in Charge of the Office of the Council of 
Ministers to Hans Corell, UN Undersecretary for Legal Affairs ( Jan. 22, 2002) (noting the 
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gaps”).
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ciliation in Cambodia: Reflections upon the Establishment of the Khmer Rouge Trials and the 
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procedures based on the challenges of prosecuting mass crimes cases in accordance with 
international standards).
 127. See, e.g., Preliminary Objection Concerning the Legality of the Internal Rules and 
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sion on Nuon Chea’s Appeal Against Order Refusing Request for Annulment, Case No. 
002/19- 9- 2007- ECCC/OCIJ (PTC 06), ¶¶ 21– 23 (Oct. 13, 2008); Douglas Gillison, 
Nuon Chea, Parties: KRT Rules Unconstitutional, Cambodia Daily, Nov. 1– 2, 2008; Slui-
ter, supra note 31, at 320.
 128. Preliminary Objection Concerning the Legality of the Internal Rules, supra note 
127, ¶ 12.
 129. Id. ¶ 20 (arguing that “any departure from ‘existing procedures in force’ must . . . be 
justified by reference to one of the[] specific statutory exceptions . . . [and] creation of new 
rules for the sake of convenience or mere efficiency [. . .] is in direct violation of the terms 
of Article 12(1) of the ECCC agreement.”).
 130. See, e.g., Decision on Request for Release, supra note 5, ¶ 11.
 131. Decision on Nuon Chea’s Preliminary Objections Alleging the Unconstitutional 
Character of the ECCC Internal Rules, Case No. 002/19- 9- 2007/ECCC/TC, ¶ 7 (Aug. 
8, 2011).
 132. Id.
 133. ECCC Defence Support Section, Press Statement on the Plenary Session of Judges of 
the ECCC 1– 5 September 2008, Sept. 5, 2008.
 134. Id.
 135. Id.
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UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia in 1992 and the State of Cambodia (SOC) Law 
on Criminal Procedure (1993). The SOC arguably lacked legal authority to adopt it at the 
time, but the SOC Law remained the primary source of reference for Cambodian courts 
until the 2007 adoption of the CPC. Sluiter, supra note 31, at 319.
 137. See, e.g., Khuon Narim & Khy Sovuthy, Municipal Court Sentences 13 Boeng Kak 
Protesters to Jail, Cambodia Daily, May 25, 2012 (reporting that 13 women arrested for 
protesting the confiscation of their land by a private company were “charged and then im-
mediately sentenced” to two- and- a- half years in prison after their lawyers walked out “in 
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delayed”).
 138. See, e.g., Decision on Civil Party Co- Lawyers’ Joint Request for a Ruling on the 
Standing of Civil Party Lawyers to Make Submissions on Sentencing and Directions Con-
cerning the Questioning of Accused, Experts and Witnesses Testifying on Character, Case 
No. 001/18- 7- 2007/ECCC/TC (Oct. 9, 2009) ( Judge Lavergne dissenting).
 139. See Preliminary Objection Concerning the Legality of the Internal Rules, supra 
note 127, ¶ 20.
 140. See, e.g., Interview with Jeanne Sulzer, former Legal Officer in the ECCC Civil 
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Party Lead Co- Lawyer Section, Phnom Penh ( June 1, 2012). Judge Lemonde Remarks, 
supra note 33 (saying the CPC is “a copy and paste” of the French Code before 2000 and is 
“not adapted to the 21st century” as the old French Code has gaps and fairness issues that 
have been sanctioned by the European Court of Human Rights).
 141. Judge Lemonde Remarks, supra note 33.
 142. See, e.g., Transcript of Trial Proceedings— Case 002, Case No. 
002/19- 9- 2007- ECCC/TC, at 70 (Aug. 27, 2009) (in which a French defense lawyer ar-
gued against following the civil law approach on civil parties’ rights to question witnesses, 
highlighting debates on that issue in France).
 143. Marcher, supra note 43.
 144. Cable 06PHNOMPENH2095, U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh, Cambodia’s 
ECCC Stumbles and Stalls (Nov. 28, 2006), available at http://www.wikileaks.org/
cable/2006/11/06PHNOMPENH2095.html.
 145. Joint Statement by National and International Judicial Officers of the ECCC, Nov. 
25, 2006; Thet Sambath & Erika Kinetz, KR Affiliates Not Surprised by Tribunal Holdup, 
Cambodia Daily, Nov. 28, 2006.
 146. See Cable 06PHNOMPENH2095, supra note 144, ¶ 2.
 147. See id. ¶ 4.
 148. Ian MacKinnon, Cambodia: Khmer Rouge Genocide Trial Close to Collapse as Judges 
Dispute Rules, The Guardian, Feb. 27, 2007, at 19.
 149. Id. (quoting assistant prosecutor Alex Bates).
 150. Thet & Kinetz, supra note 145.
 151. MacKinnon, supra note 148, at 19 (quoting an unnamed senior Western diplomat 
in Phnom Penh as saying, “It’s not that Hun Sen will be indicted, but one or two top gener-
als could be.”).
 152. See Cable 07PHNOMPENH77, U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh, Update on the 
ECCC; David Scheffer Coming to Cambodia ¶ 4 ( Jan. 17, 2007), available at http://dazzle 
pod.com/cable/07PHNOMPENH77/.
 153. Id. (quoting Open Society Justice Initiative [OSJI] trial monitor Heather Ryan).
 154. See, e.g., OSJI, Progress and Challenges and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts 
of Cambodia, at 11 ( June 2007).
 155. MacKinnon, supra note 148, at 19.
 156. Bar Association Demands More ECCC Control, Cambodia Daily, Nov. 17, 2006; 
Erika Kinetz & Prak Chan Thul, Bar Threatens Lawyers over ECCC Training, Cambodia 
Daily, Nov. 23, 2006.
 157. Bar Association, supra note 156.
 158. Cable 07PHNOMPENH77, supra note 152, ¶ 4.
 159. Erika Kinetz, Sok An Calls for UN “Dialogue” on KR Defense, Cambodia Daily, 
Dec. 18, 2006 (quoting from his letter to the UN).
 160. Cable 07PHNOMPENH103, U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh, RGC Worried ECCC 
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Prosecutions Could Affect Peace and Security ¶ 4 ( Jan. 22, 2007), available at http://cables.
mrkva.eu/cable.php?id=93358.
 161. Former Ambassador- at- Large David Scheffer visited Phnom Penh and spoke with 
Sok An at the request of OSJI “at the behest of some ECCC staff members.” See id. ¶ 7.
 162. See ECCC Internal Rules (rev. 8), supra note 14, r. 11.
 163. See Statement from the Review Committee of the Extraordinary Chambers in the 
Courts of Cambodia, Mar. 16, 2007; Press Statement, UNAKRT, International Judges of 
ECCC Say April Plenary Not Possible, Apr. 3, 2007.
 164. Cambodian Bar Association Accuses Foreign Judges of Hindering Khmer Rouge Tribu-
nal, China Post, Mar. 26, 2007. See also Erika Kinetz & Pin Sisovann, Bar Accuses Judges 
of Using Fees to Stall Tribunal, Cambodia Daily, Mar. 19, 2007.
 165. Prak Chan Thul & Douglas Gillison, Local ECCC Judges: If Bar Goes, We Go, 
Cambodia Daily, Apr. 6, 2007.
 166. Douglas Gillison & Prak Chan Thul, Bar Could be Kept Out of KR Trial: Int’l 
Judges, Cambodia Daily, Apr. 4, 2007.
 167. See Erika Kinetz & Prak Chan Thul, Int’l Lawyers Join in Condemnation of High 
Bar Association Fees, Cambodia Daily, Apr. 16, 2007; Cable O6PHNOMPENH2095, 
supra note 144, ¶ 6 (repeating speculation that the defense office’s USD $4.8 million 
dollar budget was the primary reason for the BAKC’s interest in the ECCC); Cable 
07PHNOMPENH438, U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh, Cambodian Bar Association Says to 
ECCC: Show Me the Money ¶ 5 (Mar. 20, 2007), available at http://www.wikileaks.org/
cable/2007/03/07PHNOMPENH438.html (reporting that most sources believed the 
BAKC was seeking money after losing international funds due to irregularities in the elec-
tion for Bar president).
 168. See Statement from the International Judges of the Extraordinary Chambers in the 
Courts of Cambodia, Apr. 30, 2007.
 169. Cable 07PHNOMPENH826, U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh, ECCC Pass-
es Internal Rules ¶ 2 ( June 15, 2007), available at http://www.wikileaks.org/
cable/2007/06/07PHNOMPENH826.html.
 170. Decision on Nuon Chea’s Preliminary Objection Alleging the Unconstitutional 
Character of the ECCC Internal Rules, Case No. 002/19- 9- 2007/ECCC/TC, ¶ 7 (Aug. 
8, 2011) (citing Decision on Nuon Chea’s Appeal Against Order Refusing Request for 
Annulment, Case No. 002/19- 9- 2007- ECCC/OCIJ (PTCO6), ¶ 14 (Aug. 26, 2008)).
 171. Simonneau Fort interview, supra note 119. But see interview with former ECCC 
official, via telephone ( June 10, 2012) (saying that as a separately constituted court, the 
ECCC is neither a civil nor a common law court, and the relative influence of each varies 
across issues).
 172. Decision on Immediate Appeal by Khieu Samphan on Application for Release, 
Case No. 002/19- 9- 2007- ECCC- TC/SC(04), ¶ 31 ( June 6, 2011).
 173. See Amnesty International, Sierra Leone: Recommendations on the Draft Statute of 
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the Special Court (Nov. 14, 2000), at 17 (arguing similarly in anticipation of the SCSL “that 
the mixture of two different sets of rules of evidence may cause confusion.”).
 174. Decision on Immediate Appeal, supra note 172, ¶ 28.
 175. Id. ¶ 28.
 176. Id.
 177. Id. ¶ 46.
 178. Id. ¶ 47.
 179. Id. Partially Dissenting Opinion of Judge Noguchi ¶ 6. Similarly, the CIJs have 
said that merely because some CPC provisions were not incorporated into the Internal 
Rules “does not constitute a ‘lacuna’[.]” Rather “[t]hey were deliberately left out because 
they were manifestly ill- adapted to the unique circumstances of the ECCC.” The Strat-
egy of the Co- Investigative Judges in Regard to the Judicial Investigations, Case No. 
002/19- 9- 2007- ECCC- OCIJ, ¶ 11 (Dec. 11, 2009).
 180. See, e.g., Civil Party Co- Lawyer Silke Studzinsky’s response to Judge Klonowiecka- 
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mission, Transcript of Appeal Proceedings— Kaing Guek Eav “Duch,” Case File No. 
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between CPC article 355 and Internal Rule 100, “the rules are clear in this regard . . . and 
therefore we see [the Internal Rules] as a specific and as a first- ranking source where we 
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Chapter 3
 1. We set aside administrative functions related to outreach and victim support, 
which are discussed at length in subsequent chapters.
 2. Interview with David Tolbert, former UN Special Expert to advise on the UN As-
sistance to the Khmer Rouge Trials, via telephone ( June 19, 2012).
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2012).
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contested by the defense during trial. Transcript of Trial Proceedings— Kaing Guek 
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001/18- 7- 2007- ECCC/TC, at 72 (Aug. 27, 2009) [hereinafter 8/27/2009 Trial Tran-
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the judges’ “hands- off approach” and disinclination “to attempt meaningful management of 
civil party participation” and arguing that many of the identified problems with the origi-
nal civil party scheme could have been easily avoided “through timely and robust judicial 
intervention”).
 26. Michael Saliba, Interview with Alain Werner, Cambodia Tribunal Monitor 
(Sept. 21, 2009), http://www.cambodiatribunal.org/sites/default/files/ctm_blog_9-21-
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Standing of Civil Party Lawyers to Make Submissions on Sentencing, Case No. 001/18- 
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of Assignment of Four Witnesses During First Trial Segment (5– 16 December 2011) 
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 200. See Memorandum from Trial Chamber President Nil Nonn to all Parties, Re: Up-
dated Information Regarding Scheduling of Proposed Experts (May 25, 2012).
 201. Karnavas interview, supra note 38. Cf. Prosecutor v. Ratko Mladic, Case No. IT- 
09- 92- PT, Decision on Consolidated Prosecution Motion to Sever the Indictment, to 
Conduct Separate Trials, and to Amend the Indictment, ¶ 34 (Oct. 13, 2011) (rejecting a 
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 202. Second Decision on Severance, supra note 180, ¶ 117.
 203. See Letter to the Editor by Anta Guisse, Kong Sam Onn & Arthur Vercken, Khieu 
Samphan Is Forced to Remain Silent, Phnom Penh Post ( July 19, 2013), available at http://
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 204. Severance Order, supra note 163, ¶ 8.
 205. Co- Prosecutors’ Request, supra note 167, ¶ 26. Judicial notice “establishes a well- 
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party to disprove it. Prosecutor v. Krajisnik, Case No. IT- 00- 39- PT, Decision on Pros-
ecution Motions for Judicial Notice of Adjudicated Facts and for Admission of Written 
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from Case 001 and Facts of Common Knowledge Being Applied in Case 002, Case No. 
002/19- 09- 2007- ECCC/TC, at 3 (Apr. 4, 2011). By contrast, both the ICTY and ICTR 
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cedure and Evidence (rev. 49), rev’d May 22, 2013, r. 94(B) (allowing only for the authentic-
ity of documentary evidence to be recognized); ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence, as 
amended Oct. 1, 2009, r. 94(B).
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Chamber is drafting the Case 002/01 judgment. Order Regarding the Establishment of 
a Second Trial Panel, Case No. 002/19-09-2007-ECCCC-TC/SC (28) ( July 23, 2013); 
SCC Severance Decision, supra note 164, ¶ 51. Cf. Mladic decision, supra note 202, ¶ 35 
(rejecting a prosecution request to sever an indictment into two trials in part due to con-
cern that “if the writing of the judgment in the first case were taking place during the pre- 
trial period or start of the second case, this could negatively affect the pace of the second 
case”; moreover, “partiality and appearance of partiality of the Chamber could be raised if 
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 209. Pestman interview, supra note 56.
 210. Simonneau Fort interview, supra note 175.
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 213. Opening Statement of Son Arun, Case No. 002/19- 09- 2997- ECCC/TC, ¶ 12 
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ule, Case No. 002/19- 09- 2007- ECCC/TC, ¶¶ 3– 6 (May 23, 2011); Motion in Support of 
“Ieng Sary’s Motion to Add New Trial Topics to the Trial Schedule” and Request to Add 
Additional Topics, Case No. 001/19- 09- 2007- ECCC/TC, ¶ 9 (May 25, 2011).
 214. Pestman interview, supra note 56.
 215. Memorandum from Trial Chamber President Nil Nonn to all Parties, Di-
rective in Advance of Initial Hearing Concerning Proposed Witnesses at 2 ( June 3, 
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Chapter 6
 1. See, e.g., Confidential interview with former national staff, Phnom Penh ( June 18, 
2012) (stating that joint operations work well unless politics are involved because national 
authority is not based inside the Court, but on the outside).
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